Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee - Combat Aircraft Acquisition

Hearing of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee - Combat Aircraft Acquisition

HEARING OF THE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: COMBAT AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION
CHAIRED BY: REP. JOHN MURTHA (D-PA)
WITNESSES: LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK SHACKELFORD, DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; VICE ADMIRAL DAVID ARCHITZEL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, U.S. NAVY

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REP. MURTHA: (Off mike) --

REP. C. W. BILL YOUNG (R-FL): (Off mike.)

REP. MURTHA: -- but it's very difficult when you don't get a budget, for instance, here we are into the budget process. We don't have a budget here in the House. We don't have the details of the supplemental from the Defense Department. We were supposed to get it last week, we haven't gotten it yet. We know that's not your responsibility, but it hampers us in getting our work done.

We're trying to get a field for what we can get done in the supplemental, which helps us with the base bill. And we appreciate -- we know the constraints you are under because of the fact that the budget is not ready yet. And you're constrained -- some questions you can't answer because you don't know what the results are going to be. We appreciate that, but we also have to get these hearings in. We're going to have, will have had 42 hearings and briefings between now and the 6 of April. We're doing the best we can to hold up our end of the bargain, but we just need more information. We appreciate your coming before the committee.

Mr. Young.

REP. YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, let me just welcome our witnesses and look forward to our testimony this morning. And I apologize for walking in a few minutes late. The traffic was really heavy on 395 this morning.

REP. MURTHA: I don't envy Bill Young. He lives out there in the rich section of -- he lives a long ways out.

REP. YOUNG: Actually, I live so far away because it was much less expensive. The city has moved out 35 miles to where I live. Any way, I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman.

REP. MURTHA: We will listen to your summarized statement then get right to the questions.

Admiral.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: It is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy's Tact (ph) Air Program. I'd like to submit my written statement for the record.

REP. MURTHA: Without objection.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: The fiscal year 2009 budget ensures that the Navy and Marine Corps maintain a joint force capable of meeting the wide spectrum of threats to our nation. The department continues the development and low rate procurement of the F-35 Lightning II aircraft and the development of E-2D advanced Hawkeye, the EA-18G Growler aircraft, the CH 53 heavy lift replacement aircraft, unmanned aviation and new strike weapons capabilities.

In total the Navy and Marine Corps aviation will procure 134 additional tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 69 rotary-wing aircraft, and three unmanned systems for a total of 206 aircraft with our fiscal year 2009 funding. The Navy is committed to funding and fielding the Joint Strike Fighter as an affordable multi-mission fifth generation strike fighter. The program is in its eighth year of a 13-year system design and development SDD Program. There are presently three jets in flight tests. The remaining SDD and low-rate initial production or L. (ph) repair craft are in production.

The initial short takeoff and landing, vertical landing or Stoval test aircraft BF-1, took its first flight in June of 2008 and has flown 14 sorties to date. Initial Stoval-mode operations are on track for this summer at Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland. BF-2 the second Stoval aircraft first flew on 25 February of this year and returned with no flight discrepancies noted. All F-35 variance are projected to meet their respective key performance parameters. And while the JSF production comes on line the AV-8B Harrier still comprises 40 percent of the Marine tactical aviation; and will remain in the active inventory until at least 2021.

Fiscal year 2009 provided funding for upgrades that will ensure the AV-8B remains viable and relevant in supporting Marine air-ground task force and combat and commander requirements. The FNA-18, ENF Super Hornet and the EA-18G Growler, are doing extremely well, delivering a superior capability to the war fighter on cost and on schedule. We have delivered over 268 Super Hornets to the fleet and procured 426 aircraft through FY '08.

The program continues to make technological advances in concert with the required spiral development plan. Earlier this year, we deployed our first and second FNA-18 Foxtrot Squadrons with the new APG-79 active electronically scanned Arissa radar aboard CVN76, that's USS Ronald Reagan, CVN73 the USS George Washington with outstanding results. Five times the liability and more than three times the performance over Legacy Hornets.

The APG79 radar in particular is an acquisition success story. The EA-18G Growler is currently in operational op-eval (ph) OTC-1. And we will have delivered the aircraft to the fleet for training purposes at Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island. In FY '09, we will procure 22 aircraft and transition our first squadron VAQ132 this summer. Initial operating capability or IOC is on track for late 2009. While we're waiting the Growler and JSF, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to utilize the EA-6B Prowler aircraft on extremely high deployment tempo, supporting operations against growing and extremely high and diverse irregular warfare threats.

Ongoing structural improvements and planned improvement capabilities III or ICAP-III program upgrades have extended this aircraft service life and will deliver increasing capability through its retirement for the Navy in 2012 and the Marine Corps in 2019. The E-2D Hawkeye advanced Hawkeye program has completed over 90 percent of its SDD program in operational assessment or OAS, and has currently two aircraft in flight tests. The program will be presented to the Defense Acquisition Board for a milestone decision this month. This program is absolutely critical to the Navy maintaining our continued superiority in tactical air operations against advanced threats.

The technology is extremely challenging but it's achievable. Funding reductions have resulted in the loss of two aircraft - one from the '09 advanced procurement; for the second would be advanced procurement in '09 as well, so two aircraft in total.

Major perturbations in budget appropriations as experienced in PD (ph) '09 will not allow the successes demanded by today's fiscal environment and this committee. We are finding new ways to acquire the Navy's weapon systems as with the P-8A Poseidon, which is a replacement aircraft for the P-3 where we are leveraging the efficiency of a commercial production product, the Boeing 737-800 ER line, to realize a technologically-advanced product and a shortened acquisition timeline.

This aircraft will deliver nine years after program initiation when it will be both extremely capable and affordable. The program will commence flight later this year. Initial operating capability with one squadron and six aircraft will be in FY 13. Lastly, we remain committed to the vision to meld manned and unmanned air systems or UAS (ph) in the future of tactical aviation by exploring an unmanned combat air system or UCAS capability.

Our current demonstration efforts include procuring technologies for actual aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested landings; as well as a carrier-controlled, air-space integration. These testings will begin with first flight in '09 and take to the carrier in around the end of '11, sir. It is a pleasure to set test flight for the committee today and I welcome your questions regarding the Department of the Navy's Tact Air Programs.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Good morning, Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, members of the committee. It's my pleasure to be here today to discuss Air Force combat aircraft acquisition and other programs that are important to your Air Force and nation. I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record.

My remarks today will address the progress on weapons systems and our global power acquisition portfolio and the status of the combat search and rescue recapitalization effort. This month, the Air Force accepted its 136 F-22 aircraft. F-22 production is currently delivering lot seven aircraft ahead of scheduled contract delivery dates at a rate of about two per month. When the plant delivers the last lot nine aircraft in December 2011, the Air Force will have completed the program of record of 183 Raptors.

Also this month, F-35 AA-1 completed its 75th test flight. In November of last year accomplished its first supersonic flight. The cooperative avionics test bed continues to demonstrate unprecedented risks reduction for this stage in major weapon system development. We project the F-35 will meet all key performance parameters.

We continue to upgrade our Legacy fighter fleet to enhance capabilities in support of current contingency operations. Our F-16s, the bulk of the fighter fleet, are undergoing structural upgrades to replace life-limited structural components. The common configuration implementation program and avionics update continues with modifications that include a new mission computer, color displays, an air-to-air interrogator link 16, and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System.

We expect the F-16 to be a capable element of the fighter force through 2024. The F-15 A through D fleet returned to flying status following the November 2007 mishap after an engineering analysis confirmed safety of flight. Of the 407 aircraft in the inventory, nine were grounded due to the Longeron crack. The Air Force repaired five and four were retired due to proximity to planned retirement. The Air Force will conduct a full scale pateak (ph) test, an aircraft teardown, and improve structural monitoring to establish the maximum F-15 service life and more effectively manage the structural health of the fleet.

