Hearing of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight - The Extension of the U.N. Mandate for Iraq

Interview

REP. DELAHUNT: (Sounds gavel.) This hearing of the subcommittee will come to order.

And before I make a brief opening statement, it is a pleasure to introduce for his first congressional hearing a new member of Congress recently elected from Virginia, succeeding a former colleague who passed who was highly regarded and well respected, Congresswoman Jo Ann Davis. I'm sure Mr.Wittman will carry on in her tradition and make a significant contribution to this committee and to its work and to Congress as a whole.

So let me personally welcome you, and let me yield to Mr. Rohrabacher since he's the ranking Republican on this committee for what I'm sure will be a warm welcome.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: And we're joined to my right by a distinguished member of the Congress, Jim McDermott from the state of Washington. He is not a member of this committee, but I would request that he be allowed to sit as a member of this subcommittee. He's been interested in these issues for some time, and if there's no objection from Mr. Rohrabacher -- no objection -- welcome, Mr.McDermott.

I'm going to make a brief opening statement. We have a distinguished panel in front of us.

Today's hearing is entitled "The Extension of the United States Mandate for Iraq: Is the Iraqi Parliament Being Ignored?"

Last night, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution to extend the mandate of the United States-led multinational force in Iraq until December31st of 2008.

In a previous letter to the Iraqi executive branch and to the United Nations Security Council, a majority of the Iraqi parliament denounced as unconstitutional the decision by Prime Minister Maliki to request this extension without the approval of the parliament.

So as chairman of the subcommittee that has primary jurisdiction regarding issues implicating the United Nations and as one of the two congressional delegates to that international body -- and frankly, as a member of Congress who has observed the expenditure, according to the Congressional Research Service, of some half a trillion dollars as well as the loss of almost 4,000 Americans and well over 100,000 Iraqi lives since the initial invasion nearly five years ago. I must say I found this letter and this issue profoundly disturbing, particularly if at this moment there is this deep division between the parliament and the executive, and the hope is to witness and observe reconciliation. I would suggest that this is far from reconciliation, but to the contrary.

We constantly hear the refrain from the administration that the rule of law must be respected in all countries. And if we're to restore our international credibility, it's critical that those words do not ring hollow.

So today's hearing explores whether there are in fact some serious questions about whether the Iraqi executive branch followed the rule of law in its request for an extension of the United Nations mandate.

On October 15th, 2005, almost 10 million Iraqis approved a constitution that paved the way for a new Iraqi parliament known as the Council of Representatives, and subsequently 275members were elected.

The new constitution confers upon the parliament the power to approve international treaties and agreements. A majority of the parliament has now stated that their constitutional prerogatives are being ignored -- their constitutional responsibility is being ignored -- by the executive.

I certainly do not claim to be an expert on the Iraqi constitution, but I find it difficult to imagine that a request to have foreign troops occupy your sovereign territory would not be considered the sort of an international agreement contemplated by the Iraqi constitution or, for that matter, by any constitution worthy of the name.

In a democracy, the rule of law is not an on and off thing to be followed if it's convenient. It's an all the time thing to be followed even if it's unpleasant, messy and difficult.

We members of Congress experience that frequently. I remember the year 2000, when the results of an election were disputed, where the Supreme Court made a ruling. And Democrats certainly were not clicking their heels over that particular decision, but we respected the Constitution.

In any event, I don't know if the Maliki government has acted in a way that is consistent with the Iraqi constitution, and that's what our witnesses are here to help us with. I do know that our own Congress, which is the first branch of government, has the constitutional obligation to oversee the actions of our executive branch. It has the duty to raise precisely this sort of issue and bring it to the attention of the American people for their perusal and reflection and analysis.

To further my understanding of the facts in this dispute, I wrote to Secretary Rice on December 5th seeking clarification before the U.N. Security Council acted. However, the secretary of State has not yet responded to my letter, and we in fact had requested a witness from the Department of State, but unfortunately the individual that could have added to this discussion today was unavailable. I think it's Deputy Secretary Satterfield, who is currently traveling.

Well, we have four witnesses today, and all of them have a certain expertise in various aspects of the Iraqi political system.

Our witnesses will be, in order: Dr.Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who advised the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq following the U.S. invasion and was an adviser to Secretary Rumsfeld; Mr. Issam Saliba, senior foreign law specialist at the Law Library of Congress and an expert in legal matters in the Middle East; Dr.Ken Katzman, who has appeared before this committee frequently and could be described as our favorite analyst on Iraq at the Congressional Research Service; and Mr. Raed Jarrar, the Iraq consultant for the American Friends Service Committee and its programs for Iraqi refugees, who has also worked in Iraq on reconstruction issues for the Agency for International Development.

