Hearing of the Int. Terrorism, Nonprolif. and Human Rights Subcomm. of the House Int. Rel. Comm.-Al Qaeda Threat to the U.S. and its Allies
Federal News Service April 1, 2004 Thursday
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: AL QAEDA THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE ELTON GALLEGY (R-CA)
WITNESS: COFER BLACK, STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
BODY:
REP. GALLEGY: Call the hearing to order.
Today the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights is focusing its oversight responsibility on al Qaeda, which by all accounts remains the number one terrorist threat in the United States and to its people. On March 9th, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet underlined this view by warning that al Qaeda terrorists were trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction and planning spectacular attacks against the United States and its allies.
I agree that al Qaeda continues to be a dangerous threat to all of our citizens and to our interests around the world. However, I also believe that al Qaeda has fundamentally reorganized since September the 11th, 2001, and that our counterterrorism strategy needs to reflect the new al Qaeda structure and new al Qaeda strategy. Since they have lost the sanctuary in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has evolved into a much more decentralized organization, relying on either semi-autonomous cells or affiliated groups to carry out its deadly plans. Recent attacks bear out this strategy.
The May 16th, '03 suicide attacks in Casablanca that killed 45 people were carried out by attackers belonging to a local terrorist group who were recruited and trained by al Qaeda. In the November '03 suicide bomb attack in Istanbul that killed 25 people and wounded more than 300, the group that claimed responsibility, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, is linked to al Qaeda. A few days later, an attack against a bank and British consulate in Istanbul has been tied to another local terrorist group with ties to al Qaeda. Lastly, the preliminary results of the investigation of the Madrid bombings point to the involvement of Moroccan Islamic radicals who are members of the al Salafia-al-why can't we have, you know-Jihadia --
(To staff.) Is that correct? Close?
STAFF: Al Jihadia.
REP. GALLEGY: Al Jihadia-all organizations affiliated with al Qaeda.
These four attacks were executed by four different terrorist groups. However, each of these four organizations are connected either through recruitment training of Afghanistan or localist help, all tied to al Qaeda. They demonstrate that al Qaeda can inflict major casualties with smaller physical infrastructure and more decentralized operations.
Although we must still guard against a large-scale planned attack by Osama bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders, the United States must respond to the threat posed by al Qaeda-affiliated organizations.
On a related matter, I would like to also explore the extent to which al Qaeda is not only an organization but has also become an ideology. Has it spawned completely independent groups or individuals who are bent on killing Americans or citizens with pro-American countries. And are we doing enough to isolate al Qaeda and discredit the radical ideology of bin Laden as part of a long-term strategy to defeat this terrorist organization?
I would like to now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for the purposes of an opening statement. (To Rep. Sherman) And I just want to check, were you going to yield your time to Mr. Schiff or did you want to take the time?
REP. BRAD SHERMAN (D-CA): Well, what I'd like to do is yield three-quarters of the time to Mr. Schiff and confine my-I will-why don't I yield three minutes to the gentleman from Burbank.
REP. GALLEGLY: Very good. The gentleman from Burbank.
REP. SHERMAN: (Off mike.)
REP. GALLEGLY: Very good. Mr. Schiff.
REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, and Ranking Member Sherman, I want to thank you for your generously loaning me some of your time.
For millions of Americans, last week's hearings of the 9/11 commission were an opportunity to revisit the horror of September 11th. Now, two and a half years after the attacks, we're able to look back at 9/11 and the months that preceded it and ask ourselves what, if anything, we could have done to prevent that calamity that morning. This is properly a job for the 10 commissioners and I trust that their report will be comprehensive and fair, but also unsparing. The murder of 2,996 demands nothing less. Nevertheless, I'd like to offer some thoughts on the conduct of the government in the years leading up to 9/11, for it is a cautionary tale that should guide all of us in thinking about the war on terrorism. I reject those on either side of the aisle who have sought to exploit the attacks for political gain. But that does not mean that we can shrink from fulfilling our duty to exercise oversight of the conduct of the executive branch.
The commission and the joint congressional intelligence panel that investigated the terrorist attacks in 2002 have focused on a multitude of systemic and bureaucratic failures that crippled our ability to piece together the disparate bits of information that the intelligence and law enforcement communities were receiving in the spring and summer of 2001. However, I believe that the root of the problem was a combination of an inability or refusal to imagine that attacks such as those that occurred on September 11th were possible. It was a world view that did not view non-state actors as urgent threats to our national security. The testimony before the 9/11 commission, the report of the joint intelligence panel and numerous media accounts have painted a fairly clear picture of some of our policies towards al Qaeda.
And I think that at the sum of these, we know that in the summer and spring of 2001, American intelligence was picking up an incredibly high volume of information that suggested al Qaeda was planning a major attack against the United States. However, the danger posed by al Qaeda did not fit the threat paradigm that framed our view of the world. Our failure to stop 9/11, if such a thing was even possible, was not a result of bad intelligence or ill will by officials of one administration or those of another. It was, I think, a failure to imagine that such a thing was even possible.
