Hearing Of The Senate Armed Services Committee - Missle Defense

Statement

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SEN. LEVIN: Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets today to consider the ballistic missile defense programs and budget request for the Department of Defense. And we're pleased today to have a distinguished panel of witnesses.

Bill Lynn, the deputy secretary of Defense. General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, the director of the Missile Defense Agency. We welcome you all. We thank you for your long service to this nation.

On April 6th, Secretary of Defense Gates, along with General Cartwright, announced a number of his recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 Defense budget.

These recommendations included changes to missile defense programs. And all were included in the president's budget request that's now before the Congress. These changes included an increased focus on regional missile defense, against existing short-and-medium- range ballistic missiles that currently can reach our forward-based forces and allies.

Secretary Gates announced that the department would add $700 million to field, quote, "more of our most capable theater missile defense systems, specifically the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD, and the Standard Missile 3 programs.

Now, that's a welcome and important change of emphasis and one that is consistent with the actions of this committee and Congress, in years past, which have focused on missile defense against short-and- medium-range missile threats.

It also reflects the analysis of the Joint Staff that our regional combatant commanders need many more THAAD and Standard 3 -- Standard Missile 3 interceptors, to meet our inventory requirements for their operational needs.

For instance, the report of this committee last year, accompanying the Defense Authorization Act, made the point clearly. Quote, "The committee notes that the joint capabilities mix (JCM) study conducted, by the Joint Staff, concluded that U.S. combatant commanders need about twice as many SM-3 and THAAD interceptors, as currently planned, to meet just their minimum operational requirements, for defending against the many hundreds of existing short-and-medium-range ballistic missiles.

The committee is deeply disappointed," we wrote, "that the Missile Defense Agency has not planned or budgeted to acquire more than a fraction of the SM-3 interceptors needed to meet the warfighters' minimum operational needs," close quote.

And the report accompanying last year's National Defense Authorization Act conference report had a similar direction to the agency. Quote, "we are deeply disappointed that the Department of Defense has not planned or budgeted for even this minimum requirement, and believe that achieving at least this minimum inventory should be the highest priority for the Missile Defense Agency. We expect the Department of Defense to budget accordingly, starting with the budget submission for fiscal year 2010." (Coughs.) Excuse me.

Well, the department has done exactly that in its budget request. It did what Congress legislated last year. The budget request before us would increase our missile defense capabilities significantly against the preponderance of the missile threats that we face today.

Secretary Gates has also announced several other changes to the missile defense program. These include a decision -- (coughs) -- excuse me. Let me repeat this. Secretary Gates also announced several other changes to the missile defense program. These include a decision to cap the deployment of the ground-based mid-course defense system, the GMD, in Alaska and California at 30 interceptors, and to focus on further development and robust testing to improve the capability of this system to defend against the limited missile threat to our country from nations such as North Korea.

Under the budget request, the department will continue to buy all 44 interceptors, but with 14 of these planned for testing or for spares. To illustrate the point about needing to improve GMD capabilities, the director of Operational Test and Evaluation reported in December, four years after the system was initially deployed, that, quote, "GMD flight testing to date will not support with -- a high degree of confidence in its limited capabilities."

Secretary Gates's decision on the GMD program is of major significance and of great interest to Congress. I hope our witnesses will explain how the department came to this decision and their view of how it meets our security needs. I also hope that they'll explain how the department plans to improve the capability of the system, including through robust and operation-realistic testing, and how it plans to sustain the system throughout its operational life.

This is an important and a complex topic. I believe it would benefit our security if we could be unified on this issue, and I think such unity is possible, since I believe there is common ground in the need to have operationally effective and cost-effective missile defense systems.

I'll put the balance of my statement in the record and call upon Senator McCain.

SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ): Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being here at this very important hearing.

When President Ronald Reagan first introduced his vision of missile defense in March of 1983, he asked a fundamental question which still resonates today. He said, isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war?

And while he asked that question in quite different circumstances from those that face us now, today, just as then, it's our to assess what investments are necessary to ensure our security and that of our allies.

The threat we face today is certainly different from the one we faced during the Cold War. However, the need today for a robust missile defense is as important to our security as it's ever been. That's why I have some concerns about the president's fiscal year '10 budget. For some time now this committee has urged the department to increase its focus to rogue state in-theater threats, and I applaud the decision to increase funding for both THAAD and SM-3.

However, I am concerned by the substantial reduction to our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, GMD, the system primarily responsible for the protection of the United States against ballistic missiles from rogue nations and accidental launches. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how a more than 30 percent reduction, from 44 interceptors to 30, in ground-based interceptors will affect our ability to protect the United States from emerging threats. North Korea and Iran are certainly not reducing funding to develop missiles capable of hitting the United States. So I look forward to hearing why the administration believes that we should and what additional security risks to the homeland we may incur and what has changed to warrant an almost $800 million reduction below what the last administration deemed necessary in fiscal year '10 to protect the homeland.

GMD aside, I applaud the Missile Defense Agency's decision to explore a new early intercept ascent-based strategy. This proposed system steps outside of MDA's past practices of developing brand-new systems and looks to utilize already-proven assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles to enhance pre-existing capabilities. Such an approach represents a fundamental shift of the missile defense spending, and it is significant, as it could provide substantial capability at a cost more onerous on our adversaries than the American taxpayer.

We must move forward with a missile-defense system that not only provides the necessary security of the United States and our allies, but does so in the most effective and efficient way possible. A system representative of today's threat should not only deter but impose significant and growing costs on our adversaries.

Undoubtedly, the ultimate responsibility of our missile defenses must be the protection of the United States. As rogue nations, including North Korea and Iran, push the nuclear envelope and work tirelessly to develop delivery vehicles capable of reaching America, we must aggressively develop the systems necessary to counter such belligerent efforts.

I welcome the prospect that this budget represents a concerted effort towards reform. However, I hope that our witnesses will explain why they believe that this reform will not come at increased risk. Given what former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently described as an apparent lack of action and, quote, "de facto acquiescence" towards the North Korean nuclear program, now is not the time to downplay the importance of missile defense as a deterrent or scale back the planned missile defenses responsible for protecting the United States.

Again, I appreciate each of the witnesses being here today, and I thank each of you for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator McCain.

Let me now start by calling on Secretary Lynn. Welcome.

MR. LYNN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain. Very much appreciate the opportunity to be back before the committee in discussing this important topic.

What I'd like to do is give a brief opening statement and put the whole statement in the record.

What I want to discuss is what you've asked, the administration's missile defense policy, and to do that in the context of the changing strategic environment in which we expect to (deal ?) and utilize those defenses; also talk about some of the programmatic choices and policy implications that they have.

The U.S. faces current and long-term security challenges that require a rebalancing of U.S. defense priorities and strategy. Specific security challenges the U.S. faces -- (audio break) -- North Korea and Iran pose serious nuclear and missile proliferation concerns for the United States and other nations. In President Obama's April 5th speech in Prague, he reiterated the threats posed by North Korea's missile test and emphasized the threat from Iranian ballistic missiles, stating, quote, "Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activity poses a real threat not just to the United Sates but to Iran's neighbors and our allies."

In short, the risks and dangers from missile proliferation are growing problems.

The department recently initiated the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which is closely linked to the Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as two other congressionally mandated reviews of U.S. nuclear posture and its space posture. The BMDR is reviewing all aspects of missile defense plans, programs, operations and requirements, as well as management and oversight of missile defense in the department.

Several broad principles will guide our efforts. We will focus on defending the U.S. from rogue states and protecting U.S. forces. We will also prepare for emerging threats. We will ensure our missile defenses are effective, and we will utilize missile defense to pursue international cooperation.

U.S. missile defense plans will focus on defending the United States from rogue states and protecting our deployed forces from theater threats. That is our first priority. We are committed to a continuing effective defense of the U.S. against those rogue threats, including North Korea and, if it continues down its current path, Iran.

We also remain committed to more effective theater missile defense -- defenses that include continued and increased cooperation with our allies. Short-, medium- and intermediate-range missiles pose a real danger to our forces, as well as to the territory and populations of our friends and allies. To better protect them, we will increase the capabilities available to the warfighter by fielding more of our more capable shorter-range and mobile missile defense systems.

For example, we added an additional $900 million to field more systems such as THAAD, Aegis BMD ships and SM-3 interceptors for defense of deployed forces, friends and allies.

While we focus on the current missile ballistic -- the ballistic missile threats, we must also prepare for the emerging ones. To that end, we will continue to invest in upgrades for our national missile defense systems. We will also continue to invest in research and development to pursue new and more effective technologies for theater missile threats.

One such technology that Senator McCain mentioned we think holds promise as the threat develops is early intercept. This program targets a missile before apogee in order to successfully destroy the missile and allow additional intercept opportunities. This may reduce the number of intercepters ultimately used in the overall defense.

The president has made clear that we will move forward with missile defenses. They're affordable, proven and responsive to the threat.

This means a renewed emphasis on robust tactics. It is imperative that we demonstrate the maturity, reliability and effectiveness of our missile defense system. We also need measures to ensure and demonstrate that missile defense testing is conducted under operationally realistic conditions.

On the international level, two items in particular are the subject of special attention: missile defense in Europe and missile defense cooperation with Russia. For European missile defense, we are in the process of thoroughly analyzing a number of options, including the current plan for placing GBIs in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. We are analyzing each alternative for the level of protection it affords both Europe and the United States, its responsiveness to the threat and its projected cost. No final decisions have been made. We will be closely consulting with our allies as we progress with this analysis.

We will also continue to explore cooperative opportunities with Russia for capabilities that could be additive to our missile defense efforts. The United States is committed to working with Russia on a range of issues, including missile defense. Missile defense cooperation with Russia has been a consistent U.S. goal since the 1990s. Secretary Gates has said that he believes there is real potential for cooperation on missile defense and a genuine interest in it from Russia. The U.S. will work to identify new areas where our two countries could advance our missile defense cooperation. For example, there are Russian radars near Iran that would provide helpful early warning detection in the case of an Iranian ballistic missile attack. Working with Russia in areas where we have common security concerns is in the interests of both nations.

In conclusion, ballistic missile defense is an important part of our current and future national defense strategy, and must be fully integrated into the broader deterrence and alliance considerations that inform that strategy. Missile defenses play a key role in both responding to current threats and hedging against future contingencies.

As we move forward with missile defense plans and programs, the Department of Defense will ensure they are affordable, effective and responsive to the risks and threats that confront the United States, our friends and our allies.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Secretary Lynn.

General Cartwright.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Thank you, Chairman Levin and Senator McCain. And thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

For many years -- actually, now over 15 years for me, members of this committee have worked with us to keep our forces ahead of the nation's threats. I thank you for that commitment.

I'd like to submit the balance of my statement for the record, and I stand ready for your questions.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. All the statements will be made part of the record.

General O'Reilly.

GEN. O'REILLY: Thank you, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Missile Defense Agency's, or MDA's, proposed fiscal year '10 budget to improve the development and deployment of our nation's missile defenses.

The proposed $7.8 billion FY '10 MDA budget is focused on three areas of improvement: our current protection against theater and rogue nation threats, our hedge against future threats, and improving the acquisition of our missile defense capability.