But before formally introducing the witnesses, let me turn to my dear friend from California and ranking member, Dana Rohrabacher, for any comments he may wish to make.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Dr. Katzman.

Mr. Jarrar?

MR. JARRAR: Thank you very much for giving me the chance to testify today.

I will start by following up on what Dr. Katzman was speaking about, the split between -- the political split that is going across the ethnic and sectarian factions in Iraq. It seems like during the last years, there are Sunnis and Shi'ites who are mostly represented in the Iraqi legislative branch who have a completely different agenda than the other Sunnis and Shi'ites and Kurds in the executive branch.

So it doesn't seem, at least when we looked at the Iraqi government itself, that it's a Sunni-Shi'ite issue. It's a more political issue that is putting Sunnis and Shi'ites and seculars who are nationalists for a strong central government against other Sunnis and Shi'ites and seculars and Kurds who want to secede or like to create a very loose confederations in Iraq that are sectarian and ethnic-based.

So this political split doesn't really have a lot of coverage in the United States. When I read the Iraqi newspapers and I read the U.S. newspapers, it seems like they are speaking about two different countries, you know, two different wars, because from the U.S. there is this, obviously, very much weight put on the sectarian or ethnic tension that is happening in Iraq.

Now, this tension, the political tension that is happening between the Sunnis and Shi'ites in the legislative branch against the other Sunnis and Shi'ites in the executive branch have caused the Iraqi government to seem like it's on a standstill on a number of issues -- for example, the issue of federalism.

The executive branch is for partitioning Iraq into three major confederations that are "Sunnistan" and "Shi'astan" and Kurdistan, while the legislative branch is for having a federal system that is closer to the one adopted in the United States, a geographic, not demographic federal system that keeps a strong central government.

That's why, you know, the federal issue is still on dispute. The other issue of dispute is the natural resources -- administrating natural resources. All of us know about the oil law that hasn't passed through the Iraqi legislative branch. The executive branch passed the law in, like, a couple of days. It's still struggling in the legislative branch for the last I think 11 months now because the legislative branch thinks that this law will weaken the central government and facilitate splitting Iraq into at least three sectarian and ethnic regions.

Today I will be putting, obviously, more stress on the issue of the U.N. mandate, which is a conflict that has been happening for the last year and a half. Last year, the Iraqi executive branch promised to include or consult the Iraqi legislative branch before the renewing of the U.N. mandate. Until this moment, there is no constitutional conflicts between the two branches. No one is saying that the legislative branch doesn't have the two-thirds majority approval right to pursue any international treaties.

Now, the only difference that, you know, showed up last year is after Mr. al-Maliki requested renewal last year, the executive branch said, "We do respect the legislative branch's right to ratify international treaties, but this is not an international treaty." This was the official stance.

That's why this year the Iraqi parliament took the two steps that were mentioned earlier. The first one was taken as a non-binding legislative letter, signed by 144 Iraqi parliamentarians and sent to a number of international entities. And that letter stated very clearly that this is an unconstitutional move, according to -- (inaudible).

Now, what the Iraqi parliament did during Sessions 32, 34 and 36 is that it actually passed a binding resolution that -- all the resolution says is that this U.N. mandate actually does fall under the section that considers it an international treaty.

So just to, you know, solve the dispute, they passed this on in Session 34 that was held on June 5th and it was sent to the presidency branch. Now, according to the Iraqi constitution, Article 73 second -- not third, second -- the Iraqi president has 15 days to veto or, you know, send back this resolution. He didn't, so the resolution, according to the Iraqi laws, actually considered -- (word inaudible).

Let me give you a quote from Session 34, when the Iraqi foreign minister was actually questioned in the parliament about this particular resolution.

Mr. Omar Khalaf Jawad -- I got this from the public deliberations of the Iraqi parliament -- Mr. Omar Khalaf Jawad, who's an Iraqi prime minister -- I mean Iraqi member of parliament -- asked the foreign minister: "A few days ago, the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution that obligates the Cabinet to receive approval from the parliament before renewing the occupation forces mission. What steps have your ministry or the Iraqi Cabinet as a whole taken to inform international entities and countries with forces in Iraq about the resolution so that it would be sure that the resolution will be respected and implemented?"

Mr. Zebari, the foreign minister, actually assured the parliament at that time that this resolution will be implemented. Furthermore, Mr. Zebari actually had a public appearance after another session on November 25th, which is just a few weeks ago, and it was just two weeks before they sent the letter to the U.N. Security Council. And he said, I quote: "This will be the last request for troops extension. It will not be represented to the United Nations Security Council prior to its submission to the Iraqi parliament for deliberation."

