United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act

Floor Speech

UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT -- (House of Representatives - September 26, 2008)

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition today to the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. If this body ratifies this agreement today, it will be the first time that a country that is not a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty will have the benefits of nuclear trade without any of the responsibilities associated with possessing unstable, dangerous material on the planet.

Earlier this month, the Nuclear Suppliers Group made the ill-fated decision to approve an India-specific waive from its guidelines requiring full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for nuclear supply and trade. The decision ends the 34-year global ban on nuclear trade with India, a nation which has defied international norms regarding responsible and acceptable nuclear energy use.

Now, the Bush Administration is attempting bilateral deal with India that would exacerbate and codify the NSG's mistake. Under the deal, India would only have to separate its unregulated military and regulated civilian nuclear programs, not cease the pursuit of additional nuclear weapons. Additionally, India is allowed to keep 1,000 bombs worth of nuclear material outside of IAEA safeguards. In other words, by agreeing to provide material to satisfy India's civilian nuclear needs, America would be freeing up unregulated material for use in its military bomb production program.

How a deal like this brings India into conformance with international norms of state nonproliferation behavior--something the administration claims--is beyond me. Freeing up more unregulated nuclear material for bomb making doesn't sound like a safety measure. It sounds like a recipe for irresponsible use.

The economic benefits of this deal have also been greatly exaggerated by the Bush Administration. Russia and other regional states are already actively negotiating supply deals with India; leaving little opportunity for US energy companies half a world away.

However, more important than the potential economic aspects of the deal for our domestic energy production industry, or even the increased ability of India to create nuclear weapons, is the drastic effect the deal would have on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, one of the most sacrosanct and honored multilateral agreements in international law.

The NPT is the single most effective bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons materials and technology. The treaty currently has 189 signatories and only four non-signatories. Under the treaty, NPT countries which possess nuclear weapons agree not to share weapon making materials or information. Similarly, NPT countries without weapons agree not to pursue these materials or information.

By agreeing to supply a nation that has not agreed to abide by these solemn pledges, this agreement would blow a hole in the NPT. Previously, our government required states to sign the NPT if they wanted to engage in nuclear trade with us. With this deal, the leverage inherent in that tradeoff will be gone. What moral authority will we or the international community have over Iran, or any other NPT signatory for that matter, if it actively seeks nuclear materials in violation of the treaty?

In the waning days of an administration that has shredded international law and our credibility around the world, why is this body prepared today to add to this tarnished legacy? Let there be no doubt, a vote for this bill is a vote for a more dangerous world. For the sake of peace and the sanctity of the rule of law, I encourage my colleagues to oppose the bill.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Source