Hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee - Space and U.S. Security

HEARING OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: SPACE AND U.S. SECURITY
CHAIRED BY: REP. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER (D-CA)
WITNESSES: BRUCE W. MACDONALD, AUTHOR OF RECENT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS STUDY ON CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY; MICHAEL KREPON, CO-FOUNDER, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER; MAJOR GENERAL JAMES ARMOR, USAF (RET.), OWNER AND CEO, THE ARMOR GROUP, LLC.

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REP. TAUSCHER: (In progress) -- dialogue on space issues." As you can see, the council's report should give us plenty to talk about this afternoon. With that, let us begin.

And let me turn to my very good friend, our distinguished ranking member from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for any comments he may have.

REP. MIKE TURNER (R-OH): Thank you, Madame Chairman.

So many times when we have hearings or issues that we're looking at and it's always in context of the news of the day -- and I feel like I can't go past the news of the day without recognizing that the AP is reporting that the Obama administration is indicating its choice for undersecretary of State, for arms control, and the international security to be none other than our own Chairman Ellen Tauscher. And we certainly wish her well in that. And I congratulate you on that.

REP. TAUSCHER: And we'll send your tax returns to the --

(Laughter)

REP. TURNER: Oh, oh. Well. You certainly have a tremendous amount of experience that we all get to -- have as evident in this committee, and --

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you very much.

REP. TURNER: -- wish you well on that.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you very much.

REP. TURNER: And wish that -- and I also want to thank Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Krepon, and General Armor for being with us today. The Council on Foreign Relations report, which forms the basis for this discussion today, is a first-rate product, and I want to commend Mr. MacDonald for his work on it.

Today's discussion focuses on the policies and capabilities that best provide for the security of our space assets. The current space policy, for the first time, recognized space assets as vital to U.S. national interests. Space is critical to modern day military operations, and contributes over $200 billion annually to the economy.

This subcommittee, largely in part to the efforts of my predecessor, Mr. Everett, and our chair -- soon to be undersecretary -- sought to promote a greater understanding about the importance of space assets and the potential consequences of their loss. An array of potential threats can hold our nation's space capabilities at risk, and degrade U.S. advantages in space.

A prime example, according to the Pentagon's annual China military report, is China's pursuit of a multidimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries. This includes the direct ascent ASAT China tested in 2007. The expansion of the number of space-faring nations and satellites launched each year also increases the risk of accidental collisions such as the one we saw last month between a commercial satellite and a Russian spacecraft.

We have a nexus of challenges before us. First and foremost, I believe we have considerable gaps and shortfalls in space intelligence and in our knowledge of foreign space capabilities and intent. Robust space intelligence is a prerequisite for space situational awareness and protection, and it also greatly influences decisions made about our space policies and posture.

I would ask our witnesses to provide their assessment of our nation's space intelligence capabilities and also any thoughts on whether our intelligence enterprise is adequately organized and managed to fulfill future capabilities and challenges in this area.

Second, what changes in policy do you recommend to increase our security in space? I'm particularly interested in how we apply the model of deterrent to space. What capabilities will we need, how would we demonstrate the credibility of such deterrent, and how would we manage escalation when the U.S. may have more to lose than a potential adversary?

Third, a greater emphasis on space situational awareness and space protection capabilities has been strongly supported by this committee. The 2008 defense bill we required the defense and intelligence communities to develop a space-protection strategy. In your view, what are the next steps to implement this strategy, and where do we still have gaps and shortfalls?

Fourth, our current National Security Space Architecture is comprised of relatively few very complex monolithic systems. The loss of one satellite, whether by intent or accident, could have widespread consequences for battlefield users reliant on its capabilities. Do you have thoughts on how we might change our acquisition strategies to increase the survivability and resiliency of our space architecture?

And lastly, securing our interest in space requires a whole of government approach, but also includes diplomatic efforts as highlighted in Mr. MacDonald's report. Outer space is a challenging area that requires balancing our desire to protect our most sensitive, cutting-edge technologies with promoting greater international cooperation in space. Often, these are complementary, but sometimes they are not.

What space security topics are the most promising candidates for greater diplomatic efforts? We appreciate your comments there. A desire to seek a space weapons ban treaty was featured as part of President Obama's defense agenda. Defining space weapons and establishing an effective verification regime are incredibly problematic.

I also remain skeptical that China in particular would halt its counterspace programs when reports of their across-the-border counterspace capabilities and investments suggest otherwise. And also the report that establishes rules of the road has been suggested by one of our witnesses.

Collision avoidance may be a logical first step.

However, I would like a greater understanding of what these would entail, and would also ask that you consult with our military commanders to elicit their views. Our immediate concern is that we do not disadvantage U.S. space capabilities. One also has to consider how much transparency about space assets we want. Imagine if we were required to report on the location status of our nuclear submarine.

Thank you again for being with us today and providing your critical thought on the issue of space security. I look forward to a candid discussion. And thank you for being here.

And thank you, Madame Chair, for your leadership.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you very much, Mr. Turner, for those kindly words, and thank you for your statement.

We're going to begin with Mr. MacDonald first. The floor is yours. I would -- actually I've received your prepared statement. We look forward to having brief remarks, and we've entered your statement into the record. And the floor is yours.

MR. MACDONALD: Thank you very much, Madame Chairman, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee.

It's really a privilege for me to be here today to talk about this vital issue. And I want to make clear at the outset I'm speaking purely in a private capacity, and not on behalf of either the Strategic Posture Review Commission, U.S. Institute of Peace, or the Council on Foreign Relations.

The subcommittee has posed three excellent questions for this hearing. One -- and I'll just give short answers to each of them, just elaborate just a bit -- "Do we have the right national policy to ensure the security of our space assets?" I think our policy is deficient in doctrine and strategy, and need stringent attention to avoid major problems.

"Do we have the right investment strategy for protecting and defending critical space assets?" Briefly, I have only modest confidence in this, but I have to say mostly because a few of the details of this strategy are publicly known; so it's hard for me to say.

And then, "What role can diplomacy play in ensuring the security of our space assets?" I think diplomacy has a vital role to play, but unfortunately, it alone can't solve our space security issues. The rivers of information and services that our space assets provide, allow our decision-makers and weapons both to be more effective than ever before, giving us vital advantages in our economy and our conventional and strategic nuclear strength.

The threats to our space assets come in many forms, some hostile and some not. I've often said that Murphy's law and mother nature pose some of the biggest threats that we face sometimes in a lot of areas. One of the biggest threats is that what we just don't know -- about objects in space, the intentions of those who put them there, and the very strategic landscape of space itself.

Our overall goal in space, I believe, should be space stability. We have an overriding interest in maintaining the function of our space assets and so that the huge benefits they provide are always there. But our space assets are exposed and fragile. They can't run, they can't hide, they can't defend themselves, and we depend on them more so than any other country.

And these assets face three major and growing threats. One, the proliferation of space and other technologies, and especially anti- satellite capabilities demonstrated two years ago. China could exploit our space dependence to seriously threaten our space assets within a decade if it chose to do so. Second, space traffic is heavier than it's ever been and getting more so, but there is no FAA for space.

And third, space debris poses a growing threat to all space assets as the recent collision between the U.S. satellite and an old Russian Cosmos illustrates. At current rates of debris accumulation, the debris threat could go 1,200 percent over the next 25 years. I'm concerned that current U.S. space policy raises but does not answer key stability issues.

In 2006, the new policy declared for the first time that U.S. space assets are of vital national interest. This policy reserves the right to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interest. But attacking others' space capabilities, invites attacks on our own of vital national interest, we've said.

This, to me, is contradictory. Why would we want to threaten actions that invite retaliation against our vital national interest, where we have more at stake than our adversaries? But this contradiction is never explained. It could make sense if our space doctrine seeks only to deter attacks, not initiate them. But our policy says not a word on this.