So it's very clear that the Iraqi executive branch did not ignore or even discuss the issue of the renewal this year. What they did is that they assured the Iraqi legislative branch that they will be taken in consideration and they just bypassed them, you know, without going back to them, because I think this happened last year and their wasn't enough objection to the issue.

And now, until now, we don't have any constitutional conflict regarding the Iraqi parliamentarian constitutional authority over the treaty that Mr. Bush and Mr. al-Maliki are planning to sign, but unfortunately, a number of indicators show that the executive branch in Iraq might actually continue its policy in bypassing the legislative branch. Mr. Ali al-Dabbagh, the official spokesperson of the Iraqi Cabinet, announced some three or four days ago that while the Iraqi executive branch is against any permanent bases in Iraq, it sees a very important need for the U.S. troops to stay in Iraq for at least the next 10 years.

So, I mean, I don't know what's the definition of "permanent." Maybe it's like it should be a (pyramid ?) to be considered permanent, but it doesn't seem like -- (laughs) -- you know, the Iraqi executive branch is thinking of, you know, scheduling any end of the U.S. military presence within the next few, maybe, decades.

I think the question is really valid: Is the Iraqi parliament being ignored, and what are the consequences of this policy of ignoring the legislative branch? Many Iraqis in the parliament and outside it think that this is a very dangerous policy because it makes Iraqis lose their confidence with the rule of law and with any possibilities of reaching to change and getting their sovereignty back through political change. It's a very wrong message to be sent to Iraqis. And there is a very big need to actually broker a reconciliation, a political reconciliation between the Iraqi legislative and the executive branch.

We saw how the U.S. was actually, the U.S. executive branch, was very interested in the case of Lebanon. We had a very similar executive-legislative conflict in Lebanon about Hariri's court, you know, the international tribune that the U.S. actually took in consideration what a majority of Lebanese parliamentarians were saying, despite the fact that the Lebanese executive branch and even the speaker of the Lebanese parliament was against it.

So I'm saying, in the case of Iraq, and because it's a very sensitive case that needs international assessment to help that war torn country to reach a political reconciliation that will end violence, I think shedding more light over this conflict that is happening and increasing between the two branches will help all parties to end conflict.

Thank you.

REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Mr. Jarrar.

And thank you for the very illuminating testimony from all of our witnesses. And let me suggest to you that we will be calling on you for future hearings because this is clearly a very significant issue that impacts this institution in a very substantial way. I would just observe that the bypassing of the Iraqi parliament or the legislative body is not necessarily unknown in the United States. (Light laughter). We have observed it. Here, it's referred to as "signing statements," but that's not the subject of today's hearings.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: Well, we can make it that. (Laughter.) That's another -- (laughter) -- we don't have enough time, Mr. Rohrabacher.

But I'm going to go and cede time. I'll save my own questions at the end, because I want others to have an opportunity to explore your testimony and pose questions.

I would just ask, very briefly, two questions. The Council of Representatives, the Iraqi parliament, were directly elected by the people of Iraq. Is that accurate, Mr. Katzman -- Dr. Katzman?

MR. KATZMAN: Yes, it is, sir.

REP. DELAHUNT: So they were directly elected, like those of us sitting on this side of the dais were directly elected by the people?

MR. KATZMAN: Well, the -- it's a different structure, however. Their party -- it's a party list structure --

REP. DELAHUNT: Right. No, we -- I --

MR. KATZMAN: -- which allocated seats. Yeah.

REP. DELAHUNT: Now, in terms of the Council of Ministers, which in our political jargon would be described as the Cabinet, are they elected directly by the people?

They are not? Dr. Katzman, could you articulate that verbally?

MR. KATZMAN: The constitution, and I'll defer to Mr. Saliba, gives the largest bloc in parliament the right to designate a prime minister. The Shi'a Islamist bloc choose Mr. Maliki after some turmoil. He then named a Cabinet and it was approved by the parliament.

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay, so the Cabinet in the constitutional scheme in Iraq is an unelected body? Okay.

Just one more question to you, Dr. Katzman.

You heard the testimony of Mr. Jarrar regarding the statement by the foreign minister, Mr. Zebari, before or to the Iraqi parliament that, and I guess I'm paraphrasing, they would not be bypassed but that the request for the extension of the U.N. mandate would be submitted to the Iraqi parliament or the Council of Representatives. Are you familiar with that?

