Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee - Strategy in Afghanistan and Recent Reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council of the United States (Part 1)
Good morning, everybody.
First, let me welcome our witnesses. We very much appreciate their being with us today. They're adjusting their schedules to accommodate ours. There was a memorial service -- still, as a matter of fact, going on -- for Congressman Tom Lantos, which is the reason that I, at least, had to delay this until now. We very much appreciate, as always, the cooperation and advice of Senator Warner as to how to approach these delays in the scheduling today.
Today the committee receives --
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Indeed, we've traveled with Tom Lantos and know him and Annette well. And the eloquent testimony that's now being delivered about his life goes on as we speak here, and we shall all miss him and his commitment, his love of this nation.
The committee today receives testimony on the situation in Afghanistan, including the assessments contained in two recently released reports from the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council of the United States.
Our witnesses on this morning's panel are Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs James Shinn, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, and Lieutenant General John Sattler, the director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5 of the Joint Staff.
This afternoon at 2:30, the committee will hear from two experts who participated in preparing the independent reports on Afghanistan, retired General Jim Jones, chairman of the board of directors of the Atlantic Council, and Ambassador Rick Inderfurth, professor of the practice of international affairs at George Washington University. Both General Jones and Ambassador Inderfurth participated in the Afghanistan Study Group, which was established under the auspices of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.
The American people understand the stakes in Afghanistan. Unlike the war in Iraq, the connection between Afghanistan and the terrorist threat that manifested itself on September 11th has always been clear. American support for the mission in Afghanistan remains strong.
Last week the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, reiterated the significance of the threat emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. He told the Senate Intelligence Committee that al Qaeda's central leadership, based in the border area of Pakistan, is al Qaeda's, quote, "most dangerous component."
He added that the safe havens that extremists enjoy in the tribal areas along the Pakistan border serve, quote, "as a staging area for al Qaeda's attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as a location for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States."
For too long, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have taken a back seat to the war in Iraq, leaving our forces in Afghanistan short of what they need. Admiral Mullen acknowledged as much in December, calling the Afghanistan mission a, quote, "economy of force" operation. And he added, quote, "It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must," closed quote.
Last year, Congress took action to strengthen the focus on Afghanistan. The National Defense Authorization Act included several measures to increase transparency and expand congressional oversight, including establishing a special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, requiring the president to submit a comprehensive strategy for security and stability in Afghanistan, and provide regular updates on the progress of that strategy, and requiring a report on plans for the long-term sustainment of the Afghanistan national security forces.
The president continues to paint a rosy picture of the situation in Afghanistan. Last Friday he said that in Afghanistan, quote, "The Taliban, al Qaeda and their allies are on the run," closed quote. But the reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council provide more sobering assessments of the situation on the ground.
Among the findings of those reports are the following. Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are, quote, "faltering," according to the Afghanistan Study Group report. That report finds that since 2002, quote, "Violence, insecurity and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls," closed quote.
The Atlantic Council report states that "Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan." Instead, the security situation, according to the Atlantic Council report, is, quote, "a strategic stalemate, with NATO and Afghan forces able to win any head-to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys safe haven across the border with Pakistan."
The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan, quote, "has grown considerably over the last two years," according to the Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since 2001 for U.S. and international forces.
The Taliban are relying increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140 suicide bombings in 2007. The Afghanistan Study Group report also finds that, quote, "The Taliban have been able to infiltrate many areas throughout the country," closed quote, intimidating and coercing the local Afghan people.
The reports find that more U.S. and international forces are needed for Afghanistan. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, currently consisting of more than 43,000 soldiers from 40 countries, remains short of the troops and equipment that it needs to meet mission requirements. These shortfalls include maneuver battalions, helicopters and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
The United States has announced its intention to deploy an additional 3,200 Marines, and other NATO members have upped their contributions, including Britain and Poland. Yet, as the Afghanistan Study Group points out, more NATO countries need to share the burden and remove national caveats that limit the ability of their troops to participate in ISAF operations.
