Hearing of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Exploring the U.S. Role in Consolidating Peace and Democracy in the Great Lakes Region
SEN. FEINGOLD: (Sounds gavel.) Call the committee to order. Good morning.
Over the August recess I traveled to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda to better understand the complex challenges facing these two countries at this critical time. This hearing continues this learning process, with the aim of developing long-term, coordinated U.S. and international support for the negotiation and implementation of sustainable political agreements that will improve security, enhance and extend democracy and create conditions for peace and prosperity in this strategically significant part of the world.
This hearing coincides with the visits of President Kabila of the DRC and President Museveni of Uganda to Washington, D.C. And without overlooking the rest of the region, it is these two countries that I would like to focus on given the critical stages at which they both stand.
In northern Uganda two decades of violence between the Lord's Resistance Army and the government of Uganda have forced an estimated 1.8 million people to seek refuge in squalid camps that lack access to basic resources, health care and education. The government of southern Sudan has been hosting peace talks between delegations representing the Uganda government and the LRA since July 2006.
And although slow and prone to disruption, those talks have improved security in the north and prompted renewed optimism for a legitimate and much-awaited peace. Meanwhile, the recent escalation of violence in the DRC's restive eastern provinces prompted more than 100,000 people to flee their homes last month alone, with rising insecurity preventing humanitarian agencies from reaching 150,000 displaced civilians.
Although not perfect, the current negotiations for northern Uganda are in many ways a model for the Congolese government, as they indicate the potential of regionally led negotiations that are backed by the international community. While legitimate governments may be understandably reluctant to enter into negotiations with rebel groups, they should also take into account the possibility of securing a viable piece that addresses long-standing grievances and curtails heinous acts of violence.
After numerous fits and starts, the current peace negotiations for northern Uganda appear to be moving in the right direction. Certainly a number of core issues still need to be resolved, including justice, livelihood development, security and the rule of law. But the Juba process remains the best hope to end this 20-year conflict. However, in light of the harsh rhetoric and deadlines we have seen in the past from the Ugandan government, including President Museveni, regional and broader international support in the form of consistent and coordinated high-level engagement will be essential to keep this process on track.
Across the border the situation in the eastern DRC is unfortunately moving in the reverse direction, with a significant deterioration since last -- excuse me, late August. Late last week saw a surge of militaristic rhetoric by the Congolese government, and these words may soon turn into action. Indeed, President Kabila has ruled out negotiating with renegade General Laurent Nkunda, and last week ordered his troops to prepare to disarm rebels, quote, "by force if necessary," unquote.
United States and other donors must send a strong signal that a more militarized policy is simply not acceptable. When I was in these countries recently I visited camps for the internally displaced in both the eastern DRC and northern Uganda. United States and others are funding the bulk of emergency assistance on which these people depend, and they are unquestionably grateful.
But what they really want is peace. They want to be safe in their own homes, free to earn their own livelihoods and supported by their government. I hope that this hearing will help generate ideas and commitments for greater U.S. contribution to the achievement of this vision.
On our first panel will be Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Jendayi Frazer and USAID's Assistant Administrator for Africa Katherine Almquist. They will discuss the administration's strategy for dealing with these countries and also discuss the programs and resources the United States government has in place to address the various challenges and contingencies facing this region.
On the second panel of nongovernmental witnesses, we will hear from Gayle Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and formerly the senior director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. We also get a from-the-ground report from CARE's Uganda Country Director Kevin Fitzcharles, as well as a regional perspective from Mauro de Lorenzo, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Thank you all for being here today and for contributing to this timely hearing on the collection of complex issues. I look forward to hearing your testimony and asking you some questions about how the United States can engage more activity and effectively to consolidate peace and democracy in this region.
And Ms. Frazer, seeing as you successfully got through the rain traffic in Washington right on time, you may deliver your statement.
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SEN. FEINGOLD: I thank both of you for your testimony and your answers and for your work in this area.
Thank you very much.
Let me ask the next panel to come forward.
Good morning and my thanks to the second panel. We'll start with the testimony of Ms.ÃÂ Gayle Smith.
