Proposing a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution
Floor Speech
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Ladies and gentlemen, this balanced budget constitutional amendment is one that surprises me, and very little surprises me anymore. But for us to be seriously, on this day and this time, considering an amendment to the Constitution of the United States that would destroy jobs, that would drastically cut Medicare and Social Security and give members of the Federal judiciary the right to raise taxes and make spending decisions for us is relatively shocking to me, and I am very much opposed to it.
I want to engage my dear friend, the chairman of the committee, in an exchange of views on this, but let's start off the discussion with this reality. This is not 1995, and that's why so many people that supported the amendment then have changed their minds now, and they will explain this as they go along.
I would like now, Mr. Speaker, to yield to the gentleman from New York, former chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, Jerry Nadler, for as much time as he may consume.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The gen tle lady from Washington, I listened to her very carefully, and she has promulgated one of the greatest misunderstandings in this debate, namely, that the Social Security and Highway Trust Fund are not jeopardized by House Joint Resolution 2 because section 7 excludes repayment of debt principle from the definition of total outlays.
Now, according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the balanced budget amendment could result in Medicare being cut by about $750 billion, Social Security almost $1.2 trillion, and the veterans' benefits $85 billion through 2021 if cuts were spread proportionately. So I hope that there will be fewer and fewer of my colleagues trying to assure us that this bill does not jeopardize those programs. This is from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished member of the committee, the gen tle lady from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to ask the speaker who just finished, if I could gain his attention for a moment. I thank the gentleman for coming back into the well.
Does the gentleman agree with me, in examining this bill, that this bill risks default by the United States by requiring a supermajority to raise the debt limit, which is not the case now?
I yield to my friend.
Mr. MATHESON. I think it's the same threshold that requires us to make a decision to deficit spend. It's the same supermajority for that as well. So I think that what we do is we're putting a requirement in where, if you want to default or if you want to raise the debt limit or if you want to deficit spend, it requires a supermajority. But if you want to pass a budget that is within balance, it doesn't require a supermajority. It requires a simple majority, and that's the way the bill is structured.
Mr. CONYERS. Did the gentleman say yes or no to my question?
Mr. MATHESON. I said no.
Mr. CONYERS. That a supermajority is not required to raise the debt limit under this bill?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield myself an additional minute, and I yield to my friend.
Mr. MATHESON. As I said, let's not do apples and oranges here. Let's do apples and apples. If this Congress wants to act in a way to pass a balanced budget, it doesn't require a supermajority. If this Congress wants to make a decision to deficit spend, it can do that with a supermajority, and that's the same requirement as if it wants to raise the debt limit.
By the way, if a simple majority balances the budget, there is no need to raise the debt limit. There's no need to raise the debt limit if we have a balanced budget, and that would be a simple majority to pass a balanced budget each year.
Mr. CONYERS. I want to thank my colleague for answering the question.
I would like now to turn to the gentleman who represents the majority, a distinguished member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Goodlatte.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has again expired.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.
I would like to ask him if he is aware of the fact that H.J. Res. 2 would require a supermajority to raise the debt limit.
I'm pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. GOODLATTE. As the gentleman from Utah correctly noted, it requires the same supermajority of 60 percent to not balance the budget or to raise the debt limit. Quite frankly, if you have a constitutional amendment in place that requires a balanced budget, you're going to generate surpluses most years, and therefore raising the debt limit will occur less and less frequently. But those two requirements are in place in order to have an enforcement mechanism so that Congresses of the future will not do what Congresses of the past have been doing.
Mr. CONYERS. Did the gentleman answer me with a ``yes''?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Would the gentleman repeat that question?
Mr. CONYERS. Did the gentleman understand the question?
Mr. GOODLATTE. I understand it and answered it.
Mr. CONYERS. Was the answer ``yes'' or ``no'' to my question?
Mr. GOODLATTE. The answer is, yes, it requires a supermajority to raise the debt limit and a supermajority to not balance the budget, which would be an unusual thing in the future because in the last 50 years, it's only been balanced six times.
Mr. CONYERS. Then let me ask my colleague this question: Does it presently require a supermajority to raise the debt limit?
Mr. GOODLATTE. No, there is no such requirement today.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. It isn't. And there would be in this bill, would it not?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Absolutely.
Mr. CONYERS. And the gentleman supports a supermajority to raise the debt limit?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Very much so.
Mr. JACKSON of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. JACKSON of Illinois. Is the gentleman aware that under such a scenario, a budget crisis in which a default becomes a more threat is more likely because the limits placed on the fluidity of the debt ceiling--
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield myself an additional 3 minutes and continue to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Source