Opium production continues to be at record levels. The Atlantic Council calls drug production, quote, "The most striking sign of the international community's failure." That report cites World Bank estimates that around 90 percent of the world's illegal opium comes from Afghanistan. A report this month from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime finds that cultivation levels this year are likely to be similar to last year's, quote, "shockingly high level."
The Afghanistan Study Group finds that the need for greater international coordination is "acute," in their word. Contributors to Afghanistan reconstruction include over 40 countries, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and NGOs. Unfortunately, the recent withdrawal of the widely respected Paddy Ashton from consideration for the position of United Nations international coordinator for Afghanistan, reportedly at the request of the Karzai government, is a real setback.
The Atlantic Council report concludes, quote, "In summary, despite efforts of the Afghan government and the international community, Afghanistan remains a failing state. It could become a failed state," closed quote.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning concerning recommendations for getting Afghanistan on the right track. I hope they'll address the assessments and recommendations of the reports of the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council. These reports highlight the urgent need for the administration to reassess its approach to ensure that Afghanistan moves towards a stable and progressive state and never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists intent on exporting violence and extremism.
Senator Warner.
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Thank you. We'll try a seven-minute round, if that's all right.
Senator Warner made reference to Secretary Gates's comments about NATO and the need for NATO to step up and provide a greater share in their commitments. Secretary Shinn, is NATO at risk of failing if alliance members do not come forward with the resources to meet the requirements of the ISEF mission?
MR. SHINN: I believe that's something very close to what the secretary mentioned in his comments to the NATO ministers, week before last. It's my understanding t hat he was talking about the future, that it hadn't happened yet, but that there was a real risk to the alliance if, as he said, it evolved into one set of members who will fight and others who will not put their troops in harm's way.
SEN. LEVIN: And would you agree -- and I'll ask Secretary Boucher this -- with Secretary Gates that NATO is at risk of becoming a two-tiered alliance, for the reason that Secretary Shinn just gave? Is that a real risk, Secretary Boucher?
MR. BOUCHER: It is, sir. I think we have to remember that there are difficult tasks throughout Afghanistan, and we have to value the contribution that everybody is making.
But one of the things our commanders keep telling us is they need the flexibility to use the different forces in different parts of the country.
SEN. LEVIN: And they don't have that flexibility?
MR. BOUCHER: And they don't have that flexibility, both through caveats -- people who put their troops in a certain place and want them to stay there -- and just through the overall manning levels that haven't been reached yet.
SEN. LEVIN: Now, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chairman Mullen, said that the coalition forces are facing a classic growing insurgency. He and Michael McConnell, Admiral McConnell, testified on February 5th that, quote, "The security situation has deteriorated in the south and Taliban forces have expanded operation into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul." Do you agree with that? Secretary Boucher, do you agree with that? That's our DNI saying that.
MR. BOUCHER: I guess -- I always agree with DNI, but I think we -- (Laughter.)
SEN. LEVIN: You don't have to agree with him. I'm just -- do you agree with him?
MR. BOUCHER: I think the answer is yes and no. What we've found is they set out last year, the Taliban set out last year to take territory. They set out to put a ring around Kandahar and see if they could take Kandahar. They set out to strengthen their hold on particular strongholds.
And what we showed last year is they are unable to achieve those goals. They failed last year in their goals as they stated them for last year. Spring offensive never happened.
So we have last year pushed them out of strongholds. The Panjwai district near Kandahar, it was the Qala District in northern Helmand, the Sangin District in northern Helmand, those were strongholds. Those are heartland for Taliban; they've been unable to hold them.
On the other hand, they have been able to change their tactics, adjust their mode of operations, and they've adopted tactics of bombings and kidnappings and intimidation of villagers. And they have been able to do that more broadly.