There is an inherent risk of strategic and crisis space instability in the next decade or so, it seems to me, if we're not careful. I'm one who believes that the United States can and should remain preeminent in space. But I believe we're currently incautious in our military space policy. The United States needs a space protection strategy that focuses on stability, deterrence, and in space architecture with backups in case we lose services.

Now, the difficult question about authentic capabilities in space. If it's possible to establish a space regime where no one had offensive space capability, we should certainly do so. If we can maintain space deterrence by other than offensive means, we should certainly do so. We must think long and hard, I think, before deploying space offense, but if no alternative to it exists, then we should develop some offensive capability, but in a deterrence context.

The United States and China and to some extent Russia as well, have already crossed the space Rubicon of sorts. And our satellite capabilities already developed can't be un-invented, and missile defense, with inherent anti-satellite capabilities, is here to stay. U.S. space capabilities must be preserved.

And while defensive steps can help and we should distribute our space capabilities across many more platforms, to reduce the vulnerability of any one, that may not be enough. We must be careful, though, if we acquire offensive capabilities not to create a self- fulfilling prophecy, stimulating the very threat that worries us most.

Above all, we should escape the space policy and doctrinal vacuum I believe we're now in, where as a result it seems that our space acquisition seems to shape our policy rather than our policy shaping the acquisition. We seek a posture not of space dominance, but of space preeminence which would assure that we remain the space leader with more advanced space capabilities than anyone.

We'd continue to derive more military and economic benefit from space than others, and we'd leverage this preeminence in better weapons, better intelligence, and I would argue, most of all, better military decision-making made possible by the superior space-enabled information and communications that we get.

I saw a while back that General Tom Moorman, the retired Air Force vice chief of staff said that "In addition to planning and programs, it's important to encourage a debate on space power to include development of a space deterrent theory. We need something similar to the intellectual ferment that surrounded nuclear deterrence."

I think General Moorman unfortunately confirms here that this kind of thinking isn't happening today. So we're drifting into an increasingly unstable space environment. Another major drawback of our policy is its rejection of space arms control. The past few years, the United States was alone in the world in opposing space arms control issues.

There was one vote at the United Nations where the vote was 162:1, and we were the one. All our NATO allies were on the other side. This allowed Russia and China to credibly mischaracterize our stance as hostile. Now, diplomacy and arms control alone can't solve our space problems, but they can help.

Our space arms control allergy should end. Review of space diplomacy and arms control should be an administration priority. One option that deserves special attention is a ban on debris-producing space actions, especially kinetic energy anti-satellite tests.

In conclusion, we're entering a new era in space, but we don't seem to understand its strategic landscape. So we're stumbling into the future. Let's take steps now to reduce the risks that are coming right at us. Thank you.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. Krepon, the floor is yours.

MR. KREPON: Madame Chairman, thank you for convening us.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you.

MR. KREPON: My quick answers to your three hard questions -- I don't think we have a sound strategy now. There are some missing pieces. And I'll talk about one of them. I'm not that well-qualified to answer your second important question about an investment strategy. But General Armor is well-qualified to answer that question, and the answers that he's come up with make a whole lot of sense to me.

And the third question, the role of diplomacy is the one I really want to focus on. I should say I spent a fair amount of time in my youth in this room and learned a lot here. You're sure to look like L. Mendel Rivers --

(Laughter)

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you.

MR. KREPON: -- or F. Edward Herbert -- (laughs.) Satellites are as vulnerable as they are invaluable, and they're becoming more vulnerable and more invaluable all the time. So how do we gain confidence that these essential satellites will be available when needed? No satellite has been damaged or destroyed in a crisis or in conflict yet, and so if and when this happens, it's going to be a big event.

And it's most likely not going to be an isolated event. Warfare in space is likely to be accompanied by warfare on the ground. U.S. will still win if our space assets are damaged, but the victory would be very costly, and there'll be huge collateral damage to the people who are fighting.

So put another way, everybody suffers if warfare in space occurs, including all major powers that have assets in space. And if there is uncontrolled escalation as a result of warfare in space, then the losses will be incalculable.

Many deterrent strategists -- and Mr. Turner, this goes to your question about deterrence -- there are some really smart people who worked on deterrence and nuclear deterrence, and they came up with library shelves worth of books on escalation control and escalation dominance. And fortunately, none of these theories were tested. But at least to me, these plans were not very convincing.

And so I ask you how much trust can you and the members of this subcommittee place on plans for escalation control and escalation dominance in space when it's so easy to mess up space or at least parts of it? And they happen to be the parts we care about the most. So shooting our way out of this dilemma of satellite vulnerability -- I think it's a last option, and even then, it may not be a wise option in my view.

But that means we still have to deter unwise decisions by other folks to start this game going. And so how do we best deter attacks on U.S. satellites? Our experience in nuclear deterrence isn't the best guide. To signal deterrence, nuclear deterrence, we and the Soviets tested on the average of one nuclear weapon a week from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the fall of the Berlin Wall -- to signal deterrence.

And to signal deterrence we and they deployed large numbers of weapons and launches ready for use on short order. Now, is this what we want for space? To deter somebody else' space? Deterring warfare in space has taken very little effort so far. There've been several dozen anti-satellite tests during the whole history of the space age, just a handful of tests with destructive effect creating debris field, just a handful.

Unfortunately, two of these tests have happened pretty recently -- a Chinese test, a U.S. test which was not a debris-causing event, but it was using a satellite for target practice. And we haven't heard from the Russians, and we may hear from the Russians. So a small number of dedicated anti-satellite weapons have been deployed in the past during the Cold War. But they were mothballed, they weren't very operationally useful.

And our military and even the Soviet military didn't put too much stock in these weapons. In my view, one reason why superpower competition didn't extend very far were dedicated anti-satellite weapons and ASAT tests, and because they weren't needed. We and they had so many different ways to mess up satellites using capability that was designed for other purposes; that's still the case.

We don't need to use satellites for target practices to convince other folks that we have the means today to affect their satellites if they mess with us. I think another reason why we and the Soviets didn't go so far down this path was because these satellites then as now are connected to nuclear forces. And you know, do you really want to open that Pandora's Box?

So I actually had some confidence that looking forward, we can again avoid the use of weapons against satellites during crisis or in wartime, which would vastly be to our advantage. I think we can do this. I don't think we need to carry on more ASAT tests to reinforce a deterrence message.

But we are missing a diplomatic piece, because remember during the Cold War, deterrence, which was a clenched fist, also needed reassurance which was what we then called "arms control." And deterrence without reassurance makes people very uneasy, and not just the abroad, but also at home. So how do we fit these two pieces together?

Our primary enemy up here is debris. Debris does not recognize U.S. preeminence in space. It doesn't. Debris is our enemy -- (laughs.) Debris is also the enemy of other major space-faring nations. This problem we just had with the international space station with three spacefarers scrambling into an escape module -- we're going to see this again. It's going to happen.

And we've actually lost the shuttle because of debris, a different kind of debris, the debris from the form of an extra fuel tank which punctured the Columbia, which we found out about on reentry. But it's a different kind of a problem that debris is going to threaten man's space operations to a much greater extent, and our satellites that are essential for our war fighters.

So, two ideas for you to consider about debris. One is a very narrow banded treaty that would be a verifiable treaty that bans destructive methods against manmade space objects that nothing in this world is totally verifiable. But a ban against destructive methods which create debris fields is something we can see.

And since the more debris that's up there, the more disadvantaged we become, but also the more disadvantaged everybody becomes who relies on satellites. This one could have traction, it could have traction. I would ask you to consider this.