First, we are leveraging our successes to date to address the current theater and emerging rogue nation missile threat. Today there are 5,900 ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers in countries other than NATO, China, Russia and the United States.

Ninety-three percent of those missiles have ranges less than a thousand kilometers, and 6 percent have ranges between a thousand and 3,000 kilometers. And less than 1 percent have ranges over 3,000 kilometers.

During FY '08 and 2009 to date, we demonstrated capability against these threats by achieving four out of five missile intercepts using the Navy's standard missile 3, or SM-3, the Army's Theater High- Altitude Defense, or THAAD, interceptors, and ground-based interceptor, or GBI. We delivered 28 additional SM-3 interceptors, the first THAAD unit for testing, six THAAD interceptors, two GBIs, refurbished two other GBIs and developed a forward-based -- and deployed a forward-based X-band radar to -- (inaudible).

We also continued our significant enhancements to command-and- control communications and sensors to integrate our autonomous missile defenses into a unified ballistic-missile defense system that maximizes our combined capability. In FY '10, we're proposing 665 million (dollars) for THAAD research, development, test and evaluation, and 420 million (dollars) for 26 more THAAD interceptors, 169 million (dollars) for 26 more SM-3s, and 60 million (dollars) to begin installing missile defense capability on six more Aegis ships.

Equally important, we are expanding our production capacity to procure much larger numbers of these interceptors in the near term. We are also proposing 1.3 billion (dollars) for command and control and sensor development, and 1.4 billion (dollars) for the rigorous testing of our current capability.

Second, to hedge against future missile threat growth, we propose 368 million (dollars) for research and development and 2.3 billion (dollars) for long-range missile defense. Iran and North Korea continue to develop intercontinental ballistic-missile technology, as evidenced by Iran's successful placement of a satellite on orbit on 2 February and the successful performance of North Korea's first and second stages on their -- of their April 5 Taepo Dong II missile flight.

We propose 982 million (dollars) to continue GBI refurbishment, upgrades, training, models and simulations, fire-control upgrades and operation of the ground-based mid-course defense system. We have limited the number of operational silos to 30 to more efficiently and effectively manage the long-term health of a fleet of GBIs with sufficient firepower to counter the emerging rogue-nation ICBM threats. We also propose an additional 1.3 billion (dollars) in sensors, battle management and testing that improves the performance and reliability of our long-range missile defense.

Furthermore, we continue to pursue or propose missile defense of Europe to the maximum extent allowed by last year's appropriation and authorization acts.

Many of our research programs have also showed great promise during the past year as a hedge against future threat growth. Unmanned aerial vehicle operators have tracked missile intercepts, and the airborne laser has fired an atmospheric compensated beam 15 times in flight, including last Saturday's track of a boosting missile, as we prepare for our first shootdown of a missile later this year.

But the greatest hedge against missile defense threats of all ranges is a persistent missile tracking capability from space. In FY '09 our Near Field Infrared Experiment satellite collected extremely close data of a boosting missile, and we are preparing the Space Tracking and Surveillance System Demonstration Satellites for a launch later this year.

In FY '10 we are focusing our research on the most cost- and operationally effective approach to destroying future ballistic missile threats in their early phases of flight. Due to this refocus, I propose terminating the midcourse phased Multiple Kill Vehicle research program. Additionally, I proposed terminating the Kinetic Interceptor -- or KEI -- program, which was focused on countering a highly advanced ICBM threat. Emerging medium- and intermediate-range threats can be more operationally effectively countered early in their flights by utilizing near-term interceptors and leveraging sensors in command and control networks. Thus we propose 368 million (dollars) in FY '10 for the development of an early intercept capability that will be available years sooner than KEI and avoids KEI's significant cost, operational and platform integration issues. We will apply knowledge gained from KEI to our research.

Third, we are committed to improve the acquisition of missile defense to overcome significant flight test delays, target and interceptor failures, cost growth, quality control, and program delays we have encountered in the past. The department established the Missile Defense Executive Board, chaired by the undersecretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, with the participation of the Joint Chiefs, COCOM commanders, services, director of Operational Test and Evaluation, and other senior OSD and Department of State leadership. The MDEB provides guidance and oversight over resource capability development prioritization and acquisition processes. The FY '10 missile defense budget reflects the results of the MDEB process. In MDA, we are also instituting milestone reviews to provide clear transparency that we are complying with the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.

Finally, with the service operational test agencies and the director of Operational Test and Evaluation, we will soon propose a rigorous and comprehensive test program to enhance the confidence of the United States and allied stakeholders and to deter potential adversaries from acquiring ballistic missiles.

I submit the remainder of my written statement for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, General O'Reilly. Thank you all.

Let's have a(n) eight-minute first round. The administration's budget request continues the production of the 14 remaining ground- based interceptors that are now on contract for use as testing and spare interceptors. The budget request has $180 million for year-four production of those ground-based interceptors as part of a five-year contract. Now what the budget request also does is cap the deployment of ground-based interceptors at this time at 30.

First, let me ask you, General Cartwright, do you support that approach?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I do, Mr. Chairman. And the key reason is, when we have worked through the process that General O'Reilly just described with combatant commanders, their number one request is the reliability of these missiles and the assured use of these missiles. And the early missiles that we put in the fields, we have learned much in the testing since putting those missiles into the fields. So these 14 missiles will go in and replace the earliest missiles. That will give us the highest confidence that what we have in the silos is the best that we can have.

It also gives us additional test information. That test information to date has given us knowledge that has changed the configuration since we put those initial missiles into the silos. And so this allows us to refurbish and bring to the combatant commanders the best missiles that we can bring. In addition, it gives us test assets.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

Now, General O'Reilly, I believe that in your testimony you indicated that was the proposal of the administration. Do you support that proposal?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir, I do.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, if Congress mandated the deployment of all 44 ground-based interceptors, what would the cost be?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, the cost for the interceptors --

SEN. LEVIN: For those additional 14 interceptors in the ground, what would that cost us to do that?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, we have 14 on contract. But we would not have in place then a test program and a stockpile reliability program, for the next several decades, which we have taken into account when we proposed the 30.

SEN. LEVIN: And would there also be an additional cost to actually deploy those 14 interceptors, a dollar cost, in addition to losing the 14 interceptors for test purposes?

But would there also be an actual cost, to deploy them, financially?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir.

To procure each one of those additional 14 or the additional interceptors is 70 million apiece.

SEN. LEVIN: But in terms of deploying them, putting them in the ground, is there a cost to that?

GEN. O'REILLY: About 3 million for each installation.

SEN. LEVIN: All right.

Now, the -- does the budget request, excuse me, foreclose the option to buy more ground-based interceptors, if they are deemed necessary in the future?

GEN. O'REILLY: No, sir.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, not only does it not foreclose it. But one of the directions, in the ballistic missile review, is to understand, one, how many test vehicles we're going to need for the aging process.

So over the life of the missiles, we have not yet bought the interceptors necessary to test the life expectancy. And that's part of the deliverable out of this ballistic missile review.

SEN. LEVIN: And General, let me go back to one of the issues, which has been raised, which is the director of Operational Test and Evaluation's assessment that the flight testing of the deployed GMD system and its GBIs, quote, "will not support a high degree of confidence in its limited capability."

Do you agree with that?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I agree with that. And that's part of what we want to understand in the review. What additional testing is necessary? And then what additional assets are necessary for aging?

SEN. LEVIN: General Cartwright, Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has stated that he supports the missile defense program and the 2010 budget request before Congress. You've reflected your own personal support.

Do the Joint Chiefs support this request?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: They do.

SEN. LEVIN: And do the combatant commanders with missile defense responsibilities support the missile defense program, as requested by the administration?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: They do and they reaffirmed that in the MDEP process.

SEN. LEVIN: And so they had a role in considering the missile defense program, which was proposed in the budget request.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: They did, sir, in senior leader decision forums that were convened twice, before we made that decision, after the MDEP.

SEN. LEVIN: All right.

General O'Reilly, there has been some concern that the Missile Defense Agency does not have a plan to adequately test and sustain the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System, the GMD System.

x xx System. Can you give us a little more detail on your plan for sustaining the ground-based midcourse system? And do you believe it's adequate?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, we've just completed six months worth of work, as I stated, with the operational testing agencies and the director of test and evaluation. We have looked at what is required in order to validate our models and simulations for GMD and our other missile defense systems. Out of that, we identified 144 tests -- 56 flight tests, 35 intercept tests. Seven of them are salvo tests, which involve bad Aegis and GMD. There are 15 GMD tests in that proposal.

But again, sir, the proposal hasn't gone to the MDEB process yet, but our review indicates that that would be a thorough and comprehensive assessment and validation of our models of the GMD program.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.

General O'Reilly, as Secretary Lynn made reference to the possibility of cooperation with Russia on missile defense, you've recently been to Azerbaijan, you've toured the Gabala radar, you've been involved in discussions with Russian officials about possibly cooperating on missile defense, including the possibility of Russia sharing early-warning data from the Gabala radar, or -- I might say and/or -- from the new radar at Armavir in southern Russia.

From a technical standpoint, do you believe that such radar data would be useful to have as part of a cooperative effort with Russia? In other words, would that radar data, if it could be incorporated in a(n) overall system, be beneficial to missile defense capability with respect to Iran?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, it would be beneficial in regard to collecting data -- the location of those radars -- in order to observe testing in that region of the world. They're in an excellent position to do that. And the data we would gain from that would significantly help our development of our missile defenses.

There are other options to integrate, but -- those radars into a missile defense system, but those have only been discussed as ideas and there's much further discussion remains.

SEN. LEVIN: And General Cartwright, from your perspective, does it make sense to pursue that possibility of cooperation with Russia on missile defense?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It does from a technical, intelligence or the understanding of the test program. It does from an operational perspective. And it does also from a diplomatic perspective.

SEN. LEVIN: And is one of the reasons here that it is generally advantageous to have a radar closer to a potential launch area so you can get an earlier track on a missile and can try for an earlier intercept? General O'Reilly, why don't you start with that one.

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, the frequencies of those two radars you refer to are different. But for the Gabala radar, it would give us excellent opportunity for surveillance, and that was the reason it was built. And for the Armavir radar, we would have even greater capability for early tracking.

SEN. LEVIN: Secretary Lynn, then I'll close just by saying how much I appreciate your testimony and the administration's efforts in this regard. The Russian response last week was not closing the door, in my perspective, to this possibility; but from our conversations, a number of us who went there -- including Senator Nelson and Senator Collins -- who talked to the Russians, the Czechs and the Poles, we see this as parallel discussions taking place.

Obviously, the Russians have some concerns about our proceeding with the third site in Europe, but they can, it seems to me, very usefully -- we can usefully continue discussions with the Russians, with the Czechs, with the Poles, with no preconditions but just in the hope that someday there might be a possibility of using the information from those two radars which are in Azerbaijan and Russia to help a missile defense against Iran, to make a very strong statement to Iran about the willingness of the world to cooperate against their threat, particularly if Russia, the U.S. and NATO are able to work together.

