Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
SEN. JOSEPH R. BIDEN (D-DE): The hearing will come to order. I'm doing this all too often lately. I apologize to the witnesses and I apologize to my colleagues for being late. I just told Senator Lugar any time we're doing a hearing jointly together and I am necessarily delayed, he need not wait for me, notwithstanding this division in party here. Today the Committee on Foreign Relations holds its fourth hearing on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions known as the Moscow Treaty.
We have some very important witnesses. Our Moscow Treaty witnesses in July included among others the secretary of State, the secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Senator Nunn, former STRATCOM commander, General Harbinger, not Harbinger, Habiger, excuse me, Kenneth Adelman. And today's hearing features six very distinguished people. Dr. William Perry of Stanford University, a former secretary of Defense and an incredible asset to this country and to both sides of the isle on matters that we still seek his advice.
Dr. Fred Iklé, who probably has testified here on this committee as many times as I've sat in this chair and we're delighted to have him here, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former undersecretary of Defense and director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Dr. John Holdren, a physicist from Harvard University who chairs a committee on international security and arms controls at the National Academy of Scientists. Dr. Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a former deputy secretary of Energy and has worked on U.S. threat reduction and non- proliferation programs in Russia.
And Ambassador James Goodby of the Brookings Institution has negotiated with Russia on strategic arms treaties, and the Nunn-Lugar Program and possible warhead dismantlement. And Mr. Henry Sokolski -- is that the correct pronunciation? Executive director on Non- proliferation Policy Education Center. He's worked on the non- proliferation account for secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, in the first Bush administration.
We're pleased to welcome all of you. Without going any further into my opening statement, I ask unanimous consent in the interests of time that the remainder of my statement be placed in the record and I will at this point yield to my friend, Senator Lugar for an opening statement.
SEN. RICHARD LUGAR (R-IN): Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As the chairman has pointed out, we hold our fourth and final hearing on the Moscow Treaty today. On June 10th, the chairman and I met with President Bush to discuss Senate consideration of this treaty and we committed to moving the treaty forward in responsible bipartisan and expeditious manner. And I want to thank publicly Senator Biden and his staff, working closely with Senator Helms' staff and with mine, to construct what I believe has been a comprehensive examination of the agreement and its implementation.
Each of the committee hearings has embraced one common theme: is Russia capable of meeting the timetable of its obligations under the treaty on its own? The answer from our witnesses has been no. But without United States assistance Russia cannot make the necessary reductions by 2012 and the primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing weapons levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the resulting threat posed by de-mated warheads will be the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Without this program prompt utilization is never likely -- or is not likely -- the benefits of the treaty will be realized or at least, at best, they will be postponed.
My concerns about timely treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we have faced over the summer with regard to the certification process associated with cooperative threat reduction. Each year our president's required by law to certify to Congress that Russia is committed to the goals of arms control. This year the administration requested a waiver to this condition pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made such certification difficult. But, from April 16 to August 9, the Nunn- Lugar Program was stalled because no new projects could be started and no new contracts could be finalized -- absent invocation of a waiver to the certification requirement.
Many don't realize the breadth of projects that were put on hold while we awaited passage of this supplementary appropriation bill and a temporary waiver. I will cite just three: installation of security enhancements at 10 nuclear weapons storage sites, elimination of two strategic missile submarines and 30 submarines that launch ballistic missiles, elimination of SS-24 rail mobile and SS-25 road mobile ICBMs and launchers among others. Clearly these projects were in the national security interests of the United States. Unfortunately they were delayed as we worked our way through our own bureaucratic process in this country.
Many will say that the situation was indeed unfortunate but the problems are behind us. This is true for exactly 18 more days. The waiver authority the president utilized to restart Nunn-Lugar was contained in the supplemental appropriation bill and that expires on September 30. Again, U.S. national security will suffer the effects of these conditions without remedial action before that date. President Bush has requested permanent annual waiver authority to eliminate nuclear, chemical and biological weapons once and for all. But there are some in Congress who have preferred just a one year waiver, or no waiver at all. And without a permanent waiver, the president will be forced to suspend dismantlement assistance each year pending congressional authority to the president to waive the requirement.
This could lead to delays as we saw this year, about six months or more, and without permanent waiver authority Russian implementation of key reductions under the Moscow Treaty could be suspended for more than six months each year -- each year -- while Congress considers granting the president additional waiver authority. Let us say the least, this could make the Moscow Treaty much longer than a 10 year situation.
I recently returned from a nine day trip to the Russian Federation to visit the Nunn-Lugar dismantlement sites and I met with the Russian defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, and President Putin's national security adviser, former Marshall Sergeyev.
Each indicated that he would testify before the Duma on this treaty early next month in October. They both predicted the treaty would face limited opposition and would be approved in Russia. I'm hopeful the Senate will do likewise. But I have no doubt that the Duma will make clear that the pace of Russian implementation of the reductions called for in the treaty will be to pin it on outside assistance, as was the case when the Duma ratified the chemical weapons convention. And as we discussed in previous hearings, after five years very, very little has occurred with regard to the convention, despite the obligations of both sides to destroy all chemical weapons in 10 years. That has -- little has occurred on the Russian side.
Today's witnesses bring unique perspectives to the committee's examination of the treaty. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry is well known for his expertise in arms control and nonproliferation. He is one of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program's greatest champions, now at Stanford and throughout his tenure at the Pentagon. I remember well the valued testimony and guidance Fred Iklé offered the committee in the early 1990s, as we grappled with the construction of our nonproliferation programs and policies.
John Holdren, Rose Gottemoeller, James Goodby and Henry Sokolski have all played influential roles in the implementation of these important efforts and I look forward to hearing their thoughts on the future of the program, in light of the Moscow Treaty. I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the expeditious way and the fair way we've had these hearings.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.
MR. WILLIAM J. PERRY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will go immediately to my bottom line on the Moscow Treaty. I recommend ratification. I make this recommendation because I believe that the treaty is a modest but a useful step. It is useful primarily, I believe, as a concrete step forward in U.S.-Russian relations. I concur with the administration's view that they are building a new non-adversarial relation with Russia and that this treaty is an important consequence of and helps to advance that new relationship.
On the other hand, on the important issue of security and safety of nuclear weapons, the treaty is a missed opportunity. On strategic nuclear weapons, the treaty essentially codifies the actions both parties were undertaking on their own. I certainly agree that it is a plus to have these actions codified but it would also be better if the treaty made some provisions for transparency in carrying out these actions. A way of doing that within the framework of the treaty will be suggested by Ambassador Goodby in his testimony to you later this afternoon and I support his recommendations.
The treaty also misses the opportunity to reduce the danger to both countries of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons. General Habiger in his testimony to this committee, described the importance of dealing with that problem, based on his previous experience as a commander of our strategic forces, and we suggested a specific approach to achieving a mutual reduction of the high alert status of our strategic forces. This recommended approach allowed both nations building on the treaty to remove as many weapons as possible from high alert hair-trigger status. I associate myself with his concern and support his recommendations to the committee.
Perhaps most importantly, the treaty misses the opportunity to reduce the risk that a terrorist group will get their hands on a nuclear weapon. It does not cover tactical nuclear weapons and does not provide for the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon, strategic nuclear weapons taken of deployment status. I believe the most serious security threat to America today is the theft or purchase of nuclear weapon by a well-organized, well-financed terrorist group. And therefore I regret that the treaty does not seize the opportunity to deal with this threat.
Former Senator Nunn in his testimony to this committee, suggested a way of dealing with this problem by creative use of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security called for in a joint statement associated with the treaty. I associate myself with Senator Nunn's statement of the problem and support his recommended solutions. And finally, I would like to commend the committee's attention to the global coalition against catastrophic terrorism proposed by Senator Lugar and Dr. Ashton Carter. This is a creative way to address the outstanding security problem of the day, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists.
Fundamentally, the proposed coalition builds on and generalizes the Nunn-Lugar program. Like the Nunn-Lugar program, it works in a practical way to reduce the threat that terrorists will be able to get weapons of mass destruction. It recognizes that this threat is not just the United States and Russia, but is to the entire world. And since this proposed coalition is global in scope, it envisions actions well beyond those that could be included in a bilateral treaty, and it includes biological and chemical weapons as well as nuclear weapons, therefore it is not a subject of the treaty that you are now considering. However, I mentioned this coalition because I believe that it is in the same spirit as the goals that motivated the signing of the Moscow Treaty.