MS. SMITH: Thank you, Senator, very much. And thank you both for convening this hearing and also for your leadership on U.S. policy towards Africa. It's most welcome.
As I prepared this testimony, I was struck by something, which was that 10 years ago when I was working on these issues -- both Congo and Uganda -- I was looking at the same problems: rampant militia violence in eastern Congo, structural poverty, the prevalence of arms, the absence of trade that might unite communities, regional tensions.
I think we've seen considerable progress since then, and the fact that the regional has ended is to be congratulated and is huge. But I think we've got to look at the fact that there hasn't been more progress in a decade and take into account that some of that is due to circumstances beyond our control, but some of that I think has to do with our own limitations.
And if I may, I would like to both submit my written testimony for the record but also indulge, with your permission, my confidence in your leadership of this subcommittee to talk about some of the bigger things we might do to consolidate progress.
Frankly, when I look at the situation, and the progress report of the assistant secretary notwithstanding, I am not overly confident that we can consolidate peace and security in the Great Lakes at this point. And I fear that what we're doing is chipping away at the edges of success largely because we don't have the strategies or tools that we need to make a real difference. I'd like to mention four, if I may.
I don't think anyone in this room would disagree that Congo qualifies as a weak and, some would argue, failing state. This is something we've all talked about a lot. It's a big issue in the foreign policy community. It was mentioned in the president's national security strategies. Experts believe there are 53 around the world, the majority in Africa. We do not have a strategy for dealing with weak and failing states.
I would argue it's just as important to reach agreement on that as it has been on terrorism, homeland security, climate change or trade -- any of the other issues where our national interests meet up with global realities. If we don't have that, we're trying to use individual projects, partly staffed embassies to solve huge, huge problems.
And the first panel I think exposed what those are.
The second -- and I think, Senator, you know this well, and I also serve on the HELP Commission, which is mandated to look at this problem -- I have come to the conclusion that our foreign aid system is at present irretrievably broken. We talk about unleashing our full development -- or unleashing the full development potential of our partners. We need to unleash our own.
I think the deputy assistant administrator described some very, very good projects in the Congo and Uganda, but I think we suffer considerable constraints. We have too many pots of money and not enough professionals. We have multiple good projects, but fewer long- term investments. Most important, I think we need to elevate assistance much, much higher in our foreign policy strategy, particularly with the Congo. If you think about it, even if we make gains in the east on the security situation, even if we make political gains on a stable government, consolidating those gains means that the country needs enough trade to link people together, enough infrastructure to unite them, sufficient social services to build strong communities. And again, we don't have those tools or investments at present.
Third is our diplomatic presence. I'm delighted that there's going to be a diplomatic presence in Goma, and I wish them all success. One person TDY in Goma, with all due respectÃÂ -- even if he or she is the best and brightest in the entire State Department -- is not sufficient. And that's not a criticism of the department. That is a reflection I think of the factÃÂ -- and as you know -- that our diplomatic capacity in Africa is far less than we need. We've got the same problem I believe in the peace talks in Uganda. We need a much greater diplomatic presence there.
I think we need to look at two things there. One is an overall increase -- or something that I believe you have spoken to -- which I think we might be able to do in the shorter term, which is to create diplomatic surge capacity by creating regional diplomatic cells. In this case, I would put one in Nairobi where we deploy high-level Foreign Service officials who are ableÃÂ -- if the Ugandan peace talks need a steady, full-time presence -- to put somebody there. If this lone individual in Goma starts to make success, he or she can be buttressed by other people with the skills and resources we need.
Finally, Senator -- and I'm sure you've seen the Post this morning -- one of the most stunning things about this region and about the Congo is our failure as yet to give meaning to the responsibility to protect. I think we all believe that this doctrine that embraces our common humanity is of critical importance, but it doesn't make much sense when we look at what is the worst instance of sexual violence on Earth.
One U.N. official has said that rape in the eastern Congo is not about destroying the enemy, it's about destroying women. I believe it's more than a crime against an individual. It's a violation of the family, communities, societies and our common humanity. Again, we need to light a house on fire on this issue. This is one of the most grave crimes against humanity we've seen in a region that is tragically known for it.