MR. KATZMAN: I am, and I will defer to Mr. Jarrar, because I think he reads the Iraqi press much more closely than I do. However, that appearance by Mr. Zebari was at almost exactly the same time as Maliki and Bush were signing this declaration about this new agreement. So I read Zebari's comments as referring to the ultimate treaty. That may be a mistake --

REP. DELAHUNT: Not by the -- not by the mandate?

MR. KATZMAN: That may be a mistake --

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay.

MR. KATZMAN: But I -- maybe Zebari made a mistake. My interpretation was he was referring to the ultimate treaty for July of '08.

REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Dr. Katzman.

And with that, let me go to my colleague from the state of Washington, Mr. McDermott.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: Would the gentleman yield?

REP. MCDERMOTT: Yes.

REP. DELAHUNT: In other words, if -- one could interpret General Lute's position to be that confirmation of whatever agreement is struck between the administration and the executive branch in Iraq requires no consultation with the United States Congress.

MR. KATZMAN: He did not make any reference to what the Iraqis might do in --

REP. DELAHUNT: No, I'm talking about ours. In other words, it does arise to the level of a treaty, so therefore, this administration could proceed to execute a bilateral agreement with Iraq on the issues that you enumerated in your testimony without consultation with the United States Congress.

MR. KATZMAN: He did not say there would be no -- he said there would be consultation. He specifically said there would be dialogue with the U.S. --

REP. DELAHUNT: Dialogue.

MR. KATZMAN: Dialogue.

REP. DELAHUNT: Well, that's very reassuring.

I yield back to the gentleman. "Dialogue."

BREAK IN TRANSCIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: Yeah, I would echo the -- at least the final few sentences of my colleague from California. This has been a very good panel. I think you have begun, the four of you, a process of informing and educating members of Congress. And I think it was very timely.

As my colleague Mr. McDermott indicated, it would appear that the horse is out of the barn. But let me pose some questions.

And let me get to the issue of the observations by my -- by Mr. Rohrabacher about politics and grandstanding and, you know, democracy, what have you.

I would submit that democracy and constitutions go hand in hand. And one can offer innovative and creative suggestions like national referenda. But I remember clearly some being extremely excited about the passage of a new constitution. I'm sure it's not perfect. Much in life is imperfect.

But I am concerned about the issue. It isn't about intricacies and nuances and -- it's much more about respect for the rule of law. This is what the people in Iraq decided. Now, was it a free and fair election? There was, you know, much media focus in this country about the purple fingerprint. There was a "new dawn" emerging. But now it's about intricacies.

Gee, I think constitutions are about checks and balances. I would think that the Iraqi people would welcome checks and balances. They certainly didn't have it in the Saddam Hussein era.

And democracy is frustrating. But if we don't respect the provisions of a constitution, I would submit that what we do is we create a divisiveness that erodes democratic institutions. And it does not auger well for reconciliation.

And I dare say the purpose of this hearing was to pose the question, was the Iraqi parliament bypassed? I still don't know. I think it's open to debate. But I'm very concerned about the testimony of Mr. Jarrar that seems to be corroborated to a degree by Dr. Katzman about the foreign minister making a commitment that there would be the resolution submitted to the Iraqi parliament for its review.

Now, I'm sure there are a lot of groups in the Iraqi parliament that this administration doesn't like. I can go through every parliament in the world and there are factions and groups and individuals that I abhor. Mr. Rohrabacher and I might even agree on some of them. But we can't have it both ways, my friends.

He talks about the 144 signatures in a letter. Of course it has no legal effect. It's not a "Dear Colleague." It's got nothing to do with that.

But let me go back to Mr. Saliba. Your point is this isn't about a binding or non-binding sense of the Iraqi parliament resolution or a "Dear Colleague" letter.

It's about a provision in the Iraqi constitution that was voted for by the Iraqi people that says treaties and agreements -- not just treaties; I noted Dr. Rubin's written testimony referring to treaties, but we've got to be more expansive because if you review the Vienna Convention on Treaties, there's a lot of stuff in there about agreements that is far more expansive than a formal treaty. But because it gets in the way of what we really want to happen, which is the extension of the mandate, we can pooh-pooh it.

But Dr. Saliba, let me exercise some restraint and can you go over just carefully again what does the Iraqi constitution say regarding treaties and agreements? And define for us, if you will, with your background, what agreements signify in terms of your understanding of the Iraqi constitution.

MR. SALIBA: Let me just read from Iraq's dictionary about what agreement is, because when we think about agreement, we think about a contract -- two people sitting, signing the piece of paper and so forth. But you are correct, Mr. Chairman. Agreement is much, much broader than a treaty or a pact or a convention.