The position of the administration on this is, it seems to me, a very positive and important initiative. I hope you continue that initiative. The president, secretary of Defense, secretary of State have all spoken favorably, as have each of you gentlemen again this morning. So hopefully, that will continue apace, and we welcome your testimony in that regard.

Senator McCain.

SEN. MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Lynn, one of -- the focus of a lot of attention is the budget proposal to reduce the -- decrease the number of ground-based interceptors from 44 to 30. What analysis was done to arrive at that decision? And maybe you could provide something for the record, if necessary -- if you feel necessary.

MR. LYNN: We'll certainly check and see if there's something we want to provide for the record.

But in summary, Senator McCain, the threat we face from Iran and North Korea at this point is in the range of a handful of missiles. Thirty interceptors in silos would address that threat -- indeed, would more than address that threat. And so the decision was made that we would be -- as both General Cartwright and General O'Reilly explained, we would be better off making -- ensuring those 30 silos had operationally ready missiles rather than expanding the number of silos.

So we've continued -- we're buying 44 missiles. We're just planning to put them in 30 silos in order to keep them operationally ready, to upgrade the older ones, as General Cartwright indicated, and in order to have test assets to make sure that we understand fully the capability and that we can address any issues that came out of the earlier testing.

SEN. MCCAIN: And you and the secretary have stated a willingness to revisit that decision depending on Iranian and North Korean behavior?

MR. LYNN: Oh, absolutely. This is an expandable system. Should that threat expand, we would certainly want to consider expanding it. And, indeed, the ballistic-missile defense review will be looking further at this as we look forward into the future. But at the current time and into the immediate future, we think 30 silos and 44 missiles addresses the threat we face.

SEN. MCCAIN: General O'Reilly, on June 11th there was a Reuters story that said -- that quoted you stating that Iran and North Korea are working together to develop ballistic missiles and have made significant progress. Quote, "it really is an international effort going on out there to develop ballistic-missile capability between these countries." That's a pretty alarming statement -- or concerning statement, to say the least.

What other countries are the North Koreans working with? I think we know they were working with Syria on a facility that the Israelis bombed. Do you know of other countries that they're working with?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, I would defer that to a closed session. But yes, sir, there is an extensive effort going on to sell North Korean products. We also looked at each of these countries, sir, and how much are they developing indigenously and how much are they relying on other countries' components for these missiles.

SEN. MCCAIN: And they are providing technical expertise as well as actual hardware?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir.

SEN. MCCAIN: On this issue of the joint missile system in Europe, there is some interpretation of the Russian position.

There's also other interpretation, where the foreign ministry and indeed the president of Russia have made, and prime minister have made, very strong remarks.

On June 12th, the foreign ministry spokesman said, quote, "We cannot partner in the creation of objects whose goal is to oppose the strategic deterrent forces of the Russian Federation. Only the United States rejection of plans to base, in Europe, the so-called third position of the missile defense shield could mark the beginning of a full-fledged dialogue."

In other words, the Russians are continuously stating that we have to negate the agreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia, excuse me, the Czech Republic before there is further negotiations, as far as a Russian siting, radar siting, is concerned.

Is that your interpretation, Secretary Lynn?

MR. LYNN: Well, I've certainly read the comments that they made. They have been pushing us on the site in Europe. Our approach has been that the site in Europe -- that our focus is on the Iranian threat.

We think there are a number of ways to address that threat. One of the options is to deploy the missiles in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic. And we're certainly evaluating that option, as well as other possible options.

SEN. MCCAIN: Could I interrupt you for a second?

MR. LYNN: Yeah.

SEN. MCCAIN: I thought it was -- certainly the Poles and the Czechs believed that it was a commitment we made. Do you interpret it that way?

MR. LYNN: We --

SEN. MCCAIN: To an agreement to emplace those defense in both the Czech Republic and Poland.

MR. LYNN: We are not at this point -- we have not made a decision to go forward with that at this point. It had certainly been discussed with them. And the president has said that the -- he said, I think, in Prague that we are committed to defending against the Iranian threat. And one of the alternatives is that Polish-Czech option.

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, from my discussions with the Polish foreign minister and others, their interpretation was a lot -- of our commitment -- was a lot stronger than that. But maybe it requires some more discussion with both those countries.

But I can certainly understand why they would not want to move forward and get the ratification of their government, if we have not made the decision ourselves. This is kind of -- like the Russian commitment, it's kind of a chicken-or-egg situation.

General O'Reilly, the budget introduces a new intercept concept during the ascent phase of a ballistic missile trajectory. How's it -- how's that different from other boost and midcourse intercepts?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, the idea is not new. It's been around for about 20 years, sir, and it was endorsed in the 2002 Defense Science Board study that also endorsed putting out -- or deploying an early capability, which we did in Alaska.

The next part of the study was, they also recommended we took a hard look at developing an architecture which has sensors that track missiles early after launch and very quick fire control solution architectures, so that we can launch the missiles we have today earlier and achieve intercept capabilities earlier in their flight. That part of our architecture has not been invested in previously to the extent which we are in this budget.

SEN. MCCAIN: Secretary Lynn, just return to North Korea for a second. Do you think the threat of North Korean continued development of weapons and missile technology has been accelerating and poses, in a relatively short period of time, a threat to the homeland of the United States?

MR. LYNN: Certainly their testing program has accelerated with the Taepo Dong II launches and the nuclear weapons -- the nuclear device test. It -- we think it ultimately could -- if taken to its conclusion, it could present a threat to the U.S. homeland, and we think that's a strong reason to maintain a ground-based interceptor system and to upgrade it in the ways that we discussed earlier.

SEN. MCCAIN: And obviously, it's very difficult to predict North Korean future behavior.

MR. LYNN: It is entirely difficult to predict North Korean future behavior.

SEN. MCCAIN: But to be on the safe side, we would -- we should prepare -- we should be prepared to counter at least bad if not worst- case scenarios as far as North Korea is concerned. You would agree?

MR. LYNN: Yes, I would.

SEN. MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

SEN. JOE LIEBERMAN (I-CT): Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of you for being here today, and really congratulations to the Missile Defense Agency for the extraordinary progress you've made in giving us the capability to protect our homeland and our allies from ballistic missile attack, which not so long ago a lot of people thought was -- would be technologically impossible to do. So let's start with that.

Secretary Lynn, I want to say that I was troubled by your answer to Senator McCain on the question of the European-based Ground-based Midcourse Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.

It sounded much more tentative than I thought our policy was. In other words, my understanding is that we're going ahead -- our plans are now to go ahead with the placement of these systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, unless the host countries reject those or we develop an alternative, for instance, with Russia.

But you made it sound like it's just one of a number of alternatives that we're considering, and I was surprised at that. I think it'll actually rattle our allies, and Poland particularly -- and in other places in Eastern Europe like Ukraine, where they're concerned about Russia muscling into their areas.

MR. LYNN: Well, Senator, we are looking at the alternatives in Europe, including the Polish-Czech option, to defend against an Iranian missile threat. We are exploring the cooperation with the Russians in the ways that General O'Reilly detailed as a potential additive to that kind of architecture. And what I was saying is that we haven't made a final decision on how to proceed there.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Okay, well, I was surprised at that, because I thought we had made a final decision, unless the decision was changed. That's a -- that's a -- I know we're beginning to talk to the Russians. I can certainly see the advantages of a partnership on missile defense with the Russians -- if they don't ask too much of a price in terms of our commitment to our allies in Central and Eastern Europe who used to be part of the Soviet union, and if we can partner with the Russians in a way that does not compromise the capacity of those systems to protect both Europe and the United States from a missile fired particularly from Iran.

Let me ask -- follow a line of questions here that relate to this. In February of this year, the Congressional Budget Office released a study called Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe. This was requested by Congresswoman Tauscher in her then- capacity as chair of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee. And it examined the cost in potential defensive capability of the European Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. It also considered alternatives including -- to that, to the Polish-Czech system -- including deploying sea-based interceptors around Europe or mobile land-based interceptors in Europe.

Consistent with CBO's tradition, the report makes no recommendations, but, as I read it, its findings demonstrate that the GMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic promises to be the most effective and affordable option.

And I will say that I was particularly struck that the -- by the conclusion in the report that going from the proposal to locate in Poland and the Czech Republic to the other alternatives they considered -- CBO considered -- significantly reduces the capacity of that missile defense system to protect from a missile attack from Iran against the United States.

Now, I understand they don't have the capacity to do that now, but they're certainly working on it. It also, according to CBO, slightly reduces -- less -- the capacity of the system to protect Europe from an Iranian attack.

But the -- I -- you've probably seen it. They've got charts and a concluding -- charts that depict how much the various systems will protect the continental United States. And one of the charts -- well, they -- the narrative is, MDA's proposed system -- that is, the current one, the proposed Czech system -- would provide redundant defense from a third interceptor site for all of the continental United States. "None of the alternatives considered by CBO provide as much additional defense to the United States," end quote.

And then I can see from the map that only one-half or less of the U.S. population will be protected by one of the alternatives CBO considered, which is the proposed SM-3 Block IIA deployment.

So here's my concern as we go forward and talk about this with the Russians: that one factor we have to consider, at least according to this report, is that if we -- that the ground-based interceptor system in Poland, together with the radar -- Czech Republic -- really provides us, not just our European allies but us, with the best defense against a long-range Iranian ballistic-missile attack on our homeland. Do you have a response to that CBO report?

MR. LYNN: I've actually not seen the CBO report. Happy to get something to you for the record. But we're in that same process now. We're evaluating the current plan, which you described, deploying in Poland missiles and a radar in Czech Republic, against potential other alternatives. And that's part of the ballistic-missile defense review, so we expect to have conclusions out of that.

I don't know whether General O'Reilly has seen the report. I'd --

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir, I have. The report was correct that for redundant coverage of the United States, the GBIs provide the greatest redundant coverage of the United States.

For coverage of the United States, what we have at Vandenberg and Fort Greely is best benefitted from actually the sensor networks that all the options are looking at and that report looked at.

What we need most is early tracking and early sensor data coming out of Iran. That's the biggest assistance to the United States.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right. I agree with that.

Am I right? You tell me. Do the ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California protect all of the continental United States?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, sir.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: So that what we would achieve with the GBI system, in Poland and the Czech Republic, would be a redundancy of protection.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, sir.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: But the alternative really don't give us the same protection, redundant protection, for the U.S.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: They don't give us the same redundant protection, sir.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Do the systems in Alaska and California give us the same -- I know the protect us from a North Korean attack. Do they give us the same coverage, for the entire United States, for a missile attack from Iran?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, sir, they do. There is additional contribution, as I said, from having sensors in Europe early. But for the kinetic capability, the actual ability of the interceptors, the ones in Fort Greely, Alaska, do protect all of the United States, sir, against launches -- all the launch points out of Iran.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Okay. So Secretary Lynn, just to close it up, because I appreciate that you're -- my time's up -- that you're asking the same questions that the CBO did.

I presume that one of the factors that will be considered, as we decide whether to go forward with the proposed Polish-Czech site system or do something with the Russians or some alternative as we've talked about -- sea-based or land-based -- will be not only how well it protects Europe but how well it protects the continental United States from a long-range missile attack, from a country like Iran.