The second possibility for you to consider is a code of conduct that would have one of its provisions pledges against harmful interference, against space objects -- space objects, the satellites themselves. You know, a code of conduct like the Incidents at Sea agreement that our Navy follows or the Dangerous Military Practices agreement that our Army and our Air Force follows.

It's -- their rules of the road, you know, the rules in peacetime are different from the rules in wartime. But even in war, there are some rules that are in our advantage to follow. And I would urge you to think long and hard about the diplomatic piece that deals with this debris problem which is a clear and present danger to our preeminence in space.

Thank you, Madame Chairman.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Krepon.

General Armor, the floor is yours.

MG. ARMOR: Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Turner, members of the subcommittee, I'm very pleased to be here today to testify on the vital issue of space and U.S. security.

I'm also happy to be at the table with two very thoughtful and far more experienced and well-spoken policy professionals, Mr. Bruce MacDonald with whom I had the privilege of working on the subject report, and Mr. Krepon who I've had some edifying discussions both here and abroad on space treaties and rules of the road.

Today I am speaking purely in a private capacity, and my comments do not represent the views of the United States Air Force, with which I proudly served for 34 years, or with any of my current professional affiliations. I understand today's hearing is about space security, but I wanted to take a step back and put a broader context on the state of the U.S. space program and motivate why today's hearing is so important.

As my fellow witnesses have pointed out, the U.S. is exquisitely dependent on space, but it's not just for war fighting and intelligence. It's for our economic wellbeing, our technological vitality, and our international standing and leadership. This bears repeating often, because while the U.S. currently leads the world in space, there are numerous problems other than simple security threats that jeopardize our continued leadership.

We face near-term mission gaps in our important space capabilities both military and civil, our space industry and workforce is losing its competitive edge, our engagement and influence in international space activities has declined, and there is widespread program overreach. In many respects, I think all of the nation's space sectors are in worse condition today than they were a decade or more ago.

To the point, as our security and wellbeing has grown more reliant on space capabilities, they have become increasingly vulnerable to breakdown and disruption as well as to attack. It is with this sense of urgency that I now return to today's timely discussion about space security. You have my written testimony, so let me just summarize the main points, briefly addressing each of the three broad issues that you stated in your invitation.

While I think I'm more in agreement with Mr. MacDonald than it will on the surface appear, do we have the right national policy to ensure security of our space assets? I think the answer is fundamentally yes, we do. Since the beginning of the space age, each president has issued a national space policy, and each policy has been remarkably consistent in its broad goals.

The space policy issued in October 2006 gave me, as a military and intelligence space professional, the policy guidance I needed. And it was totally consistent with policies from earlier administrations. However, I must acknowledge that the rest of the world clearly thought its language quite provocative, and it became a major distraction to any positive discussions on any of a number of space issues that I engaged in.

I therefore think we might generally benefit from a change in tone in the written policy, and I fully expect the Obama administration, typical of every new administration, to do just that. But I don't think the fundamental policy objectives will or need to change. The real problem is not the policy; it's the lack of means to implement the policy.

We're missing a national space strategy to define the means and set the priorities among those policy objectives, and we're missing a governance structure or implementation and oversight of that policy. During last year's campaign, President Obama discussed the need for a national space council, and I think that's an important decision.

The administration needs to establish an effective White House focal point and apparatus within the executive office of the president, such as a space council to actively establish direction, set priorities, provide management oversight, and coordinate actions across the agencies. Good policy is not self-actualizing; a national space strategy and leadership and oversight mechanism are needed.

I must also add, Madame Chairwoman, that the Congress shares many of the same stovepipes in its committee structure across the space sectors and technical disciplines. And I might recommend that you seriously consider reviving a bipartisan, bicameral congressional space caucus to promote cross-committee space discussions.

The second issue is do we have the right investment strategy for protecting and defending critical space assets and capabilities? No, I don't believe we do. Up to now, we have designed and built our space capabilities assuming space is essentially a sanctuary.

But in the last 15 years, space has become both a contested and a competitive domain with a blossoming number of space-faring entities and potential threats, both intentional, like China's ASAT, and unintentional, like spectral interference and debris. My answer for needed investment boils down to three interrelated recommendations.

Number one, space situational awareness -- I think we are in great agreement there. Our current space surveillance network is not fully chartered or resourced to support civil, commercial, and allied operations. The Space Situational Awareness system that the U.S. needs is one that is capable of prompt and unequivocal attribution of any space incident to a cause or agent whether that be, you know, something bad or just bad space weather that day.

This includes not only the orbital elements, but satellite operating status, space weather conditions, spectral interference, debris cognizance, and more. Now, closely related to space situational awareness is a need for foreign space intelligence -- and I heard Mr. Turner bring this up. The U.S. gave up most of its space intelligence capability in the '90s, and it requires significant reinvestment.

I watched it fade, and it was a heartbreaking thing to see those professionals disappear over the decade. The capability for situational awareness with attribution is the basis of any international discussions about space environment debris, space operating conventions, or rules of the road. It's also a foundational to any space deterrent regime that we might discuss.

The second investment shortfall is our current satellite architectures. Every critical space system and support infrastructure, civil and military, needs to be recapitalized to ensure that it can operate in a contested domain at least to the extent that it be needed during a crisis. There's no silver bullet here.

There's a number of good options -- small satellites, mixed space and terrestrial systems, there's good protection technology in some cases, and many others. Each constellation needs to develop its own approach, but it needs to do so in the context of an integrated national space strategy, which we don't really have, and with sound assessment of specific natural and manmade threats by our space intelligence.

I may surprise you here, but the third vital investment need is for the commercial space segment. As a 34-year national security space professional, I am not really willing to compromise U.S. security. But as a student of history, I am convinced that a robust commercial space regime will enhance both global stability and U.S. security.

Mahan's famous theory of sea power was fundamentally not about battleships, it was about sea lanes of commerce and maritime industry. Therefore, I recommend direct investment and space technology and other incentives towards growing a robust U.S. commercial space industry. I believe an essential part of this is to begin making progress towards a space traffic management system.

Currently, however, there is no organization assigned responsibility for space traffic management. The Air Force operates a space surveillance system, the FAA Commercial Space Transportation Office grants launch and reentry licenses, the FCC grants orbital location and spectrum, and there's other organizations as well.

So a joint study by these agencies to develop an investment framework for a space traffic management system might be useful. And I'd be happy to answer any more questions you have on that. Working towards a commercially secure space operating environment is an opportunity for U.S. global leadership that can address significant portions of space security.

And it -- and let me segue back to the committee's third and final question, the role of diplomacy. I think diplomacy plays an essential role in ensuring the security of our space assets and in global U.S. space leadership. The U.S. must be actively engaged in discussions at all levels as it expects to help set a productive agenda.

But as Mr. MacDonald pointed out, diplomacy and arms control cannot by themselves solve all of our space security problems. So I would recommend that U.S. space diplomacy have three features. The first one is just set a good example and positive precedence in space. And I note this implies that the U.S. is actively conducting a full range of space activities. You can't really set a good example from the bench.

The second is to engage in wider discussions about space rules of the road, but be forthright about limiting expectations on unverifiable agreements that might unnecessarily restrain both space commerce or U.S. civil and national security freedom of action.

Finally, third, help establish a concrete foundation of technical standards and operating protocols that will encourage a safe legal space operating regime. I believe the most productive near-term effort is being done by all the major space agencies in the multi- national Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, which is part of the International Standards Organization.

Future space traffic management system can build on the technical confidence and the professional and civil agencies there similar to what the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, and the FAA do for air traffic management.

In summary, the space enterprise is critical to the nation and its security is essential. It is on a declining trajectory, I believe, that puts the U.S. leadership at risk, and requires sustained strategic leadership, investment, and diplomatic initiative by the administration and Congress.

This concludes my remarks, Madame Chairwoman, and I look forward to your questions and discussions.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, General.