The F-15E, which was not affected by the Longeron crack continues to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Air Force improved the F-15E's ability to rapidly engage and destroy time- sensitive targets by adding secure radios and data lines for faster communications with ground units and forward controllers by integrating the latest precision weapons that improve accuracy as well as reduce collateral damage by adding a Helmet Mounting Cueing system that reduces the F-15E's time to engage a target by up to 80 percent; and by adding a state of the art active electronically-scanned radar system that not only addresses sustainment issues, but also gives the F-15E advanced capabilities to identify and engage targets and protect itself from enemy threats.

An A-10 service life extension program and overhaul programs will allow us to continue flying these venerable aircraft. The Air Force is currently upgrading 337 A-10's to the C-configuration with precision engagement capability anticipating completion by the end of fiscal year '11. The B-1 was once solely a nuclear deterrent but the Air Force refocused its capabilities through modernizing its conventional leathality. A perfect example is the B-1's potential was realized by adding the advanced targeting prod to the platform's Sensor Suite. In an acquisition success, the Air Force and industry responded to - (inaudible) - highest virgin operational need requirement by energizing a fast track development and procurement timeline.

Thanks to supplemental funding, the 34th bomb squadron from Ellsworth Air Force Base South Dakota was able to deploy a full contingent of sniper-equipped B-1 bombers to support both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom operations in June 2008 without a single break in daily combat operations. B-2 availability has steadily increased over the past five years largely due to focused efforts to enhance low-observable maintenance such as the highly- successful Alternate High Frequency Material program. The B-2 faces increasing pressure to upgrade avionics originally designed over 20 years ago.

The three increment extremely-high-frequency satellite communications and computer upgrade program seeks first in increment one to upgrade the spirits flight management computers as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment two integrates the family of beyond-line-of-sight terminals along with a low-observable antennae to provide secure survivable strategic communications; while increment three will connect the B-2 into the global information grid.

Increment one of EHS SATCOM (ph) and computer upgrade is currently in engineering and manufacturing development and on track to begin procurement in FY '11 for fleet installations beginning at the end of FY '13. The B-2 is also receiving a new radar antennae and upgrading selected radar components as part of the operating frequency changing radar modernization program. The Air Force is invested in B- 52 modernization programs to keep the platforms operationally relevant by adding satellite and nuclear survivable and secure wideband, high data rate communications, advanced targeting pods, both sniper and lightening, aircraft computer and data transfer unit upgrades and Smart Weapons integrated to improve conventional weapons capability. With the B-1 Lancer and the B-2 Spirit the B-52 Stratofortress serves as a key component for the United States long-range bomber force.

To recapitalize our rescue helicopter fleet, the Air Force intends to replace 101 aging HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters for the 141 CSAR-X aircraft. The CSAR-X is currently in source selection with an expected contract award targeted for spring of this year. Desired initial operational capability is third quarter of FY '13 with the required IOC by second quarter of FY '15. We are building a 21st Century Air Force prepared to succeed strategically, operationally and tactically. These highly capable and lethal aviation programs bring global vigilance, global reach and global power to the joint fight. They are critical enablers to the joint force.

REP. MURTHA: Thank you very much. Just a couple of things that I wanted to comment on. One, we talk about a stable ability to buy for industry and for the military. Last year, we in our negotiation with the Senate, had to cut out one E-2D, the advanced Hawkeye. We're going to see since you use this in Iraq the Navy uses that Hawkeye, we're going to see if we can work that out in the supplemental since it's something that is used in the battle group flying in the war zone.

The second is the F-22's -- you know, we need an answer. I never believed they'd build the 600 and some that they said they were going to buy in the first place. One of the complaints I've had over and over again is the military consistently asks for more than they know they're going to get because it cuts the price down when you average it out, but we have to pick up the tab.

We do need as soon as possible answers on these things. And I know it's not your fault. I know it's OSD and OMB they're making a decision now. But it makes it very difficult for us to do a supplemental, do another supplemental and then at the same time come up with a base bill. So I don't know what kind of influence you two have on the process, but we need some answers. We were supposed to get them last week. We were supposed to get them this week. The staff director now tells me that it will probably be next Friday before we get the details so that we can go forward with recommending to the subcommittee.

Bill and I have always counseled very closely before recommending to the subcommittee and then go to the full committee with this supplemental. So we know you're in a difficult position, but we need the information so we can do a more thorough job in making sure we're getting the most cost effective programs.

Mr. Young.

REP. YOUNG: Mr. Chairman, the -- I'm looking for some good news today. As I read your testimonies and I listen to what you tell us I'm not sure there is a lot of good news here. We hear about the Joint Strike Fighter is having developmental problems and cost overruns. You're talking about buying more Joint Strike Fighters, but the program is not as robust as we'd like it to be. F-22, as Chairman Murtha has just said, we're not sure where you are on the F-22 program. The B-52 is pretty old and we're talking about trying to make it live a little bit longer because B-1 has problems, B-2 has some problems. Tell us some good news.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: I believe the progress we need on the Joint Strike Fighter as an example is absolutely critical to the Navy of the future. We need that program to IOC in 2012 for our IOC for the Marine Corps, they're still - (inaudible) - and for 2015 for the Navy. We built our force on that and indications as we move forward now while the JSF has -- variants have slipped somewhat in production as they go forward. The quality has been good. We need to keep that stable and keep going with the program. As we get into it, I think we'll find more and more stability and better performance as we get deeper into the program, sir.

That's part of this about the need to recapitalize, if you will, our strike fighter to get the fifth generation fighters that we'll need in the future; and to get the stable production going. Where we see that stable production we see success stories. I believe you will see that the Hornet case of the ENF, the buyout of that success story, that program and proceeding into the Growler, where we put the Growler and melded it into the multi year, the ENF so we could take advantage of the -- basically building off of the F-18F, lot 30 with missionized (ph) to the Growler was a significant step forward that allows us to bring that program forward.

The P-8 is another example, I think a pretty significant step -- the first time we've taken and produced into a commercial line, into a militarized variant of P-3, which is a replacement for P-3. That aircraft, as I mentioned, nine years from comset (ph) development fielding is when you look at some of these other timelines, pretty significant, sir. And it is moving along well. It's on costs; it's meeting its objectives as we go forward. So there is another example for you as well.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Mr. Young, if I could comment on a couple of programs. First of all, in the area of urgent operational needs which granted are not generally new weapon systems, but they are improvements to existing weapon systems. We've had an incredible amount of success over the last year providing urgent needs for the war fighter to enhance the capability of weapon systems be it the targeting pods on the B-1 with the laptop interface in the cockpit is an interim step towards integration. Be it secure or beyond-line-of- sight radios to the F-15E's, the A-10's and the F-16's that are operating in the high terrain of Afghanistan.

Be it the joint air drop -- precision air drop system that is essentially a GPS-guided pallet for delivery of supplies. Or fielding of variations of weapons typically laser-guided, GPS-guided weapons combined to give us a moving target capability. But beyond that when you think about something like the F-22 program we have a mature production line for the F-22 that's delivering aircraft on or ahead of schedule. And many of them are coming along as zero defect aircraft. As we get that aircraft fielded and into the hands of the young aviators, who are now learning how to employ those weapons systems, we're discovering all kinds of new things about what we can do with the F-22, which then we have to take and fold back into our tactics, techniques and procedures to most effectively take advantage of what we have.

The F-35 is at a very critical point right now because we're somewhat past midway in the system design and development phase. But we're right on the ragged edge of the beginning of the flight test program with all of the flight test aircraft, the developmental test aircraft to be delivered out this year. When it comes to a prediction about what the future of the F-35 holds, those predictions are based on assumptions. Those assumptions typically are based on some kind of best practice that we have in our cost estimating or scheduling paradigms.