And finally, I strongly support President Bush's request for permanent waiver, which was mentioned by Senator Lugar in his opening comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.
MR. FRED C. IKLÉ: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'll be brief, almost indecently brief. I know the time pressure you and your colleagues are under and I'll summarize just a few points of my short opening statement. I'll submit it.
The excellent hearings that were held, the three hearings before really cover all the central points of the treaty, and I'll therefore focus a bit like Dr. Perry on adjacent issues to it. Just one or two points on the treaty and the way I consider it as really leading into a new era and the brevity which was criticized a bit, especially by the Russians, I think is in a way a good symptom. For lawyers who get paid by the hour short agreements are not desirable but in this case I think this brevity is desirable to get us out of the competitive not only arms competition in the nuclear arena but competitive negotiation.
And we can all remember the days when we kept systems, bombers and missiles, not because they were militarily needed but as bargaining chips. So that is hopefully beyond us and I think the kind of relationship between Russia and the United States that we should look towards in the nuclear arena can best be illustrated by the relationship between France and Great Britain. They both have about the same numbers of nuclear weapons, they had intense diplomatic differences about the European Commission -- the European Union which Britain tried to sabotage in the '50s, their goal, try to keep them out.
So these were big hostilities, diplomatic hostilities, but it never had to spill over to the nuclear arena. And I think we are getting in that direction so with good luck and good care we can really remove, in a way, the nuclear issue from the relationship between Russia and the United States. And I noticed that was a point made in the president's letter of transmittal as well.
The adjacent issues which are of great importance, Dr. Perry has already touched on the main ones, the safety and eventual disposal of unneeded weapons. I think the two commissions that are envisaged and the administration's submission of the treaty, the Bilateral Implementation Commission and the consultative group would be the forums for that.
Further efforts are needed to eliminate the risk of catastrophic accident that Dr. Perry referred to. Some of these perhaps can be done with further diplomatic agreements. Some get so complex and in some ways sensitive that I think other approaches have to be needed, which is not to say that this committee and other committees cannot be enormously helpful by nudging this and further administrations on that continuing problem. What I'm kind of obscurely referring to here is that the safety of the safety of the nuclear weapons systems and command and control for the large nuclear powers like Russia and the United States is enormously complex.
It is not a system for which you can find a person who understands the whole thing.
This is a problem I'm sure Secretary Perry could say more about but this is not the place to get into it. But we have to keep in mind how complex it is. If you want a definition of an accident, it's an event that was not anticipated. But the time delay is one thing that can usually help. The cushion of time gives an opportunity to correct an error if you find it. Other issues are the acceleration and continuing support of the Nunn-Lugar program, and Senator Lugar mentioned the need for the waiver. I hope this will -- permanent waiver that will come about. And, if I may digress a little further from the Moscow Treaty, analogous to the desirable permanent waiver for the U.S. support for Nunn-Lugar Program, I think as Senator Lugar submitted a bill here on getting rid of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, it has no practical effect now but it has a psychological effect on the Russian side, which is negative, which is not helpful. They gain nothing by it.
As you did -- all the members did -- I knew Scoop Jackson well. When I was undersecretary in the Defense Department and two years before his untimely death, he advised us and I consulted with him a great deal. I think he would be very, very upset. He would have seen to it that his name is not attached to such an obsolete bill. With that kind of extraneous point, Mr. Chairman, I'm finished.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.
Dr. Perry, do you think that the Senate can usefully add to this treaty's accomplishments by attaching any conditions or declarations that we can get the administration's support along the lines of some of the issues you raised? Or do you think we should just let it rip?
MR. PERRY: I would like to see the Senate ratify the treaty without any crippling amendments or without the Senate taking the position which is likely to lose votes for approval. But I think still that the Senate can take many constructive actions to deal with the way the treaty is implemented rather than changing the treaty. And those are what I was referring to in the proposals made by Senator Nunn and General Habiger and Ambassador Goodby. All are those of ways of implementing the treaty and make it more useful and I think the Senate can give an important nudge in that direction.
SEN. BIDEN: Do you believe -- both of you, do you believe Russia has adequate storage capacity for the nuclear warheads and bombs downloaded from strategic delivery systems now?
MR. IKLÉ: I don't have the detailed information on this, Mr. Chairman, but I have seen, particularly thanks to the Nunn-Lugar Program and these contacts, that while in size it may be adequate, the safety may not be in many of the places. And we have, of course, worked on improving those. Again, thanks to the cooperative threat reduction program -- a very important effort that's continuing and has to be kept moving and accelerated.
MR. PERRY: I have the same answer.
SEN. BIDEN: Do you think we should offer additional financial assistance to Russia to provide for this safe, secure storage capacity?
MR. PERRY: I would -- I think it's worth the United States investing more of its resources to do that but I would not describe it as giving money to Russia to do it because the Nunn-Lugar Program is administered is different from that.
SEN. BIDEN: By that you mean, it's American contractors, we pay American dollars to go to Russia --
MR. PERRY: Yes.
SEN. BIDEN: -- to build such facilities?
MR. PERRY: Yes. I just wanted to make that important nuance point.
SEN. BIDEN: No. It's a very important distinction as you are obviously, as usual, not only substantively more knowledgeable but politically more astute than I am in the way in which I phrased the question. Are there any practical reasons why, gentlemen, we could not lower the operational status of forces that we've already slated for later reductions under the Moscow Treaty? For example, by changing the alert status of missile bases or the deployment patterns of submarines. I mean, we're already slating these in the out years to be dismantled. Is there any reason why we should not now lower their operational status?
MR. PERRY: I think we can and we should.
MR. IKLÉ: As some of my friends know, I've been on this question of nuclear accidents for a long, long time. I have, in fact, talked to General LeMay when he was vice chairman of the Air Force into starting a permission action link at that time, which he did with great vigor. And I don't want to take too much time here. This is a very rich area as I mentioned before and there are no simple solutions. To get off alert can lead to some other reaction that is more dangerous than what you changed. I think the generic idea for the kind of open discussion we have here of having more time before ultimate decisions might be taken in the day to day situation in our forces. Or even a crisis alert situation is the right way to go.
And as we think more about this we also have to we think about the multiple world we're in. We're all concerned about the India/Pakistan relationship and here the best lesson, symbolically, is the start of World War I, a petty terrorist act, with revenge to that act by one country and then we know what happened.
SEN. BIDEN: The reason I raised it -- in '93 you were part of the, I think it was the U.S./Russian working group --
MR. IKLÉ: Yes.
SEN. BIDEN: -- and my recollection is that you, at that time, suggested that certain agreed procedures should be arrived at between Russia and the United States including separating missiles from warheads and the like. In the light of the -- is there anything that's happened since '93 relative to even India and Pakistan or Chinese intentions from your capabilities? Or is there anything that's happened out there that would cause you to think, if necessary, to reassess those recommendations you made in '93?
MR. IKLÉ: I have learned more since then about the resistance in the bureaucracies to going there or on this path both in Russia and here. But on that's score, there's one point that we ought to keep in mind. Those of us who would like to see more concern about the danger of catastrophic accident and that it's useful to make a distinction between the inherited U.S./Russian relationship of all these weapons and the thinking that still lingers in the basements of some buildings about first strike, second strike and you have to be ready and all that on the one hand.
And on the other hand, the new danger highlighted today in the United Nations of countries with very few or just biological weapons irrationally starting to use these weapons and the overarching priority then would be to stop the devastating catastrophe producing attack, irrational attack, absolutely as fast as you can and maybe the only means you have is a fast nuclear missile, especially with biological weapons which are dispersed if you attack them with high explosives rather than (inaudible.)
So it's important -- I think it's useful to think that you want to make a distinction between a few missiles that ought to be on high alert to protect against irrational terrorist use of WMD weapons of mass destruction from the large numbers of missiles that we still have inherited from the Cold War.
SEN. BIDEN: Right. Doctor, and I'll yield after this, would you repeat the point you just made on the specific issue of a irrational use of biological weapons that a conventional explosion may disperse them? Did you imply or say that a nuclear response would destroy them? Is that the point you were making?
MR. IKLÉ: It normally would.
So many thing can go wrong and not go the way you expect but the very heat of the detonation would burn them up.
SEN. BIDEN: That's what I thought you said. Okay. Thank you very much.
SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want to mention that, Syrovatka (ph), a site about 600 miles east of Moscow, an operation has started to destroy at the rate of four a month SS-17, 18 and 19 missiles. The warheads have been taken off the missiles but the missiles still need to be drained of volatile fuels and other problems that they have. Now in the past, such an operation usually was under some high security, although it clearly at this point is sort of carving up of -- but there are some technological situations that might have been shield.
In my visit to Syrovatka there were 12 television stations, two times as many radio and print journalists -- most of them young Russians -- all following this. After a greeting by the governor of Nizhny Novgorod at the airport and the public officials following out to this installation. And what I found was essentially the Russian expectation is that that facility will receive four missiles every month until all the SS-17s, 18s and 19s, all those missiles have been destroyed. At the same time, a dedication occurred with high publicity, eight storage facilities that -- eight warhead facilities for storage of SS-24 warheads as a forerunner of the beginning of an SS-24 or 25 destruction program, which at least unless we stop the music, continues throughout.
I mention this because in another committee, Mr. Chairman, that will be reporting to our Intelligence Committee, people were trying to make estimates of how many there are, how many would there be, how would we know. And there's a high degree of unreality about this which I pointed out. Here, you know, we're walking around these missiles. You're not in rocket science to count one, two, three, four and to know that next month a contract comes in. Now, in the event that due to some untoward incident in the Congress we stop the appropriation, likewise they will stop chopping up the missiles.
Now, somebody could say, well, why don't the Russians just proceed anyway and spend their own money? A good question. I'm not going to try to allocate or parse the Russian military budget, which we estimate as $8 billion, single digit, as opposed to our 391 or so forth. For all I know, it may be 18 or even triple that. But the fact is that when I saw the defense minister, Mr. Ivanov, his major play was that we get to Kamchatka and start destroying what he described as 115 submarines that are not classified as strategic but most of them have nuclear cores, they have all of the problems that may come if that nuclear spent fuel is not properly disposed of.
Our program doesn't touch that, and you know, the chairman is going to schedule in due course sort of a first view of the 10 plus 10 over 10 program which working with G8, with our allies, they have an interest in this not only there but over in Murmansk on the other side with regard to these submarines, which I think are very important even if they're not strategic. Now, this is to say that we've had testimony from people who said there's nothing certain about the Moscow until 2012. On that day we'll know whether the Russians destroyed everything they pledged to do.
And what I'm suggesting is that in fact there is already a production flow of destruction unless we deliberately stop it, as we have been doing this year. Inadvertently I hope but we did it and now we've sort of got it going for 12 more days until we hopefully get to another pass. And I don't want to be tedious about the subject but the degree of unreality surrounding all these hearings is astonishing, as we're discussing this as if somehow it might or might not happen, we can verify it, it's not transparent. The fact is that Russians have decided they want to get rid of it. And for the people who were following those television cameras at Syrovatka, it's a jobs issue.
It is important to that governor in that state as well as to the mayors and all of the rest, and the greatest disappointment on my trip was that the Nerpa shipyard where I had to say honestly we could not proceed beyond the 24 strategic submarines that we about finished off because our act doesn't permit this, and that was on national television in Russia, that a U.S. senator gave disappointing news to the masses who were there at the shipyard. So this is a different Russia.
Now, that Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out, Secretary Powell. They've said to us, get over the old phobias. Now, there's still some there. I would just add bureaucratic hassles occur in Russia. As you go from Syrovatka next door to the military installation where the eight warheads are to be, you have to get off the bus, pass mustard to a military guard. I saw a priest who wanted me to build a Russian- Orthodox church on the place, which is obviously beyond our charter.
SEN. BIDEN: What did you say?
SEN. LUGAR: Well, I said we'll do our best. I'll have to get back to you on that.
This is -- but I just bring this at least to complete the record. Now, both of you are veterans of the trail. You have traveled more times through Russia than Senator Biden and I have, and yet that is a different place, but still with lots of bureaucracy, lots of people apparently undercutting President Putin and the secretary of Defense, Mr. Ivanov, and they will continue to do so. So we all have to work together to air these problems. So in our bureaucracy as well as in theirs.
I thank both of you for your testimony, it was very direct, and Secretary Perry, you were almost as brief as former senator Mike Mansfield, who used to make two-word comments on television in answer to complex questions. But I think we got your point. We appreciate really both of you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the floor.
SEN. BIDEN: I'd like to follow up on one point. You gentlemen have not only had incredibly distinguished careers in the government, you are very well connected to your former contemporaries who had jobs, similar jobs in different countries.
One of the things I don't quite understand, and I realize this is a little bit off the beaten path of what you expect to be asked and I understand if you don't want to respond, but when I meet with my counterparts, our counterparts in Europe, when I meet with our counterparts quite frankly anywhere else in the world, there doesn't seem to be any sense of a sense of urgency about any of this. And I don't know whether that's just -- I'm meeting with high ranking but uninformed counterparts, I don't know whether it's that there's just not been much discussion about it, but it seems to me that the case that Dick Lugar and Sam Nunn have been making for years and Dick continues to make so eloquently inside this government and Sam outside the government, and both of you and others, I'm almost amazed that there isn't this overwhelming sense of urgency.
We're worried this moment, with legitimacy, about whether or not Saddam Hussein may take, and this is nothing to do with what we should or shouldn't do with Iraq, should take any of the anthrax he has or the VX he has or anything else he has, and give it to or sell it to or allow it to get in the hands of terrorists. And yet there are these scores and scores and scores of disasters waiting to happen in the hands of people who want to do something about it positively. And we kind of seem like we have all day here.
When you have these conferences, Mr. Secretary, out of Stanford, some of which you've been kind enough to invite me to, that have foreign leaders, I mean, do you get a sense there's any sense of both the opportunity and the urgency to deal with cooperative threat reduction type concerns?
MR. PERRY: There is, I think, an urgency to deal not only with the problem that terrorists can get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, which you explicitly referred to, but there's also an urgent environmental issue developing. Senator Lugar described these 100 or so submarines with nuclear cores that are deteriorating. This poses potentially an environmental problem of the first order of magnitude, and it's one that affects Europeans and Japanese more than it affects Americans. So both problems we're talking about, both the terrorist and the environmental problem are global problems, they're not just American problems.
And if there's any area we ought to be able to get global support, it should be this area.
And that's why I, in my testimony, called attention to Senator Lugar and Dr. Carter's proposal for a global coalition on this problem. I think it's an area that we have a tremendously compelling case to make and we apparently haven't successfully made it so far.
SEN. BIDEN: Correct me if I'm wrong, Dick, and I will yield to this. We had, for example, NATO parliamentarians here a month ago, a month and a half ago. These are our counterparts on the same committees, these are senior defense, senior foreign policy, senior international relations personnel in the various parliaments. They came to a luncheon -- and these are very well informed people. You could ask them detail about NATO. You could ask them detail about 65 other things and they'd know it like that and have a firm view. But I was surprised that they said they were very surprised and pleased to hear we were going to spend x number of dollars on cooperative threat reduction. You're making a real commitment here.
And I thought at first it was a joke. I thought that the particular parliamentarian who, if I named him, you'd know him. Very well respected man in Europe in a whole and in his country in particular, I thought he was using a little bit of his sarcasm about the United States. In fact, he wasn't. They were all, golly you guys are really starting to act on this. And it's astounded me. I embarrassed Dick because I made him stand up -- I didn't make him, I asked him whether he would stand up and lay out the case. And I'm just wondering if you understand there's a sense of urgency. You've been preaching it, both of you. Do you think your counter -- the people who hold the positions you once held in this government, among our European friends, sense that same urgency? Is it they don't know --
MR. PERRY: No. I don't.
SEN. BIDEN: -- or is that we're not selling it?
MR. PERRY: I think we have been unsuccessful in selling it. Maybe it's wishful thinking on their part. But even the environmental problem I describe is an urgent problem and it's one that affects them first before it affects us. The only country that I saw really responded to that was Norway and Norway's right up by where those submarines are deteriorating now. And they were the only country that I saw showed a real interest in treating this as an urgent problem and taking action on it.
SEN. BIDEN: Well, I for one cannot think of a single problem that is more urgent.