MR. LYNN: Senator, we certainly want to evaluate any architecture against the threat, both to Europe and any potential threat we might see to the continental United States.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you.

Thank you all.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Thune.

SENATOR JOHN THUNE (R-SD): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your great service to our country.

General Cartwright, I want to explore a question or two with you. A few weeks ago, in a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, you stated that, "Missile defense for me is part of global strike, meaning that an offensive global-strike capability goes hand-in-hand with fielding credible ballistic missile defenses." I'd particularly like to focus on your comments.

In that same speech concerning conventional bombers and the global-strike mission, you're quoted as saying, and I quote, "The reality today is conventional bombers for global strike are probably not creditable. They're too slow; they're too intrusive; they require too many 'Mother, may I's' to get from point A to point B," end quote. You further state -- again, and I quote -- "The low end of global strike is probably any place on the face of the Earth in an hour," end quote.

Over the past several months, we've had a number of leaders from the Defense Department testify that the proliferation of ballistic missile technology not only requires improved ballistic missile defense capabilities, but also requires a shift from short-range systems to long-range systems, such as the next-generation bomber. And in fact, Secretary Gates himself has made this claim several times in publications such as the Foreign Affairs Journal.

In light of your statements on conventional bombers, I'd like to get a little bit more deeply into your views on the subject. Do you believe that a new bomber should be developed?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: We -- the nation needs a new bomber. A next- generation bomber is kind of the way we have titled it. My comments are more associated with the speed at which a salvo of short- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles can be salvoed. And then for a bomber today at the speeds -- even if we talk about the B-1, which is the fastest of our bombers, it's still 19 to 20 hours to close on the other side of the globe.

And so that's the challenge, is how quickly these assets, the short- and medium-range missiles, can be launched in salvo. So missile defense gives you a credible alternative to changing the calculus of the adversary as to whether they're going to do that in a surprise, number one; and number two, gives you then the time to close our conventional forces in a way that's appropriate.

But if you have just the conventional offensive capability without something to change the calculus, much of the conflict is over before the bomber in this case as we're discussing can close. The same with other general-purpose forces. They either are in the right place at the right time, or it's difficult to close in the time lines of a short- or an intermediate-range ballistic missile.

SEN. THUNE: And I know a lot of the decisions that are being made now I think probably -- regrettably -- are being driven by budgetary considerations. But do you believe that prompt global- strike capability that you advocate should come at the expense of developing a new bomber?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: No, they have to be -- there has to be a synergy there. We have to understand the bomber, in comparison to the prompt global strike, is going to bring scale and persistence.

The prompt global strike that we are looking at and have explored is for those niche targets.

So it may be a good response in deterrence -- and we're talking in the conventional sense right now -- to a short or an intermediate- range ballistic missile attack, to hold it at risk. But it's going to be those platforms in the general purpose force that are going to actually have the credible counterstrike.

SEN. THUNE: Okay. And I want to come back, in light of your view that the low end of global strike is probably anyplace on the face of the Earth in an hour, I wanted to get your opinion -- there's a Defense Science Board report published in March of this year, entitled, "Time Critical Conventional Strike From Strategic Standoff," which concluded that on close examination, "there appears to be nothing unique or compelling about one hour," end quote. And one of the board's most significant findings is that the solution for time critical strike is not necessarily weapon speed; in fact, of the five different scenarios evaluated, none of the scenarios exposed a need for one hour global range delivery.

The board goes on to say that transition to covert loitering strike systems enabled by robust target ISR ID and tracking, C-3 and fire control capabilities would revolutionize global strike for both the long war and for deterrence of rogue and near peer nations.

Now, I'm interested in your -- sort of opinion of the Defense Science Board's findings with respect to time critical conventional strike from strategic standoff, particularly regarding its conclusion that there appears to be nothing unique or unusual about one hour. Is that something that -- is that a finding that you would agree with?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Two qualifiers that I would put on the Defense Science Board. One is the ability to loiter every place on the face of the Earth for extended periods of time has a certain reality and affordability aspect that we have not been able to crack right now. And so in lieu of that, we use our long-range prompt strike capabilities rather than being -- (inaudible) -- we also have challenges with basing and we cannot base every place on the face of the Earth.

And so those places with great strategic depth where we are challenged by the infrastructure to be there demand systems that can close. The one hour has always been an objective. It is, essentially, the idea that we don't know where the strike is going to occur, so there needs to be a certain amount of that hour that's associated with the ISR to find out where the threat is and to credibly target it. And then the next part of that hour has got to be something associated with a time of flight to close a weapon system on it.

If it is important enough to do that from long standoff ranges, then the hour gives you a sense of, okay, I can, one, do the ISR to find and fix the target; and two, do the launch and the flight to get to it.

If you have more time, then there are better systems out there and more affordable systems to close. But we do have challenges around the globe with strategic depth and with the ability to close with the lack of infrastructure and basing. And we've got to have a way to address those credibly for our deterrent postures.

SEN. THUNE: And do you agree with some of the people -- a lot of the leaders like Secretary Gates who do recognize the need to transition from short-range to long-range systems?

MR. LYNN: I do. I always agree with my boss. (Laughter.)

SEN. THUNE: Good policy. General O'Reilly and General Cartwright, Secretary Gates recommends transitioning from the airborne laser program to a research and development program and terminating the purchase of a second prototype.

I'd like to get your feeling on how that change would affect current development plans and testing. And General O'Reilly, I guess I would direct this question to you, but is the ABL program still on track for a full-scale test in the next few months?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, the ABL program is on track for a test -- full-scale test. Again, as I was referring to before, we've just had some first time engagements of the aircraft's tracking and beam compensation laser, which are critical of boosting missile. We did it Saturday and we did it on the previous Saturday. That's the first time that's ever been achieved by a laser in flight.

We are completing some optics work and we'll be using the high- powered laser, the first lasing from it will occur. Today, the schedule is early September with shoot downs later on in the month of September.

SEN. THUNE: Secretary Lynn, General Cartwright, if a successful, full-scale test is achieved, does that affect the Department's level of support for the program?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: My sense right now is, one, we need to keep this work going on directed energy; two, I think that General O'Reilly would tell you that if he were given the money to build a second ABL, it would not look like the current ABL -- that we've learned enough in this first bird that the design work needs to be restarted to figure out what an appropriate directed energy platform airborne looks like.

And so in lieu of that, building the second one, which is designed now to be a clone of the first one doesn't make a lot of sense to us. We have to keep this work going on directed energy, though. It offers a substantial capacity and capability to the nation that we don't today have.

SEN. THUNE: Secretary Lynn -- and a follow on to that -- but do you -- what's your view on terms of the plan to transition ABL to an R&D program?

MR. LYNN: We do want to continue the R&D, but for the reasons General Cartwright just gave, we wouldn't commit to building a second aircraft at this time. We think it would look very different.

We think a lot more work needs to be done, including the test that you referred to, but there are some tests after that as well and we think -- we also need to do some work, the operational concept that we have right now isn't really workable. It would involve having large, vulnerable aircraft -- in the Iranian case, probably over Iranian territory and in the North Korean case, very close. We don't think that's a workable concept.

The power that we need for this aircraft is probably 10 to 30 times what we've demonstrated so far. And the kinds of -- going back to the operational concept, the number of aircraft given three orbits would probably be close -- you would need a fleet of 20, 25 aircraft at 1 billion (dollars), 1 billion and a half (dollars) an aircraft. It's a very expensive capability under the current construct.

So we think we need to both continue the technology to develop that further and to work on what would come out to be a much more employable operational concept. So we plan to continue with the program, but not at this point with the second aircraft.

SEN. THUNE: Well, it seems like -- I hope you will because there are a couple of attributes about it -- boost phase, independent queuing, if somebody were to take out some of our satellite capabilities that it's a very important, I think, platform and could be a very useful asset in our missile defense capability. So I hope that you will continue to pursue it.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Thune. Senator Bill Nelson.

SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL): Gentlemen, I've been listening to this testimony about GBI for nine years and I want to complement you. This is the clearest and the most realistically optimistic testimony -- and I underscore the word realistic -- that I've heard.

I realize that we've come a long way in our testing. We have a long way to go. But you all have presented it more clearly and concisely, and my complements to you.

With regard to Senator Lieberman's excellent questions about Eastern Europe, I just want to inject the one thing that was omitted in the conversation, which is, that the Czechs may well reject having the facilities in their territory. As you know, the government has changed and, although they've got an election coming up, we fully -- the expectations are that the party that will be in power will not approve of the facilities located there and this was clearly the message that Senator Collins and Senator -- our chairman and I learned while we were there.

The other thing that I would like to underscore about Eastern Europe is that as the two generals have testified, if we are able to hook in with the Russian radar in Azerbaijan and southern Russia, it gives us all the more early warning for the protection of Europe, as well as early warning on any threat coming out of Iran for the United States.

So I would underscore those points.

General Cartwright, you chair the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Is there a validated military requirement for deploying 44 ground-based interceptors for the GMD system in Alaska and California?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The requirement that exists out there is for the defense against a rogue state of the -- not just the continental, but what we call the defended area, which includes our territories in Alaska and Hawaii. The number has been the subject of analysis, which we have sharpened based on testing to protect against that rogue threat. The question that we are working our way through in the missile defense review is at what point does this not manifest itself as a rogue threat, but becomes a sophisticated threat? And that also then goes to the inventory question.

Right now, as a rogue threat, the idea of -- we're using a Conops of shoot, look, shoot, so two GBIs per threat. The idea of 15 simultaneous is probably at that balance point and that's what we're trying to understand. If we're talking about more than 15 simultaneous shots, has that surpassed what we would call a rogue state? And that's what the JROC and the Missile Defense Executive Board are looking at in this ballistic missile review.

SEN. NELSON: That's a lot of shots.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: That's a lot of shots.

SEN. NELSON: Fifteen times two.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Simultaneous.

SEN. NELSON: Shoot, look, shoot.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: That's correct, sir.

SEN. NELSON: That's a lot of shots. Well, how was the 44 originally established as the number?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It was without a credible, what we call, boost phase capability or terminal capability. And so as we have developed, first, the terminal capability with THAD, Patriot and SM-3, it has taken some of the stress off of the midcourse. The addition of the sea-based expand radar also took some of the stress off of the midcourse. It allowed us to tell -- that was the first capability that we had that told us whether we actually hit the missile or not.

So prior to that time, which is the way we've been working, we've been working with a four-shot salvo against every threat because we didn't know if we hit. Now, we can tell that. So now we're into what I would call a different environment, which is why we're stepping back and taking a look based on the test data as to what's the appropriate number of missiles.

SEN. NELSON: So if that rogue threat becomes a more sophisticated threat, we can always pick up the tempo on trying to strike down at the midcourse phase, as well as the -- what you call the asset phase.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: And the Defense Science Board and several other analytic bodies have certainly steered us in the direction that this early intercept and boost phase is where you make -- have your greatest leverage. And to the extent that we can use existing missiles, the cost implications are substantially in our favor rather than in the opposite direction.

SEN. NELSON: Now, for the protection of Europe, the capabilities that we have now with Aegis, with Standard Missile III on ground and their enhancements over the foreseeable future, does that look like it would protect Europe?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: This is the construct of the early intercept, and we're going to take the next two to three years to prove out what in the lab and test bench-based systems have demonstrated for us.