But again, that's something that is at the, if you will, 30,000- feet level. And I hope that with your leadership we can start to get some of these.
Finally, in questions I'm more than happy to deal with specifics, but I thought I'd take the opportunity to go big picture this morning.
Thank you.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you for your excellent testimony, and I have urged greater diplomatic resources in both Kinshasa and in the east. Surely I agree with you, having been in that region for a couple of days and seen just Goma itself, let alone the exceptional situation where the interface of that region with the other countries in the area and the other crises in the area -- if there ever was a place that was begging for a diplomatic surge, that is one. And perhaps the kind of surge I could support, unlike the one that -- (laughter) -- I didn't support and don't support.
Mr.ÃÂ Fitzcharles?
MR. FITZCHARLES: Yes. Thank you. Good morning.
It's an honor to be here on behalf of CARE. I'd like to thank Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Sununu and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for holding this vitally important hearing on the Great Lakes, a region that should be considered one of the United States' top foreign policy priorities.
The continuing instability in these countries serves as a destabilizing factor for the entire African continent, and indeed poses serious implications for the rest of the world.
Excluding food aid, the DRC received only $50ÃÂ million in U.S. humanitarian and development assistance in FY '06, which hardly reflects a strategic commitment to a country the size of Western Europe where more than 4ÃÂ million lives already have been lost. Northern Uganda also receives inadequate assistance for the 900,000 people still in IDP camps and the 500,000 in halfway camps trying to return home.
All of this said, humanitarian assistance, as vital as it is, only addresses symptoms. To make serious lasting progress in the region, the U.S. and wider international communities' attention span and depth of engagement must increase by an order of magnitude.
In the interest of time, I'd like to highlight three areas where U.S. efforts should be concentrated: one is lasting peace and security; secondly, protection; and thirdly, long-term equitable development.
First, regarding peace and security, there is no hope that the humanitarian situation can be significantly improved or that economic development can take hold in a region where insecurity constantly looms. Furthermore, improved security is a prerequisite for organizations like CARE in providing humanitarian assistance in hard- to-reach areas. For these reasons, the following steps must be taken to advance peace and security in the region.
First, the U.S. must actively support the extension of a robust MONUC force with adequate resources to implement its mandate to protect civilians. MONUC provides a critical security presence that benefits the people in the DRC, humanitarian actors, and the broader Great Lakes community. A drawdown would be catastrophic.
Next, the U.S. should also continue and scale up its work in security sector reform of the DRC's military, ensuring that it is capable of protecting vulnerable groups.
Third, the U.S. must provide greater support and higher-level commitment to the Juba peace process, put pressure on all armed factions in the DRC to negotiate, and promote women and marginalized groups' involvement in negotiations. The U.S. could have an immediate impact in both crises by employing much more vigorously and steadily its high-profile and diplomatic clout.
Next, an integrated U.S.-Great Lakes policy and strategic plan must be articulated, adequately resourced and aggressively implemented. No such overarching and coherent plan currently exists, to our knowledge.
Finally, the U.S. must work with the government of Uganda to increase the focus on the situation in Karamoja at the same time as steps are taken to negotiate and finalize a peace agreement with the LRA. The Karamoja situation is one of the main reasons that IDPs remain in camps, and addressing it must become a priority.
Secondly, with respect to protection, CARE's been asked to address specifically the scourge of sexual and gender-based violence, a major focus of our work on the ground. As detailed in our written testimony, CARE research on SGBV in the Great Lakes demonstrates not only the prevalence of these atrocities in the midst of armed conflict, but also a frightening trend toward the use of sexual violence in the wider culture. The idea that being raped is normal is increasingly taking hold.
The following steps can and must be taken to address the current situation. The U.S. government should provide increased and focused assistance toward SGBV prevention and response through support for community-level initiatives to raise awareness and action, and expansion of access to justice, medical care and psychosocial support, especially in conflict-affected areas.