Agreement is, among other things, the act of two or more persons who unite in expressing a mutual and common purpose. This is an agreement. That union of two or more minds in a thing done or to be done is an agreement. A mutual ascent to do a thing is an agreement. And an agreement doesn't necessarily need to be expressed. Even -- it can be implied from the facts. This is again implied agreement -- implied in facts or implied in law. Implied in facts: One inferred from the acts or contact of the parties, instead of being expressed by them in written or spoken words.

And if we read anything about agreements, especially international agreements, it is very wide often. And this is why the United Nations have published on their website something about how the terms are used in their treaty collection. And they said that international agreement has the widest -- very wide in terms of what constitute an agreement.

And this is why they give the example, if a foreign minister of one state made a promise -- oral promise -- to a counterpart of another state, it's an agreement. It's an international agreement. This is not my words. This is the words of the United Nations.

So here, of course, legalistic. But I am an attorney and have to be legalistic. When we are talking about the government of Iraq requesting from a body like the Security Council to do something and that body did do something, then there is an agreement -- an international agreement.

Now, we shouldn't confuse this agreement with the resolution that the body took because the resolution was the result of the agreement, was the implementation of the agreement.

I hope this will satisfy what --

REP. DELAHUNT: I got to let you answer, Dr. Rubin. But before you do, because I can see you're anxious, but maybe -- your background is, I know, focused on the Middle East but I'm sure you're familiar with democracies all over the world because of your scholarship. But don't the Germans and the French and other Western democracies all operate -- and Dr. Katzman, feel free to respond as well; I don't want to leave you out of this. But my understanding is they all have party lists.

MR. RUBIN: Sir, in some cases, for example, in Australia as well, you have two different conflicting axes, if you will. One is first past the post versus proportional representation. And the other is single member constituency or even multiple member constituency to national constituency. Many places, you have some combination of this.

And what you tend to have in the Middle East is the larger the constituency, especially when it's done by proportional representation, the less likely it is that any representative will represent any specific town or village. You can have cities, towns and villages in Iraq that have no members in parliament right now under the current system.

REP. DELAHUNT: But that is also true elsewhere, all over the world.

MR. RUBIN: No, Iraq is more or less an extreme example. And in fact, the U.N. representative who helped --

REP. DELAHUNT: I have to disagree -- let me disagree with you because I can give you example after example in Latin America --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the U.N. would disagree with you, if I may, Mr. Delahunt.

REP. DELAHUNT: No one ever disagrees with me -- (laughter).

MR. RUBIN: Carina Perelli was quoted in The Washington Post before the system was implemented as saying that only 3 percent of Iraqis had a favorable impression of the political parties and of the party list system. This, I believe, was in The Washington Post in May of 2004 and should be accessible in LexisNexis.

REP. DELAHUNT: Well, thank you.

Mr. Jarrar?

MR. JARRAR: I just think it's not respectful enough to the millions of Iraqis who voted, including myself, during the elections because people actually voted for political agendas and for clear demands by all of the different lists. It's true that the lists changed -- like, you know, they split and stuff. But I don't think this should be considered a reason to dismiss the Iraqi parliament of the entire democratic process in Iraq.

Iraqis are very happy with elections. They hope that they will reach to a democratic state. But the message that is being given to them now is that if your democratic elections produced a body that will ask some political demands that we don't agree on, we are going to dismiss it. And this is a very dangerous message that is given to Iraqis, is that democracy is optional. If we agree with what they say, we'll actually take it in consideration. If we disagreed what they say, we'll just, you know, talk to our friends and dismiss the entire elections and the entire democracy process that still they're starting with.

REP. DELAHUNT: Dr. Katzman?

MR. KATZMAN: I just did want to add one example because we have the example of Afghanistan, which in many ways is parallel to Iraq -- both products of the post-September 11 U.S. military action, basically.

And in Afghanistan, they went with a district-based election because parties in Afghanistan are not popular because they were perceived as linked to --

REP. DELAHUNT: They're not popular in the United States, either, Dr. Katzman. (Light laughter.)

MR. KATZMAN: I'm not making any real point here. I'm just pointing out we have two parallel cases and in one case we went with one system and in the Iraq case we went with --

REP. DELAHUNT: The point that I'm making is that worldwide there is a variety of hybrid, if you will, systems that exist because of popular support.

I noticed the arrival of the gentlelady from Texas; however, I see that she's preoccupied now so -- (laughter) -- I --

REP. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE (D-TX): Can I just say a word?

REP. DELAHUNT: Oh, you can definitely. I anticipate you'll say a word -- (laughter) -- Congresswoman. Sheila Jackson Lee from Texas.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: I want to thank the ranking member. And I particularly want to thank him for his declaration that there will be no permanent bases in Iraq.

