Executive Session

Floor Speech

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Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, if you will let me know when I have used 4 of the 5 minutes I am to have.

Mr. President, I rise today to support the amendment by my friend and colleague and next-door neighbor on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as my next-door neighbor of State, Senator Risch.

I want to discuss the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. While the United States and Russia have a rough equivalence in their strategic nuclear weapons, there is a significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons, and it favors Russia.

Russia currently has a 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, and it is expected that the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia will continue to grow. This imbalance directly impacts our security commitments to NATO and to our other European allies.

Mr. President, I have been to the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee. As a member of that committee, I have heard statements given by former Secretaries of State of both parties. Henry Kissinger testified before the committee and said:

The large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence.

Former Secretary James Schlesinger called this imbalance of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons ``the dog that did not bark.'' He called it a ``frustrating, vexatious, and increasingly worrisome issue.''

In the past, many current Members of the Senate have expressed their concerns with Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. Even Vice President Biden, when he was a Member of this body and serving on the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke about it, and he said:

We were hoping in START III to control tactical nuclear weapons. They are the weapons that are shorter range and are used at shorter distances, referred to as tactical nuclear weapons.

Well, Mr. President, as I look at this and work through it, it seems that, clearly, this administration did not make tactical weapons a top arms control and nonproliferation objective in the New START treaty. The negotiators of this treaty did not make this issue a priority, and they gave in to pressure from Russia to exclude the mention of tactical nuclear weapons.

I want to point out that while the administration failed to negotiate the reduction of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in the New START treaty, it did allow a legally binding limitation of U.S. missile defense, and that is, I believe, a mistake.

So I disagree with those who argue that ratifying the New START treaty is needed in order to deal with tactical nuclear weapons in the future. I believe the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should have been addressed--together with the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons--in the New START treaty. The administration lost a real opportunity by not negotiating a deal in this treaty. It is unclear what leverage will remain for us to negotiate a reduction in Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, the Risch amendment tries to resolve the complete failure of the administration to address Russia's advantage in tactical nuclear weapons in the New START treaty. The Risch amendment acknowledges the interrelationship between tactical nuclear weapons and strategic-range weapons, which grows as strategic warheads are reduced. The Risch amendment seeks greater transparency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 4 minutes.

Mr. BARRASSO. I thank the Chair.

The Risch amendment seeks greater transparency, greater accountability of tactical nuclear weapons, and the Risch amendment recognizes that tactical nuclear weapons can undermine stability.

So with that, Mr. President, I support this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.

I yield the floor.

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