So can we do this in the real world is part of what the Missile Defense Agency will prove out over the next couple of years. If that works, which there's no indication that it won't, then we will be able to provide at a very reasonable cost with a very comprehensive coverage, a defense of theater areas to include the Gulf states, to include Europe, to include the Pacific, a defense that is probably much more affordable, less intrusive than our alternatives have been thus far in the R&D phase. That's why we're looking at it so closely.

Going back to the comments about the third site or the European site, there's no change in requirement. The question is can we offer alternatives that may be more palatable to the host nation, in particular, as a way forward? And are they going to be credible? And can we field them in a reasonable period of time? That's what we're trying to understand.

SEN. NELSON: And simultaneously, what is critical is this early warning --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sure.

SEN. NELSON: -- and you've talked about since it's unclassified now, unmanned aerial vehicles.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Right.

SEN. NELSON: You also -- the Secretary talked about this new satellite using infrared technology. Now, are we simultaneously thinking about how we would protect that satellite from what Senator Thune had talked about, anti-satellite program or perhaps -- hardening it for a nuclear explosion?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: We are looking at -- any good war fighter should, more than one way to skin the cat. And so space gives us a pervasive and persistent global presence. The unmanned UAVs give us augmentation, redundancy and the ability if the space is not available to us, to have an alternate path for that track file.

SEN. NELSON: There's been a suggestion that Congress should mandate a certain minimum number of flight tests. General O'Reilly, what do you think? What's the minimum number?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, the minimum number is driven by not only our ability to assemble the hardware and to make the arrangements with the range and conduct the flight tests, but it's also based on our ability to learn from those tests and conduct post-flight reconstruction we call it with our hardware in the loop and really apply the lessons learned and how we contribute to our models and SIMS accreditation.

Now, it really depends, sir, on the complexity of the test. A THAD program today with its maturity can sustain a rate about every six months, conducting a test and we're going through the analysis process with the operational test agencies.

More complex tests like GMD, sir, I would propose on about a nine-month center for the time to thoroughly understand and do to the complexity, the number of other assets that are involved and the general scope of these tests.

So it really depends on the maturity of the program at the time and how complex the tests are.

So I would not be in favor of a mandated schedule of testing, that also presumes that we have success in every test. If you have a failure, then you have to take a step back and that takes more time to determine exactly what happened.

SEN. NELSON: Well, given the earlier testimony of General Cartwright, what about salvo testing?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, we do need salvo testing to demonstrate, even though theoretically we see there is no interaction between two GBIs, there's a lot of empirical data that you have to collect to validate that. And that is why we brought online our second test silo at Vandenberg this year so that we can have salvo testing.

SEN. NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator Collins.

SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as you probably have seen or figured out at this point, I, too, was on the trip that Senator Levin led to Russia, the Czech Republic and Poland to discuss missile defense. When we discuss missile defense with the Russians, the Russians stated over and over again that they considered the third site to be directed at them rather than at the Iranians.

If we were able to collaborate with the Russians, wouldn't it alleviate that concern?; and second, wouldn't it also send a far stronger message to the Iranians than if the United States proceeded with the third site without any Russian involvement?

MR. LYNN: Senator, I guess I'd have three comments, one, as long as we see an Iranian missile threat developing, we think we need to develop systems to respond to that. So that's point one. Point two is as you've indicated and as General O'Reilly talked about in detail, we think the involvement of Russian assets, particularly Russian radars would enhance the capability of that kind of European-based system. And then, third, I would agree with you that a U.S.-Russian collaboration would have an additional benefit of a diplomatic signaling to the Iranians that this is an unacceptable course for them to pursue and that they will face a concerted international front should they proceed down that path.

SEN. COLLINS: General Cartwright, I see you're nodding.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. I mean, I agree. Probably the greatest leverage is the partnership and the message that that would send. That would be very powerful.

SEN. COLLINS: Secretary Lynn, I'm very sensitive to the concerns that Senator Lieberman raised; we don't want to break our commitments to our allies, but when we were in Poland, we found that Polish leaders were far more concerned about the goal of having some sort of U.S. presence on Polish soil than they were being the host for the ground-based interceptors. And, in fact, what they said over and over again that they wanted was the Patriot battery installed in Poland.

Could you -- and I understand that the Poles recently announced that they hoped, or at least expected to have a Patriot battery deployed on Polish soil by the end of 2009 -- could you comment on what role a Patriot battery could play in these complicated negotiations on missile defense?

MR. LYNN: Well, it's certainly been part -- as you indicated, part of the Polish desire is to have not -- as part of the architecture, a Patriot battery and that's under discussion. So that --

SEN. COLLINS: General?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: When we did the negotiations with the Poles -- and you're exactly right, there isn't an element of this that is the theater defense or the defense of their territory that is very important to them and the signal of our commitment to that ideal.

The construct that was worked out is that we would over the first few years, cycle periodically the number of times during the year a deployment of Patriot, PAC-3 capability to the country, that we would also rotate the Aegis ships and SM-3 when the Patriots were not there and increase the presence to be able to give them now some theater coverage. They're more comfortable as anybody would be with something that's right there in their backyard that they can touch and see, but we're committed to helping them with this theater construct. And it's important to understand that in the construct of the European site as it relates to those two countries, there's the element of the theater and the element of our defense of the homeland. Their first priority certainly should be to their country and their theater. Patriot starts to give them a visible capability, which they're looking to invest in themselves, but they start to get training on it. They start to understand what its capabilities are.

SM-3, for us, gives us a little more stand-up. We're not directly on their territory, but we're demonstrating to them the value of the sensors and the value of an integrated, regional approach rather than a single country approach that is going to be much more powerful.

Those are the messages that are inside of the discussion about theater versus homeland and the basing constructs. And what we're trying to understand now in the evaluations is what architecture gives them the most comprehensive approach to both their defense and our defense and how do we approach that in a way that's diplomatically palatable as well as kinetically functional?

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. General O'Reilly, the intelligence community has long said that if a rogue state could deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile, it could do so with countermeasures. How does canceling the multiple kill vehicle program affect our ability to intercept an incoming warhead threat accompanied by decoys?

GEN. O'REILLY: Ma'am, the MKV program was a research program that was aimed at delivering a capability in the later part of the next decade. As we have spoken earlier today, we believe pursuing or diverting that research towards intercepting earlier also puts pressure on countermeasures. It forces an adversary to either deploy them when they wouldn't want to very early in flight where they start to drift away over time. It is difficult to make a lightweight object, especially right after boost and deploy it so that it appears like an RV, re-entry vehicle. And second of all, once you deploy countermeasures, if you maneuver your RV, you either, one, disturb those countermeasures, or two, you give away which one is the real RV.

So the early intercept capability does put pressure and puts to the advantage of the defense our ability to detect and determine which is a countermeasure and which is an RV.

SEN. COLLINS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Collins. Senator Begich.

SEN. BEGICH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. And you can probably guess where my conversation is going to go, so I want to ask a few questions if I can regarding the missile defense system in Alaska and just some data points and, you know, what I'm looking at is two pieces of the puzzle here -- the risk factor and the costs or the real costs and trying to understand those better.

First, understand that we've spent about $20 billion already on the system to get it to where we are and where the stages and the completion or how far out we are, which is not too far to complete this project. The other is the risk and I was just reviewing a chart that I've had since 1998 and the launches from Korea and where you look at where they have -- what the timing has been for their launches, 40 percent of them have occurred since we announced the budget preparation regards to the missile defense system in Alaska -- in other words, stopping the missile defense system at the level it is at today. Almost 40 percent of their tests have occurred since that date, which is kind of an interesting, maybe it's coincidence, but it adds to me, at least, an additional risk factor.

Let me ask if I can just a couple of questions on the technical elements. My understanding is there are three fields, there's field one, two and three. Field one is completed with six silos and they are always filled, three with 20 and then the question is field two, which is under different levels of completion.

Will you maintain and let's say, field three, you want to replace some of those missiles as part of the plan is you want to replace those, you have to shut the whole system down, the whole 20. So what happens? What's the risk level at that point when we're down to just six missiles there in Alaska and I know four in California. What does that do? I know Senator Nelson brought up -- utilizing the gross number of 30, but at any given point, there's maintenance going on up there. I was up there with Secretary Gates recently. There was maintenance going on and if your plan is to refurbish a sizeable amount, 14 based on the replacements, that means some of these are going to be shut down. My understanding was the weight of three systems where the system is to work is you would have these three fields for that purpose alone, so you would have redundancy.

Could someone give me a brief comment on it, whoever wants to do that? I'll look to the two generals, General O'Reilly. And then I have some very specific costing that doesn't add up yet. So, please.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, our approach to the missile field that we have taken is to look at the reliability and the certainty of the missile launches and the assuredly that the combatant commanders will have when they need those missiles that are available. When you take that approach, you look at, not only the number of silos, but also the entire population of GBIs and how you have to rotate them through.

The missile fields are each distinctive. The first one is a very early test bed and it has the characteristics of a test bed and it has the life of a test bed. Missile field two or missile field three, the one that has 20, is a harder missile field and it has redundant systems in it and it is designed so you can perform the maintenance you referred to without shutting the missile field down. It has backup systems. It has shielding. It has other things associated with it so that we can, in fact, do that. On top of that, the missiles themselves were designed that they can have the software completely replaced on them while they're sitting in the silo.

So all of that was taken into account for the lifetime maintenance, lifecycle maintenance of the missile system. So missile field two can operate or missile field three, the one with 20 silos, can continue to operate and sustain itself because of the way it was designed and built with those redundancies. The first missile field was not.

The missile field we're currently working on also has another generation of capability and so forth, and that's why we are finishing up that work, but the reason we are at six silos and actually a seventh one we're considering for a spare is, again, when you take into account the overall fleet management of the GBIs and how many do you need in silos, how many do you need outside silos that are being refurbished as you say and how many are being used for test purposes?

When you put all of that together, you can sustain for several decades, a 30-missile fleet, much more significantly, efficiently and effectively than you could 44 missiles, given the fact that the original missile field was a test field designed for that purpose.

SEN. BEGICH: Let me ask you -- and I'm going to follow up on what I think Senator McCain was asking and I know the 30 number is kind of where you folks are at -- but how do you judge the risk level when you don't know what the risk of North Korea is? I mean, I think, Secretary, you made the comment that -- or maybe General Cartwright, I'm not sure which -- but made the comment that they're not predictable.

And yet we're making a very stringent decision here to make a decision that we're going to have this many, that's it, and maybe in the future, depending on the conditions, that might change.

But with North Korea it seems -- since we've made this announcement, as I said, 40 percent of their testing has occurred, plus an underground nuclear test. I mean, I don't know; that seems risky to me.

MR. LYNN: As I said to Senator McCain, the actions of North Korea have been unpredictable. Their capabilities for ICBM or longer- range missiles are quite well understood. They are well within the bounds of a 30-missile field, and we would be able to expand the field far faster than they could expand their capability.

So the risk in terms of their having some kind of breakout is not there. We have the ability to turn inside anything they could do. That has nothing to do with their predictability; that has to do with understanding of their capabilities.