We will find out whether those assumptions are valid or not beginning over this year as those flight test aircraft are delivered. Meanwhile that program does have an incredibly robust laboratory and development lab infrastructure including that cooperative avionics test bed, which is going to go a long way towards maturing the avionics and bypassing many of the problems we've had on earlier weapons systems in their development.. Taking care of that risks reduction early so that we are surprised by fewer things as we move forward into the program.

REP. YOUNG: Well I thank both of you for those reports that appear to be somewhat positive. What worries me and I would be very honest with you, there are some in the Congress and some in the government who have stated openly that they believe that some of these aircraft that we're talking about are Cold Ward relics and that we'll never need them again. Of course nobody can be sure of that. It's not only important but it's absolutely essential that we are able to maintain complete control of any error over the battlefield.

And so, I think you'll find this subcommittee is prepared to do whatever it is that we need to do to be supportive of decisions that you make. But it's important that you do make those decisions. I know that sometimes the decision is not entirely up to each one of you as individuals. But it just -- it seems like we're just going around in some circles here. Maybe that's just a feeling that I have and maybe that's totally not accurate.

But we need to keep these airplanes going; we need to get them into robust programs. We need to get them into the inventory and we need to be -- if we never have to use them we should be thankful. But in the event that we have to use them, we sure as heck better have them. So any way, I'm here to support keeping this Navy aviation and United States Air Force more capable than ever.

We'll have some specific questions as we go through the hearing this morning, but just my general thoughts. Thank both of you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. MURTHA: Go over the F-22 again because last year we put money for advanced procurement in to make sure the line didn't come to a stop. It sounds like you're saying the line is going well and our concern had been that if that line closed down and we made the wrong decision then it would be very expensive down the road. Now, what do we have to do this year to make sure until a decision is made? If they keep putting this decision off, is there something we need to do in the supplemental?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Mr. Chairman, the Air Force obviously supports the secretary of defense's position on bridging the production line until a decision can be made attributable to the new administration. And that in fact is what's in place right now. The Defense Department has --

REP. MURTHA: Let me make sure from a technical standpoint, this subcommittee understands. You're saying that last year's money or we'll need more money this year in order to have the bridge?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: I'm talking about the '09 money to take care of the four aircraft that are currently in lot 10, the proposed lot 10. The action was taken between last November and just a few weeks ago to make sure that the production line for those four aircraft is preserved. Now this is advance procurement money so we're not actually building those aircraft yet.

REP. MURTHA: I understand.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: But it's advance procurement money to lay in the initial supply chain, if you will, for the components that would be built up eventually into F-22 aircraft.

REP. MURTHA: So subcontractors are a problem.

If you don't have that money the subcontractors start to go away; is that basically the technical problem?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: It's actually the supplier base before you even get to the subcontractors, but yes, sir.

REP. MURTHA: That's what I'm talking about the supplier base which is the subcontractors that if they don't have the advance procurement money, it dries up, we've got the same problem we had if we shut down the line. We want to start it back up again.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, if we reach a point where they do not consider the future of the program to be solid enough for them to continue building whatever component they're providing. Then we wind up with a break in that supplier base and that's what we're protecting right now for those four aircraft.

REP. MURTHA: Okay.

Mr. Visclosky.

REP. PETER J. VISCLOSKY (D-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I want to ask about the alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. For the last three years, the committee has directed the department to fund an alternative engine and it provided about $1 billion. And each year, the department has elected not to follow the direction. With 2,000 jets you don't think competition would help as far as pricing and reliability?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Sir, while the Air Force and certainly the Defense Department support the notion of competition as being good, particularly in the manner of saving dollars for the taxpayer, the business case analysis that we have at this point, that the Defense Department has supported shows that we would not be saving money by bringing on that second engine. So in spite of the potential for competition, the business case doesn't support it at this point. And therefore, the department doesn't support the second engine.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Could you explain the rationale of that report basically as for the thesis?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: There are several elements that go into that. Part of it is the investment required early on for the continued development of the second engine. Those dollars were they sourced out of the existing program, would be at the expense of dollars going towards production of aircraft, which has a side effect of increasing the unit costs on an annual basis for those aircraft making them less affordable at that time. Likewise, the learning curve which has a direct impact on the unit cost of the engines be it the primary engine or an alternate engine gets shallowed (ph) out sooner, therefore, we don't save as much from a learning perspective in the increased production of the original engine. When you factor those items together, the cost benefit does not equal a favorable number.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Am I correct in understanding that the engine that will be used to power the Marine Corps variant of the Joint Strike Fighter experienced significant problems over the last year, which delayed the first flight?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: The problems experienced with the engine related to blades have been resolved and the engines now are in, as I mentioned before, the BF-1 and BF-2 are both proceeding on towards flight testing as we go now. Those were and the Pratt and Whitney engines were resolved and what was the cause of the blade failure. The blade failures were problems that were resolved last year.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Is the contractor still waiting for a certified engine?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: On the 135, the Pratt and Whitney engine continues to go through tests, some 11,000 hours on 16 engines. And the program continues to move forward on the development of that engine.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Is the contractor waiting for a certified engine?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The engine is certified. It's in the aircraft and the aircraft is on the Hover Pit beginning initial evaluations in the short-takeoff, vertical-land mode. Not yet having flown in that mode.

REP. VISCLOSKY: So the engine is certified to begin short- takeoff and vertical- landing testing?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir, it is.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. MURTHA: Both the House and the Senate feel very strongly about the alternative engine. I can remember years ago when Pratt and Whitney was having big problems with one of their engines. We put GE engines in and that saved the day. We had an alternative to it. That's why this subcommittee feels so strongly, our experience is there are times when you need not only competition, but you need something out there.

So we feel very strongly about this and I know your answer was well it comes out of production. That's not the point, at some point the competition, we feel in a long period of time as long as these airplanes run, as long as we have these programs going, that we feel it would be actually cost effective to have the competition. So we expect the Air Force to eventually build this alternative engine.

REP. RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN (R-NJ): Maybe competition -- good morning, gentlemen, from another perspective. What the Russians are doing, what the Chinese are doing, Indian capabilities. I mean some of the things that happened in the Taiwan Strait in just the last week or so I don't like the notion that we'd ever be in a position where we wouldn't be able to exert our superiority.

The Joint Strike Fighter can you talk a little bit about its dog fighting ability either of you? I understand, you know, I'm still a -- have a good memory of going out to Langley and obviously I think that the Raptors is a remarkable plane. But the Raptor has stealth, the Joint Strike Fighter has less stealth, but I'm interested in sort of air-to-air combat capability vis-a-vis what our adversaries have in terms of capabilities.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Sir, the F-22 and F-35 are really complimentary in that --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Oh, I know they're complimentary; they're part of our team.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: What the F-35 lacks that the F-22 has is altitude capability, speed capability and a certain amount of agility. While it has an air-to-air weapons capability in the internal-carriage mode, that is nothing to shy away from.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: How many air-to-air missiles does the Joint --

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Internally four AIM-120 AMRAAMs.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: And that's internal?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Internal, yes, sir.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: And so, for additional capability you'd have to have things on the outside of the aircraft; is that right?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, to add the heat-seeking missile, the AIM-9X that would be external carriage.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: And when you do that, obviously you have a bigger footprint, I assume, right? Whatever the stealth capability is you've somewhat minimized.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Well, any change to the outside of the aircraft has a negative effect generally on low observables.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: How does that aircraft compare with its -- shall we say the foreign competition, our likely adversaries? What are the Russians and Chinese doing? Because the issue here to me is that, you know, there are a lot of what we call integrated air defense systems out there. I just sort of wonder whether you know what the capability of the Joint Strike Fighter is vis-a-vis those types of defense capabilities that our adversaries have and that seem to be proliferating.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, the comparative nature with the foreign weapons systems is something outside of my specific area. So we could get back to you with a direct comparison if you'd like. From an acquisition perspective, the things that the F-35 brings, the stealth capability is important because the foreign competitors do not have that. The integrated avionics are important because the foreign competitors haven't reached that stage yet. Now when you combine those things with the, particularly the stealth with the avionics, with the weapons systems --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: You're talking about the Joint Strike Fighter here?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The F-35, yes, sir. When you combine those things, you do put the F-35 in an advantageous sense even if it's in a maneuvering capacity on par with an international competitor. Because he'll be able to engage prior to a visual fight where the maneuverability becomes more significant.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: But if you add things that are not internal, you obviously have a bigger, you know, for those that are -- the air defense systems have some ability to sort of -- to spot you; don't they?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The air defense systems, the surface-to-air missiles particularly the higher end, newer air defense systems that are proliferating around will have a much more difficult time finding an F-35 than any fourth generation --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Even with all the add-ons that are not internal in your footprint? Your footprint isn't larger?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Once you reach a phase of the battle where you can afford to add external stores to the F-35, then those integrated air defense systems are less significant. The early portions of the battle when the clean airplane, that is, it's smallest signature most important. And those are the times when you would prefer not to add external stores.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SANFORD D. BISHOP (D-GA): Thank you very much, gentlemen.