SEN. LEVIN: Have the Taliban -- have the Taliban forces expanded operations in to previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul, as Admiral McConnell said?
MR. BOUCHER: They've been able to carry out attacks in those areas, yes, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: All right.
General Sattler, do you believe the anti-government insurgency in Afghanistan has been contained?
GEN. SATTLER: Mr. Chairman, it goes back to your previous question. We have expanded, NATO has expanded their operations, doing more distributive ops outside major bases, which means you obviously encounter more enemy forces in locations they may have declared safe havens previously, but now you're there.
So our engagement with the enemy, and each -- as was already articulated, sir -- each and every time we do encounter the enemy mano a mano, they come out on the short end. So I would say contact with the Taliban and the insurgent forces has been greater over the course of the last year.
But once again, I cannot confirm, sir, that either they may have been there and now we're operating in areas which were previously perceived as safe havens, or if, in fact, they've grown, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: So you're not able to tell us that as of now the anti-government insurgency in Afghanistan has been yet contained? You cannot tell us that.
GEN. SATTLER: Mr. Chairman, in the areas where we have forces, it is contained. Where we have been able to do the clear and the hold, it is contained. And other areas, I cannot comment on, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: You can't comment, or you can't tell us that --
GEN. SATTLER: I can't tell you that it has been contained, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Now, the Atlantic Council report says that the future of Afghanistan is going to be determined by progress or failure in the civil sector, and I think a number of our witnesses have confirmed the importance of that.
The reconstruction effort has been criticized for the lack of international coordination among contributors, which include over 40 countries, the U.N., E.U., NATO, and a number of non-governmental organizations.
Both the Afghanistan Study Group and the Atlantic Council reports recommend the appointment of a high-level U.N. international coordinator. Paddy Ashdown, the former representative for Bosnia, was considered for this position, but apparently the Karzai government nixed it. Do we know, Secretary Boucher, why that appointment was nixed, and does that represent a setback?
MR. BOUCHER: First of all, I think it's regrettable that the Karzai government didn't accept Paddy Ashdown as the international senior civilian. We very much looked forward to having him in that role.
We've heard a lot of explanations and discussions, mostly having to do with the domestic political environment. But ultimately, I think it's for them to try to explain, rather than me.
But I would say at the same time we've sat down with them subsequently, both in the secretary's talks last week and in my subsequent follow-up with the foreign minister. They tell us they do agree on the need for a strong international coordinator. They will look forward to working with an appointment by the U.N. secretary- general, and we're now engaged in the process of identifying the proper person.
SEN. LEVIN: (Off mike.) And the Atlantic Council report finds that less than 10 cents of every dollar of aid for Afghanistan goes to the Afghan people directly. One program that has worked, we believe, to -- worked successfully to establish community development councils, to identify local priorities and implement approved sub-projects, that has been the National Solidarity Program.
Now, according to a press release from December, the National Solidarity Program has provided $400 million in payments disbursed to 16,000 community development councils in Afghanistan. These payments have financed more than 30,000 community development sub-projects to improve access to infrastructure, markets, and services.
The program draws resources from the Afghanistan Reconstruction trust fund, which is administered by the World Bank. By distributing funds directly to districts at the lowest level, which are the villages, by bypassing the central or provincial governments, the National Solidarity Program reduces corruption and misappropriation and avoids unnecessary contractual layers.
I'm wondering, Secretary Boucher, whether or not you are familiar with the National Solidarity Program, and would you comment on it? And if it is successful, does it -- can you tell us if the Afghan government supports the program and their use of community development councils? And do we support the program?
MR. BOUCHER: The answer is yes, yes, yes, and yes. This is one of the more successful programs in Afghanistan. Ten days ago when I was out there I met with the minister for rural rehabilitation and development, who runs this program. His updated numbers are 35,000 projects in 25,000 villages around the country.
These are mostly small projects. They're wells, they're roads, they're retaining walls, schools sometimes -- things that are done in consultation with the local people, with the local villagers, through the community development councils.