SEN. BEGICH: Let me ask you about the comment you mentioned about how fast you can move forward in case we didn't necessarily have all the best information in determining what their capacity is or capabilities are. Help me understand the project as you have it now, sealing it off at 30.

What is the current -- and I've been trying to figure this out -- what is the current cost to close it up? What is the cost for the contractor to close them up as they are still idle up there right now, or my understanding is there is a stop-work order on some of the work but we're paying --

MR. LYNN: I have not issued -- that is not correct, sir.

SEN. BEGICH: Okay.

MR. LYNN: I have not issued a stop work.

SEN. BEGICH: That's fair, then. But what is -- when we close it off, is there a contractural fee that we have to pay the contractor to finish out the contract? Is there a cost for where these 14 missiles will be stored, because obviously if you don't build the silos you don't have them stored. So where do they go, and is that in your budget proposal that you have in front of us that shows the cost of storage and putting these 14 completed missiles somewhere?

MR. LYNN: Sir --

SEN. BEGICH: And have you done kind of a -- you know, because I haven't seen it. I know we're requested it internally, but we're -- I want to see the match-up, which I have not seen yet, and the close-out costs that the contractor may require, which I believe they probably will.

MR. LYNN: Sir, you're describing it as if it's a contract termination and it is not. We are given redirection to the contractor but we are not terminating. So termination costs and so forth are not part of our estimation.

Also, this is an FY10 budget request, so what I described, the fleet management into the future, is going to follow up in future years as we identify the requirements once the -- today we do not have the missiles deployed that exceed the 30, and we do have storage capability today at Fort Greely and at Vandenberg to handle those 14.

Plus when you take into the account the idea is refurbishment, some of them will be back in the industry base going through the upgrades, which they will need.

SEN. BEGICH: Thank you very much. My time is up. I have more questions but I will probably submit those in writing then to you. Thank you.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Begich. Senator Sessions.

SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Cartwright, you mentioned the Patriot matter in Poland. I see one report, June 12th, that those are not going to be armed. What is that about?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: We are in fact working our way through a challenge of the distribution of Patriot. You know, sir, from our long conversations, that the number of Patriots and the batteries that we have are limited and therefore, as we deploy them worldwide, matching up the battery with the command and control is a bit of a challenge.

And so right now what we had talked to the Poles about was the first deployment would be a training deployment. What we're trying to understand is can we put the battery in there, the equipment, with the command and control or without the command and control? Do we put the weapon with it if it doesn't have the command and control? And so we're working our way through trying to put the assets together.

The agreement was made after we made agreements with other nations about exercises in '10. And so we've got competing requirements right now. It is our intent to give them a usable, trainable asset and then to start moving towards armed capability, but we have to get that aligned with our exercise programs and commitments with other nations this year.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, we had a contract, did we not, with the Poles and the Czechs? I mean, the United States signed an intention to go forward with these systems. I know the Polish legislature and the Czech have not ratified fully, but we did have an agreement to go forward with that system. Is that correct?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: An agreement to go forward with the training in the first two years and then with deployment in later years, replaced by their procurement.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, if we can't make up our mind about it, it's not likely that the Poles or Czechs are going to be supportive of this system, and I think that's undermined that whole process. It came about from the president's own comments and it undermined the commitment of the United States to the program and therefore has undermined the Poles and the Czechs' willingness to participate.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Senator, I --

SEN. SESSIONS: That's where we are, and I think that's an unfortunate event.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Senator, I agree with you. We're going to make every effort to make this work, because I see it the same way you do from a perception standpoint, that we've got to put a unit in there that is functional, capable, and can actually be trained and can defend the area.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, to follow up on Senator Begich's comments, General O'Reilly, this Pole's budget has taken quite a hit. The budget numbers, as I see it, is a $1.2 billion cut in missile defense, period, which is about 15, maybe more, percent of the missile defense budget, which includes theater as well as national missile defense.

The national missile defense, GMD program, is taking a $700 million reduction -- is that about right -- from previous budge plans?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, 500 (million dollars).

SEN. SESSIONS: And that's, what, a third or 40 percent of the total budget?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, 328 million (dollars) of it was planned to come off the work that was going to be accomplished this year anyway between 2009 and 2010. And 160 million (dollars) is reduction due to the work up in Alaska on the missile field silos.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, and then we've eliminated the MKV, the Multiple Kill Vehicle. We eliminated the Kinetic Interceptor, the KEI, and have basically put on hold the ABL. So those programs have been gone, and now we've taken from 44 to 30 our missile defense -- you know, deployed missile defense system. And I think that's what Senator Begich and I are concerned about.

Let me just follow up a little bit on that. The Secretary of Defense told this committee on May 15th that he expects GMD, our national missile defense system, to continue to improve over time.

Additionally, in a National Defense University presentation on June 2nd, you said this, quote, "We are not limiting the production of GBIs and we'll continue to produce, upgrade and test GBIs to maintain a more operationally ready capability to defeat long-range missile threats to our homeland," close quote.

And as you indicated, and I think Secretary Lynn, those threats are increasing from the North Koreans. You go on -- yet, MDA budget justification materials and statements by senior MDA officials seem to contradict your statement and Secretary Gates' explanation. So I just need to get this straight.

On May 7th, MDA Executive Director Altwegg told reporters that the GBI production line ends circa 2012-1013, after the 44th missile. And MDA's vendor analysis shows most manufacturing lines closing down by FY10 -- 2010.

The FY2010 DOD overview, which I suppose you worked on from your area for the MDA, clearly states that MDA tends to, quote, "curtail additional GMD development." An MDA chart depicting program changes that you've produced shows that GMD program has been descoped.

Eliminated activities include GBI three-stage fleet avionics upgrade and obsolescence program, software testing and fielding. That's in your paperwork. MDA's planned test schedule for 2010 calls for a test of the two-stage GBI, intended for European deployment. There is no plan to intercept tests for the three-stage GBI deployed in Alaska.

So I guess this to me suggests a disconnect between the secretary's intention to improve and upgrade the NMD system over time and what actually seems to be happening. And I'm aware -- I think all of us are -- that a lot of this is driven by money. And you're given some choices and difficult choices and you have to make choices based on how much money you've been provided.

But I would just note that our budget is over $500 billion. We've invested, you said, 20 (billion dollars) in GMD alone. And we're this close to actually deploying a system that I thought we'd all agreed on, 44 missiles plus robust testing.

And so I guess I'm wondering what's happening here. Can you tell me about this disconnect between the idea that we will continue development and improve the system, and what appears to me to be the reality of massive budget reduction and elimination of programs?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, yes I can. First of all, of the $1.2 billion reduction, 566 million (dollars) I'm restricted due to the Authorization and Appropriation Act last year on European defensive capability. Most of that was in the GMD effort.

So that accounts for the largest reduction is complying with last year's appropriation and authorization of restrictions on how I can use funding this year. But I will note that in another line, we have 182 million (dollars) for the upgrades of the avionics and the other common components that you're referring to on the two-stage line. They also apply to the three-stage.

Second of all, the comment on GMD curtailment was a phrase lifted out of a sentence that has to do with the missile field and the silos up in Alaska. So it is consistent. We are curtailing that missile field and some of the work on that missile field area. That did not apply, as it's been taken out of that sentence, that we are stopping or curtailing overall GMD upgrades. We are in fact completing extensive upgrades, as I said, through the fire control, the training and all of the other requirements.

You referred to the two-stage test. The original two-stage test was just a booster, and we have high confidence in that booster because we launch it every time we launch a three-stage.

So we looked at that test and we looked at the value of the test and we determined that it would be much more beneficial to the three- stage and the two-stage to put a kill vehicle on it and stress the kill vehicle in a way that it hasn't been before where you can't do during an intercept test because you really want to drive it to its performance ends, and so you have a good understanding.

So in fact it may look like there's one two-stage test this year. We have changed that test so that in fact we get a significant benefit to the three-stage development also as well as the two-stage. And finally the other developments that are occurring with the GMD System are associated with the sea-based X-band radar, the command and control, our other sensors, our ability to use forward-based radars to queue GMD, that all accounts to an addition $1.3 billion that directly improves the capability of our mid-course defense system that is not in the GMD budget line. And so it is a significant investment of over $2 billion of improving GMD over fiscal year '10.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I don't know. I mean, it seems to me that you've reduced the capability of the system and you've reduced spending quite significantly. The assembly lines are going to be shut down soon, and with all due respect, General Cartwright, we just can't -- if we use our launch systems, we're not able to snap our fingers and have a new assembly line start back up again; it's going to be closed down and all the subcontractors and suppliers -- it seems to me the time to reduce the adequate number of missiles is now, and 14 missiles at two tests a year would mean seven years and we're talking about a 40-year or more assumed defensive system.

So that's not the kind of testing we use for our submarine-based missiles. It's not the kind of testing we use for our ICBMs; they're much more robust than that. So the numbers don't add up to me. I think it's just a question of somewhere somebody has decided to cut missile defense substantially and you're doing the best you can under difficult circumstantiates and I'm concerned about it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Bayh.

SEN. EVAN BAYH (D-IN): Gentlemen, I've been a strong supporter of your efforts and I want to thank you for them and I intend to continue to be a strong supporter of your efforts. What would your answer be to Senator Sessions in his final comments? Is this being budget-driven, or is this driven by, you know, your honest assessment about the move from 44 to 30.

It does not materially affect our ability to make the intercepts, and the change in the testing regiment does not materially affect our ability to assess the efficacy of the system. Is this being driven by the budget or is this being driven by -- I'm going to vote to give you all the money you need to have a system that works, but of course the taxpayers shouldn't be asked to pay more than they need to for a system that works. So what's the answer to his last comment?

MR. LYNN: Senator, maybe I could start and then ask the two generals to join in. We undertook a review of the missile defense program and we developed, frankly, a new approach to it which is more focused -- more heavily focused on rogue state threats and on theater threats. That drove a series of changes; it actually drove about 1.2 billion in ads and a couple billion in cuts. It netted to the number that Senator Sessions mentioned of about a $1.2 billion reduction, but those reductions were driven by programs we think that were either too immature like the MKB, programs that were not -- that should be in the R&D phase but not go into production like the ABL, and programs like the kinetic energy interceptor, which is a troubled program the start.

SEN. BAYH: Well, the troubled program, that different. But the things that are sort of in the process of development ,these changes you've made in the near-term don't affect their longer-term potential to -- our ability to assess whether they're ultimately going to work or not?

MR. LYNN: We think in particular with the air-borne laser, we do indeed intend to assess whether this has more capability. It's been mentioned at that table. The technology itself is promising, the operational concept that we had for it is not currently the right one and the technology isn't ready for production. If we were going forward we wouldn't go forward with the second version of the current aircraft, so it's appropriate to step back and to maintain this in R&D, to explore exactly that potential, but not to go forward with the planned second aircraft at this time.

At the same time I ought to mention is we added substantial resources to programs that are more focused on that theater and rogue state threat. We added substantially to the THAD (ph) program, to the AEGIS ship program, as well as to the SM3 program.