Secondly, the U.S. should support Great Lakes countries' capacity for implementing national, regional and international instruments addressing SGBV. All governments in the region have existing laws and policies in place on SGBV; however, their ability to enforce them are weak and the resources to do so are lacking.
Finally, the U.S. government should pass the International Violence Against Women Act, which I understand will be introduced soon by distinguished members of the committee. This bill would be a step forward in U.S. leadership on the problem.
Third, on long-term development, implementing peace agreements and preventing countries in the region from sliding back into war will require constant and robust engagement for decades to come. The following steps will be essential.
The U.S. must dramatically increase its humanitarian and development assistance to the region. The current level of U.S. assistance does not match the scope of the need and the strategic importance of the region; it cannot be expected to make a meaningful impact.
Secondly, U.S. assistance must be comprehensive and well phased, aimed at both immediate needs and longer-term support -- in other words, not only the rebuilding of infrastructure and delivery of basic services but also serious investments in human rights, democracy, rule of law and reconciliation.
Thirdly, the U.S. should urge the governments of Uganda and the DRC to take meaningful steps to address economic and political disparities in marginalized areas, which has been a driver of instability in the region.
In conclusion, securing peace in the Great Lakes is a process, not an event. Major and sustained investments of political and economic capital by the U.S. could turn the tide towards peace. This window of opportunity must be seized and must be seized now.
Thank you very much.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr.ÃÂ Fitzcharles, for your testimony and your work. And let me just underscore the phenomenon of sexual violence, particularly in the eastern Congo. It's easily one of the most sickening things I have ever seen in 15 years on this committee reviewing crises all around the world. This needs far, far more attention.
Mr.ÃÂ de Lorenzo?
MR. DE LORENZO: Chairman Feingold, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today.
And thank you also for your sustained attention to this region over many, many years.
In the interest of time, I'm going to summarize and would ask that my full testimony be submitted for the record.
And before talking about some of the outstanding challenges in the eastern Congo, I want I think to emphasize that contrary to conventional wisdom, the prospects for sustained peace and security in the Great Lakes region today are actually better than they've been at any time since the mid-1980s. That's not always apparent because of the horrific things that continue to go on. And the U.S. engagement across two administrations has played an important role in this fairly remarkable turnaround.
Rwanda today, less than 15 years after the genocide, is at peace. It's become a model of sound economic and business policy, good governance and the use of aid. The country's leaders often have less confidence in the durability of their own achievements than they ought to, which causes them to exercise extreme caution about the political and the media space. But I think as they gain more confidence that press and political freedoms won't be used by extremists to reconnect with the population, we can expect -- or I hope we can expect -- to see more liberalization in the years to come.
Most significantly, I think, for peace in the region, Rwanda made a strategic decision in 2004 to shift to a more pragmatic foreign policy emphasizing dialogue with its neighbors and de-emphasizing the use of force as a means to settle its differences.
Burundi's enjoying a fragile but real peace, bar one party. And this is the place also, I think, to single out Congressman Wolpe's Burundi leadership training program, which is supported by USAID and which has made a real difference, most recently this summer in bringing together everyone in Burundi to talk about that country's problems, which years ago would have been impossible to imagine that that could take place. It underscores that nongovernmental U.S. action or U.S. engagement in this region is as important as official action.
Congo is not fully at peace, but thanks to massive international support, including very substantial U.S. support for MONUC, democratic elections there were held in 2006. However, for many years to come, the country is going to remain disordered and its public institutions prone to human rights violations, even if the international community remains substantially engaged. If the international community disengages, most of the gains that have been made since 2003 will be reversed.
The most serious threat to peace in Congo is to be found in Kivu, as has been the case since 1960, and the current standoff there between government forces and General Nkunda does indeed have the possibility to derail the Congolese transition and in fact erase the gains of the entire region. But if the crisis is managed carefully, I believe this doesn't have to happen.
I'll say a few words I think or a few caveats, really, about Congolese Tutsi and the Nkunda problem in north Kivu.