General Shackelford, I know you can't speak for the FY '10 proposed budget. We've seen some press reports, some quoting the chairman of the joint chiefs are discussing a new number for the F- 22's combat requirement of at least 243, 250. Can you discuss this new so-called moderate this number and whether it's backed up by some classified campaign-based analysis? In an unclassified manner obviously can you explain why the Air Force needs more than 183, the tactical air fighter mix?

And some people have suggested that the F-22 and the F-35 are the same thing. Can you -- of course the Air Force's response is that they are complimentary and they're different. Can you explain how they are different and how they are complimentary in the context of your need for additional F-22's?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, and thank you for your interest in those fifth generation fighters. The chief of staff of the Air Force has previously said that 381 are too many and 183 are not enough. What comes out as the new number -- he's reserved the right to bring to the secretary of defense -- and I expect some number to come out of the budget when it's released next month.

As to how we judge those numbers and over time how we have changed the numbers, a great deal of analysis goes on in the background using scenarios that have various assumptions as to what is going to take place in the scenario and what force structure is brought to that scenario. And so it's more than just a single weapons system scenario. And in this case, it would include both F-22's and F-35's. As that analysis takes place, part of the calculus, if you will, is what level of risks is there in accomplishing the national military strategy given those scenarios and how the scenarios interact.

So depending on how you judge what is acceptable risks that will lead you to some number. And that number, that sort of number is what contributes to changing requirements.

REP. BISHOP: What is the difference in the F-22 and the F-35?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Both aircraft bring stealth technology, integrated avionics, advanced weapons systems, maneuverability. The F-22 is optimized from a super cruise maneuverability or agility perspective and Sensor Suite for air-to-air battle. It has air-to- ground capability in a supplemental sense, which is growing through the modernization program. The F-35 has less performance but a much different Sensor Suite optimized for detecting and identifying targets on the ground with a much larger weapon load out albeit external at some point once you get to a phase in the battle that you can afford to carry external stores.

So complimentary in nature that both of them have the ability to take on an integrated-air-defense system, with the advantage really being initially for the F-22. But as we move farther into that battle, the F-35's strengths in terms of persistent ground attack will start to carry the day in terms of supporting the rest of the joint force.

REP. BISHOP: Thank you. Let's switch gears for a moment and talk about the combat search and rescue helicopter program. The Air Force has said that the combat search and rescue helicopter replacement program is the second highest priority behind only the tanker replacement program. What's the status of the Defense proposal versus driving the need for the new combat search and rescue helicopter? And will these assets continue to be low density, high demand, or will we buy enough and accrue them sufficiently so that they become a part of the Air Force's expeditionary force?

And the secretary of defense has started to use the combat search and rescue assets to assists in medical evacuations in Afghanistan. How does that differ from the traditional combat search and rescue missions? And how will this impact the number of aircraft that are required by the Air Force as some of them will be recast for medical evacuations?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The combat search and rescue CSAR-X helicopter program is in source selection right now. We're expecting a contract award late this spring and it's moving forward. That program replaces 101 HH-60G's, our present CSAR helicopter with 141 aircraft bringing to mind two issues sufficiency in numbers and capability. The number change from 101 to 141 intended to get out of the low density, high demand category. The capability changes for the new helicopter intended to address shortfalls that the current HH-60G has in performing the mission.

These will be self protection, the load out it can carry, how it handles higher elevations, as we're seeing in the Afghanistan type of theater range. So those are all addressed through this acquisition program.

REP. : (Off mike.)

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir. When it comes to the role of combat search and rescue, this is a long time role that the Air Force has taken on and it differs from the use of helicopters in say a general utility role. Typically, the medical evacuation mission is more of a general utility type of role for any helicopter and they're so tasked either out of the Army or the Air Force.

Combat search and rescue is a riskier, much more offensive and self-protected type of mission. And today's CSAR helicopters are called upon in a theater when there is a medevac mission that is in a higher risks type of context maybe the low visibility or night, for instance, where the special equipment onboard those helicopters and the special training of the personnel is valuable for a personnel recovery.

REP. MURTHA: I appreciate that line of questioning because this committee has been in the forefront trying to make sure you have what you need. And we just found out it takes 72 minutes to get an injured person in an average, in Afghanistan to the hospital. And therefore, our death-to-injury ratio is much higher in Afghanistan than it is in Iraq. We went out to Nellis, I sent staff out, I went out to Nellis.

We put $100 million, as you know, to upgrade. And we know that the Air Force is involved in trying to help the Army in increasing the number of medevac helicopters in Afghanistan. So we're in the forefront on this issue. We think it is as important as anything that you could possibly do.

Mr. Kingston.

REP. JACK KINGSTON (R-GA): Thank you Mr. Chairman.

I have a few questions for the admiral and then one for the Air Force. The first question, admiral, and I'll just go through them. You say you have a shortfall of 125 aircraft. And I was wondering how you get those numbers, just generally? For example, does it include your grounded aircraft? You have 39 P-3's that are grounded.

And then, I guess along that line, you have 157 P-3's. How many does it take to track a sub? How do you decide how many P-3's you actually need? And also, did we ever figure out what the Chinese learned when they seized the P-3? And then finally, do you feel like the Prowlers are going to be okay for five more years, ten more years, or is that something we should start focusing on?

And then, general, I have a question for you on the F-22 on the performance-based logistic contracts. Where will that work be done and what is the cost effectiveness of that? How much money does that save to the taxpayers to have it done by a contractor? And as I understand it, that business model did not come before the contract was signed. If the contract was signed, and then we're working up the cost effectiveness of it? And that's not an unfriendly question; I just wanted to know more about it in general.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Congressman, thank you for the questions. First let me begin by saying that as we are here today, future force requirements are under review and will be subject to further - (inaudible).

But to your question, when you raise specifically addressing a shortfall. You also talked about 125 aircraft and then mentioned P- 3's. When we talk about shortfall, the strike fighter shortfall would be one piece. We have shortfalls in other areas, for example, P-3's as you get red stripped to the P-3's, which is basically taking P-3's offline due to fatigue and other things in life. We need to do some additional maintenance on them. As we take those aircraft offline that creates a shortfall.

So let me address, first again emphasizing that future force structure is under review and I can only, but as an acquisition person, I'll address what specifically your question was so not to be evasive. At the PB (ph) '09 submission for the budge there was a force structure in place for this type of tactical aviation. That involved supporting 11 carriers, 10 air wings and three marine air wings. When you looked to that force and projected forward, with the current burn rate and projected burn rate of the aircraft on life cycle that is attendant with them, we did predict or projected out to be at that time 125 tactical aircraft short.

Your next question was how would you make that up? It's through a combination of factors where we would first insist and go after the ramp rate of the JSF to meet our 2012 and 2015 IOC's for the Marine Corps and the Navy. It is absolutely critical that we do that. And the numbers that are supported within it in the JSF program office.