Let me proceed to ask some more questions. This is -- I'm looking at the clock and we haven't had votes yet and we're at the end. And this is just too good to conclude.

The representation by the foreign minister, Zebari, that the framework agreement -- the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Iraqi government would be submitted to the Iraqi parliament, is that a statement that has been made in a public venue?

Mr. Jarrar?

MR. JARRAR: There was more than one statement, in fact, by Mr. Zebari and other leaders of the Iraqi Cabinet that ensured the Iraqi parliament that this agreement will be sent to the parliament before any approval. But the problem is that this sounds exactly like the other assurances that were given before the U.N. mandate. And that's why there is this, you know, situation of -- that Iraqi public opinion is being skeptical about these issues.

In fact, one of the materials that I included in my testimony that went on the record was the front page of al-Zanam (ph) newspaper. It's an Arabic newspaper. It's the equivalent of The New York Times, maybe, in the U.S. -- like the second or first in circulation. And there's a headline of the day of the signature of the agreement between Mr. al-Maliki and Mr. Bush. It said, "Bush and al-Maliki agree on principles to leave permanent military bases in Iraq."

So it doesn't seem like the Iraqi public opinion actually thinks that Mr. al-Maliki is going to go through the constitutional process. It seems like there is this expectation that yet another illegal and unconstitutional step will be taken on behalf of the executive branch by signing an executive agreement which is, I think, according to my reading, half or more than half of the agreement that the United States government has with other countries for basing agreements -- SOFAs, status of forces agreements -- are actually executive agreements that didn't go through the legislative branch.

So there are some concerns about the Bush-Maliki agreement. In fact, even the biggest concern about the U.N. mandate is linked particularly to this issue. It's not really just about the U.N. mandate per se. I'm sure that many Iraqis would have loved to see some real conditions attached to the mandate. But I think the major issue is how to speak about the permanent bases agreement that is anticipated to happen very much soon.

REP. DELAHUNT: Well, I -- as I'm listening to you, and I believe I would have the support of the ranking member, but I think it would be important for us to consider not a hearing but a briefing and invite the Iraqi ambassador to come before this subcommittee so that we can be very clear, at least among members of Congress, that the Iraqi parliament on this occasion -- because it is of such importance in terms of the future of Iraq and our relationship that the Iraqi parliament will not be bypassed. I think maybe this is a contribution that we can make.

Again, as I indicated, you know, the -- there has been -- and by a number of, you know, prominent Republicans -- a real concern about the lack of consultation for the past seven or eight years prior to and after the invasion of Iraq. And I think it's important because I do believe that in many respects a legislative body is a more accurate reflection of the popular will and where the people of a nation are. And if we are to build upon the stirrings, if you will, of democracy, I think it's absolutely essential that the Iraqi parliament play an appropriate role according to their constitution. And I think that we should, as parliamentarians, as members of this body, assist in that.

I said earlier to a staffer, I have not on a single occasion -- and I don't want this to sound accusatory, but we have never had here in the United States a meeting face to face between a significant number and a cross-section of members of the Iraqi parliament and members of the United States Congress. That ought to happen, to assert the legislative role in the future of both countries.

You had a comment, Dr. Katzman?

MR. KATZMAN: You know that obviously CRS doesn't comment necessarily on congressional suggestions, but --

REP. DELAHUNT: If you do, we won't tell them, so -- (laughter) --

MR. KATZMAN: I would just say that the future of the U.S.-Iraq relationship is so complicated that, you know, inevitably, I would not personally be surprised if the Iraqi parliament would be unable to really act before the next mandate expires in December 31st, 2008.

If we do complete the agreement with Iraq by July of '08, that gives six months. It may very well take them longer. You know, I think what you're suggesting is to start thinking about this agreement and what's in it and how it gets reviewed in the process. And I would say that that's useful.

REP. DELAHUNT: Dr. Rubin, Mr. Jarrar?

MR. RUBIN: One overriding comment I would have: The more democracy, the more transparency, the better, except what the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee seems to be suggesting is to impose on the Iraqi parliament one of the most expansive definitions of agreement, which, as Mr. Rohrabacher has pointed out, other countries do not subscribe to.

I would argue that perhaps the only thing which you can get the Iraqi parliament in agreement about is that none of them have ever heard of Black's Dictionary. And that regard, what -- the question here, and it highlights, actually --

REP. DELAHUNT: I can assure you, Dr. Rubin, that most members of the U.S. House of Congress if posed a question relative to Black's Dictionary --

MR. RUBIN: I was talking about --

REP. DELAHUNT: -- would stare off into the space. (Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Okay.

REP. DELAHUNT: A similar reaction

MR. : What are you guys talking about? (Laughter.)