As he justifies his refusal to join the national army with an appeal to fears for the safety of Congolese Tutsi in eastern Congo if passed as prologue, the fears of the community are justified. And General Nkunda receives substantial support for his community precisely because they're afraid that incidents of killing, expropriation and expulsion that have happened over the years would be repeated. In other words, the current crisis in eastern Congo is political. It's related to the architecture of security forces in the east, and it's not about an individual. Even if you were to sideline Nkunda -- to arrest him or if he were to be killed or defeated -- the people that give him support would continue to fight because they feel they're fighting for their own survival. There are many commanders who would step up to take his place.
Neither would putting pressure on Kabila -- President Kabila -- solve the problem. He's not the cause of the problem. The problem is a political one in that he's too weak to rein in the extremist politicians who have for many years called for the expulsion of Congolese of Rwandan origin, both Hutu and Tutsi. These hardliners are urging a military solution on the president, and because his base of political support in Congo is so narrow -- confined to Kivu and Katanga and some other Swahili-speaking parts of the country -- he can't lose Kivu politically and maintain a secure grip on power.
So you have a situation where ironically it's the very democratic process of 2006 that has produced the political constellation that has strengthened political extremists in Kivu and made it extremely difficult for Kabila to act against their priorities and wishes. Nkunda and his supporters are aware of this, and it strengthens their resolve not to disarm and not to trust the government.
For this reason, my view is that the conditions are currently not ripe for a negotiated political settlement to the standoff in north Kivu. And they won't be ripe until Kabila has a broader base of political support in the DRC, potentially by allying himself with other forces in the country. U.S.-MONUC policy should focus on managing the crisis to contain the risk of a return to war in the region until a political solution is achievable, and also on focusing on the urgent humanitarian needs.
I'll run through four scenarios, all of which are unattractive.
In one, the Congolese army attacks Nkunda's forces and defeats them -- or the Congolese army is defeated. In that scenario, Kabila would be fatally weakened and may lose his grip on power. MONUC could also take casualties and the U.N. could find it across Africa more difficult to field large-scale peace operations.
If Kabila gives into Nkunda's demands to a negotiated settlement -- dropping charges against him, for example -- similarly, he could be seen as weak and lose the support of his base and you could see a destabilizing competition for political power.
Similarly, if Nkunda gives into Kabila's demands, he would probably be sidelined by his own officers and supporters before any such deal could be put in effect, and they have the capacity to continue fighting in the east for a number of years to come.
The most dangerous scenario is one which is currently being contemplated where Nkunda's defeated militarily by a joint Congolese army-MONUC operation. If Nkunda is defeated, so long as the FDLR, the Rwandan rebels and extremist Mayi-Mayi militias are still a force to be reckoned with in Kivu, they will likely attack Banyarwandan civilians. An expulsion of those civilians or worse would be a predictable consequence.
This scenario might also signal the re-emergence of the FDLR as a military force on Rwanda's border. The ENOUGH Project and other observers have already documented cases of known FDLR units cooperating with Congolese army units in recent months. There's some debate about whether it has official sanction.
Rwanda could be forced to act under such a scenario even though it's actually not in their national interest to do so and they have no interest in doing so. In this connection, it's important to recall that the FDLR has been designated a foreign terrorist group by the Department of State and should not be treated as if they're just any other party to this conflict. They killed Americans in Uganda in 1998.
A caveat that applies to all of these scenarios that involve military action -- particularly where MONUC is to logistical support -- is enabling the Congolese army to be more active and have more control over the countryside. A predictable consequence of that is an increase in sexual violence since, as we know, those forces are one of the main perpetrators. Similarly, support for MONUC that enables the FDLR and the Mayi-Mayi to roam more freely across the countryside will also result in more sexual violence against women, not less.
I have a number of other things to say about the role of the United States, but I think I'll just sum up by -- or stop by saying that a pragmatic U.S. and international policy recognizes that north Kivu is a problem to be managed for some time to come, by promoting concrete intermediate confidence-building measures and using U.S. diplomatic and military leverage to deter a return to all-out war while managing some of the humanitarian challenges.
Thank you very much.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you very much.
And I certainly acknowledge the situations that have improved over the last 15 years, and I certainly think you were accurate in your general description of what has happened in the DRC.