MR. IKLÉ: I think, given the geographical location of Kamchatka, you may done this already, Senator Lugar, Japan can and should be interested in contributing on that one. On that broader issue you just described, Mr. Chairman, in a way it's a familiar problem that foresight isn't as strong as hindsight on these issues. I remember I testified before you a few days before September 11 last year about all these good recommendations on counter-terrorism against biological weapons and what have you and the implementation started after September 11 for obvious reasons.
And you have the European reaction to Chernobyl which they saw and felt and they did quite a bit on that issue and spent money on it. So the problem we all have here is to bring people's attention to something that's not visible on television yet but is an imminent or a constant, very serious threat. And that's hard.
SEN. BIDEN: Well, thank goodness we have both of you who are continuing to make the case and have unparalleled credibility in this area and we're going to continue to need your help. We continue to need your help. I have many more questions. I must tell you I know the answers that you'd give to each of them because you've spoken so much on the areas that I was going to speak to, to try again just to make the case more public but time, I don't think, would permit and it would be in a sense a waste of your time because I know the answers.
But I hope you will -- I know you will -- continue to speak out because this is an area where I just think there is such a compelling, overwhelming case to be made and there's such a willingness for disparate reasons to get cooperation that has the ability I believe as a consequence of that cooperation lead to other areas of cooperation. Just based upon the interaction that occurs. That I just think we are really missing the boat. But at any rate -- sure, please.
SEN. LUGAR: A small footnote to this. I just want to pay tribute to the fact that when Senator Biden and I visited with the president, the vice president was there, Condoleezza Rice, and Andy Card in the room. And we made the point that, after five years -- half time of the 10 years of the Chemical Weapons Convention -- the Russians had not destroyed the first pound. The president was genuinely surprised and he reacted appropriately. Now, I would just say in fairness to that conference, a very strong letter came from Condoleezza Rice which I used to go over to the floor of the Senate to get an amendment to the defense appropriation bill to give the president the ability to waive all the additional stipulations placed upon doing anything on chemical weapons.
Now that still remains in conference as of this moment. But, following up, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld have made calls to individual members of the conference and, as I've heard from some on the House side who by and large take your point Secretary Perry have said we're not in the environment business. We're in strategic weapons and not any of these soft subjects like environments or if the Norwegians, or the Japanese or am I worried about that's your problem. But that was not the position the president's taken or the vice president or Condoleezza Rice.
So I'm grateful and our problem is we're not moving very fast on these appropriations or authorization bills in which all these waivers are contained. We mentioned that to the president. That was back in June as I recall we had this meeting. The second point is that the treaty does not cover, as Secretary Powell pointed out, tactical nuclear weapons. He said this is a point he took up with the Russians. They were not receptive at this stage. He would like it to follow through with a consultative group. I understand from Marshall Sergeyev that the consultative group is going to have some meeting maybe within 10 days or so. I don't know the timetable precisely of that. And the marshall, I think, wanted still to talk about the pace of destruction and things of this sort which are not covered by the treaty.
The Russian minister of Defense is less interested in that. I think he felt the flow is moving about as we described it today. But the tactical nuclear weapon issue is of tremendous interest to European friends, as you know. And this, once again, goes back to this 10 plus 10 over 10 situation which I don't think is being pushed maybe as strongly or, if it's being pushed by our administration, has been fairly silently moving and that's been true with Britain and with France and with others.
So, you know, hopefully our committee can at least illuminate where things stand and encourage because this is a tremendous force. These countries have got to step up to the plate. The $10 billion as we have pledged to do over the course of a 10 year period of time. And it was seen as a diplomatic triumph by our administration. I think that's right, but once again, only if the realities finally really lead to something occurring.
SEN. BIDEN: Actually, I have one more question. We shouldn't have kept it. On a different area. Did we lose any additional margin of security and safety by the fact that MIRV'ed ICBMs were no longer under this treaty required to be destroyed or is it just assumed, and is there a rational basis to assume that the Russians in choosing what to keep under the treat will choose single warhead less destabilizing weapons? Could you speak just a moment about because I grew up in this business being taught by you fellows that the most destabilizing weapon out there was a MIRV'ed ICBM because of the user lose posture it possesses? Could you speak to that for just a moment?
MR. PERRY: Well, I strongly supported the treaty feature which eliminated MIRVs because at the time that treaty was signed I believed that MIRVs were enormously destabilizing.
That was not only the conventional wisdom but I think it was true in those days. I am not so concerned about losing that feature now because I do agree with the administration that the world has changed a lot since then. I would feel better not to have the MIRVs but I'm not as deeply concerned about it as I would have been 5 to 10 years ago.
MR. IKLÉ: I would put it even a bit more strongly, and I'm glad we're not far apart even on this point having agreed on the others, that the MIRV issue has become important only if we hadn't for friends -- if Moscow and Washington slided back into the intense hostility that we had in the 50s between Stalin and Truman and the Eisenhower administration at the beginning where you really sit there if you are in Omaha or even in the Pentagon, and worry about the calculation of they want to knock out all our missiles, can we get there first, get theirs and these things, which you find in the books but hopefully not in the future and reality.
MR. PERRY: We really ought to get off the hair-trigger status. We get off the hair-trigger status --
MR. IKLÉ: I agree.
MR. PERRY: -- our problems then would be greatly reduced.
MR. IKLÉ: Right, right.
SEN. BIDEN: Well, gentlemen, thank you very much. I really appreciate you coming. Again, I apologize for having kept you waiting. It's always an honor to have you both here. Thank you.
The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, Ambassador James Goodby, Dr. Holdren and Mr. Sokolski. I'm want to make -- you can call me Bidden if you like -- Sokolski, I want to make sure I pronounced it correctly. Welcome, all (laughs.) Why don't we invite your testimony in that order, please.
MS. ROSE GOTTEMOELLER: Mr. Chairman, I believe that means I go first.
SEN. BIDEN: That's correct.
MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Ladies first, hey?
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.
MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Lugar, thank you very much for the honor of testifying before you today. It's not only a great honor but also a great opportunity and I very much appreciate the chance to be here and talk to you about my views not only of the Moscow Treaty but of the forward agenda for arms control and nonproliferation.
If I may, sir, I would like not to go through all my testimony but simply to submit it for the record and just hit a few high points.
SEN. BIDEN: I'll place your entire statement in the record.
MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you, sir.
I want to state at the outset my very firm support for this treaty. I believe that the main lesson of the first decade after the Cold War is that we must continue to focus on control and reduction of nuclear weapons, not relegate the issue to the backburner of policy. The weapons do not magically protect or de-alert themselves, nor do they go away. But although this issue is not on the highest point of the agenda between the United States and Russia anymore, and I welcome that fact, I do think that we need to continue to concentrate on the arms control agenda and we do that in several ways these days.
Negotiated treaties are an important aspect, one of the most important tools we have available to us, but there are other important tools that we have available today as well, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction Nunn-Lugar Program which we have already been discussing this afternoon. But I welcome the Moscow Treaty as an important aspect of our arms control activities at the present time. It is a statement in treaty form of the continued commitment of the United States and Russia to control and reduce nuclear weapons, and so it lends momentum to the process in my view.
But I'm going to spend the remainder of my time concentrating on what needs to be done next, the forward-looking agenda. So let me first mention new transparency measures and then I would like to turn to non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control or tactical nuclear weapons arms control.
The Moscow Treaty, as we've already heard this afternoon, really does not concentrate in any detail on additional transparency measures but I believe that the lack of an agreed timetable, practical venue and specific tasking for talks to accomplish additional transparency measures is a significant problem. A working level group should be established, people with very experienced and knowledgeable experts available from the United States and Russia, and it needs to be established and tasked in order to be provided with activities that will be carried through according to a specific timetable to accomplish additional transparency measures.
What are the types of transparency measures that I think need to be developed? First I think the transparency measures related to conversion and other treatment of launch vehicles in ways that were not foreseen by the START Treaty. And this is an area that I know the two countries were working on in the context of the negotiations and were not able to complete. But I think that this is an important area that should be studied and discussed between the two sides, I'm hoping, in the upcoming meeting next week between the ministers of defense and foreign relations on the two sides. But I hope, as I said also, in more technical level discussions where the real work would be done to accomplish such new measures.
But a second important type of transparency measures would relate to warheads. Experts from the two sides have already been cooperating to develop procedures and technologies that would be relevant to warhead transparency in a number of technical forms such as the Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement. Considerable joint progress has been made on technologies critical to the success of such measures such as tags, seals and information barriers.