Mr. MacDonald, in your testimony you observed that the debate over the United States offensive space capabilities has often resulted in simplistic answers on both sides of the question.

Can you give the subcommittee a couple of examples, where you think offensive capabilities are appropriate, and alternatively where they may be counterproductive?

MR. MACDONALD: Let me -- maybe take the second one first, if I may.

REP. TAUSCHER: Sure.

MR. MACDONALD: My sense is that offensive capabilities are something that we should only do if there really isn't another approach to do it. I think the key goal again is, I think, it should be deterrence and stability in space.

I came to the conclusion in my recommendation about offensive capabilities somewhat reluctantly, I must admit. When I started my study, I was pretty much thinking that wasn't a good idea, but I saw the need that we had to deter. But there are some ways that we could that that I think would be counterproductive.

To pick an extreme example, a nuclear burst, up in the ionosphere, or up in Low Earth Orbit would be a tremendously affective ASAT weapon but it would have horribly self-destructive collateral side effects, and so that would be going to one extreme.

But areas where it might be, is if we had -- and I listed in my report and I think in my full statement at least seven conditions or requirements -- and one very much would be that any effect should be temporary and reversible so that there is no physical damage, a permanent physical damage, and that there is not a tremendous loss, I mean, those satellites, as been pointed out, can be extraordinarily expensive.

And -- but I think that if we need to respond to somebody else's first use, for example, I think that there could be merit, potential merit in such capabilities. But again the idea is that the effect should be temporary and not permanent. So I would guess I would just leave it at that, but we can talk more if you'd like.

REP. TAUSCHER: Sure.

Mr. Krepon, your testimony describes the national security benefits of the United States of establishing a space code of conduct. Could you expand on why you think it might be more appropriate to pursue the development of rules of the road rather than a formal arms control agreement banning destructive ASAT testing?

MR. KREPON: Madame Chairman, I don't think the two are mutually exclusive. I think one could go into a forum being open to both possibilities. The idea of an all encompassing ban on weapons in space, to me, causes insuperable problems, problems of verification, problems of definition.

But if I home in on destructive effects against manmade objects in space, I may well need to invest, as General Armor has stated, in improving my ability to watch the heavens. But when there is a debris cloud, where there was once a singular orbital body, and I think we can reasonably infer that that body has broken up. And we have to figure out the reasons for it.

And there will be preceding actions that help us come to a logical conclusion about why that orb has become a mutating debris cloud. So I would say, let's be open to both. But a key element has to be debris, whichever way you go, it has to be debris, and which is why the notion of traffic management, collision avoidance is so essential at this moment in time.

So the code of conduct piece that we -- that I think, deserves a lot of attention is traffic management. If you will, we need an FAA- type body for space, even if we hate the notion of -- you know, an international or small international body dealing with this problem, the consequences of major debris are so profound and so long-lasting that I hope we will be open-minded towards this.

Now, one last point and then I'll shut up. The Bush administration placed a lot of emphasis on bottom-up approaches to come up with rules of the road. I don't know if this was part of the allergy to diplomacy, and we did succeed with a bottom-up approach that produced voluntary debris mitigation guidelines.

And it was just -- this deal was done just last year. It was finalized, I think, in the U.N. General Assembly last year. It took 14 years to do that, 14 years to do that, during which the debris population doubled. That's the trackable debris population. The smallest stuff which can also kill you is -- there is a lot more of it up there.

REP. TAUSCHER: Let me ask you if there is an analogy to a homeowners' association.

(Laughter)

Since we apparently think we all own it that there would be clear guidelines. You know, you have to mow your lawn, you have to clean up after yourselves, you're responsible for this. There is a sense of transparency. I think that there is an FAA piece here, which is traffic obviously, is a component of management.

But what I hear you saying, I think, is that there is nothing mutually exclusive about code of conduct and moving forward into some more formal agreements. But in the basics, you have to agree that you like the neighborhood and you want to keep the neighborhood a certain way, very much like when you decide to buy in a neighborhood, you're meant to add value not detract value.

MR. KREPON: Yeah. If there are no rules, there are no rule breakers.

REP. TAUSCHER: That's very good.

General Armor, in your testimony you recommend determined S&T investment and other incentives toward growing a robust United States commercial space industry. Now, in this context, can you talk about how the United States should balance its responsibilities to prevent the export of sensitive technologies and the need to develop a globally competitive United States space industry?

MG. ARMOR: Yes, Madame Chairwoman. That's a very tough trade to make. We do need to be careful about technology transfer, in general. We need to be precise in protecting critical technology proliferating to parties that we especially don't want to have.

But on the other hand, we need an open commerce, international commerce because the world has gone global. Right now, some of the -- I believe, some of the trade restrictions have prevented us, prevented our own industry from expanding like it should.

Our second and third-tier of parts vendors are basically dying right now, and in fact there was a recent article about counterfeit parts, that the NASA was having engineers look because we were having to import more overseas parts instead of developing our own. I think that traces back to some of our own trade restrictions.

So yes, we do need to be very careful, and pick the regime on technology to protect, but industry moves very fast. And so we -- I think, we need a mechanism that keeps up with that technology and protects what needs to be protected.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you.

I'd like to turn to Mr. Turner. I'd like to turn over to Mr. Turner, our ranking member. (Inaudible).

REP. TURNER: Thank you, Madame Chairman. Thank you again for your discussion. And one of the things that is really, really helpful is that the concepts that we're dealing with in these policy discussions, and you so eloquently are able to describe.

And I'm going to ask you to embellish some of your discussion that you've been having. Because I think it's really important, and I think that, you know, as we do a forum like this, it's good to get from you the descriptions of these elements.

When you're talking about a space weapons treaty versus rule of roads, many of you were discussing the issues of verification and definition. Could you embellish that for a moment so that people can get an understanding of, you know, what are some of the problems in verification and in definition? Because we know what the different areas that a satellite can be challenged with. And it would be great to hear your descriptions of those, and as we try to balance that issue of rules of the road versus space weapons treaty.

Mr. Krepon, let me start with you?

MR. KREPON: Yeah. Well, as Bruce has said, I can use a nuclear weapon to destroy satellites. In 1962, before a limited test ban treaty was completed by President Kennedy, we carried out a weapons test, over one megaton that killed or destroyed every satellite that was in Low Earth Orbit. There weren't many, they weren't all ours.

But we learned a very important lesson from that. So we can use nuclear weapons to kill satellites. We can use ballistic missiles if they have enough legs. So a medium-range ballistic missile, an ocean- spanning ballistic missile can be adapted for use against satellites.

Missile defense interceptors can be used -- adapted against satellites. We've demonstrated that last year on lasers, jammers. There are lots of things out there that have vital military uses. It can all serve as anti-satellite weapons. Do we ban them all, do we prohibit them all? How do we verify if somebody is not hiding one in the basement? So this all-encompassing treaty may not be such a good idea.

REP. TURNER: And in that we are a country that clearly, in the area of verification, we are going to comply. So we always have to have a concern as to what our ability is to verify other's compliance, and now, let's continue that on the way as you talk about the issue of no space weapons treaty versus rule of the road verification and definition.

MR. MACDONALD: If I could, I'm picking up on what Michael was saying. I think a key thing here is -- and it's a problem. The previous administration did a -- an excellent job of identifying, and that is, I think, that bans on weapons be problematic unlike for example, an ICBM, or a strategic bomber, or missile firing submarines, which are very big, and there are ways that we can monitor those.

The kinds of things that could do -- perform an anti-satellite test first are, very often are smaller to begin with, then because they are multi-purpose, it's easy to claim that we didn't build it as anti-satellite weapon. We built it for some other reason.