But, you know, I just want it very clear on the record: The elections in the DRC were surprisingly good and credible compared, for example, to what happened in Nigeria. On the other hand, what's happening in eastern Congo is not simply a situation where there's sort of a huge humanitarian crisis and sort of a mop-up of remaining military problems. The situation is militarily very complex, involving so many international players that the humanitarian situation, as you just suggested, cannot be seriously addressed unless those pieces are very aggressively addressed.
I just -- it's so important that people get the right impression about what's happening here. It's good news, but there's also very bad news. And it's not something that's sort of almost taken care of by any means, and I think that that's something I want everyone following this to realize about this crisis in eastern Congo.
Ms. Smith, despite last year's historic election in the DRC, my recent visit highlighted how fragile the domestic political situation remains. Within the government a lack of capacity, political will and Democratic experience have hobbled forward movement with almost no progress on key political issues such as decentralization, resource management and military reform.
Meanwhile the local population is increasingly disenchanted with President Kabila's government, since for the most part they have seen little change in their daily lives. What do you think the United States and other donors should prioritize in our diplomacy and assistance to help ensure that the Congolese government follows through on critical policy initiatives and that the Congolese people see evidence of a democracy dividend?
MS. SMITH: This is a really key question. I think we've seen around the world where democracy doesn't deliver, we see setbacks. And I think that would be a real mistake in Congo, given, as you pointed out, that the elections were far better than any of us had anticipated.
I think there are a couple of things that I'm pleased that my colleague also mentioned, the work of former Congressman Howard Wolpe, who is doing this work all over the region at this point in Burundi and also in the Congo. And he's just started the project in the Congo. And what's interesting there is that it attacks head-on this problem in the Congo, winner takes all. That's been the political culture for decades.
And so essentially what they do to get everybody in the same room and train them -- and how do make joint decisions about resource allocations? So it's not a discussion of which political entity gets how much of the pie, but how do they collectively make decisions based on the national economy and for a national citizenry? That's the kind of initiative that will take time to bear fruit, but I think is an absolutely critical instrument of our success. It's being funded by USAID, but I would certainly expand that funding.
Second, I would urge that we concentrate the investment of our aid dollars, so that we can help to the greatest extent possible, see real returns, probably most appropriately in agriculture, so that people can see tangible gains, either in agriculture or education. We're spread out, as we are in every country around the world; we do a little bit of everything. I'd narrow those resources to a couple key priorities so that the government doesn't face the problem that President Obasanjo did in Nigeria right when he came into power, which was trying to do everything and being a mile wide and an inch deep and have nothing substantive to deliver a couple years into the game. So I'd concentrate -- and I'd invest much more in our friend Howard.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, first let me acknowledge Congressman Wolpe's tremendous leadership in this area. I learned from him a great deal on my extensive trip to Africa in 1999 and he really has been an incredibly well-informed and able person in this area.
Also so pleased that Senator Nelson has joined us, and when I finish my round I'll turn to him for a round of questions.
Ms. Smith, one of the root causes of the current conflict in DROC was the historical exploitation and neglect of Congo's eastern provinces. Even today as the World Bank and bilateral donors invest in energy and AIDS-related projects just across the border in Rwanda, almost no national or international resources are being directed toward the Kivus. I believe that there will never be sustainable peace in the region as long as these states, which make up an area the size of Rwanda itself, continue to be disregarded by the Congolese government and the international donor community.
What do you see as the best way to increase the energy, health care and other essential resources available to the Congolese in the east?
MS. SMITH: One of the things, Senator, I take a serious look at doing is seeing how we, working with the international financial institutions, the U.N., NGOs and others, can put together a regional economic agenda that focuses on a couple things. One is cross-border trade and the second is petty trade with an in-between community. So I honestly believe, and I think the other panelists have alluded to this, that unless people have tangible assets that they want to protect, it's very easy to fall into war, and there's less resistance, as I think we've seen throughout. So I think that would be one thing.
The second would be to do some joint regional programming.