I believe that enough progress has been made in these technical discussions that the United States and Russia could readily establish transparency measures in warhead storage facilities. In the words of the Helsinki statements, these measures would promote the irreversibility of de-productions, including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. They would in particularly begin to address the uncertainties that are followed from U.S. statements under the Nuclear Posture Review that it will eliminate a very large -- that it will maintain a very large reserve of warheads available for redeployment rather than eliminating them.
This area of warhead transparency is also relevant to the last point that I would like to bring up, which is the area of non- strategic nuclear weapons warhead arms control or tactical nuclear weapons arms control. Because of their relevance to terrorist threats against the United States, I believe that the most important new task to undertake is the control and reduction of non-strategic nuclear warheads on our upcoming warhead agenda -- on our upcoming arms control agenda.
I would like to finish my testimony by suggesting a new avenue for accomplishing this task. The United States and Russia have been trying for many years to work on non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control, first through the parallel unilateral initiatives that are known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, and later through negotiated measures, as called for by the 1997 Helsinki statement. However, efforts to establish negotiations were constantly stymied through the end of the 1990s. The United States was concerned that the Russians had done little to implement the unilateral measures that were to have taken place as a consequence of the PNIs. And the Russians for their part remained concerned about U.S. tactical warheads remaining in NATO Europe, and held fast to the position that they would do nothing to further negotiations unless this issue were addressed.
I believe, however, that the time is right for considering this issue again. Specifically I believe that we have many tools available to us that enable us to move forward in this direction, some of which have been in fact suggested by the Moscow Treaty. A parallel unilateral process between the two treaties could be renewed that would begin with a restatement and reformulation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives from the early 1990s. Under this reformulation, the United States and Russia would agree to include the PNIs -- to include in the PNIs not only non-strategic nuclear weapons but also strategic nuclear weapons that each is placing in the elimination queue.
They would back up this statement with a declaration and exchange of data and with transparency measures at warhead storage facilities, and that is why I believe it's important at the present time to be focusing our attention on completing the important technical and procedural work to establish transparency measures in the non- strategic as well as strategic warhead arena. The data exchange could be augmented over time if the parties agreed, by familiarization visits and other transparency activities at warhead elimination facilities, but I believe as a matter of practicality, storage facility transparency would be an important place to begin.
Mr. Chairman, these are some initial ideas but I do want to stress in closing that I believe it's important now to pay attention to the forward-looking arms control agenda, to not believe that we have checked the box and we have no more work to do. I think actually we have quite a bit more very important work to do, part of which will be served by negotiations and further treaties and agreements, part of which will be served by new tools such as cooperative threat reduction, part of which may be served by continued unilateral parallel activities conducted with a great deal more cooperation between the United States and Russia. But I do believe that we need to get on with it and we need to continue to emphasize this important agenda.
Thank you very much.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.
MR. JAMES E. GOODBY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With your permission I'd like to submit my statement for the record and just highlight a few points.
I mentioned in my statement that even short treaties can be understood in different ways and they might give rise to recriminations. And I gave as my case in point, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was equally short with this treaty we're now considering, and I suggested that there were some issues which might come up which we ought to think about. Since I wrote that, I have learned from the secretary of State's testimony that there is as yet no agreement on the definition of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and that there may be a difference about accounting rules for the treaty, which of course would result in there being different numbers on each side.
Now, I don't think that makes a great deal of difference, frankly, given the very general nature and purpose of this treaty, but I do think that frankly it would be a good idea for the Senate to make it clear in the record in some manner that there is a U.S. position on questions like that, and furthermore that the matter may not be resolved. One of the reasons I suggest that is that just before coming over here I was rereading some of the things that the Russians are saying about this treaty and one of them was said by a man named, you all know, Aleksei Arbatov, who happens to be the deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma, and he said about the treaty, we may ratify it on conditions that these questions, and he was talking about the accounting rules, will be clarified, so that we know how we count these 2,200 warheads, how we verify the side's really cut to this level.
He is not, of course, going to be in a position to block the treaty in the Duma and I'm convinced the Duma will ratify it. But it does appear to me that since there's a recognition in the Duma about these possible differences of interpretation, it might be a good idea if we could think about how you reflect that fact. I would even go so far as to suggest perhaps there ought to be some informal exchanges with the state Duma. I know you've gotten assurances from the -- probably from Putin and from others as well that it will be ratified, I don't doubt that, but given the possibility of these conditions it seems to me that it's not totally out of bounds to think about some informal exchanges.
Another concern I mention in my prepared statement was the probable return of the Russians to the practice of MIRV'ing their ICBMs. And I agree with what Bill Perry has just said and what Senator Lugar has said about these MIRV missiles, but at the same time I'm troubled by a statement I also read shortly before coming over here. This is allegedly a statement from Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of strategic missile forces, and he said, "The possibility to prolong the life of heavy missiles through overhauling the missiles in their combat elements allows us to keep the R-36M Satan missiles on combat duty. A decision has been recently A decision has been recently made to keep two of the three available divisions on combat duty until 2015, and we are discussing the possibility of keeping one more division armed with such missiles."
Now, I mention this not because I'm concerned about a bolt from the blue, that's past history. What I am concerned about is prolonging the life of an old heavy missile, I'm concerned about the safety of it and I'm concerned about possibly command control kinds of problems.
Now, this brings me directly to the main point I want to make, which frankly is about the Nunn-Lugar program. And I also want to speak about the declaration of Moscow which accompanied the treaty, which I've not heard discussed today and very little in some of the previous discussions. I think that declaration of Moscow signed by the two presidents really is a blueprint for building a new strategic relationship. And I think in fact it ought to be considered as a kind of extension, de-facto extension of the treaty. It really could make a difference and I'm referring especially to the section which is called preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and it seems to me that does pick up exactly where the Moscow Treaty leaves off and the two ought to be considered in parallel.
There is, I think, a need to give some life and some force to that declaration in connection with the treaty. Now, how do you do that? Here I come to the Nunn-Lugar Program, and I want to say in my view it is one of the most successful government programs of all times and I personally rank it up there with the Marshall Plan and I think its potential is far from being exhausted. It can be applied around the world and I hope indeed it will be. But as a private citizen, an outsider, I am frankly worried by what appears more and more to be a kind of a conceptual and contractual dead end that is endangering the program. The recent success in extracting weapons-usable fissile material from Yugoslavia was a textbook example of how cooperative security should work. But my own satisfaction was tempered by the realization that it took some private money to get it done.
The difficulties and delays over waivers for a program which is so self-evidently critical for the safety of the world tells me anyway that a fresh start or at least a clearing of the air is needed between the executive and the Congress and perhaps between Russia and our country. It does seem to me that in addition to the damage being done to the Nunn-Lugar program, this situation if it continues will weaken the declaration of Moscow and the Moscow Treaty itself in that case will be just a building block but with no plans and no building to be put into.
I would say this is chief negotiator in 1993, '94 for about 30 of the Nunn-Lugar umbrella and implementing agreements. How important it is to have a context in which this is occurring. The context then was START-1, that's basically finished, START-2 is not going to be coming along. And the treaty itself does not provide a whole lot in terms of explaining how important Nunn-Lugar is in that context. The most directly applicable framework we have now is in fact the declaration of Moscow.
I'm inclined to think that perhaps some new legislation, I think you've been referring to that possibility in connection with this waiver issue, possibly even a condition attached to the Senate's resolution and ratification of the Moscow Treaty, will be required to put the Senate on record on the relationship between the Nunn-Lugar program and at least that part of the declaration of Moscow that relates to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. My own view is that large parts of the Bush-Putin declaration could become a dead letter absent Nunn-Lugar support, and in that case the Moscow Treaty would become a relatively minor footnote.
On a related point, Mr. Chairman, as you are so well aware, the language of the Biden condition, condition number eight, attached to the resolution and ratification of START-1 required that the executive branch focus attention on cooperative measures to monitor weapons stockpiles and fissile material inventories. I spent a year of my life in talks with the Russians trying to make that happen.
I didn't succeed then but I'm convinced it can be done and I'm convinced President Bush and President Putin may be the ones that can get that done.