And that's a mechanism that we think works. We think the projects are done well and the -- it delivers what people need and what people want from their government, which is, as I said in my opening statement, really the nub of the matter.
So we have put money in this program ourselves. I think we put about $10 million in, but we have another 50 million (dollars) for this program in our budgets this year. I think much of it's in the supplemental funding that hasn't been passed yet. But we would hope to get that money and be able to expand our contribution.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, I'm glad to hear that, because apparently it does not have the problems of corruption and bureaucratic layers that these other programs have. And I'm glad to hear there is support for it, and we will continue to look for that money to be flowing in that direction.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
SEN. LEVIN: Senator --
MR. BOUCHER: There are a number of ministries in Afghanistan that have walked -- that have gone through the reform process, that have improved their capabilities. And they're really able to deliver projects at local, provincial, and district level. This is one of them; education's another one, health's another one.
And one of the things we're trying to do this year is concentrate international and Afghan resources so that all those programs can work to stabilize an area.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
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The Afghanistan study group recommends a number of diplomatic steps to be taken to strengthen a stable and a peaceful Afghanistan, including the following -- and this is for you, Secretary Boucher -- this is what they recommend: reducing antagonism between Pakistan and Afghanistan, including by having Afghanistan accept the internationally recognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the so-called Durand Line, as the official border; next, getting Pakistan to remove restrictions that burden the transportation of goods through Pakistan to and from Afghanistan, including from India; and third, having the United States and its allies develop a strategy to convince Iran to play a constructive role with respect to Afghanistan, including the possibility of resuming direct discussions with Iran on the stabilization of Afghanistan.
I'm wondering, Secretary Boucher, whether you would support those, or whether the administration would support the diplomatic initiatives outlined in the Afghanistan study group report that I've just quoted?
MR. BOUCHER: Generally yes, but not exactly the way that they recommend it I have to say, we've spent a lot of -- we've put a lot of effort into reducing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We all remember last year, April, March -- March, April when things really flared up, and not only was there shooting across the border, but one of our U.S. officers got killed at flag meeting that was held to try to reduce that -- that shooting.
So it's a very -- it has been a very dangerous situation. I'm happy to report that the situation seems to have turned around quite a bit. And last fall there were a jurga of the tribes from both sides of the border where peaceful people on both sides stood up together and said we don't want the insurgency, we don't want the extremists in our midst, and we're going to work to accomplish that.
And that's a process that we're confident will continue to go forward between the two countries. President Karzai and President Musharraf met at the end of December, the day after Christmas, had a very good meeting, and there have been subsequent follow-up meetings and cooperation between the two sides.
We've also promoted greater cooperation, economic cooperation in other areas. So we see things going I'd say a lot better between the two countries, both starting to realize and starting to act upon the realization that these people are enemies of both nations, and these people need to be dealt with by -- from both sides, by both countries.
Frankly, we haven't taken on the issue of the Durand line. It's a problem that goes back to 1893, to the colonial period. I think both sides do operate with that as the border; they shoot across it to protect it. They operate border posts on it, and our goal has been to try to reduce those tensions and get them to work in a cooperative manner across that line.
Pakistan's restrictions on transit trade from India, truck transit from India, is an issue that we have taken up, and we continue to take it up because, frankly, we think it's in Pakistan's overall economic interest to capture that transit trade and have it go through Pakistan, and not have it go through Iran.
And it's something we continue to raise. The Pakistani government keeps telling us it's really a matter that's determined by their bilateral relationship with India, and not even by their sort of broader global interests. But it's something we do continue to push, because we think it would be not only helpful to us and our allies and others who operate in Pakistan, but it would be helpful to Pakistan itself.