Even though the regional war has ended, I would not suggest at this point that there are warm fuzzy relations between and among all the governments in that region. There is still a lot of skepticism. So to the extent that we can, for example, in a field like energy, they all need affordable sources of energy that are not based on fossil fuels because they can't afford it. Look at a regional energy facility that brings all of them into the same mix. Again, I think regional is absolutely critical.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.
Mr. Fitzcharles, what kind of programs exist to deal with these problems of sexual and gender violence, both in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic experience like that, but also in terms of negating any social acceptance of such acts? From your on-the-ground perspective, what is missing from these programs in terms of resources and support that could make them more effective?
MR. FITZCHARLES: Thank you.
Types of programs for SGBV generally focus on the three areas of prevention, which deals with community awareness of SGBV, women's rights, decision making in the household, how husbands and wives -- or even not husbands and wives but living together -- make decisions.
Then secondly, what happens when SGBV occurs? What happens to the survivor? Where can she go -- normally she, sometimes he -- go? What kind of assistance can they get under the law and what kind of help assistance can they get? So those are basically the three areas that most programs on SGBV are funded, are predicated.
I think you then asked the question what can be done to increase that. Currently there's very little funding specifically for SGBV. We have had a very difficult time; we have funding from UNFDA at the moment. It's only six-month funding, which I'm sure you'll agree is quite absurd to try to do much about sexual gender-based violence with a six-month window.
Unfortunately, the way we program, we -- the development community is very sectoral, as I think you know as well. So we'll have an SGBV component under a health program, or we'll have an SGBV component under a woman's rights program. But it's rare, quite rare to find a stand-alone SGBV-integrated program.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Of its own. Yeah.
MR. FITZCHARLES: And that's a shame, I think. I'm quite certain the U.S. government is not funding any in northern Uganda at least, and I don't think in Congo as well.
SEN. FEINGOLD: That's a useful comment.
Let me turn to Mr. De Lorenzo. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has publicly stated that General Nkunda has legitimate political grievances against the Congolese government. And there's a widespread perception that Rwanda is providing support in Nkunda's forces.
How would you characterize Rwanda's overriding interest in this conflict in the region, and what impact, positive or negative, do you think it is having on stability in the Great Lakes region?
MR. DE LORENZO: At the moment I believe their role is essentially positive and fundamentally different from the way they dealt with these issues in the late '90s and throughout the period of the RCD rebellion. The two presidents meet often and talk often. They met most recently at the U.N. General Assembly in New York. President Kabila himself didn't raise the issue of any Rwandan support to the FDLR.
The Congolese government asked the Rwandan government, the Rwandan army to help mediate between the Congolese chief of staff and General Nkunda, which they did.
Rwanda decided in 2004 to have a go and to try and see if they could work with Kabila. Rwanda's priorities are very different now than they were in the late '90s and the main reason is that Rwanda has a lot more to lose, economically and in terms of the goodwill that's built up around the world, with people like former President Clinton, who's very active in Rwanda, with Bill Gates, with a number of other American business leaders whose reputation depends -- whose involvement in Rwanda depends on it not sullying their own reputations. And President Kagame is very aware of that.
And -- Rwanda, the chief economic constraints faced by Rwanda is the price of energy and its own energy security. And solving that problem depends upon cooperation with the Congolese government, because the only source, the only viable source of energy for the short term is methane gas extraction from Lake Kivu, which is shared between the two countries.
So that's why you find at the presidential level but also at the ministerial level back-and-forth exchanges, even as this crisis has unfolded. For that reason I think it's unlikely that we'll see any direct support by Rwanda to Nkunda. They're in fact kind of annoyed with him and find him difficult to deal with. And in fact, Nkunda is independent of them because he has his own sources of funding and his own sources of troops from his own community.
SEN. FEINGOLD: I think the more Rwanda can assure us that they're not giving this kind of help and prove that they're not giving this kind of help to General Nkunda, the more likely I and others are ready to believe that their overall influence is positive. And of course I want to think that, but I got a strong feeling when I was in eastern Congo that that may not be the case. But I'm open to information and persuasion.
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