National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
SENATE
Oct. 4, 2004
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I rise today to not offer but to talk about an amendment because things are in the works. Therefore, I can only talk, not offer.
The amendment, were it to take place, would be amendment No. 3712. Of course, it is to No. 2845, which is our basic bill. I think it is widely agreed that Congress has an obligation to ensure that the efforts of the 9/11 Commission to improve our system of homeland security is accurately captured by any legislation that we pass out of this body.
Last week, Senators MCCAIN and HUTCHISON offered constructive amendments on aviation security, but I believe my talking points offer the most comprehensive approach to improving aviation security, so I put them forward to my colleagues. I am pleased that Senator McCain was an original cosponsor of my Aviation Security Amendment Act, which I am talking about today as if it were an amendment, which it is not, for the moment anyway.
My idea would be to take needed steps to make certain that Commission transportation security recommendations are reflected in the pending legislation faithfully.
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are wide ranging. They build on the work we did in the House-Senate joint inquiry in 2002. I strongly believe that we must reform our Government, our Congress, and our intelligence agencies to meet the threat of terrorism as has been eloquently discussed by the two floor managers on many occasions.
Although the recommendations for transportation security are a small part of the overall report, their importance cannot be understated. They are sort of the most visible parts of security. I agree with the Commission's report when it states that targeting terrorists' ability to travel is a potent weapon against our efforts to protect against future terrorist attack.
In my position as chairman and now ranking member on the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee's Subcommittee on Aviation, I have worked on many of these issues that face Congress after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
I should point out that the Commerce Committee has looked at these issues and developed other recommendations in the years preceding 9/11. I also want to note that while we need to incorporate legislation consistent with the 9/11 recommendations, the report contains specific criticisms of the FAA prior to 9/11 that I do not believe are justified.
For example, the report criticizes the Administrator of the FAA for being more focused on the delays than on security prior to 9/11, but we all were. We addressed those needs collectively with a new process to expedite airport construction.
Unfortunately, I found it to be one area of the report that failed to put into context the actions of the FAA prior to 9/11 and what the congressional role was during that period.
Additionally, after TWA 800 went down in July 1996, we all know that we spent countless hours trying to develop measures for aviation security. That was well before 9/11 by 5 years. Ultimately, we mandated that more equipment and canine teams be dispatched as quickly as possible, but clearly the events of 9/11 have required an even more comprehensive approach.
I have worked closely with Senators MCCAIN, HOLLINGS, LOTT, and many others over this period to take action to help ensure that the events of 9/11 are not repeated. Congress has passed a number of landmark bills to address critical needs in filling gaps in our aviation security. While the legislation that passed in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks was responsive to the crisis our aviation system faced, these laws primarily addressed the immediate needs we had regarding commercial passenger airline security, including aircraft passenger and baggage screening. I believe we have a much improved aviation security network because of the laws that were adopted. Improving aviation security is a continuous process, an expensive process, and we must continue to make improvements to our aviation security network. I think we all know much more needs to be done.
Over the last 3 years, TSA, the Transportation Security Administration, has had an appropriate opportunity to get up and running. It was awkward at first. They are much better at it now. I, along with my colleagues on the Commerce Committee, have conducted numerous oversight hearings on TSA and aviation security, a number of them in closed session. Because of this oversight and our understanding of the transportation system, we were better able to understand where we had made progress and identify what more work needed to be done about aviation security.
To further address these needs, Senators MCCAIN, HOLLINGS, and myself introduced S. 2393, the Aviation Security Advancement Act, which included measures to tighten air cargo security and bolster other existing programs.
As we know, after the 9/11 Commission was established, they began a complete review of the events surrounding 9/11 and the requirements that would be necessary for a comprehensive strengthening of all of our homeland defense. When this report was released in July, it contained specific recommendations regarding transportation security, along with express concern about cargo and general aviation security. Both cargo and general aviation security have been subjects considered at hearings before the Senate Commerce Committee this year, and I introduced S. 2393 in an effort to make these issues a focus of Congress.