The strategy for Iran, we are certainly keeping very close touch with the Afghans on their relationship with Iran. We see Iran doing a lot of different and sometimes contradictory things. They do participate in support for the Afghan government. They participate in the joint coordination monitoring board of countries, donor countries that are trying to support Afghanistan. But they're also undermining the politics, and in some cases even supplying arms to the Taliban.
So we've had a I think a comprehensive response to that. At this point, I think the issue of whether we sit down and talk to Iran about it is more one that needs to be looked at in the broader context of our relations with Iran. We have had such discussions in the past. But really Iran needs to cooperate with the international community and with the Afghan government, not just with the United States, and that's where we think the pressure ought to be, on Iran.
SEN. LEVIN: Thank you.
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Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
I just -- it's Senator Akaka's turn, but just on this particular subject, if Senator Akaka would not mind just for a moment -- your figures were 49,000 currently Afghan national army and 74,000 Afghan national police personnel, and that's the figures we have. But we have something added to that, which is there's a training completion date for those two groups of March 2011. Is that right? Are my notes right on that?
GEN. SATTLER: Senator, I'll have to check, sir. There's 8,000 Army in training right now, and we're at approximately 49(,000). So when they graduate you're looking to actually hit the goal of the current objective force of 70,000. Sir, I'll have to -- I wouldn't want to take a guess at that, Senator. I'll --
SEN. LEVIN: How long does it take to train a police unit, approximately -- Afghan police unit?
GEN. SATTLER: I can't --
SEN. LEVIN: Okay. That's all right.
GEN. SATTLER: I'll get back to you rather than guess.
SEN. LEVIN: (Inaudible) -- how long it takes to train the army unit. I don't quite understand that figure in my own notes, so it's -- I'd appreciate it for the record.
MR. BOUCHER: Sir, the -- it's a development plan that pulls the police out, puts in temporary police, and then moves them back. It's an eight-week training program that they go out on, and then they go back. But they go back with mentors, and the mentoring is actually probably the key part to how they operate when they get back there.
SEN. LEVIN: We'll get into the mentoring later.
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Thank you, Senator Akaka.
You've talked a little bit about the use of the military in terms of interdiction, drug interdiction. And I may have missed this testimony, in which case I am apologetic for that, but I think you were asked, I believe, Secretary Shinn, but I'm not sure -- it may have been Secretary Boucher -- about the use of the military in terms of drug interdiction -- in terms of eradication. Were you also saying that we should not be using the military in terms of interdiction? Who addressed that issue?
MR. BOUCHER: Actually, it was him, but I could answer for him.
SEN. LEVIN: Either one.
MR. SHINN: I think --
SEN. LEVIN: Point the finger at yourself. Go on, Secretary Shinn.
MR. SHINN: Yeah. I think the response was that our military is not directly involved in either eradication or interdiction, but we believe it should have an Afghan face to it. But we do have quite indirect support in terms of training and equipping for some parts of the counternarcotics strategy, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Why can't we join with the Afghan forces in the interdiction side? You know, leave the farmers alone. Don't get involved in the eradication. But when it comes to dealing with heroin laboratories and smuggling convoys and going after the precursor chemicals, why not use our military jointly with the Afghans -- not on the fields, not on the eradication, but on the big guys?
MR. SHINN: Sometimes we do, actually. There is some cross-over between the Taliban and, you know, narco-traffickers.
SEN. LEVIN: Well, even when there's not a cross-over --
MR. SHINN: We do go after them.
SEN. LEVIN: Even when there's not a cross-over, why not go after the big guys militarily?
MR. SHINN: Part of it's theology, but I think it's more effectiveness.
SEN. LEVIN: Part of it's what?
MR. SHINN: Theology; sort of, you know, these things get discussed in the NATO --
SEN. LEVIN: I think there's enough theology as it is in Afghanistan. Can you use a different word, perhaps?
MR. SHINN: Part of it's a theoretical decision that was made by NATO on how the NATO forces should be used. Part of it's the practical aspect of you want to take down drug lords in a way that can be done through law enforcement means so that they can be prosecuted and punished. And therefore, if it's going to be done in the Afghan justice system, it's better for the Afghans to do it.