But as Michael alluded to actions, particularly actions in space are lot more visible. So I think a more productive approach to take is to seek to put constraints on harmful actions, not necessarily on weapons. I mean, to introduce maybe what's probably a bad analogy, under the right circumstances, of course, you know, guns are not illegal, but shooting somebody with a gun is.

You know, what's at issue is not the possession of the gun, but rather how it's used. And so in the same way, I think that any -- the most productive approach are -- from an arms real (ph) perspective would be one that seeks to inhibit or limit actions unless somehow there is something that is so big or prominent that you can -- that you can address it.

REP. TURNER: General?

MG. ARMOR: Well, as Mr. MacDonald mulls, I've had difficulty looking at space in the sense of nuclear deterrence. To me, space is, by far a more conventional domain, not a nuclear one. So I have trouble with the nuclear analogy right off the bat.

That said, defining an ASAT can -- is very difficult. Therefore, you know, doing some sort of treaty for no ASATs, I think, is unverifiable and not a productive path. If I can address one thing Mr. Krepon said, I do believe that it took a long time to get some of these earlier lower level agreements, but that was because there was no compelling reason.

Now, with some of the collisions and other things that have happened in space, that has stepped up tremendously. And I do believe that some of the rules of the road discussion that he is proposing would also help accelerate some of the more technical discussions as well. So I'm in favor of that.

I also agree with Mr. MacDonald that maybe treaties against harmful actions, not things, maybe a more productive line of logic.

MR. KREPON: Mr. Turner, because we have all these other latent capabilities to punish others in space, it seems to me we have an insurance policy. And we are not going to let go of that insurance policy. If we focus in on destructive methods, actions that produce debris clouds, we have an insurance policy against non compliance.

We can respond in kind, but we don't have to respond in kind. So I would urge you to be open to this narrow banded approach, which is a verifiable treaty approach. The administration may decide not to go there for whatever reasons, but to me, it would be in the net interest of the United States to proceed with this.

REP. TURNER: Well, that takes me to the other area of your discussion and the issue of deterrence when you were discussing it. Yesterday we had General Chilton, commander of U.S. strategic command before us, and we were asking him, if someone attacks our satellite, what are the consequences?

And if you look at deterrence, there are two main components. There are other components, but two main components.

And one is that there are consequences if someone should attack our satellite systems and/or that there may be mechanisms whereby they might not be successful in attacking them. You can have defensive systems or you can have just policies that indicate what the consequences would be.

(Inaudible) -- in your discussion with Mr. Krepon, you started with the concept of, you know, deterrence isn't that effective. If you could just discuss a little bit on the concept of how you see -- what are we not doing besides just diplomacy that we ought to be doing as you look at our space assets in the area of deterrence?

MR. KREPON: Well, just to be clear, I think deterrence is essential in space. We don't want people messing with our satellites, especially in a crisis or in -- when our troops are in harm's way. So deterrence is the key piece, and I'm trying to argue that we have the means to deter. We have the means to punish.

We can punish on the ground, we can punish in space. It's our choosing what works best for us. So please don't misunderstand me, deterrence is crucial. How do we reinforce deterrence?

General Armor has some excellent ideas. I don't know a single person in this field who is not -- maybe my knowledge is limited, but I don't know anybody who is arguing that we ought to invest hugely in a small number of wonderful satellites that can do everything. I don't think we're -- nobody is arguing that --

REP. TURNER: Right, what I don't understand is what are we missing, and then -- and if we could go on down on that line, if there's things that you think that we need to be doing that we're not doing that would be significant. I appreciate your perspective there.

MR. KREPON: Sorry, I would -- the piece that's most missing to my way of thinking is better space situational awareness. We do what to whom? Who may collide with whoever else? And the diplomacy piece.

MG. ARMOR: To continue along that line, I agree. I think that -- I think that it detracts though unfortunately from a doctrinal point of view, deterrence is missing. One other thing, when I was writing my report for the Council on Foreign Relations, I was searching, I thought that there has to be something in here about deterrence. I guess I'm just not looking in the right places.

And I finally found an article that was written by one former Bush administration person. He was literally on his way out the door, retiring; worked as the deputy undersecretary of defense. And I went to him and I said, "So, where is this better developed?"

And he said, you are it. And I practically fell on the floor. I couldn't believe it. I'm not trying to tamp (ph) on itself. But just that he said that in -- on the inside, he said he didn't see any discussion of how deterrence works in space. How would we want to operate?

If you take a look at, for example, in space war games, I've heard that there are -- that it's beginning to change a little bit. But if you ever take part in a war game, I mean it's a kind of a classic thing. There is always a phase of it that is where the -- there is the crisis build up. But everybody just wants to get through that to get to where the real action is, which is when the war starts.

But I'm saying no, no, you want to focus on the crisis because you want to try to avoid a conflict in space in the first place. So I think we need -- one of the things we crucially need is more development of how -- what our doctrine should be in space and how does it work? What are the dangerous areas? What are the areas where there are opportunities?

Which by the way, is not to short what my colleagues have said. I think space intelligence is crucially important, space situational awareness, we need to know what's going on.

What does it say for example -- and Michael briefly alluded to it. The smallest objects we can reliably track are 10 centimeters in diameter. And yet people know that objects one centimeter in diameter or more can be lethal to satellites. And there are hundreds of thousands of it.

There are about 17,000 or so pieces that are 10 centimeters in diameter. There are hundreds of thousands that are one centimeter or more. So there are these lethal -- hundreds of thousands of lethal objects growing at a rate of 10 percent a year, whizzing around there, but we don't know where they are.

I mean I'm just flabbergasted by that. And there are technical approaches to deal with that, but I know you hear this all the time. It takes resources. And somehow that -- the requirements for that kind of space situational awareness always seems to fall off the table because there seem to be higher priorities.

And I would just say that if we are experiencing one or two incidents a month now, imagine 25 years from now and we will be experiencing, maybe two or three incidents or four incidents a week or even almost daily.

So we need to do -- we need to be more active in those areas as well.

MR. MACDONALD: Yes, sir. One of the difficulties I have with talking about space deterrence is that none of our adversaries depend on space the same way we do. So -- and I think Mr. Krepon was on the right track here about responding in kind. If there are attacks, responding in kind, is probably going to be ineffective. So a deterrence regime would have to go beyond the space domain I think -- you know, right off the bat.

Let me say that, another reason for an offensive space capability might be the converse argument that if there was a potential adversary that held advantage over us in some other area that we might want to respond out of kind with a space offensive capability. I'm not advocating that. I'm just saying that's in the realm of discussion here.

As far as what we are -- what we are not doing, I'll go back and harp on the space situational awareness and space intelligence again. I'll foot stomp on that. But the one I really want to get across again is that we are not organized to address the space domain -- might be loved at Air Force, I mean, is focused on using space for military purpose. They are not really resourced or chartered to secure the space domain for all legal use.

And it's sort of unfair at this point to hold them accountable for collisions or anything else because it's just not in their job drawer (ph). And I think we need, you know, a strong executive branch, a national strategy that says, hey look, securing the space domain for all legal use is an important part of our policy objectives. And here is the organization that I'm going to hold accountable for seeing that it's done. And here is a budget.

And you know, work with the State Department so that we can collaborate with all of our international partners and allies and other space faring entities. And I'll stop there.

REP. TURNER: Okay.

Thank you Madame Chairman.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you Mr. Turner. I'm happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.

REP. MARTIN HEINRICH (D-NM): Thank you Madame Chair.

Mr. MacDonald, and you have to forgive me, my voice is failing today, but given the successful anti-satellite test from China, the unpredictability of the debris problem -- or maybe I should say the predictability of the problem that debris creates. What kind of satellite replacement capabilities do we currently have in place and can you speak to the importance and need for rapid reaction satellites or other -- I think you used the phrase, back ups?