Senator Biden can correct me, but the premise of that condition was not inspired by Cold War adversarial attitudes, it was rather a concern about nuclear proliferation and getting rid of the nuclear legacy of the Cold War. Now, START-1 is still in force and so I suppose the Biden condition also is still in force. I do think there's some merit if there's any doubt about that and reaffirming it, in connection with this particular treaty. I'd also mention finally there is a declaration number one which was attached to the Senate's ratification resolution for START-2 and that essentially was not dating the Biden condition.
I think that also probably ought to be reaffirmed if indeed we are intending to try to give more life to the connection that I think is terribly important between Nunn-Lugar, the declaration, the Biden condition, and fundamentally to the treaty, which I do support.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.
Mr. Holdren -- Dr. Holdren.
MR. JOHN P. HOLDREN: Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, I am happy indeed to be here this afternoon to testify on this treaty. I do want to emphasize that although I'm a professor at Harvard and the chairman of the National Academy's Committee on International Security and Arms Control, I'm testifying this afternoon as an individual and not on behalf of either of those organizations or any other --
SEN. BIDEN: We assumed Larry Summers sent you down here.
MR. HOLDREN: He did, but I can't admit it. Like the others I will a hit a few high points and ask that my longer statement be entered in the record.
SEN. BIDEN: His entire statement will be placed in the record.
MR. HOLDREN: As long as it is. Mr. Chairman, this committee has already heard a number of distinguished witnesses both extol the virtues and decry the deficiencies of the Moscow Treaty. I find myself in agreement with much that has been said on both sides of that issue. Like some others who have testified before you in this matter, I find that I'm a critic who's also a supporter. I'm a critic because the treaty is lacking so much that one might have hoped for but I'm a supporter because I think there is great symbolic importance in the two countries certifying formally and jointly their intention to proceed to much deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces than the ones permitted in the START-1 Treaty.
I'm also a supporter because I think the Moscow Treaty represents an important step beyond previous ones in focusing principally on the actual numbers of bombs and warheads. And finally, I'm a supporter because the texts both of the treaty and the accompanying joint declaration at least recognize the incompleteness of the agreement and allow for the possibility of adding missing elements later.
I want to spend most of my time talking about the specifics of the further building blocks that I think the administration and the Congress should be seeking to add to the initial framework established by the treaty, including some that I think the Senate could usefully promote in its resolution of advice and consent on ratification. In doing so, I refer particularly to the findings of two studies of these matters that were conducted during the 1990s by the National Academy Committee on International Security and Arms Control, the '93 to 1995 study on management and disposition of excess weapons, plutonium, and the 1997 study on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.
Those studies together laid out a comprehensive array of measures that the United States and Russia could take mutually and cooperatively as well as separately to reduce the carry over dangers from the Cold War. The dangers of accidental, erroneous, unauthorized or inappropriately massive use of Russian or U.S. nuclear weapons as well as the newly prominent dangers from nuclear weapons coming into the possession of additional nations or terrorists. Those measures are described at some length in my longer written statement and in full in the reports themselves which are referenced there.
The key bottom line for the purposes of this hearing is that rather little of the nuclear risk reduction benefit of the comprehensive approach that the academy reports describe can be expected to flow from the Moscow Treaty alone. The arsenals will still be much too large. Their alert status too great. The circumstances and targets for their potential use, too unconstrained. The transparency and confidence concerning their size and their future, too small. The Moscow Treaty, as written, is a modest step in the right direction but only a modest step.
While I believe that this modest degree of progress does make the treaty worth ratifying, I also believe that the Senate's resolution of advice and consent should push for somewhat more. It seems to me that incorporation of five elements that I'm going to mention -- elements which would not require amendment to the treaty -- could at least partially address some of its principal shortcomings in that these particular additions and clarifications would be unlikely to be opposed by the Russians. I hope they would also not be strongly opposed by the Bush administration.
The first one is clarification of the unit of account. I think the resolution could call on the administration to issue a unilateral clarification of the U.S. interpretation of the phrase, "operationally deployed strategic warheads." The phrase that appears in the November 13th, 2001 statement of President Bush which is cited by the treaty as to the U.S. definition of what is being constrained that clarification would state that warheads associated with launch platforms and delivery vehicles in routine maintenance or overhaul will be included in the category of operationally deployed strategic warheads subject to the treaty's ceiling.
That clarification would close the most glaring legal loophole in the treaty which is that any number of launch platforms and delivery vehicles could be declared to be in maintenance or overhaul on December 31st, 2012 in order to achieve formal compliance. The second element I call a part-way reduction target. The resolution could call for a further U.S. unilateral declaration concerning its intentions to move in a measured way toward the 2012 ceiling specifically by indicating the number of deployed strategic warheads it intends not to exceed by the treaty's halfway point of December 31st, 2007.
A suitable level for this intermediate target might by the old START-2 ceiling of 3,000 to 3,500 strategic warheads. That clarification would help address the defect that the treaty specifies no reductions at all before its ending date and in that lack encourages what I would call a senseless prolongation of the retention of deployed Russian and U.S. strategic warhead stockpiles far in excess of any conceivable need. The third ingredient would be a voluntary limitation on reserve forces. The resolution could call for a further U.S. unilateral declaration that the reserve strategic warheads it retains will, at no time, exceed a specified fraction -- say 50 percent -- of the strategic warheads it deploys at that time. This clarification would allow ample provision for any of the kinds of contingencies cited by the administration in support of the need for reserves while eliminating, at least, the total open-endedness of this particular loophole.
The fourth element would relate to the intention to pursue agreed limits on reserve and non-strategic warheads in a next round. The Senate's resolution could call on the administration to announce its intention to initiate discussions with the Russian government on a new round of agreed limits that embrace all nuclear warheads, reserve as well as deployed, and non-strategic as well as strategic. A declaration of intention to move on this agenda in a timely manner would underline the seriousness of the United States in pursuing meaningful nuclear arms limitation and would set the stage for bringing under control the category of Russian nuclear weapons that is by far the most vulnerable to unauthorized or accidental use or transfer into the possession of terrorists or proliferant states.
The last item was already mentioned by Ambassador Goodby. It relates to the pursuit of transparency via implementation of the Biden Amendment. Many others have already noted here that a failure of the treaty is its lack of provision for measures of transparency and verification beyond those in force under START-1 that will expire in 2009. I found that a mission all the more distressing, Mr. Chairman, because the amendment which bears your name connected with the START-1 ratification resolution should well have precluded that omission.
I won't read the amendment here. It's in the record and in my testimony. It does, as Ambassador Goodby already pointed out, require that in any further agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms, the president shall seek arrangements for monitoring and verification. I think it's unclear whether President Bush actually made an effort in this direction in negotiating the Moscow Treaty but, in any case, I believe the Senate's resolution of advice and consent should remind the administration of the Biden Amendment's provisions and should call for its implementation to arrangements to be worked out in the consultative group on strategic security or through other mechanisms.
I think that calling in the Senate's resolution for the kinds of clarifications and goals and commitments that I just listed would be a valuable impetus to the administration and to the Russians to sure up the provisions in the Moscow Treaty as written and to move beyond it to measures that are more fully commensurate with the dangers that nuclear weapons still pose to this country and to the world. Those measures include the expansion and acceleration of the Nunn-Lugar Program, the completion of a far-reaching program of accountancy and protection for all nuclear explosive materials including cessation of the production of such materials for weapons.
It would include the ratification, in my view, of the Comprehensive Test Band Treaty. It would include the progressive de- alterting of strategic forces by parallel initiatives. It would include the elimination of massive response options from U.S. targeting plans, as discussed in the 1997 academy study. It would include an unequivocal commitment by the United States to no first use of nuclear weapons and it would include the limitation and reduction of the total nuclear weapons stockpiles, not only of the United States and Russia but also ultimately of all of the other nuclear weapon states.
I repeat that the Moscow Treaty, as written, would be a modest step forward. With a strong Senate resolution along the lines suggested here, it would be a significantly bigger step forward. But the enduring challenge after the ratification discussion is over and the resolution passed will be to maintain the momentum in pursuit of the further steps that the safety of the country and indeed the preservation of civilization require. Please let nobody suppose that ratifying the Moscow Treaty, whatever the conditions and declarations attached to that, has checked the box on the efforts of this administration and this Congress to reduce the dangers from nuclear weapons. That work is really just beginning.
Thank you for the opportunity to put those views before you.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you, doctor.
Mr. Sokolski, the floor is yours. Last but not least.
