Executive Session

Floor Speech

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Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Senator Corker and I had a vote--actually, Senator Corker, Senator McCain, and I had a vote on whose name should be first on this, and Senator Corker and I won, 2 to 1. Senator McCain's name is first because this is an amendment that attempts to deal in a unifying way with our concern that the Russians misunderstand the impact of this treaty or the impact of our development of missile defenses on this treaty and that it is important for us to speak out in unity, in a unified and clear voice, to the Russians, and no one has made that point more clearly as the treaty has been considered than Senator McCain. In fact, he offered an amendment earlier in our deliberations on the treaty which I supported, which did not pass, which would have removed the section of the preamble that has obviously been put in by the Russians in the negotiations which is confusing at best and downright mischievous at worst.

This is the section that says:

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

That is the end of the quote from the preamble. It strikes me as I read it that it will be a topic of consideration in law schools and classes on international law. The first question is, What did it mean? But I think the Russians had a particular intent in putting it in there, and they know what they wanted it to mean.

What is troubling is that when the treaty was signed earlier in the year in Prague, the Russian Federation issued a statement that basically made these same points--that the treaty will be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of America.

But these are two separate categories. This treaty, the START treaty, is all about reducing the offensive capabilities, nuclear and delivery capabilities of both great powers. We are building a missile defense system. It started out as a very controversial matter. It started out a long time ago--President Reagan, really, initially, and then serious consideration in the 1990s when a lot of people argued against it and said it was a waste of money and it would never work technologically, that you couldn't create a bullet that would hit a bullet. Yet that is exactly what we have done. Thank God that we invested the money and that our scientists and military leaders have brought it as far it is because one of the great threats that will face the people of the United States, our national security, will come from missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction fired particularly by rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. It would be irresponsible of us not to have developed a capacity to defend against those kinds of missile attacks. We have done that.

The Russians keep wanting to link that to this treaty. It is not linked to the treaty. Therefore, I regretted that

section was in the preamble I read. The United States responded through the State Department to that statement by the Russian Government when they signed the treaty. But it is really important for us, at the same time the instruments of ratification are conveyed to the Russian Government, to make a clear and direct statement of our understanding of the total nonrelationship between the development of our missile defense capability and the START treaty.

That is what this amendment does. I am privileged to cosponsor it with Senator McCain, Senator Corker, and a number of other Members of both parties. Basically, it says that before the New START treaty could enter into force, the President shall certify to the Senate--basically, this is certifying what the President said in a letter sent to Senator Reid a few days ago--and at the time of the exchange of instruments of ratification shall communicate directly to the Russian Federation that, No. 1, we are going to continue development and deployment of a missile defense system to defend against missile threats from nations such as--and I would add ``not limited to''--North Korea and Iran.

No. 2, what do we mean by qualitative and quantitative improvement of such systems that we are going to be continuing? This is very important. We define that here to include all phases of the phased adaptive approach to missile defenses in Europe embraced now by our NATO allies; second, the modernization of the ground-based midcourse defense system; and third, the continued development of the two-stage ground-based interceptor as a technological and strategic hedge.

We are being as direct as we can be here to the Russians. Some of my colleagues have said--and the record, unfortunately, shows it--that their record for complying with treaties is not a good one. We don't want to enter into this one with any misunderstandings or covering up the truth. We are saying here loudly and clearly that the United States is going to continue to develop all of these different forms of missile defense to protect our security and that has nothing to do with this START treaty.

I think the third section here is very important. We say:

The U.S. believes that these systems [missile defense systems] do not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the U.S. cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the [START] Treaty--

Which is the section that gives nations the right to withdraw under extraordinary circumstances--nonetheless, if we adopt this, when we adopt it, this amendment, we are saying here:

The United States believes continued improvement and deployment of United States missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the treaty.

We are trying to manage our relationship with the Russian Federation in a way that is conducive to the security of our country and the security of the world.

We disagree with the Russians on an awful lot of things, including human rights and values and freedom of the press--which the current government in Russia has so aggressively suppressed. So we want to be honest with them and direct with them and not enter into this important treaty with any illusions. I believe we have said that clearly. If it passes, it will be presented to the Russian Government directly.

I am very pleased we have a broad, bipartisan group supporting this. It is a unified way to conclude our deliberations here before we go to vote on ratification, and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor to the Senator from Tennessee.

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