MR. MACDONALD: Yes. My understanding of the kind of capabilities we have today, Congressman, fall into two categories. One is the backups on the ground and the other is backups already orbiting in space. And I think that those are wise steps to take. We have -- there is an initiative called Operationally Responsive Space. That is another way to try to get things up quickly that might be damaged.

The only drawback, and I mean everyone acknowledges this to Operational Responsive Space is that satellites are pretty expensive.

Of course, even the smaller leaner ones and so it's not cheap to have a few spares hanging around in your warehouse. But nonetheless, when you think about the -- how much value they deliver, steps like that are very good.

I'm worried about the -- again, about the growth of debris and other things that could pose a real threat to these and we need -- another thing we need as well as when a satellite is either injured or disabled, we need some mechanism or way that we learn that it's disabled or injured. Some kind of a self awareness capability, if you will, on the satellite that can transmit back to earth so that we know what is going on up there.

Once again, we don't have that. And I take on board what General Armor says about it's not the Air Force's job drawer. And the problem is right now, it's not anybody's job drawer, and God bless the Air Force, they've done a really remarkable job just in letting people know what is out there that is even 10 centimeters in diameter.

The whole world can access this information on the World Wide Web, and they not only can access it, they do access it. And they very much -- operators overseas very much depend on it. So I think there are a number of steps that we can take and that we are taking. But I'm not convinced so far that we have as much as we need.

REP. HEINRICH: Thank you. General Armor, do you have any thoughts on the role of Operational Responsive Space and sort of creating a resiliency in our entire system?

MG. ARMOR: Yes, sir. I do believe that a responsive or small sats are -- are a part of the answer. But they are not a silver bullet. I mean, they are one part of making all of our constellations a little more robust so that there is a deterrent effect. You're not going to take it out with a single shot.

REP. HEINRICH: Right.

MG. ARMOR: But keep in mind that most of these smaller satellites are far less capable than the ones that they might replace. Now, if you put these on orbit and you had two or three or four flying, you make the targeting a lot harder and you know, the payoff smaller if anybody attacks them. So there is a number of trades that you can do here, and Operational Responsive is one.

REP. HEINRICH: Mr. MacDonald, I think you said earlier that there are some technical approaches to dealing with the -- or potential approaches to dealing with the debris issue. And I don't want to mischaracterize what you said, but in addition to the need for a ban on behaviors that worsen the debris problem, are -- what are -- are there? And what are they if there are, the technical approaches that might address moving -- the ever growing problem with debris in the other direction?

MR. MACDONALD: Well, this was a case where I think an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure, because it's very expensive to get a vacuum cleaner up in space. In fact, I was just over at DARPA a few weeks ago and I was talking to them about concepts. And we were kicking a few back and forth but we all agreed this would be very, very expensive.

So the whole emphasis -- and here I will give the Bush administration good marks that I think that they were seized with the importance of the issue of debris. But we absolutely need to continue it.

So most of the technical means I'm thinking of really involve prevention as opposed to, I mean, like the talk about possible cleanup options, but again there is -- it will be a long time before that becomes practical. And there are guidelines that we've worked out with other countries on how to minimize this.

I was speaking -- in fact, it was a wonderful event here about nine months or a year ago, here in this building, I believe, and the chairman of the international group that coordinated space debris was there. And I asked him, I said, how did the -- and the Chinese have been, to their credit, very active participants in this -- and I asked him, well, how did the Chinese react when -- after their space test? He said, oh, they were very embarrassed. They did not -- they were not, needless to say, informed about this.

And in fact, so much so, the Chinese basically -- the next meeting was supposed to have been in Beijing, and they purposely, they suddenly became ill, and they deferred it for three months. So they -- the Chinese can be good participants, but this was a case, I think, within China where the PLA was not talking to the others in the civilian side.

REP. HEINRICH: You might say it's hard to use a vacuum in a vacuum?

(Laughter)

MR. MACDONALD: I beg your pardon?

REP. HEINRICH: It's hard to use a vacuum in a vacuum.

MR. MACDONALD: Yeah.

REP. HEINRICH: The last point that you brought up about the Chinese, what do you -- are we going to see -- was that a case where the PLA just didn't think about the ramifications that that debris field might have on their own infrastructure?

MR. MACDONALD: Well, I've heard some stories. I've had some interactions with the Chinese and I -- the one that -- the story that I've heard that I put the most credibility by is that the scientists and engineers in the PLA that have been working on this, have been working on it for a long time. And like scientists and engineers anywhere, they've wanted to do the test to see if it worked. You know, one, because they, scientists and engineers like to do that, and secondly, they wanted to be able to justify all the money that they've been spending in this area. And they knew they had to tell the -- according to the story that they had to tell the foreign ministry.

So they did what any good bureaucrat would do, and remember the Chinese invented bureaucracy may be 4,000 years ago, so they're really good at it, and that is they told -- I'm told that they informed the foreign ministry in advance about this, but they informed them in such a technical, obscure way that nobody at he foreign ministry understood what they were being told, so that this allowed the PLA people to say, did you inform the foreign ministry, and they checked the box that said yes, but that in fact nobody understood the significance of it. But that I'm told that in fact China was really shocked by the very strong worldwide reaction. And I think that kind of worldwide reaction had a beneficial effect. I mean, that the -- I don't think the PLA in general is open to the rest of the world, as other parts of the Chinese government are. So I think that -- I hope that they've learned a good lesson, but we'll have to see how that plays out in the future.

REP. HEINRICH: Madame Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. I'm happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.

REP. MAC THORNBERRY (R-TX): Thank you, Madame Chair.

I appreciate the work that each of you has done to put more intellectual vigor and effort into space strategy and space policy. I'm struck by Mr. MacDonald's comment that our strategy comes from our acquisition. Basically, we buy what we can and then figure out a strategy on how to use it, rather than getting the strategy first and having our acquisition come from there. So General, I want to kind of get up to a little more practical I guess, because this committee as well as the Intelligence Committee at least has had a very difficult time with space acquisition, and mounting cost, and delays. And certainly the country's strategy comes in part from our inability to have a successful acquisition strategy.

I know you talked about small sets in previous answers, but give us some more assistance about how our government, our country, can do better on the acquisition side, if we're going to have a strategy we're still going to implement?

MG. ARMOR: Yes, sir. There have been some recent acquisition studies, and I don't recall what they were. I think Tom Young did one, and I think there was another one that I -- I'm sorry, I'm at a loss to recall, that really covered those answers very well. And I -- I'm sorry, I didn't really come prepared to talk about that today, but from my view on the inside over the last, you know, 15 years, watching the professional Acquisition Corps, and the scientific, technical engineering, and math-skilled people in the service and the Acquisition Corps disappear in the '90s, to me it was an inevitable result that we would have, you know, these kind of problems with our complex system acquisition, not just in space, but across the board. And I think, sir, I'll stop there.

REP. TAUSCHER: Mr. Thornberry, if you'll yield, I think this is an excellent -- as usual you've come up with some of the best questions. I think this is an excellent question, and I think that what we would try to do is empower our staff to at a minimum, if not a hearing, come up with a briefing and -- where we can start to tease away some of this issue, because I think you're right. We have been troubled for a long time trying to get the cart before the horse, and/or the horse before the cart. And why don't we try to work with you on that, because I think this is a very good level of interest on your part. I know we are all interested in this.

REP. THORNBERRY: I appreciate it, Madame Chair. It does occur -- as we were talking about strategy, and space policy, and what is possible with diplomacy, and so forth, none of that is going to matter unless we can buy stuff on a reasonable timeframe, and it's going to do what we want it to do, and we have just enormous difficulties there. So I appreciate it.

Mr. MacDonald, let -- a while ago General Armor said, and I'll paraphrase, we can't get into a tit for tat on your satellite versus our satellite, because we are so much more dependent upon space than anybody else. Do you agree with that, and how does that help inform us on what deterrence schemes when we put it in a -- when it includes at least, not limited to but includes a space content?