The need to imagine that, trying to separate ourselves from the world view that guides our response to threats and information about possible threats, is especially important now. The al Qaeda of today is different from the al Qaeda of 2001. Like a virus, al Qaeda has evolved and adapted to the U.S.-led war against it. Already defused, it has become less an organization than a banner. Whereas 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, the majority of those arrested in the wake of the Madrid train station attacks were Moroccans. Two days ago, British security services arrested eight suspected terrorists and seized half a ton of ammunition-of-excuse me-ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Those arrested were Islamic extremists, but all had been born and raised in Britain. British officials said that the eight had no known connection to the al Qaeda hierarchy, but can there be any doubt that they were inspired by Osama bin Laden?
President Bush has said that the struggle against al Qaeda will be a long one. I agree with him. I also agree with Richard Clarke, who said that al Qaeda has come to resemble a mythic hydra; where one head is lopped off, two more emerge from the bloody neck. We may have made remarkable inroads in destroying the al Qaeda of 2001, but my question for Ambassador Black is this: Are we making progress against the al Qaeda of 2004?
Again, I thank the chair and ranking member for indulgence, and I look forward to hearing from our witness.
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REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA): Thank you very much.
Mr. Black, I'd like to ask you a few questions just to get a good understanding of the background on this. And I'm not going to ask you to speculate as we just-the last question was, but maybe just to give some details about what's going on on the inside of the government that permitted this tragedy to happen on 9/11 and what's happened since then to make sure that that has been corrected.
And after September 11th, what became of the State Department and the CIA officers, but especially at the State Department, who insisted that we-before that date-that we be cooperating and working with moderate Taliban elements? Are they still in decision-making positions in the State Department?
MR. BLACK: I'd have to-I am not too sure --
REP. ROHRABACHER: Well, you're right there.
MR. BLACK: I don't know how to respond to the question.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Well, listen, you have a background-you have a long history in terms of terrorism and this whole issue.
MR. BLACK: And I'm happy to answer questions about terrorism, not necessarily on personnel, Congressman.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Well, personnel make policy. And if people are wrong to the point that thousands of Americans have lost their lives, we on this side of the branch of government, we in the legislative branch, have a right to know whether the personnel who are responsible for this were held accountable. And what I'm suggesting is that the people at the State Department who are responsible for the policies that led to 9/11, some of them may still be in positions of authority. And that's what I'm asking you.
Were the people who were insisting before 9/11 that we work with the Taliban, and undercutting the efforts, I might add, of those people who were trying to set up resistance to the Taliban, are those people still in positions of making decisions over at the State Department?
MR. BLACK: I was not in the State Department then. I do not know.
REP. ROHRABACHER: You weren't in the State Department. But you haven't bothered to check to see --
MR. BLACK: Well, Congressman, I haven't checked that question. On issues of 9/11 -- I mean, this is meant to be a threat briefing on al Qaeda. Happy to talk about that.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Well, al Qaeda was --
MR. BLACK: I know. But Mr. Chairman --
REP. ROHRABACHER: Obviously, this goes to where al Qaeda came from.
MR. BLACK: Yes, I know.
If I could just-if I could request, Mr. Chairman. I'm scheduled to be in front of the 9/11 committee on the 13th of April, so issues having to do with that I'd prefer to reserve for that. I'm happy to talk about al Qaeda and the terrorist threat, if I may, and would like to leave other type topics like that to that time.
REP. GALLEGLY: If members would try to focus their energy on the al Qaeda threat, that would be --
MR. BLACK: I'd appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Let me just note you're a spokesman for the administration. You're here to testify. Mr Chairman, I personally resent this administration or any administration not being willing to discuss issues of importance at this level. This is how we learn. This is how we are going to do our job. And if we have people in this administration or any other administration who are refusing to talk about the people who actually made the decisions and whether or not they are still in decision-making positions, then if we're not insisting on those answers, we aren't doing our jobs.
MR. BLACK: Well --
REP. ROHRABACHER: And if you're not willing to tell us, you're not doing your job.
MR. BLACK: Well, Congressman, I'm trying to respond to you, sir, with greatest of respect.
REP. ROHRABACHER: All right.
MR. BLACK: At time, I was in the Central Intelligence Agency, involved with that work. I was not in the State Department, and I was not involved in their decision-making process. And I was not intimately familiar with who was in what position, making policy at the State Department. I did operational activities, and I produced intelligence.
REP. ROHRABACHER: Might I suggest --
MR. BLACK: Yes, sir.
REP. ROHRABACHER: -- having been in the executive branch myself-I spent seven years in the White House-might I suggest that you find out who amongst you, in your group at the State Department now, or who in the CIA was advocating those policies which led to this horrible tragedy that we suffered on 9/11, and not listen to their opinions, or put them in other spots, and be able to assure us that that happened, because this is a-what-when I in the White House, we said people are policy. That's the first thing we learn. And if people who have-who are advocating certain things and are pushing certain things before 9/11 obviously-and I can tell you I dealt with it before 9/11 -- obviously, there were people who were pushing in exactly the wrong direction, which led to this catastrophe. That-we need to know that's been cleaned up.
Now George Tenet is still director of the CIA, and as far as I'm concerned, he should be-he should have been gone a long time ago.
But let's give us-the only assurance you can give us is that-assure us that those people who were pushing the wrong policies are no longer in positions of making decisions. And I would hope we get that from this administration. Thank you very much.
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