HENRY D. SOKOLSKI: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, my name's Henry Sokolski. I'm the executive director of a nonprofit organization known as the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and it is a distinct honor to be up here because looking back behind you I remember being there for about eight years. It's different on the other side, I won't try to abuse this too much.
SEN. BIDEN: You lost power, didn't you?
MR. SOKOLSKI: Yes.
SEN. BIDEN: That's exactly how we feel when we turn around.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Yes. For the sake of brevity and the late hour --
SEN. BIDEN: No, you take your time. You were kind to be this patient.
MR. SOKOLSKI: I only want to highlight key points of my testimony and two brief attachments, but with the permission of the committee I'd ask that these items be entered into the record.
SEN. BIDEN: They will be.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Okay. Thank you very much.
With the signing of the Moscow Treaty, as we've heard, thousands of additional nuclear warheads are to be downloaded from U.S. and Russian strategic launchers over the next decade. This has raised, as we've heard, new concerns about the adequacy of our cooperative efforts to secure and dispose of surplus nuclear weapons materials in Russia and the U.S. and to reduce the leakage of strategic weapons capabilities from Russia generally, I think. I don't think we want to just focus on materials here.
To date, and mostly in what I've heard previously, to be honest, these concerns have focused attention very much, if not almost exclusively, on how much more we should spend and how much more we should expand some of the most controversial and expensive of the cooperative programs, the Defense and Energy Department's fund. I don't want to get into that debate. My message to you today is that we can do much more to reduce remaining U.S.-Russian strategic weapons threats if we focus first on what we're doing rather than what we're spending. In fact, if we focus more on how we might do a better job, I think we could do a significantly better job at reducing strategic weapons threats and reduce planned congressional spending.
In my written testimony, which is based on a two-year study published by the Army War College entitled Beyond Nunn-Lugar I make three points. The most important is first, and that is that in our zeal to dispose of surplus weapons plutonium I think we've failed to recognize how significantly the plan we've adopted will actually increase the threat of nuclear theft and terrorism. By terminating this scheme known as the Mixed-oxide Disposition Effort, we could reduce these risks and free up $5.8, and depending on who you listen to maybe more, billion to support more worthy threat reduction undertakings.
Our current plan involves taking 68 tons, that's over 10,000 crude bombs worth, of weapons-grade plutonium from a few guarded sites, transporting this material thousands of miles to and from a larger number of different plants in the U.S. and Russia, and I think before we get done likely Western Europe, and letting thousands of workers handle it continuously over the next 20 or more years. The goal is to irradiate the material to reduce its attraction for weapons. But the risk of nuclear theft generated by multiple handling and repeated transport of weapons-grade and near weapons-usable nuclear materials outweighs any possible gain.
We would do better and could save billions of dollars in spending if we simply dropped this effort and focused instead on making the storage of existing U.S.-Russian weapons plutonium materials more secure. Terminating this program would also avoid helping Russia and encouraging other states to get into the business of producing and using nuclear weapons-usable reactor fuels in civilian power reactors, something the U.S. has rightly opposed since President Ford and President Carter.
And I might add on a personal note, I have a bit of me invested in this. I studied under Albert Wohlstetter, who helped create that policy, and I spent the first three years of my career and I would say my life, because I did not go home, I stayed here every night, fighting the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. And we've defeated that and that was the last of the efforts to flip the Ford/Carter policy. I am concerned we are about to go back to that and I don't want that to happen. In short, terminating this program I think is the single most important thing the U.S. can do to avoid increasing the threat of nuclear theft and terrorism.
Second, by supporting a spent fuel storage proposal the Russians have already expressed interest in and signed contracts about, the U.S. could conceivably, I emphasize the word conceivably, reduce congressional spending on threat reduction by as much as $8 billion to $9 billion dollars. The spent fuel proposal which has been promoted by the Nonproliferation Trust Incorporated is discussed in the testimony briefly and more extensively in the attachment.
To my knowledge, Congress has held no hearings or received any testimony on this proposal. Now, if it was just a private firm and it was just a proposal I could understand. Maybe it isn't worth listening to. But this thing has been on the summit agendas of both Russia and the United States for nearly a year now. More needs to be learned about that. You have to come to your own conclusions.
But there are people in our government who may get down to that listed item and talk about it. Congress needs to know more about it.
Finally, we've not done hardly enough to implement efforts that could reduce biological and long-term brain drain threats with little or no new spending. The two most important of these efforts are health monitoring and student exchanges, and that was reflected in our study which was done about -- it was completed in about August of last year. The kind of health monitoring that's needed is precisely the kind backed by your committee and your bill.
I think you've heard testimony from Dr. Al Zelicoff, who was a close associate of mine, and you've done great work that needs to be passed. But the health monitoring that's called for in your bill is so affordable, so non-controversial and so important I know for a fact it could be funded with existing DoD and DoE funds if the bill doesn't pass. Don't let it not happen simply because the act somehow doesn't get completed, because you've got to get the house to pass it too.
Last point, student exchange programs. This is kind of tragic. We are succeeding in eliminating some of the greatest weapons talent just by letting our programs run long enough that these people will retire and die. I mean, it's 10 years now. A lot of these people are a lot older. Some of them really have literally died. However, we've got to worry about the next generation. If you take a look at some of the studies that have been done by Carnegie and out there other places, you'll discover that over a third of the Russian university students who were surveyed said they would consider working in some of these closed nuclear cities, and that over 60 percent of the best students said they preferred to work in state enterprises.
We cannot let that trend go without some attention. The best way to attend to it I think is something that's already passed, already authorized, already funded. It's the Freedom Support Act Senator Bradley had so much to do with. In there they hoped, the sponsors, and I suspect we all voted for this, I mean, it was a great bill, that there would be 15,000 high school students, 15,000 a year. You know how many Americans go to Russia now a year? Five hundred. Do you know how many Russians are here that are below the age of 20, on student exchange? A handful. A handful. Of the 5,000 students it's estimated that Russia has here, most of them are over 20. And why does that matter? Because we make up our minds and our opinions about our careers and outlooks when we're young. We have to found out why the participation rate is so low. It may be that it's a tough problem. But, boy, that needs attention.
With that, I conclude my testimony and I thank you again for letting me speak here today.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you very much.
Dick, why don't you --
SEN. LUGAR: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Goodby, you made the point about exchanges with the Duma and their interpretations and that's a very important point because they're not coming back into this session until after the 1st October. And the minister of Defense and others who were planning to testify are thinking about their testimony during October at some point and you quoted a good friend of all of ours, a parliamentarian in Russia who has views about this situation, which I suppose Aleksei Arbatov will make known during the debate in their foreign affairs committee or the equivalent.
I'm concerned about this in a way. I had no idea what the timetable would be for ratification here, even the consultative meetings that may occur prior to October that may take both Russian and American officials into timetables or other stipulations. And I mention that just simply for the record that, probably, this is something we need to monitor. To sort of find out if other people want to add things that the negotiators did not have in mind or to put more context in it. And I think that's unknowable for the moment but probably should be known.
Now, the MIRV missile issue that you mention -- it seems to me that the Russians have in mind missiles other than the SS-18s because, as I mentioned at Syrovatka they are planning to destroy those seriatum in part because of the strange production requirements in the Ukraine that have woven this into a very complex problem for them but there could be other missiles down the trail and I think they've left that option open. Perhaps, without as many as 10 warheads, but maybe with three or four and among the accounting rules or at least the MIRV way in a way the whole idea of those carried by aircraft, by bombers, still appear to be a question.
But everybody today has said this is less of a concern but it is not really put to bed. I would just guess most of our negotiations in the past were worried about the SS-18s because they did have 10 warheads and they were very large. In START-2 everybody revolved, as you know, around that. The Vinca Project -- or the nuclear threat initiative group went after is an important situation because here $2 million did come from our Department of Energy for the transportation of the spent fuel and the interesting point was that the Russians were willing to receive it for the first time. In the past, they were not.
So that as we take a look at all of these situations around the world, as you remember maybe in your time with Project Sapphire, all the fuel went from Kazakhstan to Oak Ridge with some domestic problems in our government in trying to get that done. But now the Russians are prepared to receive it. That is new and really is in the last year or so. The dilemma was that the officials in Belgrade were not prepared to do business until somebody promised to clean up the problem. That is, the environmental problem surrounding the spent fuel situation. That's where the five million comes in.