The second thing we have to do is manage our existing inventory. The ENF program today, as I mentioned, is at very -- excluding (uncertain?) extremely well. The program of record for that aircraft would have 23 ENF's in the budget for the '09 budget. And additionally, the program would buyout at around 506 totally inept aircraft. When you add that to the existing A. through D. Legacy Hornets; which on -- the number of those is somewhere around 600 and some odd number of aircraft.

You say well how do you manage your shortfall then? Well these aircraft, the Hornets, had when they first came on with a notional life of 6,000 hours. We have done center-build replacements on lot 17 and below Hornets to bring them up to be able to fly to 8,000 hours. There is an additional -- every time we do these, we look at a service life assessment program that feeds into a service life extension program.

We're looking at can we get those aircraft up to 8,600 hours. To do that, would require an investment of about a half a million dollars per aircraft we estimate to get forward; and would give you about two years additional flight service. By that I mean, you're figuring notional fly rates around 30 hours per month, per aircraft. So if you do the math, it comes up about two additional years.

To fill the - (inaudible) - higher that with Legacy, you would have to go to additional hours. The question was how far could you go with the Hornets in life time? There is a SLAP analysis that was conducted. I'm getting from 8,600 to 10,000 hours. That is a significant investment it would take a significant amount of maintenance and depot work to bring those up to speed. That's not funded, that's not in the plan today, but it's being looked at to see what we do if need be.

So the third thing we do is mange by bureau number on these aircraft today. We know exactly what fatigue life is on each one of these -- in these airplanes. So when you first started into the Hornet looking at fatigue life it was wing roof we were concerned about traps (ph) and cats (ph), how many risk of landings would we get in these airplanes. We took that from 2,000 up to 2,700. Then we got into things like wing roof fatigue life issues where we had to then go into the airframe and how we would bring that along to get additional hours.

All those go forward as we do that. And we look at every individual jet what it has on it. For example, if we had Marine Hornets that had cats and traps available because they had been more shore based than at sea, but have limited flight hours, you could send them -- exchange them with Navy and Marine Corps. And then the same thing with Navy might have more hours left but not cats and traps on them because they've been at sea. So we could then look to share those as well, but bring that -- and fill that as much as we can as we go forward.

Again that's how you would manage the force to cover that shortfall. The same is true --

REP. KINGSTON: Let me -- because that's a lot longer answer than I figured. That explains it, I've got to back off though and see if I could get to talk about the Chinese and the P-3. And then, if we have time you can get to that F-22 question.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: To the P-3 question you had two (sp) force-four composition. That is dictated by combat and commanders needs throughout the world to go through in various theaters of operation of what we have. And that is what dictates our force structure for the P-3 which is -- the P-8 is a planned replacement of P-3 where a program of record would put us at a 108 requirement. That is again based on the training and equipping and providing for those squadrons as they go forward.

You said -- was there intel (ph)? I can take that for the record about the impact of the EP-3 so that I could certainly come back with that - (inaudible) -- sir.

And your last question was on Prowlers. We will continue to maintain our Prowlers as we go forward. The Navy's position is to bring -- as we're bringing on the Growler, which is a tremendously capable airplane that has 88 revisions in the program of record. It will replace, as I mentioned, our squadron of Prowlers in the Navy today. The Navy is also de-calming (ph) its expeditionary squad. And so it will be a 10, essentially 10 Growler squadrons as they come forward with IOC. And at the end of this year actually, we'll have the first squadron be an IOC on the Growler.

And then what will be the future for the Marine Corps is as we bring Growlers on the Marine Corps will keep the Prowlers in service until sundown of 2019 for them. But they are going to go to what will be in the JSF in terms of Stoval variant and that will incorporate what is the study that is kicking off this year and is funded in the '09 budget is the - (inaudible) - alternatives for the next generation jammer. So that's their plan as they go forward.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, and thank you for your question on performance-based logistics. That area in general, the supply chain is one that is ripe for continuous process improvement. And performance-based logistics contracting is the fruit of some that improvement. If I recall correctly, the F-22 performance-based logistics contract was a DOD award winner this past year for a success story.

As to the details that you're asking for there that lives more in the sustainment world than the acquisition world so I would ask if you would let me take that for the record and get back to you with the detail you're looking for.

REP. KINGSTON: Okay, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. MAURICE D. HINCHEY (D-NY): Thank you, Mr.. Chairman.

Admiral, General, it's very interesting to be here with you and to listen to your answers to these questions and the things that you're saying. I just wanted to follow up a little bit on the tactical shortfall first of all for the Navy and Marine Corps, which as I understand it, is continuing to decline. That shortfall is going up in fact, more and more aircraft are in need and not being there to deal with the circumstances that they have to deal with. The number that we're being given is 125; the shortfall is not 125 in the context of this fiscal year.

So that means that it's likely to continue to increase over the course of the end of this fiscal year and into the next. That primarily, the reason for the shortfall is the delay in the F-35, which is an aircraft of substantial priority, which is going to take on a lot of this responsibility.. I assume all of that is true. What is delaying the F-35? Why is it not coming in as quickly as it was anticipated?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Thank you for the question, Congressman Hinchey.

Without repeating myself on the shortfall, again the force structure and composition which the future is under discussion today, I'll caveat all what I say. When discussions of the strike - (inaudible) - is based on what was submitted for the PB '09 budget. And you ask a question about -- I would emphasize that the JSF as we go forward as an example, we need to have the ramp rate for the JSF as it's coming now into its production, and we see that things are a few months behind as even today from what we thought they would be. We need to get them forward.

The quality is excellent, for example, and other areas like software development we should be about 69 percent, about 70 percent or so that's tracking well. So there are areas of the program that are doing extremely well and we want to continue them. What matters is to get into production ramp rates that delivers in a stable quantity that we can count on to deliver forward.

The more you slide out to the right on those things then obviously we're not having the numbers to fill our air wings as we go forward. So we have to plan accordingly. And I think the indication last year was when we had -- the - (inaudible) budget had for one a long lead for one carrier sea variant as an example. We had put in for four and it was basically reduced to one. Subsequently, the Congress took action to put an ATR on the official reprogramming to return those three aircraft long lead material for AP.

That allows us then to not have to slide the IOC as the Navy variance for example, that's critical. So the answer to your question is that it's essential that we maintain the future procurement of the JSF to fill our air wings. And that we manage very closely the Legacy fleet to match up with that.

REP. HINCHEY: Well we fully understand that. And part of the situation that is causing concern of course is the additional pressure that is put on the existing airplanes. As an example of that the F- 15, which fell apart while it was in flight. I think it was sometime last year. So whether or not anything like that is likely to occur of course is a significant issue that we have to deal with.

That is one of the reasons why I'm sure that you're doing everything you can to press for that F-35 to move as quickly as possible.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

REP. HINCHEY: I just wanted to ask a question about the combat search and rescue helicopter that you had talked about just a few moments ago.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

REP. HINCHEY: You said that the contract for that is going to be coming into effect sometime later this spring?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir, our intent is to award the contract late this spring.

REP. HINCHEY: And what do you anticipate about that? Do you know where that contract is going? And do you now what are the context, what's the context of that contract? How rapidly do you anticipate that these new combat search and rescue helicopters are going to be put into play?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: In terms of timing, the initial operational capability for the helicopter is intended to be between the third quarter of FY '13 and the second quarter of '15. So a contract award this spring will lead to about four years from now initial operational capability.

REP. HINCHEY: So you're feeling comfortable with that?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Yes, sir.

Congressman, to answer you one thing, it's similar but not exactly the same in terms of combat SAR (ph) would be the Navy capitalizing on its combat SAR assets on the carriers and the ESG's and the carrier strike groups. That's mentioned before from Mr. Young with what's some good news stories we can hear. The Romeo and Sierra programs are doing extremely well. The Romeo which replaces our - (inaudible) - surface and our submarine hilo (ph) assets at sea. Thirty aircraft delivered and as we go forward this year 254 is in the program of record. The Sierra is our combat SAR for the carriers and the expedition strike groups as you go forward. And those are part of a multi-year would be Army that produces the 60 series in general. So it's Romeo the Sierras and the Army.

