Pakistan

Floor Speech

PAKISTAN -- (Senate - June 06, 2008)

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, during the Senate recess at the end of last month, I visited the central front in our Nation's fight against al-Qaida: Pakistan. During my 4-day stay, I met with a broad range of political officials from numerous parties, including the Pakistan People's Party of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the PLM-N of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, as well as with President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani intelligence officials, the ousted chief justice, and representatives of Pakistan's civil society. Outside of Islamabad, my visit included a trip to Peshawar, in the tumultuous Northwest Frontier Province, where I met with local officials, and Kashmir, where the United States has funded numerous successful humanitarian and development programs in the wake of the devastating 2005 earthquake.

The breadth of this trip was commensurate with the critical importance of Pakistan to our country's national security. Despite recent claims by CIA Director Michael Hayden that al-Qaida is now on the defensive, including in its safe haven in Pakistan, I traveled there because it is out of that country that we face our most serious national security threat. As the intelligence community has said again and again, the fight against al-Qaida begins in Pakistan. According to the State Department's 2007 terrorism report which was released this past April, al-Qaida and associated networks remain the greatest terrorist threat to the United States. That threat emanates from the reconstitution of some of al-Qaida's pre-9/11 capabilities ``through the exploitation of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.'' The report added that instability in Pakistan, ``coupled with the Islamabad brokered cease-fire agreement in effect for the first half of 2007 along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, appeared to have provided AQ leadership greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operational planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States.''

During my visit, I conducted extensive discussions with Pakistani leaders about ceasefire negotiations, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, as well as in the Swat region of the NWFP. I remain skeptical about those negotiations and am particularly concerned that those in the FATA region will give al-Qaida room to plot against our troops in Afghanistan and our citizens here in the United States. The new civilian-led Government in Pakistan is seeking a different approach from that of President Musharraf, and that is understandable--it has, in fact, been mandated by the people of Pakistan, and it is high time they have a responsive government that heeds their call. A key part of this new approach will require success in reining in the military apparatus, which has historically controlled much of Pakistan's foreign policy--sometimes overtly with a military dictator running the country and other times more discreetly from behind a screen of a civilian-led government. But as Pakistan's new Government seeks to reconcile these complex, multilayered issues, it must not do so at the expense of the grave threats emanating from the border region. We must address those threats head-on because what happens in the terrorist safe haven of FATA is central to our national security, and we cannot afford to be distracted or complacent. To do so would be to the detriment of our safety and security as well as that of our friends and allies.

At the same time, any long-term counterterrorism strategy in the FATA must include serious economic reforms, legal political party development, and initiatives to integrate FATA with the rest of Pakistan. This will not be easy, but it is long overdue and will help ensure we are using all the tools at our disposal to fight al-Qaida and associated terrorist threats. The growing extremism and creation of a terrorist safe haven in FATA has emerged out of decades of political marginalization and ensuing poverty. In working closely with the FATA political agents and local law enforcement, as well as the Government of Pakistan, we need to help create sustainable development strategies that provide opportunities for engagement while ensuring sufficient financial resources are allocated to those in need now and in the years to come.

This must include not only traditional development projects but institution building and political engagement in a region long deprived of such opportunities. The people of the FATA must have alternative livelihood options that help facilitate opposition to terrorists and extremists.

At the same time, we must find Osama Bin Laden and his senior leaders, and we must work to neutralize forces that plot or carry out attacks against Americans. But that cannot be our only goal. This fight runs much deeper than a simple manhunt--if we are serious about countering al-Qaida, and preventing another Bin Laden from emerging, we must shift our assistance to be more aligned with the needs of the local population and expand our development assistance throughout a country where poverty and anti-Western sentiment are pervasive.

This administration's policies toward Pakistan have been highly damaging to our long-term national security. By embracing and relying on a single, unpopular, antidemocratic leader--namely, President Musharraf--President Bush failed to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that transcends individuals. He also encouraged Pakistanis to be skeptical about American intentions and principles. The recent elections provide a window of opportunity as the people of Pakistan soundly rejected President Musharraf's leadership in favor of political parties that promised a new direction. Although domestic politics remain fragile, we have an opportunity to reverse our history of neglect and mixed signals by expanding our relationships and supporting fundamental democratic institutions instead of one strong man--something the President may still be reluctant to do. We must do this so that our counterterrorism partnership can withstand the ups and downs of Pakistan's domestic politics, reflecting a more wide-ranging approach that does not ratchet up the already high levels of anti-American sentiment in that country.

Any enduring counterterrorism partnership must recognize that Pakistan, despite the coups and military dictatorships that have marred its history, has a democratic tradition, a vibrant civil society, and a large and educated middle class whose interests and values frequently coincide with ours. By working with those Pakistanis and supporting their desire to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, we align ourselves with the moderate forces that are critical to the fight against extremism. Supporting the Pakistani people as they seek to strengthen democratic institutions is not just an outgrowth of our values--it is in our national security interests. The counterterrorism efforts we need from Islamabad must be serious and sustained in a way that only democratic processes can ensure.

For these reasons, I have been deeply disappointed by the Bush administration's failure to condemn the illegal dismissal of the chief justice of Pakistan and scores of other judges and its refusal to call for their reinstatement. The ousting of the judges has become a cause céle 2bre for Pakistan's civil society. It prompted the creation of a ``Lawyers' Movement''--a moderate, democratic uprising that Americans should embrace. During my time in Pakistan, I visited with the chief justice and shortly thereafter called for the judges to be reinstated because it is a clear violation of the basic tenets of the rule of law. I was asked whether I had made such a call in support of a particular political party and whether I also sought the removal of President Musharraf. I responded that those are issues for the Pakistanis to determine, and I continue to believe that is the case. Indeed, while the political landscape in Pakistan remains turbulent and fragile, I have no intention of meddling in domestic affairs. Nonetheless, it is unacceptable for the United States to sit back in the face of such fundamentally undemocratic actions. We cannot be selective in the democratic principles we support--that is not consistent with our values, and it is shortsighted in terms of our national security.

Mr. President, the emergence of a new civilian leadership in Pakistan provides an opening for us to develop a new approach--a new relationship--that includes a sustainable, comprehensive counterterrorism partnership. We must seize this opportunity because, despite a great deal of anti-American sentiment, in many areas the Pakistanis are ready and willing to work with us. This is not to say that this process will be free from challenges--there are already serious hurdles that must be dealt with, including negotiations in the FATA and NWFP, both of which are cause for concern. In the end, we must recognize that the new leadership reflects a broad cross-section of Pakistan, and by fully engaging them, we can take an important step toward defending our national security interests in the central front in the fight against al-Qaida.

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