REP. DELAHUNT: Yeah. And then one to my left over here. He's not usually to my left, but in terms of geography right now, he's to my left. (Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: This raises an inconsistency which came up a little bit before, that with regard to the issue about whether the U.S. Congress would ratify any -- the new agreement with Iraq, the future agreement with Iraq, that we're talking about the U.S. interpreting the law one way and the Iraqi parliament interpreting the law -- the definition of agreement -- another way to have different mechanisms kick in. It shows --

REP. DELAHUNT: But we're talking about -- we're at this point in time talking -- we're looking prospectively in talking about the agreement that is purportedly being discussed between Iraq and the Bush administration.

MR. RUBIN: I agree. But what we're doing is --

REP. DELAHUNT: We thought we would, you know, converge a little bit.

MR. RUBIN: No, and I -- in that very agreement, what we have is an inconsistency where the Iraqis were talking about interpreting with a very expansive definition of what "agreement" should mean under Iraqi law. We're imposing a U.N. definition. We're not doing the same thing with us, and that's going to lead to trouble.

Now, that doesn't mean that that inconsistency can't be reconciled.

REP. DELAHUNT: However, under the U.S. Constitution, the word "treaty" is used, and of course under the provision of the Iraqi constitution, "treaty" and "agreements." I'd suggest that one could draw the inference that for whatever reason, they wanted a more expansive interpretation of international understandings.

And again, I know you're familiar with the Vienna Convention on Treaties. And the language is very expansive from the U.N. in terms of its definition of agreements.

MR. RUBIN: But that's -- it's very expansive from the U.N.'s definition of agreement. But there's nothing --

REP. DELAHUNT: And what appeared to be from the Iraqi perspective.

MR. RUBIN: No, sir, that -- I would -- this is where I would disagree with you because there are quite open and public discussions, wordsmithing word by word with regard to the Iraqi constitution. And there does not --

REP. DELAHUNT: One hundred and forty-four members of their parliament seem to agree with the more expansive definition.

MR. RUBIN: If they agreed with the more expansive definition -- first of all, the letter doesn't suggest that they agree with the more expansive definition. The letter --

REP. DELAHUNT: Well, what would you suggest --

MR. RUBIN: -- was centered around a specific issue, which was regard to (sic) perhaps some --

REP. DELAHUNT: The extension of the U.N. mandate.

MR. RUBIN: No, sir. It was with regard to how -- with regard to the U.N. mandate, but not with regard to setting a precedent as to the nature of what "agreement" meant. If they fully disagreed with this, they have every mechanism in their power to knock the government which they think is breaking the law out of power, except what they say -- they were for it before they were against it. What they say to their constituents and what they do as lawyers when they consider the various episodes is important.

And when -- the reason I hesitated before when the question was asked as a yes or no question, whether Iraqis would want a withdrawal -- an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces -- if you ask a question, "Do you like occupation?" in Iraq and in every other country, the answer will be no. And when you ask a poll question just like that, is -- "do you favor the withdrawal or the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces?" the answer is yes.

However, when you ask a poll question -- and folks have done this -- for example, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute -- and ask Iraqis to rank their priorities, what one has is establishment of security, the functioning of basic services as being much more -- as being ranked much higher in the order of priorities than the immediate withdrawal.

So unfortunately -- and this is in the nature of any post- autocratic state -- how the nature of the (whole ?) question's asked.

REP. DELAHUNT: I would presume it's the nature of any nation- state, whether it be democratic or authoritarian. "Give me a good job and make sure that my personal safety is protected."

But you indicated polling questions. And I remember, Mr. Jarrar was going to reference a recent poll in Iraq about presumably Iraqi attitudes. I don't know if he has information available to him, but --

MR. JARRAR: I do.

REP. DELAHUNT: -- I'd be interested in hearing that.

MR. JARRAR: The latest poll data I read was conducted by ABC and BBC and the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation. And that poll showed, like many others -- in fact numerous polls that were conducted in the last four years -- that a vast majority of Iraqis think that the U.S. presence is making things more complicated and that a U.S. withdrawal will make the situation better.

In fact, 79 percent of Iraqis, according to that poll, asked that.

REP. DELAHUNT: Does that include the Kurdish population?

MR. JARRAR: I think yes. That was an inclusive poll, as I remember.

The point that I think should be made is that the debate in Iraq is a little bit different than the debate in the U.S. in regards to the withdrawal issue.

It seems like the Iraqi side is more pragmatic about -- that no one is asking for an immediate withdrawal, but there is a majority of people who are asking for starting negotiations to reach to a complete withdrawal. So I think the word "immediate" versus the word "complete" --

REP. ROHRABACHER: There's no disagreement on that here, either.