That multi-year has been extremely beneficial. As we go forward, we're about 18 - (inaudible) - sustaining rate on the Sierras, but that will deliver our capability there. So not the same hilo but it is a combat so when you mention combat SAR that is what the Navy is booting out in that aircraft which will fill that need for us.

REP. HINCHEY: I thank you very much, gentlemen.

REP. KAY GRANGER (R-TX): Thank you. This is a question to both you gentlemen.

General, given the Air Force's FY '13 IOC requirement, and the Navy is, the Marines is FY '12 and Navy FY '15. How important is it that the F-35 production stay on track and be allowed to ramp up efficiently to high-rate production in order to stay affordable?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Ma'am, thank you for that. It's absolutely critical that the F-35 stay on track. Presently the Air Force plan is to ramp to 80 for the conventional take off and landing F-35A by FY '15. The production line could handle as many as 110 were we able to get to that or a total of roughly 240 for the entire A. B. and C. production line. Were we able to ramp to 110 in the Air Force that would deliver the Air Force's compliment of presently program of record 1,763 seven years early and it would save the combined program $13 billion.

Affordability is one of the pillars of the F-35 program. The more we can keep it on track the more we can buy at economic rates, the more economical and affordable it'll be.

REP. GRANGER: (Inaudible.)

ADM. ARCHITZEL: I can only echo those comments. As we've said before, the JSF is critical to the Navy and the Marine Corps as the program record for the Department of the Navy, it's 680 aircraft.

That's how we split that as we go forward into - (inaudible)- structure will determine what the exact numbers fall out to be or whether between the Stovall and Sea Varian, but in the '09 budget with the El-Rep 3, seven Stovall long lead with additional event procurement for '14 budget, rather, and also, as I mentioned, the long lead for the CV Varian, so it's absolutely critical that we maintain those on track for the 2012, correct on the 2012 IOC for the Marine Corps and 2015 for the Navy.

REP. GRANGER: I have a follow-up question also having to do with cost. The GAO annually expresses concerns about concurrency in programs, and while it's true there's an overlap of development and production of the F-35, isn't it also true that this makes the programs more affordable and the lessons learned in the F-22, as well as significant investment in laboratory and infrastructure, has significantly reduced the risk of overlap in the F-35 program?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Ma'am, when the F-35 program first started back in 2001, the acquisition strategy was recognized as having a fair amount of concurrency and that was accepted by the enterprise, if you will, as an opportune way to move the weapons system forward. That, granted, provides a certain level of risk in terms of production before we are complete with development.

On the other hand, what it allows us to do is take advantage of reduced prices, unit cost, by increasing the production numbers early in the program and perhaps in a purer sense, if you tried to actually split the development and the production, the implications for industry in terms of a break in production and the expertise required to build the airplanes would be catastrophic in terms of the cost implications.

And to mitigate that in the case of the F-35, as we move forward on an annual basis or more often, when we're discussing the program with the defense acquisition executive, each phase of the program has entrance criteria or exit criteria that play into the maturation of the development of the product, so we have frequent opportunities to pause if we see something coming along that is going to be a major developmental issue for the aircraft. But in the general sense, that tradeoff between affordability and risk, if you will, is cooked into the F-35 program from the start.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: I think, Congresswoman Granger, a question also went to, as we've already mentioned, the idea of stability in anything we're going to acquire is always helpful both for long lead material, for economic quantity, for industrial base considerations and produceability, so - and when we -(inaudible) - that and when you change those quantities or change those ramp rates, it has an impact because we have to deal with it at that point, so from an acquisition standpoint if we know we have a stable amount we're going to buy and we can then translate that to industry and they can count on that investment, they can make investments in their lines. They can make investments and that gives them that return on investment that they're sure they are going to have.

When we start to pre-debate that, then that has an impact. Of course, we also need the same thing back from industry, which is when you say you're going to produce these we need to have them come out in the numbers you say and the quality that we need them, which we're seeing in the case of JSF.

REP. GRANGER: Thank you. I thank you both. Thank you.

REP. CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young and the rest of the subcommittee for your dedication, understanding and intellect of the entire Department of Defense. I'm just amazed, having sat here now for a month or so and watched all of you, and I want to put that on the record. I am most proud, most proud of you. Thank you, sir, and to the Admiral and the General, same to you, sir, to the both of you. As I sat here and prepared for the hearing last night, it's probably the most technical in terms of technicalities and what you need to know in this business, and I want to commend you both as the acquisition men for your services as you represent them well, your knowledge and all of that.

But then let's talk about the Joint Striker Force as well as the F-35. Eight years, 13 in total. As we move to Afghanistan and we talk about the Joint Striker Force fighters and their coordination, the F-fighters, will we have enough? Will we be able to - because the 35 is not readily available, will we have what we need as we move into Afghanistan? Different terrain, different type of equipment and fighters necessary? As the acquisition chiefs in your services, can we meet it? Can we meet the demand? Will our soldiers be safe? Will we have what we need to secure them first and then to - I don't know what you'd call "win" because there's no win in any of this to me.

Just - can you comment just a bit on that, first in terms of equipment and capability and protection of our men and women who will be on the ground and in the air and in the water?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Congresswoman Kilpatrick. Thank you. I appreciate it. We don't often get the acquisition people being told what a good job we're doing, so we appreciate that. (laughter.) But I will say that as we look forward to your question, which is a good one, again, we are in a position where we really don't know what the next future force levels will be, so we're basing things on the here and now, today.

So, but to your comment, it would be, as an acquisition force, we have to look across the board, both in-service and future, and what we're buying and procuring will be out there, so to the question you have on Afghanistan, per se, we have to deal with what we have today. To that aspect of it, I would tell you we take great pains to make sure that we maintain our aircraft in a vigilant way to make sure that we take care of our - the people flying those airplanes and maintaining them, that they're the best equipment we can have so -- we don't have a fair fight. We're not looking for a fair fight; we're looking for a fight we can win.

And so, we keep our war fighters in mind. I've had command of Theodore Roosevelt and a squadron of aircraft and General Shackelford has had his own experiences operationally, as well, and we - I know what it means to be out there and in harm's way, so we look to that today. And we mentioned the maintaining of the strike fighters today, the ENF, the Hornets, the A through D, as well. We have to make sure we maintain those aircraft so that they can go forward, whereas -- it's not just the fighters either, but it's across the board, whether it's the aircraft we introduce into the theater today, aircraft like the B-22s they go in, whatever it happens to be, we want to make sure we actually have capable aircraft that are ready and can perform the mission needed at the time they're needed, so thank you for your question.

REP. KILPATRICK: Thank you, Sir.

GEN. MARK SHACKELFORD: Ma'am, if I may comment, your Air Force today is perfectly capable of responding when the combatant commander calls and asks for force structure to support the joint mission, which we are very capable of doing to the extent that we're called on in Afghanistan, which, from an Air Force perspective, could largely be thought of from a fighter perspective, is the ability to support the joint operation - (inaudible).

We use the F-15E, the A-10 and the F-16 to do that, and we have ample force structure to meet the needs. From an acquisition perspective, it brings to mind keeping those aircraft relevant for that particular kind of fight and the types of challenges that we've run into in Afghanistan are primarily related to the elevation, the high terrain, line of sight kind of problems when we have ground forces that are down in valleys and they either have to communicate or have to get air support, which is available and on-call, so acquisition-wise, what we've done is equipped those types of aircraft with radios that use satellite communication to overcome the terrain issues.

