United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act

UNITED STATES-INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION APPROVAL AND NONPROLIFERATION ENHANCEMENT ACT -- (Extensions of Remarks - September 28, 2008)

* Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Speaker, given the enormous pressures this Congress is facing to solve urgent financial problems which threaten the stability and health of our economy, I must express my deep reservations about expediting approval of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement at this time.

* While I fully favor strengthening economic, social, cultural, and political ties with our Indian friends, why this most desirable pursuit hinges upon the sale of sensitive nuclear technology--remains a mystery to me.

* The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement sets a groundbreaking precedent that could open a floodgate for worldwide nuclear commerce that, absent rigorous conditions, safeguards, and oversight, could significantly damage the stability and integrity of U.S. and international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Just this week, the Russian Prime Minister announced that Russia ``was ready to consider the possibility of cooperation in nuclear energy'' with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez.

* As you know, in 2006 Congress passed the Hyde Act, which waives key provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to enable our consideration of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Absent the Hyde Act, the agreement would violate the Atomic Energy Act, which has regulated U.S. nuclear commerce since 1954 to prevent the dangerous proliferation of nuclear technology and materials.

* Upon a preliminary review, the agreement does not address the Hyde Act's prohibition on nuclear cooperation in the event of nuclear testing. Also, I understand that the terms of this agreement and India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency would permit the removal of tritium from heavy water in safeguarded reactors, possibly enhancing nuclear weapons yields, in contravention of U.S. law and the NPT.

* Moreover, I am deeply concerned that international guidelines recently eased to pave the way for this agreement and exempt India from longstanding rules of nuclear commerce that have applied equally to all nations are insufficiently rigorous to prevent the potential erosion of decades of global nonproliferation gains.

* Let us remember that the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, which India has not signed, is the nonproliferation mainstream.

* This bill also waives the 30-day period provided in the Hyde Act for congressional consideration of the underlying agreement. As co-chair of the Nuclear Security Caucus and the author of a Hyde Act amendment that seeks to prevent potential diversion of fissile material for military purposes, I oppose waiving the 30-day requirement to permit thoughtful consideration of whether this agreement in fact complies with the law we passed to condition its implementation.

* Mr. Chairman, we should not rush this. We are accountable to the American people for conducting rigorous oversight on matters of nuclear security, and I am concerned that short-circuiting the review process for this agreement is not consistent with that obligation. The Hyde Act was the result of precise and painstaking negotiations. I urge my colleagues to allow for adequate ,due diligence of this complex matter.

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