We have extensive DEA presence that we're in the process of beefing up to work with the Afghans. But they need to be able to do these operations, by and large, in a manner that allows them to continue not just to take down the guy but to go into prosecution and law enforcement.
That said, NATO is quite aware, because of the nexus, that there are drug lords along with the Taliban. And I think, both in counterinsurgency terms and counternarcotics terms, they're prepared to go after some of these guys.
SEN. LEVIN: Is the Afghan police and Afghan army effective against the drug lords and the heroin labs?
MR. SHINN: The Afghan police and army tend to provide, as I said, the overall security of the perimeter for the Afghan eradication force, but the --
SEN. LEVIN: No, not eradication. I'm talking about --
MR. SHINN: Well, the Afghan drug police and the Afghan eradication force, who are more directly charged with that mission.
SEN. LEVIN: Are they effective in interdicting heroin in the poppy?
MR. SHINN: They've had some success with small and medium traffickers, not a lot of success at the bigger levels.
SEN. LEVIN: Do they want to succeed at the higher levels?
MR. SHINN: I think they do. The people we work with and --
SEN. LEVIN: No, I'm talking about the police themselves. Or is there just so much corruption in the police or the army that you can't rely on them to go after the big guys?
MR. SHINN: The counterdrug police seem to have a determination to do so. We're trying to build up their capability.
SEN. LEVIN: There's a -- you've mentioned a shortfall in the number of trainee -- their trainers, I guess; a significant shortfall. I think, General, you talked about commanders being about 2,500 trainers short, 900 short in the army and about 1,500 short in the police. I think those were your numbers. A thousand of the Marines that are going to be deployed to Afghanistan in the next few months are going to support that training mission. But we're way, way short.
Our allies have not carried through on the commitments that they've made for training teams. I guess the operation is called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, shorthand being "OMLTs," I gather. What's the resistance in our NATO allies to doing that? It's not a direct combat role. It's a training mission. Why have they fallen short on the training mission?
GEN. SATTLER: Mr. Chairman, it really is -- it becomes a combat mission. When you become an operational mentor and liaison team, you're paired with an Iraqi battalion or brigade. When you go to that brigade, as do our embedded trainers, you eat with, sleep with, you mentor by your mere presence, and you teach and train as you move along.
SEN. LEVIN: These are embeds.
GEN. SATTLER: These are embeds. And OMLTs do the same, sir. When the OMLTs go with that unit, if that unit moves into combat, or when that unit moves into combat, the OMLT goes with. The OMLT provides -- they call for fire. They provide medevac. They control artillery. So they become a critical enabler to that unit.
Right now, sir, there's 34 international OMLTs that are in the field right now inside Afghanistan. Of that 34, 24 have been certified. There is a certification process because of the responsibility that the OMLT -- with the enablers that they bring to the fight, sir. So obviously they're certified by ISAF in conjunction with General Cohen (sp) and (CSTICKA ?). There's six more OMLTs that are in the pipeline that should be fielded later this year. So that'll be approximately a total of 40 international operational mentor and liaison teams on the ground.
SEN. LEVIN: Of the 72 that are needed, is that --
GEN. SATTLER: Sir, I'll have to get the exact end, the objective number, but they are substantially short of the ultimate goal. Correct, sir.
SEN. LEVIN: Which gets back to the question of our NATO allies not being willing, too many of them -- because a number of them are, and I don't think we ought to generalize about NATO allies, because we have got NATO allies that have had greater proportionate losses even than we've had in Afghanistan, including the Canadians, so we shouldn't be generalizing about this. But too many of our NATO allies have not come through. And one of the reasons, apparently, is because of the public opposition in their countries to the Afghanistan mission.