They're also secure to deal with possible jamming or intrusion by some bad guy that would want to do that. We've also deployed a communications gateway, a high altitude platform that is able to communicate with multiple types of radios. They're various varieties of radios and data links that don't all speak the same language, so to speak. Well, this gateway speaks all of them and translates so that we can get that direct communication between the striker aircraft and the folks on the ground, either the engaged troops or the - (inaudible) - air patrols.

REP. KILPATRICK: Are we far more superior than our adversaries -(inaudible) -- where we can beat this, even as we beef up our numbers and all that you've mentioned, are we more superior than the adversary we'll be fighting?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: I would suggest to you that the sophistication we can bring to the fight would be superior to what the adversary can bring, but, again, we have to think about the type of fight, the irregular warfare that's going on there.

REP. KILPATRICK: It's totally different.

GEN. SHACKLEFORD: Because we have to --

REP. KILPATRICK: It already is.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: We have to make sure we're relevant to that contest.

REP. KILPATRICK: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. MAURICE HINCHEY (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. Let me ask you about the F-15. While we're waiting on the F-22s and the 35s and whatever else, you still have to utilize and rely upon the F-15. And when, in December '07, one of them crashed, you grounded all of the F-15 aircraft. Where do we stand now with the F-15s and are you sure you've got it right?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, that mishap, which was early November, resulted in the grounding of the F-15 fleet and a subsequent determination that the F-15Es, the newer airplanes, average about 18 years old, were not at risk because of a different structure, so they were taken out of the equation immediately.

The older F-15 A through Ds, average age of about 27 years at this point, were the culprit, resulted in a great deal of structural analysis that grounded nine aircraft permanently, though five of those - four of those - four or five of them -- we were able to go and repair that Longeron. We retired the other aircraft, but only nine were ultimately at risk of the same type of failure.

Following the analysis, it led to an establishment of safety of flight, the fleet was cleared for operation and it has no performance limitations based on that problem with the Longeron. There are additional inspections, an additional load on the maintenance personnel to make sure that we don't have a recurrence of that particular event. It also led to a resurgence, if you will, in the aircraft structural integrity program for the F-15, which we've got on contract now for a structural teardown of one of the aircraft, and starting on the contract later this summer a full scale fatigue test which we'll carry out over time and will inform us as to what other potential issues we may have for the F-15 in the future, considering that we plan to keep 176 what are termed Golden Eagles out into the mid-2020s.

REP. HINCHEY: So are the CMVs flying now?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir. The fleet is flying with no restriction based on that Longeron problem.

REP. HINCHEY: And the CMVs, those were the nine that you repaired?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, Sir. They were As, Bs, Cs and Ds.

REP. HINCHEY: And you've determined that the Es do not have that same problem?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir. The structure on the E, because it's built as a mission, a two-seater plane as opposed to the one seat, which for training versions had a second seat applied to it. Different structure in the Longeron area so the design flaw that contributed to the mishap doesn't exist in the E model.

REP. HINCHEY: Now, what will happen to the F-15s? What's the prognosis of that aircraft?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: As I mentioned, we have some of them identified as Golden Eagles, those will be the 176 that continue to receive all of the modernization updates over time so that they remain as relevant as possible out into the mid-2020s. The rest will eventually come to a retirement date that'll be part of the overall force structure planning for the Air Force.

REP. HINCHEY: Well, when the F-22 comes into play, will the Golden Eagle be replaced, supplanted by the 22?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: We'll have all of our program of record F-22s by the end of 2011, so there will be a significant amount of time while the F-15 is still in the force structure, out to the 2020s, so they'll exist in parallel for quite a long time.

REP. HINCHEY: Do you foresee that the E might have some structural fatigue that beset the C?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: At this point I'm unaware of any structural issues with the E model, but that is part of that overall aircraft structural integrity program that will go out and look for those kinds of potential problems.

REP. HINCHEY: So you'll keep a sharp eye on that?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir.

REP. HINCHEY: I mean, these planes are getting pretty old.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir.

REP. HINCHEY: In fact, the C goes back to what, 1972? Early to mid-seventies was the beginning of the F15A program.

REP. HINCHEY: Thank you, General.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman.

REP. MURTHA: Mr. Rogers.

REP. HAROLD ROGERS (R-KY): We're hearing something about I think it's a contractor proposal on something called the Silent Eagle. What can you tell us about that, General?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Sir, I've read those newspaper articles just like you have. That particular proposal from the contractor is intended to provide a limited amount of stealth capability to the international business market, as I understand it, not intended to be a competition for anything existing within the U.S. inventory at this point.

REP. ROGERS: The Navy's Grower program with the F-18 seems to be doing very well. Is the Golden Eagle program on target time-wise and cost-wise? Is it where you want it to be?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: To my knowledge, it is healthy. I will go back and get specific details on that and report back to you.

REP. ROGERS: Okay. Thank you. - (inaudible)

REP. RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN: Need to focus on the stealth issues here. Can you comment a little bit about the F-22 low observable problems. I know that a lot of materials were applied to the aircraft. Can you talk about -- there were some problems?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: And have they've been addressed?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: As low observable maintenance plays into the overall mission capable rate for the F-22, yes, there have been some issues and we are learning a lot about the F-22 through those.

I might comment that --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Is it manning and materials?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, it's both. The situation in the field is, and particularly at Langley Air Force Base, where the MC rate dipped quite severely, the result of a combination of events that had to do with an upcoming inspection moving experienced maintenance personnel out to the new sites at Elmendorf and Holleman, a general new experience level within the maintenance community. However, those decisions that were made to favor training pilots because of the number that they had there and in lieu of keeping up with the LO maintenance did not yield aircraft that were not combat capable.

Certainly, if we had been called on to deploy at that point, we would have taken the time to fine tune every aircraft that was going to deploy. The details of that situation and specific numbers are over in the operational realm. If you'd like details on that, I can get those for you on the record. Now, from an acquisition perspective --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Well, it's such a superior (laughs) plane, you know?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: We want to make sure that, you know, it's the top of the line.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir, and it absolutely is. Now we can make choices when it comes to how much time we're going to set an airplane down to fine tune the signature of it, and that's how I would describe a lot of this decision process.

From an acquisition perspective, what we have is an aircraft that is 53,000, maybe 58,000 hours into its lifetime, so it's still what we would consider to be immature, so we're learning lots of new things about particularly LO maintenance and the materials, which we fold back into changes in those materials to move towards the 100,000 hour maturity point that's been designated to occur probably late next year, where we have a mean time between maintenance key performance parameter to meet, and we project to beat that with these changes. But in a similar notion, taking that learning and applying it to the F-35, which will also be a flight line maintained LO platform will help us overcome some of these issues --

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: But there has been some criticism from the lack of stealth with the joint strike fighters. There's certain vulnerabilities in terms, in that regard, isn't that accurate?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The signature of the F-35 is similar to the F- 22.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: The signature is that similar?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: It's very similar.

REP. FRELINGHUYSEN: Well, I thought the F-22 was pretty invisible. I thought there were certain vulnerabilities. Okay, well, thank you very much.

REP. MURTHA: Mr. Visclosky.

REP. PETER J. VISCLOSKY (D-IN): Chairman, thank you very much. Admiral and General, by statute, major acquisition programs are required to have an independent cost estimate conducted as part of the acquisition process, but there's no statute that directs the Department to actually fund that independent estimate. Several programs are not funded to the estimate but to a lower confidence level. One of those programs, and there are others, are the joint strike fighter program. What factors are considered in funding a program to a lower confidence level than that provided by an independent cost estimate?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: The factors that go into cost estimating - (inaudible) - the produceability, the affordability, the things that go into materials that go into the bids that would come forward, what is the confidence in those bids, et cetera? What's our confidence in the vendor's ability to produce, so when you talk about confidence factors in terms of cost estimating, you get into probability of curves about where would you want to fund the airplane in terms of probability of meeting or not meeting a certain cost estimate, so the many, many factors that go into that run the full range from the produceability aspect on the producing side to the material side to the actual labor rates and things that go into how much we know or don't know about those issues as we go forward and so it's a variable input that comes back to say what that would be.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Is the independent cost estimate usually followed or only followed in the breach, the independent estimating what a program's going to cost?

