Tax On Bonuses Received From Certain TARP Receipients

Floor Speech

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Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I am grateful to be joined by Senator Kaufman after me.

Almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia maintain more than 90 percent--90 percent--of the world's total stockpile of 23,000 nuclear weapons. Each of these weapons has the capacity to destroy a city, and a large-scale nuclear exchange could extinguish most life on this planet. As you are aware, massive numbers of nuclear weapons increase the risk of catastrophic accidents, errors, or unauthorized use.

There is a serious imperative in the United States to address this issue. The United States--and especially this administration--has rightly focused on nuclear nonproliferation as a top priority. In his Prague speech, the President of the United States, President Obama, said:

As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

So I think it is important to note that the President used a number of important words there: ``safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.'' But he also said we have responsibilities.

The first test of that commitment is the new START agreement.

In October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said:

[T]he United States is interested in a new START agreement because it will bolster our national security. We and Russia deploy far more nuclear weapons than we need or could ever potentially use without destroying our ways of life. We can reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons without posing any risk to our homeland, our deployed troops or our allies. Clinging to nuclear weapons in excess of our security needs does not make the United States safer. And the nuclear status quo is neither desirable nor sustainable. It gives other countries the motivation or the excuse to pursue their own nuclear options.

So said the Secretary of State.

As we know, Secretary Clinton is in Moscow now, and we all hope we will be able to make progress on the START follow-on treaty during her visit. We want to thank and commend her for the work she is doing not only as Secretary of State every day but at this time especially in Moscow.

The START follow-on treaty would reduce deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia and would provide crucial verification measures that would allow a window into the Russian nuclear program. While this treaty has taken a little longer than expected to complete, I applaud the leadership of Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, and her efforts to pursue a strong agreement as opposed to an immediate agreement.

A new START agreement is in our national security interests, especially in terms of maintaining verification and transparency measures. Once complete, this agreement could help to strengthen the U.S.-Russian relationship and potentially increase the possibility of Russian cooperation on an array of thorny and grave international issues, including North Korea and Iran.

The START follow-on treaty is a clear demonstration that the United States is upholding our nonproliferation obligations under the NPT.

START is a necessary step in reaffirming U.S. leadership on nonproliferation issues. Without a clear commitment to our nonproliferation responsibilities through a new START agreement, it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to secure international support in addressing the urgent security threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons.

International agreements to limit nuclear weapons draw upon a deep well of bipartisan support over the years. There is no reason--no reason at all--why this START agreement should be different. We may have our differences on elements of the treaty when it is presented before the Senate for ratification, but I hope--and I believe this will happen--we will be able to come together in common cause in recognition that these agreements are in our national security interests because they ultimately decrease the likelihood--decrease the likelihood--of accidental launch and decrease the likelihood of terrorist access to nuclear materials. There will be deliberation and there will be debate, but I am confident that at the end of the process, we will have a strong agreement that in the proud tradition of the Senate will garner bipartisan support.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

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