Is one of the reasons for that, Secretary Boucher, is that, in the minds of many Europeans, the Iraq mission and the Afghan mission are linked? We have a report -- the Afghanistan Study Group recommended that there be decoupling of the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as a way of improving our overall approach to the war on terrorism. If we delink them, it may be helpful in terms of attracting greater support for the one, and it wouldn't be colored or diminished by opposition to the other. Is there some truth to that that you would --
MR. BOUCHER: I guess there's some truth to that. I don't find it extensively. As I've gone to Europe and I've talked to parliamentarians and party leaders and people like that about the Afghan mission, Iraq is not usually thrown up at us.
SEN. LEVIN: How about their publics?
MR. BOUCHER: To some extent, you see it in the public commentary. But a lot of the restrictions on forces are either parliamentary restrictions or promises that they've made to Parliament that, you know, "We're going in for peacekeeping and stabilization, and therefore we will do these things and not those things."
And that's where a lot of the caveats come from. And it basically, I think, has to do with the image that they have of their forces, the kinds of things they think they should be doing. And, you know, they're there to be nice to people and give them a happier life. And when it comes to fighting, not everybody else is as committed as we are, but many are; as you mentioned, the Canadians and the Brits and the Dutch and some of the others that are with us in the south.
So I think part of it's lack of understanding of the full breadth of the mission -- (inaudible). In order to give people a hospital, you've got to be able to give them police and you've got to be able to give them a secure environment as well. Our forces and several others are fully committed to the whole breadth of that, whereas others have gone under the assumption that they would only be doing part of that.
SEN. LEVIN: To the extent that the public linkage in some of the countries that have put restrictions on their troops is a cause for those parliamentary restrictions or government restrictions, to that extent would it be useful to decouple these two missions?
MR. BOUCHER: Sir, we've been looking at that recommendation. I guess the answer is yes, in general, but --
SEN. LEVIN: Just to give you an example --
MR. BOUCHER: -- what it means in practical terms is not quite clear to me.
SEN. LEVIN: Let me give you an example. The Afghan mission could be put in our regular budget and keeping the Iraqi mission in a supplemental budget.
MR. BOUCHER: The only place that these two seem to go together is in the supplemental budgets. We have -- a lot of our funding goes into the regular budget, but there are supplemental needs. And the vehicle for getting that is a combined supplemental. But at least when we talk about it, when we go out and lobby for it, we're talking about the situation in Afghanistan and what we all need to do it accomplish our goals there.
SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, but I think those two missions are linked in the rhetoric in Washington and in the budgets both. It's the global war that we talk about, Iraq and Afghanistan. And I think you ought to give a lot more thought to this question, to the extent that the European publics in those countries that have not come through with what they've committed link these two efforts. It seems to me that is a diminution of the support that you're likely to get from their representatives in their parliaments.
Here, many of us have delinked them. I mean, many of us who have opposed the effort in Iraq, including me, and a critic of it, and opposed going on, nonetheless very much supported going into Afghanistan -- which, by the way, was a unanimous, I think, a unanimous vote in the Senate to go into Afghanistan, go after the folks who attacked us, and who are still there, at least on the border, and the Taliban, who supported those folks.
And yet -- so I think many of us have delinked it. And I guess you, in your positions, have delinked them. But I'm just urging that if there's truth to the perception, to the point that in those countries there's been a linkage in the public minds, and if that is one of the reasons why there's been a shortfall on the part of many NATO countries in stepping up to what's needed in Afghanistan, it may be wiser that the administration, in its rhetoric, talk -- and in its budget request -- separate these two missions.
They can argue they're both valid, and you can talk about where ought to be more troops than the other. You have to do that, obviously. But in the rhetoric and in the budget, I think it'd be useful. It would reflect the public mood here, where the public, I think, sees very differently the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has consistently. And it may be true in some of the NATO countries as well.
Thank you, gentlemen, and your staffs for rearranging your schedules today to accommodate ours. And we will stand adjourned.
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