ADM. ARCHITZEL: I don't mean to be evasive. I would say it depends on the program and where it is versus what the services or the program's estimate would be, as well as the independent estimate and then doing the determination of where you are. And generally I would tell you that we end up following the independent estimates where they come in and say, we'll have the -- at least it's considering why -- understanding what the differences are between an estimate from the program or from the Navy or the service versus, say, a keg estimate that comes in and where we can understand those differences and we can accept risk we might determine not to go to the full keg estimate but we would understand what those differences are before we - (inaudible)--. If we can't and we believe it is, we would fund to the estimate that's there.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Is a budget consideration a factor here, where if you go to a lower confidence level as far as what the cost's going to be, you can put more program in a given budget request and worry about paying for it later?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir. If I could comment from that perspective, the independent cost estimate that we typically use comes from the OSD cost analysis and recruitment group for ACAT 1 or the larger dollar programs, and their practice is to recommend roughly a 50 percent confidence level in those numbers. Now we will typically take that and if we have the ability within our budget to, particularly at the program start-point, which is milestone B, when we go on contract for the development, what's now called engineering and manufacturing development. Our goal would be to fund that at the 80 percent confidence level and that's a new initiative, if you will, within the Air Force, one of the five things we're looking for under recapturing acquisition excellence, so getting to that point is definitely an issue of are we oversubscribed in the overall budget in terms of a lot of content and insufficient dollars to fund the confidence level we would like to?

So, there's a discipline piece on our part to pick and choose what we actually start and make sure it's funded at a high confidence level at program initiation, there at milestone B.

REP. VISCLOSKY: I'm confused as to what the high confidence level is and the 50 percent and the 80 percent.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Yes, sir.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Is that the level in the independent estimate or is that something different?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The independent estimate will produce a cost curve, where there's a probability of that being the cost based on their ability to forecast in their estimating technique. Fifty percent, which is what is typically an OST keg number essentially means there's a 50 percent probability of coming in under that cost, which also means, of course, a 50 percent probability of being over the cost. If you follow up that curve farther, there's a point where ...

REP. VISCLOSKY: Of the independent cost estimate?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Of the independent cost estimate. If you follow up that curve farther, you'll get to a point where the probability of the actual cost being below that figure is 80 percent, and that would be the desirable point for starting the program. If I could -- (inaudible) - when we talk these numbers of 50 percent probability above and below - well, on balance, if we looked at all Navy programs, we would find that most average out to be at the 50 percent level.

And when we talk about that and you talk about whether you're above or below in terms of where your cost estimate comes in, what's really important is the shape of that curve, so what does it mean to be - 50 percent is one thing, but what does it mean to be ten percent below that in a program? If it's dramatically different, that's significant, so it's not just the point where you fund the 50 percent point or the 80 percent point of a curve, but what is the fidelity that goes to generate that curve and that confidence that's there, so as you go further into a program, it gets more defined and that, if you will, the shape of that curve gets steeper because the difference between a 50 percent and an 80 percent or a ten percent would dramatically change as you know more about the program, as you go through its development and you start to learn more and more, so at the beginning of a program, when you don't know as much as you would like to have, it's there.

REP. VISCLOSKY: Can I ask you, under - let's take the presidential helicopter, you have an independent cost estimate. Is that saying, okay, per copy, here's what it's going to cost? Is that what the independent cost estimate says?

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The independent cost estimate will give the cost of the program and in that would be also - you could come out and get the average unit cost of the airplane.

REP. VISCLOSKY: But you've got the life cycle cost, too.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Right, as well as the nonrecurring and the recurring costs that go into what you have, so it's all factored as you go forward and what you provided in the estimates.

REP. VISCLOSKY: So what's the 50 percent? If they give you a life cycle cost, here's what we think it's going to cost. What's the 50 percent? I don't --

GEN. SHACKELFORD: The 50 percent would be what would be the average per unit, the average unit flyaway cost, for example, and that would be what is it going to be and what is your confidence of attaining that, so, on that particular issue?

REP. VISCLOSKY: Let me ask you a different way because I don't want to take the committee's time because I'm not following you at all.

REP. MURTHA: Let me interrupt the gentleman because I've said this over and over. Now you two are responsible for all the acquisitions, not only tactical air, but all the air. What we get from the services we get an RFP, which goes to the industry. The industry underbids it.

You exaggerate the number of airplanes you're going to buy or whatever it is you're going to buy because you know that then reduces the cost, so, whatever, the independent cost estimate doesn't mean anything because in the end we, representing the taxpayer, have to pick up the tab for your mistakes. When I say your mistakes I'm talking about just combination.

Now the helicopter, in particular, we have the problem of the White House saying in order to protect the president we have to add all these provisions. You know, I had 14 of them in here the other day trying to explain -- (laughs) -- to them, "Folks, we're not going to build this expensive helicopter. We're going to build the second version but not the first version." And we had people on this committee - all of us want to protect the president, but when they keep adding criteria to this, it really makes it very difficult for us to come up with - every program is overrun because of that.

The ship program, same thing. LCS said $180 million. We knew it was going to be a lot more than that, so it's a combination of things. The problem is, we have to pick up the tab. You mentioned stability in the program, we want stability in the program, but unless industry and the services cooperate and give us an honest estimate, then we have a real problem down the road, and so we have to make up the difference.

For instance, what happened with the E2? We had to take one out to find $150 million because of all these other things that happened in the budget - (inaudible) - so my advice is, and I know how difficult it is, to have industry not come in with an underestimation and you not to estimate you're going to build "X" number because you know you're not going to build "X" number so that we have a reasonable estimate of what's going to happen and then we can do a better job at making sure that you get the money and stabilize the program. I don't know if that answers the gentleman's question, but --

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Well, I'm in agreement with you. The other examples are the DDG 1000 program, the Advanced Extreme High Frequency Satellite program, the CVN-21 aircraft carrier, the helicopter program, and the concern I have from the budget standpoint is then every year you get the ripples where, okay, now we've got to adjust each one of these programs and, as the chairman says, now we've got to find new money, you know, recognizing many of these are unique systems and you're always going to have problems, but you've got a statute talking about independent estimate and then --

REP. MURTHA: Well, let me --

REP. VISCLOSKY: If we have the independent - why are we going through the drill?

REP. MURTHA: Let me mention on a lighter note, I see big changes in the services. I had two nephews graduate from the Naval Academy. Big changes in the Navy, but the Air Force has the biggest change. You mentioned - my grandson was at the Air Force Academy. Before we met I went out there to the Air Force Academy. They showed me the mud that these guys crawl through. They showed me the tents that they stay in. They showed me the combat obstacle courses they went through, and I was amazed. I don't know why they showed me that, to make sure that I knew how tough it was at the Academy, and then I happened to get a call from the Secretary of Defense while I was out there, about another matter. And I told him, I said, "You know, they're going through the mud, these poor guys in the Air Force, they don't ever spend any time in the mud." He said, "It wasn't like that when I was in the Air Force," and I see today an evidence of that.

I mean, a professorial response, which is good. I mean, you're the premier fighter pilot in the whole Air Force. I would never believe that if I hadn't read your biography. I mean, you're the best the Air Force has and you come up here and yet you know all these technical details. That's a pleasure, and of course, the same way. You guys got real responsibilities and I know you can't control what goes over an RFP, but we need more -- (laughs) -- honest RFPs and so the industry would be more honest so that we can judge this budget and stabilize the damn thing so we can buy in quantities that we'd like to buy so we don't have these estimates which completely distort what we're trying to do.

So, I appreciate your testimony and we appreciate your service to the country, and the committee will adjourn until 10:00 A.M. tomorrow. Thank you very much.

ADM. ARCHITZEL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GEN. SHACKELFORD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END.

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