MR. JARRAR: Yeah, I mean, I think --

REP. ROHRABACHER: That's our goal, too.

MR. RUBIN: Indeed, that's what a status of forces agreement is about.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Sure.

MR. JARRAR: So how can -- like -- I think the majority of Iraqis are asking to start negotiating some type of a timetable that will end all of the U.S. presence in Iraq on the short term. You know, we're not speaking about decades. I think they're speaking about some few years.

And let me just -- for the record, I just want to, like, object on the unfair assumption that Iraqi parliamentarians, you know, are, like, less educated or illiterate because Iraqis -- in fact, there are many of them who have, you know, Ph.D.s and, you know, very specialized in international law. I'm sure that they know definitions of agreements and more than the definition of agreement.

MR. RUBIN: There were actually very public and also very private but well known in the newspapers, including al-Zanam (ph), which, by the way, is edited by the former editor of the Ba'ath Party paper. But the point being, in the discussions among Iraqi parliamentarians -- and we need to give them the benefit of the doubt and now impose definitions upon them -- they discussed these issues and the discussions seemed to suggest an understanding of treaty agreement --

REP. DELAHUNT: Dr. Rubin --

MR. RUBIN: -- which is different than the House Foreign Affairs Committee wishes to impose on them.

REP. DELAHUNT: No, I mean, you're making a statement that is inaccurate. And this is not a question of attempting to impose. This is a question of eliciting testimony to clarify what Iraqi parliamentarians understand in terms of the extension of the U.N. mandate and whether that falls within the definition of treaty and agreements, which you fail to --

MR. RUBIN: The U.N. definition, which you're --

REP. DELAHUNT: No.

MR. RUBIN: -- adopting.

REP. DELAHUNT: No. It falls under the Iraqi constitution what "agreements" refer to.

Am I misstating --

(Cross talk.)

Just a sec.

MR. RUBIN: Okay.

REP. DELAHUNT: Let's see what Mr. Jarrar has to say.

MR. JARRAR: There are three articles --

REP. DELAHUNT: Mr. Saliba, do you agree with me?

MR. SALIBA: I fully agree with you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make --

REP. DELAHUNT: And I don't want to impose. I want just to find out.

MR. SALIBA: I want to make a point that the letter --

REP. DELAHUNT: I can't impose. Others would impose, but not me.

MR. JARRAR: There are three articles in Iraq's constitution that has the word "international treaties and agreements" -- 61, 73 and 80. And the three of them are very, very clear about the issue, like about -- like, for example, participation of international treaties and agreements should happen by a two-third majority of the members of the Council of Representatives.

It's not -- I think like -- all of the witnesses, and even the Iraqi experts and the Iraqis in the legislative and executive branch are not arguing whether the Iraqi parliament has a right for international treaties and agreements or not. I think the only point of conflict that happened through the United Nations renewal is that the executive branch claimed that the U.N. mandate is not a treaty or an agreement. And that was dealt with legally through passing a binding resolution on June 5th that became a law on June 20th just to deal with this particular technicality. But I don't think there is any constitutional ambiguity in that regard.

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay. I mean, to go back -- I mean, I'm just reading the letter signed by 144. There's 275 -- 275?

MR. JARRAR: (Two hundred) seventy-five.

REP. DELAHUNT: (Two hundred) seventy-five members of the Iraqi parliament. And I'm not very good at math, but my arithmetic is really solid and I know 144 is a majority. Right?

MR. JARRAR: It's more than 138, which is a majority.

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay. So this is the letter that they signed. Because the request -- referring to the request to the U.N. Security Council, by the Iraqi government to the Security Council regarding the extension of the presence of occupation multinational forces without conferring with the Iraqi parliament is a constitutional violation.

At least these 144 interpreted the term "agreements," I would dare say, under their constitution, not the United Nations, as a much more expansive view than maybe you would, Dr. Rubin, or even maybe myself.

MR. RUBIN: Or the Iraqi court.

REP. DELAHUNT: Or the Iraqi court.

MR. RUBIN: If it would go to that.

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

And Mr. Jarrar, you heard my suggestion. And knowing of your relationship, the fact that you are an Iraqi, we could task you with exploring the possibility of having a number of Iraqi parliaments (sic) come here and sit around, possibly in this very room, and discuss, first, the bilateral agreement, and then, where do we go from here?

I think it would prove to be very positive, because it's important that we inform each other, because sometimes the realities are far different from what the understanding is on both sides.

And with that, we adjourn. And again, thank you so much. (Sounds gavel.)

Source