MR. MACDONALD: Well, it's a very important point that General Armor makes, and that you have repeated. I addressed this a little bit in the Council of Foreign Relations report. While it is true today that we depend far more on our space assets than other countries, China is generally considered to be moving up fast, and if -- this were a classified area, and I could say a little more, but let me just leave it to say that there will come a time where China is going to be very dependent on its space assets as well, and then there would be more of that dynamic. But I -- certainly one thing about deterrence, and I'll take onboard what Michael Krepon had said that we should not -- were any of our assets to be attacked, we should not feel constrained that, oh, the only way that we could respond would be relative to space.

It sometimes -- the attacking U.S. space assets is called an asymmetric attack, because it would have a disproportionate effect on our forces. But we should have our own asymmetric ways of attacking was well, or of responding. But I think the whole idea is that when you're dealing with a country like China, fortunately while China is not exactly our best friend, we're not bitter enemies either. And we are almost getting a point of such mutual dependency where neither one -- the only issue where we could really see coming to blows would be over Taiwan, and we are hoping of course that that's not going to happen.

But I think that the short answer is that we need not feel constrained to respond in ways related to space, but that China is going to become a lot more dependent on space assets pretty soon, and that would provide a way of -- offense capabilities there would provide one way of deterring such attacks.

REP. THORNBERRY: I'd just say I hope we don't limit our space policy to what China does, and being responsible to them. They're not the only folks out there in the world.

MR. MACDONALD: Couldn't agree -- (Off mike.)

REP. THORNBERRY: And I just -- for me, I'd want to be careful. Thank you.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.

I'm happy to yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin for five minutes.

REP. JAMES R. LANGEVIN (D-RI): Thank you, Madame Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you, I appreciate your testimony here today. My question first is for Mr. MacDonald, and if it's come up already, I apologize. I came in -- another -- the other hearing was delayed. Recently the Chinese have announced that they're trying to further develop their space program by building a new space station in 2011.

As with our early program, China's is run through their military. In news reports, I've noted that the purpose of the station would be for scientific and military research. Do you think it's the move by China to increase their strategic military capability in space, and if so what are the strategic implications for U.S. national security, and for the peaceful development of space?

And as a follow-on to that, should U.S. be moving more aggressively to bring China in as a partner in space aspiration, in an effort to dissuade them from focusing on your efforts on military space technology, and you know, what efforts would our nation take to increase this cooperation?

MR. MACDONALD: Thank you, Congressman. Two very good questions; let me take the second one first. I think we should be actively exploring ways to cooperate with China wherever possible. You know, 11 years ago, we had the problem of technology being transferred improperly to China, which led to a very strong response that we've now had for 11 years.

Some -- I've heard from a lot of people that say that our response was too strong, and that we ought to take another look at those restrictions that were placed on technology transfer and interaction with China, and let's hold on to the ones that make sense, but either the ones that are outdated or just don't work, we should consider dropping or modifying.

But we can interact with them more. China is not our enemy on this, and I think we ought to see ways we could bring them in, if you will. On the question of their proposed space station, we had seen this coming for some time. My take is that their space station itself would not pose a important strategic problem to the United States, but it would in the sense of what it signified that their capabilities would be, and what they might be able to do not with the space station itself, but with other systems they could develop.

Now, there are all kinds of technologies that might be relevant to capabilities that would be somewhat worrisome, proximity operations like what you do when you are very close to something. We heard this from the Soviets back in the ASAT discussions we had with them back in the late '70s, when they accused our space shuttle of being a potential anti-satellite weapon.

We had to go around the mulberry tree on that one. So it's more -- to me the concern I would have is more the capabilities that such a space station would demonstrate that they have, rather than an intrinsic threat from the space station itself.

MR. KREPON: Senator, if I may add, the Chinese presence in space, not just with the space station, but their manned missions, makes them more vulnerable to the debris problem. So we've had to change out the windows on the space shuttle over 70 times because of very small debris hits, paint flecks that have left thankfully shallow craters on the window panes of the space shuttle.

So for whatever reason the Chinese carried out the most irresponsible anti-satellite test the world has ever seen, which will endanger their space operations, as well as their satellites. So I am of the view that it may be possible to carve out a zone of cooperation in this area, preventing debris-producing anti-satellite tests in the future.

REP. LANGEVIN: Well, this maybe a good follow-on to my next question -- unlike nuclear deterrence, space deterrence works on the principle of preventing the addition of weapons in space.

With anti-satellite capabilities increasing worldwide, the U.S. clearly has the most to lose strategically and financially in the space arena, which is why I believe we have to ensure that space doesn't become a battlefield, and I believe that another delusion lies in that the whole government approach to our space security.

So can you provide us some specific steps that the U.S. can take to ensure that not only our interest is preserved, but that the access at space for peaceful research remains open to U.S., other nations?

MR. KREPON: Well, the point Mr. Thornberry made, I think, is just foundational. If we can't get our act together to get the assets we need into space in a timely, cost-efficient manner, then we're just going to be scrambling. So that's just key. But we need to have a better sense of what's going on up there, especially with this debris population. We're the best in the world, but we're still deficient.

And there is -- and you will be making some investment decisions that matter with respect to space situational awareness. And as I said, maybe before you came in, we have all kinds of ways to mess up satellites now. So that's part of the deterrence piece. But what we've been missing over the last eight years has been reinforcing diplomatic periods. And I'm hopeful that that will add that to the complement.

REP. LANGEVIN: I agree; good suggestion. Thank you, Madame Chair. I yield back.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Langevin. I'm going to yield to the Ranking Member Mr. Turner, and then I'm going to Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Turner.

REP. TURNER: Thank you so much. I just wanted to put a footnote here that I appreciated the comments of General Armor and Mr. MacDonald concerning the industrial base, and our ability to support it both on export restrictions, and its impact, and our acquisition policies.

Yesterday, General Chilton raised the same issue with us, with Rick Larsen raising it as an important issue, and of course Mr. Langevin today. Now, this is an issue that the committee is interested in, and madame chairwoman has indicated an interest in. So I appreciate you -- you mentioned that as we go through our issues of vulnerability, because it is one that is important.

With that, I thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you. Mr. Lamborn for five minutes, gentleman from Colorado.

REP. DOUG LAMBORN (R-CO): Thank you.

And General Armor, I'd like to ask a question of you, but anyone else who wants to comment is welcome to also. There is -- there are some commercial operators who provide things like optical imaging in our -- in space architecture, and to some degree there are public and private partnerships going on, contracts where these optical images are being purchased.

So with this growing commercial capability, I believe that there's less -- that that's a way of sharing the risk and guarding out the risk, because private investors at no cost to the taxpayer, are starting to put up satellites. So -- and even more so, that military or defense community -- intelligence community can directly use.

So what do you see that the future should be for sharing -- for having these kind of partnerships in the future, and should that be part of our strategy to consciously and expressly rely to some extent on commercial operators?

MG. ARMOR: Yes, sir, Congressman Lamborn. I generally agree with what you're saying, and my earlier testimony, I am an advocate for constructing a strong commercial space business in the United States. The methods that you're talking about are definitely one of the -- a way good way to do that. I mean, even when the government deployed the GPS system, they had really no idea about the commercial applications that spun off of that and now, you know, it's part of our infrastructure, the imagery sharing, you know.

Public/private financing, that is a way. I would find other incentives whether it's tax breaks or whatever to incentivize it even further. I know the NASA is using the COTS program to buy commercial launch vehicles and other, you know, supply.