SEN. BAYH: Mr. Secretary, I don't mean to interrupt, but there were some other things -- (inaudible) -- but I thought he raised -- long-time observers of Washington might have reason to be somewhat skeptical and say, well, you know, is this really being driven by substantive factors or has there been a decision made and now they're trying to justify it by doing this sort of thing?

But to hear -- judging by your answer -- and I guess I'd just ask our two generals if they disagree -- what I hard you saying is this does not affect the efficacy of the system or our ability to assess the efficacy of the system. Is that -- that's what I understand your comments to mean. Do the two generals --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: That is correct. Nor does it foreclose the opportunity, because we know we have to go back and assess the aging testing program. We know that we may have to build additional interceptors if, in fact, we make a decision to go forward with the European site. The line will stay hot, as will the vendors. The question that we're taking a pause for right now is how many more missiles are we going to require for that test program, what's an appropriate test program, and when will the decision be made about the third site?

SEN. BAYH: One of the reasons for hearings like this is not only to inform members of the committee and Congress, but to inform the American people. So I'd like to ask a series of questions; I hope they're fairly short about that.

Mr. Secretary, I guess I'll start with you. With the current missile technology the North Koreans have, can they launch a missile that could hit the Hawaiian Islands or Alaska?

MR. LYNN: They've not been completely successful with what they've done but their systems have the potential to do that.

SEN. BAYH: In what time frame, do you think?

MR. LYNN: Well, the systems they have now --

SEN. BAYH: The potential to hit --

MR. LYNN: -- have the potential, if they were to do a successful --

SEN. BAYH: And to the best of our ability to determine these things, with the kind of path that they're on, when do you think they'd be able to reach the West Coast of the United States?

MR. LYNN: I think I'd have to take that for the record. I can't give you --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Let me help. We've had three unsuccessful tests, but progressing in their capability. Even if they are successful in the range aspect of getting to the United States, they still have to be able to actually deliver an RV that can re-enter the atmosphere and find a target. Generally -- and, you know, this not scientific but -- we're dealing in at least probably another three to five years minimum that normal nations would take in the progression of testing to get to that stage.

SEN. BAYH: Minimum three to five years, that's the missile technology. What about producing a warhead, coupling that to the -- that includes that in your analysis?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: That is the staging; it does not include how long it takes to build that warhead, but it includes the ability to deliver it.

SEN. BAYH: And to miniaturize it in a way that would --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: All of which are going to be significant challenges, but realistically --

SEN. BAYH: You think they'll be able to do that within three to five years?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The missile technology, not the warhead technology.

SEN. BAYH: Well, what about -- one without the other isn't all that meaningful -- what about both of them together?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: There are -- that would be a huge --

SEN. BAYH: I've been a long-time supporter of what you're trying to do and I'm trying to -- (inaudible) -- the American public --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I understand. I just don't want to mislead anybody either.

SEN. BAYH: Of course.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Because my crystal ball's not going to be any better that anyone else's, but you're dealing in five-year activity to be credible in being able to deliver a weapon in an RV to a target in those kind of ranges. And that assumes a lot of luck on their part in moving forward.

SEN. BAYH: And there's an unavoidable element of the unknown either on the --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, sir, there really is.

SEN. BAYH: We've been surprised by more aggressive development in the past and then sometimes things have taken a little bit longer.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: One thing I'm sure of is that that number's exactly wrong, but it's in the ballpark.

SEN. BAYH: In the intelligence world we've learned, unfortunately to try and deal with irreducible ambiguity.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, sir.

SEN. BAYH: General, the collaboration between North Korea and Iran, factoring that in, the Iranians, they currently have missiles that can hit a fair amount of Europe. Is that correct? They can obviously hit Israel, is that true?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir, that's true from what they've demonstrated in their flight testing. They have a range of about 2,000 kilometers is what they've stated and what they've demonstrated.

SEN. BAYH: And it's a further out time horizon for them to have the capability of a missile with a warhead that would reach the United States?

GEN. O'REILLY: That large of a missile, yes, sir.

SEN. BAYH: Very good. Israel -- I know this is not perhaps the subject here -- but obviously if they are reachable today, the Iranians have been working to produce missile material. They had designs; they decided not to go forward with them. But they may have suspended that decision and maybe be forward as we speak. I think observers of the regime would think they probably will do that, the design, the weaponization of the -- perfecting the weaponization of the product, the device. The Israelis, do they have an effective missile defense against that threat?

MR. LYNN: They have some capability with the arrow system against that threat. They're working towards an upgraded system. They would prefer that to be the Arrow 3, which would be a highly capable system. We're supporting them in that; we think that they should also have as a backup the possibility of land-based SM3, which is a little bit less capable technology but more mature.

In terms of kind of immediate measures, we've moved an X-ban radar into Israel to assist with their immediate engagement capabilities.

SEN. BAYH: I've bumped up against my time limit here, but there was one final question, if you can give me a brief response. You're briefing the president of the United States. He asks you based upon -- you know, he's got to take into his consideration what you're doing in terms of facing these threats. He asks you if there is a rogue launch, what are the percentages that we're going to be able to hit it and bring it down, what would you tell him?

GEN. O'REILLY: Ninety percent plus.

SEN. BAYH: Ninety percent plus confidence that we could -- if there's a rogue launch from North Korea, let's say, we could intercept that target and bring it down?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir.

SEN. BAYH: I assume there are a number of assumptions factored into -- (inaudible) -- in how many launches there are and that sort of thing, but a single launch would be pretty impressive.

A final thing, Mr. Chairman, if I could be allowed just --

The Russians, when they say they're threatened by this third site in the Czech Republic, they really -- they really believe that's aimed at them or is that just a pretext designed to leverage us for some other things?

GEN. O'REILLY: Oh, I don't know that I could define their true meaning, Senator. They have certainly said it repeatedly, and we are focused on the Iranian threat and we are trying to persuade them that the systems that we're proposing are focused on the Iranian threat and we think as the conversation earlier indicated, that if we collaborated on the Iranian threat, we could have a more capable system, vis-a-vis that it would protect both us and them and signal the Iranians and hopefully reassure the Russians. So those would be the goals.

SEN. BAYH: They keep raising it, so it's obviously something we have to deal with, but given the nature of what we're talking about there it just strikes me as bizarre that someone could think that that would be -- have any sort of material impact on the sort of arsenal that the Russians have. So we either have, you know, two sets of people looking at the same facts and reaching dramatically different conclusions, or, you know, there's something else they have in mind and trying to gain some negotiating advantage on some other things.

So I was just curious in your perspective on that, so.

Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Bayh. Let's just try a shorter second round here so we can all have a chance, and maybe try a four minute second round and see if we need a third round.

Relative to that Iranian threat and the potential of having access to the information that Russian radars would give us on an early launch from Iran, the distances that we've determined roughly are the following in terms of the distance from a radar to Iran, an outside radar to Iran. Gabala (ph) we estimate is about 100 kilometers from the Iranian border. Armavir (ph) is about 500 kilometers from Iran.

The proposed radar in the Czech Republic, assuming they approved it, is about 3,000 kilometers from the Iranian border. Assuming those numbers are about right, it would mean that it's about a 2,500 -- excuse me -- 2,500 -- yes -- kilometer advantage in terms of closeness if we were able to work with the Russians and get that information about any launch from Iran from an Armavir radar in Southern Russia.

Let me ask you, General O'Reilly, is that a significant advantage, 2500 kilometers closer?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, it is and we've always had in our proposal for a defense of Europe a forward based radar in the Kakasis (ph) region for that very reason so that we do have an early observation of a launch that would then cue the forward -- the radar in the Czech Republic.

SEN. LEVIN: And is that potential also on a ship?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, the frequency of the radar on the ship is not as accurate as an X-band radar would be or a forward-based, or what we've recently seen even from unattended air vehicles.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, I think you described the advantage before in terms of an early warming. One of them was in terms of the cueing, which we could follow, even if there were not decoys, but then you made reference to the possibility of decoys and as to whether or not an earlier warning also helps earlier information about a launch, gives us advantage in terms of the decoy issue.

SEN. : Senator --

(Cross talk.)

SEN. LEVIN: Did I hear you right? If so, can you just go into that a little bit more?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir, the proposal for an early intercept capability would require the ability to see and track very early in the launch and the concept there is to force someone if they were going to use countermeasures to deploy them as early as possible because that is to the advantage of us. They tend to drift away. They have other problems with them over time. Ideally, you'd want to deploy them very close to an area of their flight where they would think they're about to get intercepted, and -- so this has a significant advantage. So having sensors forward does give us the ability to help us prosecute an early intercept.

SEN. LEVIN: Now, in terms of the Alaskan site for our intercepts, would having information from those forward radars, if they -- we could work out something with Russia, could they be linked to an Alaskan intercept? Could that information?

GEN. O'REILLY: Sir, theoretically, yes, they could, sir, and they would enhance the ability of those missiles in Alaska.

SEN. LEVIN: And would that also be true in California?

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: I just -- I know that Senator Begich was being distracted at that moment, but I think this is an important area where we may be able to find some real common ground was on a question which I just asked and that is the possibility that the -- if we worked out something with Russia on their information, that that would -- could be theoretically linked to the launchers in Fort -- at Fort Greely, and could make them -- what were your words, -- more --

GEN. O'REILLY: They're more effective, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: More effective. That that would add to the effectiveness of those launchers if we were able to work out something with the Russians, but technologically that information, I gather, could be transmitted in a matter of maybe even a few seconds of --

(Cross talk.)

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: -- if not minutes. My time is up. Thank you.

Senator Sessions.

SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you.

Well, I guess my concern about the missile defense system and ideas that we're dealing with is that the study that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, I guess, is going on now is not completed until the end of the year and I'm not aware that any specific study has been done to alter our plans to go from 44 to 30, and I don't think there has been one. And -- so that's a troubling thing to me, and we'll just have to see how that plays out, but I am concerned about it, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, the -- Secretary Gates testified that we should not reduce our weapons stockpile or made the statement in October of '08, we should not reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing, which we're not planning to do, or pursuing a modernization program. The Perry Schlesinger Commission said then as a part of our -- it should be a part of our agenda to modernize our nuclear weapons and -- as part of any reduction of nuclear weapons that might occur. And that's the bipartisan commission that's given us a lot of research and thought into these issues, a really impressive group of thoughtful people on that commission.

So I guess my question to you is I don't see anything in the budget to modernize our nuclear weapon's system or any request from the administration to do so, yet we will be -- I guess you will be asking Congress if the Start (ph) Talks with the Russians go forward to approved reductions and so how can we agree to do that if we don't have a plan to modernize?

MR. LYNN: We are reviewing in the Nuclear Posture Review the kinds of requirements that Secretary Gates mentioned, what changes do we need to make to the nuclear infrastructure, what additional developments do we need to ensure nuclear surety to ensure that we have reliability of our stockpile and we are doing -- the Nuclear Posture Review is inextricably linked with those Start Follow-On Talks.

So we are evaluating what our needs are as we go forward and that will be part of the next year's budget.

SEN. SESSIONS: So you would expect that by the time any asked for ratification that we would see a good plan to modernize the stockpile?