Last week, there was the amendment that I am talking about-not offering but talking about-which would do the following: Standardize the Federal screener workforce to properly address staffing needs and promote more efficient and effective screening at airports; require DHS to consider coordinating aviation-security-related functions to improve efficiency and effectiveness of passenger screening; increase funding for all-cargo aviation security to establish an improved security program and to promote the use of improved technology for cargo screening; provides an additional $450 million to fund priority capital security projects at airports; develops a streamlined baggage screening system by requiring a schedule for the in-line placement of explosive detection systems; it bolsters the Federal Air Marshal Program; advances the development of biometric technology for precise identification of workers and travelers; and improves perimeter security at airports by authorizing more than $20 million for TSA to develop biometric technology and fund a biometric center of excellence.
I believe these changes significantly improved the underlying legislation and have left us with a product that speaks to many of the problems that the 9/11 Commission found and which continue to exist in our airport transportation security network.
As I indicated, this is all in some flux now. It is being worked out with the floor managers. I simply thank my colleagues and the Presiding Officer and the two floor managers for allowing me to speak on what I think would be potentially quite a helpful amendment.
I yield the floor.
BREAK IN TEXT
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
AMENDMENT NO. 3903
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Madam President, I rise today in opposition to amendment No. 3903, offered by Senator Ted Stevens. This amendment strikes the provision in the bill that calls for the disclosure of the aggregate amount of funding requested, authorized, and appropriated for the national intelligence program.
There is one of the fundamental reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission and one that I have long supported.
The proponents of this amendment have made two central arguments. First, they suggest we are rushing into this decision without fully understanding the implications.
Second, they suggest that revealing the amount of overall spending could somehow damage our national security.
Let us address the first argument, that we are rushing into this decision. I must point out this is not a new debate. The Congress has been considering this particular question for at least a decade. In 1993, the Senate adopted an amendment calling for the disclosure of the aggregate amount of intelligence spending.
Let me repeat that the Senate endorsed the idea 11 years ago.
That effort and a subsequent attempt to make the top line public, which is what we are talking about-the total amount of the intelligence budget-in 1997 had the support of Senators SPECTER, Boren, and DeConcini, all of whom served as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. We had a full and complete debate in 1993, and this issue has been reviewed, debated, and discussed numerous times in the intervening years. The argument that we are being rushed into this decision is an excuse being used to stop this important change.
Regarding the second argument, that disclosing the overall budget will damage our national security, I cannot cite a better source than the Deputy Director of the CIA John McLaughlin who testified last month that this important step would reinforce responsibility and accountability, not only for those receiving the money but for the Congress as well. In addition, Robert Gates and John Deutch, former Directors of Central Intelligence, have said that releasing the number would not damage national security.
Arguing that disclosure of the total spending for national intelligence would compromise our security and provide enemies with useful information about our intelligence programs ignores the reality of the current situation. While the number is in fact classified, it is widely reported in the press. It also was officially declassified for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 by former DCI Tenet.
Some have argued that the total amount is not the problem; it is the budget trends that need to be protected. Again, current practice undermines this argument. Every year when we do the intelligence authorization bill, the chairmen and vice chairmen in both Houses come to the floor and talk about whether we have increased or decreased the budget that year. Often those statements include specific percentage increases. These discussions and trends disclose nothing about the specific intelligence programs being funded.
The idea that our enemies can somehow determine something about our intelligence capability by knowing the total of what we spend is simply not accurate. Year-to-year changes in any specific program will not move the overall total number enough to give an adversary any indication of how that money is being spent.
In other sensitive national security areas, we disclose much more information without doing damage. We currently disclose an enormous amount of detail about our defense budget and military capabilities. The amount of money we spend on personnel, acquisition, and research and development is unclassified. Also available are the amounts for specific weapons systems, such as tanks, aircraft, and missile defense.
Even much of the spending in the defense budget for specific tactical intelligence programs is unclassified currently.
The disclosure of the total of the national intelligence budget is simply not an academic debate. This step is critical to many of the other reforms in this bill which our floor managers are trying so hard to get done, and to some of the proposed congressional reforms we will be discussing later this week. Without a separate unclassified budget number, the fund for the National Intelligence Program will still need to be included in the Defense Department budget. This arrangement will hinder effective control by the national intelligence director and will restrict our ability to organize in a way to streamline congressional oversight, which is what the 9/11 Commission and our floor managers are seeking in their legislation.
To conclude, it will be virtually impossible to have a separate appropriations for intelligence without the declassified intelligence budget. If we do not take this step and make this number public, we are seriously undermining the reforms in this bill.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the Stevens amendment and support this key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.
I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.