So yeah, I believe that there's a broad spectrum of government commercial practices and acquisition techniques that could help stimulate that, and if I could go back a little bit to Madame Chairwoman's analogy to the -- the homeowner analogy, you know, maybe part of the licensing process for the growing commercial business is that they take care of their orbits, just like you would have to clean your own sidewalks, and make your neighborhood look nice, so that they would be held accountable either by insurance or some, you know, commercial mechanism or they'd be penalized or fined if they mess up their orbital regime that's been assigned to them by the FCC or other, you know, government traffic management authority. So I digressed a little bit there. I think I answered your question, sir.

REP. LAMBORN: Yeah, thank you.

And either of you other two gentlemen?

MR. MACDONALD: If I could just add to that a little bit, and I don't want to beat the homeowner analogy to death, but if you could take just sort of one step up from that, I think that if you were a small businessman, if you wanted to locate in your town, you might be able -- you would want to make sure that it had appropriate police and fire protection, and sewage, and water, and that sort of thing. In the same way, I think that -- I think the potential for the private sector in space is really exciting.

And like -- and as General Armor said, it's amazing how the private sector has figured a way to leverage off the GPS satellites. But I think that the private operators would be -- count on the fact that there is some basic infrastructure support like the Space Situational Awareness, that they could inform private operators where the debris is, what to watch out for, and that there was kind of a traffic cop role, the traffic management step, they don't end up losing an investment, that kind of thing. But I think that there's -- and that's the way in which I think government can be very helpful is in providing that basic infrastructure support to allow the private sector to go full speed ahead and take advantage of it.

MR. KREPON: Armed Forces never have enough pictures.

(Laughter)

So I'm totally in support of this.

REP. LAMBORN: Are there any policies you'd advocate to make sure that this happens, or should we just continue as we are now, where it's pretty informal?

MG. ARMOR: My understanding, and I'm a year or so out of date, was that there already is policy that encourages use of commercial systems. It's been a matter of you know, implementing that policy, and I'm back to my -- we needed the -- you know, a national strategy and a mechanism to implement it argument.

REP. LAMBORN: Thank you.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. I'm happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks.

REP. TRENT FRANKS (R-AZ): Well, thank you, Madame Chair, and Madame Chair, may I go ahead and take this opportunity to congratulate you on the news that the administration has tapped you for a very important situation -- position. I know that there's probably a lot of things to still do, and I don't even know what your own conclusions are, but it's certainly an honor I think for any member to be tapped by presidential administration for something as significant as that.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Franks.

REP. FRANKS: General Armor, following the Iridium satellite incident, you know, we were all pretty impressed with the survivability of the Iridium constellation in terms of being able to function relatively uninterrupted even with the loss of one of its members as it were.

And I'm wondering related to our other defense satellite systems, and you know, just constellations, do you think we have enough redundancy or enough system redundancy in some of those to accomplish the same thing, or should we -- is this something we should be focusing on significantly more?

MG. ARMOR: I don't think we have robust enough constellations, and we're looking at gaps in many of our capabilities coming up. I wouldn't necessarily, you know, say that all of them could take the same approach that Iridium does, it's got a sort of a unique 66 bulb (ph) satellite constellation, whereas with an imagery system, for example, you just -- you can't do it that way yet. I mean, maybe in the future there may be a technique for a large dispersed matrix kind of imagery approach to doing business, but that technology isn't here today.

So -- and some things are done at geostationary, where it's a different, you know, laws of physics in effect here. But the Iridium approach is effective. It's very robust, and you can have accidents, and it's commercially sound, so they didn't upset too many customers, and they're happy with that.

REP. FRANKS: Well, General Armor, I guess everyone has probably asked you this already, but what's your assessment of the root cause of the February 2009 Iridium incident? What do you believe happened? Do you think it was preventable?

MG. ARMOR: I guess technically it was preventable if we had assigned the resources and the intellectual capacity to do that. There is a law of large numbers in effect here. There's a lot of stuff out there, and statistics is going to get you at some point. Again, had we focused attention on that particular conjunction, yeah, maybe we could have maneuvered the -- that particular Iridium satellite, but it really was an outside event. I mean, it was a law of large numbers event here.

REP. FRANKS: Mr. MacDonald, did you have a thought?

MR. MACDONALD: Yeah, one dimension of that I think is that the Air Force does a wonderful job as I said a little earlier in putting information out about the 17,000 different orbiting objects. But it's not their job responsibility, and it would cost them a lot more money if they were to go through the complex calculations to try to figure out possibilities for collisions.

Right now, the policy, and this is -- I'm not faulting the Air Force at all on this -- is here's the information, but if you've got a problem, you've got to figure it out.

One possible service we could do would be to provide the kind of capability that would allow this, and the technical term for it is conjunction analysis, it sounds a grammatical term, but it's not, basically where you would analyze to see where collisions might happen. But right now the Air Force isn't given the resources, and doesn't do that kind of thing, and the Iridium people for whatever reason didn't figure it out. And so we unfortunately had this accident.

But we did have the backup capability. And I wanted too -- just if I could, just to take this chance to point out something that this committee did 16 years ago, when over the objections of the Air Force, it funded the DSP 23, the last missile-launched detection satellite, and said, no, SBIRS, the new system is coming online, but it may not come as fast as we think.

(Laughter)

MR. MACDONALD: Well, guess what, it hasn't come on as fast as we thought, and so that DSP 23 satellite it ought to have "courtesy to House Armed Services Committee" on a decal on the side of it.

(Laughter)

MR. MACDONALD: And that was very thoughtful and a lot of foresight on the part of this committee to ensure that we had the backup for that absolutely crucial capability that our nation's security depends on.

REP. FRANKS: Well, thank you. Mr. Krepon, I wanted to -- I was impressed with your emphasis on the space junk, and I'm just wondering now, and this is not one of my official questions, but when are you going to invent some type of a satellite that will come along a parallel orbit, and pick this stuff up, and load it, and bring it back here?

MR. KREPON: Yeah, that stuff's traveling at 10 times the speed of a rifle bullet, so.

REP. FRANKS: No, I know it is. I'm talking about a parallel orbit, you know, you've just got to come alongside.

MR. KREPON: Right now, we've only got one method, one proven method, and that's the atmosphere, and --

REP. FRANKS: I'm looking for you to invent something.

(Laughter)

MR. KREPON: Let me just tag on to your last question, Mr. Franks, because it's -- this maybe a problem of the law of large numbers, but with every collision, the numbers grow big time. And I'm not technically qualified here, but I've read people who are technically qualified, who are warning us that we can expect a collision every couple of years now. So this is a serious problem.

MR. : Ranking member --

MR. MACDONALD: If I could just build on that --

REP. TAUSCHER: Go ahead.

MR. MACDONALD: Estimates I've seen is that the space debris was growing at about 10 percent a year. If we just do the math on that, that's why I mentioned in my statement that 25 years from now, the debris problem will be 1,200 percent greater than it is right now.

And Michael is exactly right, the problem will be just far worse, and some are even worried about the possibility you could set up a slow chain reaction, where because you create -- a collision creates more debris and then you could almost get into a chain reaction situation if you're not careful.

REP. FRANKS: So an arithmetic addition of objects means a geometric increase in collision?

REP. TAUSCHER: Yes.

REP. FRANKS: Good to know. Scary situation.

Thank you, Madame Chair.

REP. TAUSCHER: Thank you, Mr. Franks.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you on behalf of the committee and on the people that we represent, the American people, for your individual and collective service to this country, and especially your presence at the committee today. It is invaluable to us to have your expertise and your significant pedigrees, and you always respond, and we can't thank you enough for what you do for the American people. It is very, very important work. Space, big place, and -- cosmically, physically, and obviously we have some very, very important issues to work on to make sure that we get this right.

You've aided us significantly today, and on behalf of my subcommittee, I want to thank you very much. And the subcommittee stands adjourned.

END.

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