MR. LYNN: We'll be evaluating what plans we have concurrently with the -- as part of the analysis supported in the negotiation, we'll be able to talk to that at that time.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I just would cite to you I don't think that you'll have a lot of support over here. I think there will be a good bit of opposition to any kind of Start change if we don't have this proposal done and both the Secretary have said and the Commission itself has stated and I would urge you to get serious about that and come up with a plan that we think can work.

Also I would just observe that it's not necessary that the Start talks be completed this year. That can be extended easily for five more years. I'm a little concerned that the administration seemed so determined to have an early agreement with the Russians and I hope we aren't making unwise agreements with the Russians, policy changes in our defense structure to gain favor with them in order to try to smooth out a rapid Start Agreement, which is a limitation of our nuclear weapons.

I don't have any reason to believe that we are facing any immediate threat from the Russians' nuclear weapons; and whether they have 2,200 or 1,800, not much difference, really. What is a threat to this country is the nuclear weapon system being built in North Korea and in Iran, and we need a defense against that and we need policies against that. And we need to take some action, sanctions and other things, to try to bring that to a head -- to an end -- because there's a danger of proliferation.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, if the North Koreans or Iranians develop nuclear weapons, a whole host of nations are going to feel obligated to develop their own nuclear weapons, so we could have a proliferation surge far beyond anything we would want to happen.

So I think those are big issues. Whether we have -- what the exact number is between the United States and Russia is not the most critical issue facing our country at this time.

Would you comment on that briefly?

MR. LYNN: Sure. Let me say several things. One, in terms of the START talks, we do see an opportunity to potentially gain an agreement with the Russians before the treaty expires at the end of this year. But let me assure you that we are not going to agree to anything that we don't think is in our national security interest. So that will be the ultimate bottom line on any agreement that we are able to reach or potentially not reach.

With regard to your statements on Iran and North Korea, I agree with you. They indeed present a very real threat and a growing threat. And that, I think, was what underlined some of our discussion on the missile defense area. We're actually trying to shift more of the programs in that direction. So that's what's behind the changes -- much of what's behind the changes that you've seen in the missile defense budget.

I'd go further, I think, along the lines that you said. It isn't just -- the threat isn't just the North Koreans and the Iranians might possess these. There's the second- and third-order threats. The second-order threat is that they might transfer either the weapons themselves or the technology behind them, and they've both shown predilections to do that, particularly the North Koreans. And so that's a very real threat. Even if they do nothing with them, their having them an ability to proliferate is indeed a very unsettling and dangerous prospect.

And then, third, I agree, the signal it sends for the proliferation regime for North Korea and Iran to proceed on this path is something that needs to be countered. And we're looking at the Nonproliferation Treaty and other larger mechanisms, and indeed, the most immediate past, the U.N. Security Council resolution vis-a-vis the most recent North Korean actions are trying to start to demonstrate the unity of the international community against those actions.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Begich.

SEN. BEGICH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for that comment regarding Russia and the potential there of some middle ground.

Let me comment with some questions here. And again, I can only say this as a new member here; I've been here now six months -- but your comments earlier that the Fort Greeley program has direct impact, obviously, with North Korea, but also has, but limited to certain extents, if Iran has missile capability hitting the United States, what our system up there in Alaska can do, even though it's limited, recognizing, but it has some impact to it.

MR. LYNN: Sir, it is not limited.

SEN. BEGICH: Well --

MR. LYNN: We have very good coverage against Iran from North Korea -- from Alaska.

SEN. BEGICH: I don't want to say I said that on purpose, but I appreciate you saying that now, because you have just done what exactly my point is, and that is, Fort Greeley is not just about North Korea. It's about North Korea and Iran. We have to keep that in perspective as we all sit here and discuss Alaska.

As someone who lives there -- and I can tell you, when I go back home and people see news accounts about North Korea shooting off more missiles, they also get very concerned about Iran shooting off a lot of missiles. And so you just did exactly what I was hoping -- thank you very much for that. It wasn't a trick question, but I appreciate it.

The issue of almost $20 billion investment that we've made in the system up there -- and we're at $160 million issue in front of us, which, in the larger sense -- and I've had to adjust my thinking here coming to Washington, D.C., coming from being a mayor of a city. When you talked $160 million, that was real big money. Twenty billion is real big money; but when you look at a system of $20 billion, an investment of only $160 million more to finish out.

We've made decisions or you've made decisions on this missile defense system when, my understanding from the testimony, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review hasn't been completed yet, but you've made decisions. So the review will be completed. My assumption is these budget decisions all across the board on missile defense will be backed into that or part of that answer already. I mean, the answer had already been given partially, even though the review isn't done. And I'm just kind of -- this is how I'm processing all this.

Now, saying all that, we have a $160 million issue in front of us. We will have -- and I think you said, General, that and maybe seven completed silos, not just four more. I thought I heard something; I wasn't real clear on that.

GEN. O'REILLY (?): There are seven delivered up here at this time.

SEN. BEGICH: So it's possible those will be -- that gets you to 33. I'm trying to do my math here.

GEN. O'REILLY (?): No, sir, the -- well, yes, sir. But --

SEN. BEGICH: I mean, it gives you 33 silos.

GEN. O'REILLY (?): This discussion is more, sir, not just about individual silos.

SEN. BEGICH: I understand that.

GEN. O'REILLY (?): When you look at the overall, the impact of life cycle for the next 20 years would be several billion dollars, not $160 million. And I believe the readiness would be lower. I believe we have higher readiness and high (assurety ?), when you select a specific missile to launch, that it will launch in the way we anticipate it to with the program we're putting forward in this budget, just the first year, because it's a one-year budget.

SEN. BEGICH: Can you do this? And again, because the time is only four minutes here, what I want --

SEN. LEVIN: You can take additional time, Senator Begich. That's fine. We're good on time.

SEN. BEGICH: Okay, I just need to -- this is what I want to get is the side by side. And, you know, I'm looking at 2010, because I don't have a five-year budget in front of me. I don't have the QDR. I don't have the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. What I'm dealing with is what I have in front of me today, and that's what I have to work with.

And so what I want to compare it to is what's the cost to cap it. What's the cost to store. What's the cost to demobilize? What's the cost to remobilize? What's the time frame on that? And understanding that Alaska is not your year-round construction season, even though Missile Defense has done a very good job, because they've timed it right, that they can do concrete work and so forth in the summer and then have the field work, additional work as the winter goes forward, even though it's 30, 40 below.

I want to see that comparison. And I guess that, to me, helps me understand how you make out a $20 billion system installation and a $160 million reduction, which -- and I understand your long-term play- out, but I don't have those tools in front of me because those aren't completed. In other words, your review of the ballistic missile defense system is in process, but you've made decisions that will determine what that review will say. So I'm trying to figure this -- and again, take it from someone who's only been here six months. Your career has spanned many, many years. But that's why I have to look at this. So I need a side by side, now or in the future -- very near future, obviously.

But again, to the earlier point, the system is not just about North Korea. It's a broader system. And we've had some great discussions, you and I have. And the one other piece is, today I noted that you made a comment that testing on this would be possibly every nine months. That's different than what we've talked about, and I know Senator Murkowski have talked about.

My understanding was it was twice a year, every six months' capacity, to the launch, analyze, readjust, launch. Is it now nine months? And is that driven by budget or is it driven because that really is the capability of the system?

GEN. O'REILLY (?): Sir, the nine months was driven as a result of the study we've just completed for the last six months. And looking at our -- one is as we move forward with each one of our ground-based mid-course defense tests, they get much more complicated, and the goals and the objectives get much more aggressive.

And when we look at our analytical capability, the complexity of all the contributing systems that are involved and the size of the tests, it is much more reasonable to us that a nine-month (center ?) is executable than doing it every six months, just because of the sheer magnitude. And as a good benchmark, mature systems that are much smaller, working autonomously, they launch typically every six months. So nine months is still being aggressive in our mind.

SEN. BEGICH: Thank you. And I'll just end on this question, and I think it was to Senator Bayh's comment on the system reliability, missile defense reliability. And I'm not saying necessarily GMD, but missile defense was 90 percent. If you had a question from the president, you would all say 90 percent reliability to hit something.

Now, I'm assuming -- why I'm asking this is that's the whole system, including the GMD. And the reason I ask this is the debate years back -- not as much today anymore -- is its reliability. And it seems the testing has proven to help it advance, and future testing will obviously get even more. But 90 percent is not bad. Is that -- am I reading this right that GMD is part of that percent? I think, General Cartwright, you --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It's a combination of the sensors that we've fielded since the early days, the command and control, the weapon system improvements because of the test programs, and the fact that we now have terminal and soon intend to have something that will look at the early launch phases. So absent the early launch, with what we have today, I'd be very comfortable saying 90 percent.

SEN. BEGICH: Thank you very much.

And, again, if you could provide -- at least to me, you know, that side-by-side cost, that would be very helpful. And, again, I'm dealing with a 2010, recognizing there's a five-year schedule too. Thank you very much.

SEN. LEVIN: If you could provide that for the record, that would be helpful.

Also, General, you made a statement about lifecycle costs, I think comparing deploying 44 to 30, and using a figure, I believe, of a "difference of billions," I think was your comment, in terms of lifecycle costs. If you could, for the record, explain or expand on how you arrived at that difference between the two deployments.

And, what is the difference between the Office of Test and Evaluation's statement that I quoted before, about -- that the flight testing of deployed GMD systems and its GBIs, quote, "will not support a high degree of confidence in its limited capabilities," which you, I believe, said you agreed with the OT&E assessment.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Right --

SEN. LEVIN: Is that consistent with your 90 percent figure?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It is -- (laughs) -- obviously, in my mind it is.

What they're referring to -- or at least the way I interpret it, in talking to them, is the body of test data that has been produced, to date, gets them to a point where they are comfortable with the missile itself, but not comfortable across the entire range of the missile's capacity. In other words, the entire envelope, okay -- and, (inaudible) jump in.

The question here is, the rest of the test program will then expand that envelope out. The threat that we face today does not expand to that entire envelope. And so, the question here is, the rest of the testing has got to be done.

These are salvo issues. These are high-energy issues that today probably are not necessary for the threat that we're facing over the next two to five years, but if the system stays around, as it should, for the next 20, we need to have the full envelope.

And I'll turn that over to General O'Reilly.

GEN. O'REILLY: Yes, sir. And, again, we just completed a six- month review with the Operational Test agencies, and we identified 101 actual critical parameters which need to be dated; that needs to be collected across the entire ballistic missile defense system in a comprehensive test program which will take five to six years to complete.

And at that time, as General Cartwright just said, we will have covered all of the different scenarios, and measured the performance of the system against a predicted performance of our models and simulations in all of the different areas that the Missile Defense System could see over the next several decades.

SEN. LEVIN: And is this entire Missile Defense System, or is this just the National Missile Defense System?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sir, it's the entire missile -- it's Aegis, THAAD, our sensors, command-and-control and the GMD system.

SEN. LEVIN: Got you.

Any other questions before we excuse our witnesses?

Thank you. It's been a very informative hearing. We very much appreciate your being here, your information, and what can give us for the record. We obviously would appreciate if you can get it to us this week.

(Witnesses all express thanks.)

SEN. LEVIN: We stand adjourned.

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