Now in our debates here in our government, the House representatives take an adamant view once again. Not a dollar for environment. Well, that's environment. So we have a further problem. It is not simply the adequacy of the budget but it really has to be a debate in our own government as to whether this makes a difference. The nuclear threat initiative people, and I visited with Sam Nunn this week, do not have another five million available for the next one of these. And so that issue is going to come up and it's very critical. And we're discussing, as you know, Iraq and the availability of fissile material from somewhere in the world. And so this makes the situation very current.
It once again would not be, it seems to me, good policy if we denied ourselves the ability to capture spent fuel or other fissile material situations where they come available simply because we're still having an internal debate over whether environment counts but that is where the dilemma is. And it's a sort of matter of long record in these things and sort of tragic. The declaration of Moscow does offer, it seems to me, a lot of possibility and a few of you have mentioned that. To do some more work. To really seize the Bush and Putin initiative well beyond the language of the treaty.
The Biden Amendment clearly ought to be involved in this argument and I take that point and I'm sure that Sherman has and so explore really where that fits into whatever we have to say in the treaty. I would say, Mr. Sokolski, that one aspect -- the Freedom and Support Act -- you mentioned didn't die but, on the other hand, it diminished over the course of time as you recall because the Congress became less and less enamored with many of the economic projects. The lack of reform of the Russian judicial system or the contract law system where difficulties made it difficult for American businesses to go. That should not have negated the student exchange program but nevertheless year by year appropriated funds or funds asked by the administration for freedom support diminished.
Clearly the high school project has worked in the Bundestag Exchange Program with Germany has been very important and over 10,000 students on both sides have been exchanged including in recent years those from the east of Germany. Especially --
MR. SOKOLSKI: They're starting to go more to Europe than the States. The authority is there though. There's 50 million of authority sitting.
SEN. LUGAR: Well, that's an important point and we either explore that because clearly the numbers may not get up to 15,000 rapidly but they should be better than 500 or 50 or whatever you have mentioned. And that's a good alert system. One thing that we do presently is fund the ISTC, the International Science and Technology Center, and that does bring stipends, at least historically, as 22,000 Russian scientists have received support, including a good number of laboratories.
We have tried conversion which you have mentioned in your background papers, and likewise that's become very controversial.
Members of Congress have felt that that was bridge too far. Once again, it is not strategic destruction and so forth. But nevertheless, defense conversion is a very, very important topic and one which, hopefully, we can continue to talk about. Maybe revive in the process of this declaration that Ambassador Goodby has talked about. I just sort of go on seriatim to these points because I think they're important points.
The point that you make, Dr. Holdren, sort of gets to the issue, and I don't know what the consultative group will do in terms of filling in timetables or more stipulations. They probably have that authority. At least I think Secretary Powell indicated that might be the agenda, although he didn't say that's what they're going to do but they'll meet, I guess, twice a year. Perhaps bring on further stipulations. I was suggesting that, unless we literally stop the music, a good bit of the timetable has been set by current contracts under CTR. Now they may or may not be funded or other things may happen to them, but at the rate of four missiles a month going through Syrovatka through the SS-17s, 18s, 19s and 24s, 25s, you've got a certain rhythm to the program. You have a pretty good idea rather than waiting until 2012.
Now we could botch it all and sort of leave a mess and then, as things have occurred with the chemical weapons convention, and you've made that point, nothing happened. But if we want to make something happen, maybe we put further stipulations in or maybe we recognized that we have a pretty good cooperative thing going and trying to make sure we keep it moving.
MR. HOLDREN: My proposal, Senator, was that we stipulate unilaterally and voluntarily on the U.S. side that we will move down as one of the ways to make sure that the music doesn't stop.
SEN. LUGAR: Well, it's probably a good idea.
MR. HOLDREN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. BIDEN: Thank you. I won't keep you very long but I do have a couple of questions for you each if I may.
Mr. Sokolski, your arguments about how we could free up billions of dollars for more urgent needs against disposing of plutonium by turning it into fuel and so on, is there any -- do you think there's any support either in Russia or here for the idea of vitrification, turning this into glass? In other words, the two -- you make a good argument but the flipside of that argument is that I'm not sure that they're going to get much of an audience for the permanent storage of weapons-grade fuel without doing anything to make it less attractive to terrorists. Is there any -- should we look again at this idea of turning plutonium into glass? I mean, is there any --
MR. SOKOLSKI: Short answer, yes. Second answer --
SEN. BIDEN: No.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Our job is -- no. Second answer is our job, as people who were supposedly expert and public officials and people behind the public officials, it's not to make things worse. We're allowed to spend money, sometimes it helps, sometimes it doesn't, but we're not really allowed to make --
SEN. BIDEN: No, I understand your points. Your argument is it's worse what we're doing than if we permanently stored.
MR. SOKOLSKI: For the moment I would do that while you do another run at the question and not --
SEN. BIDEN: Okay. That's just trying to get a handle on.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Yes. And I think we certainly have enough time to get it right and we should be in no rush to get it wrong.
SEN. BIDEN: Got it.
Dr. Holdren, you refer in your written testimony to a '97 National Academy of Science study on U.S. nuclear weapons policy which recommended the United States and Russia negotiate a comprehensive agreement limiting both sides to approximately 1,000 total nuclear warheads each. That's strategic and tactical deployed and reserve. Total, right. Is that what you meant? That was the report?
MR. HOLDREN: We recommended that as a subsequent stage at the next step beyond the kinds of levels to which the Moscow Treaty has now committed us. We did not recommend that at the next step.
SEN. BIDEN: Got you.
MR. HOLDREN: We had a phased scheme and we said ultimately as political conditions permit, that's the direction in which we should head.
SEN. BIDEN: Now, as I understand, the study also discussed specific transparency in monitoring requirements critical to any arms control regime that purports to include all warheads and fissile material possessed by both sides. Is that right, did it have it?
MR. HOLDREN: Indeed it did. It addressed that issue and we have a study going on at the moment in the same committee which will be available in the spring that looks in greater details at the monitoring and verification challenges and possibilities, the technical options for dealing with the regime in which all warheads are counted, deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic.
SEN. BIDEN: Now, the administration has testified or administration officials say to us that because Russia retains the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons and because we currently lack re-manufacturing assembly lines, we have to keep large reserves in case we find a fault in our developed warheads or future changes occur in our strategic environment. How do you respond to that argument?
MR. HOLDREN: My response to that is that we do have to keep some reserves but they don't have to be as large as some have suggested. That's why in my testimony I've proposed that if we said we would not keep reserves greater than 50 percent of what is deployed, that would be plenty to account for the kinds of contingencies that various administration spokespersons have mentioned. It's very difficult to conceive of a contingency where given the maintenance of something in the range of 2,000 deployed strategic warheads, that another 1,000 in reserve would not be sufficient in that strategic category.
SEN. BIDEN: If we were to agree, and I can't imagine this administration agreeing to it, but if we were to agree to dismantle more of our excess warheads than I think is contemplated, should we -- does it matter whether we demand in return a Russian limit on the capacity to produce new warheads. Is that a kind of tradeoff that's feasible or is that not --
MR. HOLDREN: In my view, I don't think we need it. If we accept the spirit of the Moscow Treaty and the respects in which we are not in the old Cold War relationship, again it's very difficult to imagine the circumstances in which Russia could afford or would want to exercise a large production capacity. It would take them so large -- so long a time and so much money to ramp it up that in the meantime we could respond in any number of ways if we needed to, but I find it a very unlikely eventuality in any case.
SEN. BIDEN: I do as well. One of the things that I find a little bit -- I leaned over. I apologize for having done this when one of you were testifying, and I sent to Senator Lugar, "I wonder if they understand how difficult it was for us to convince them that this should be a treaty anyway. I'm not being facetious when I say that. Sounds like I'm being somewhat flip.
MR. HOLDREN: Could I make a further point on the breakout issue?
SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.
MR. HOLDREN: You're raising this issue of breakout and I wanted to make it in response to Mr. Sokolski's point about plutonium disposition. He is right that one needs to be very careful not to jump out of the frying pan and into the fire and not to try to dispose of plutonium in haste or in ways that actually increase the risk. We weighed those risks in our mid 1990s National Academy study of that question. We recommended a dual track approach which included both vitrification and pursuing the MOX option. But we found it unsatisfactory just to say we can leave this plutonium stored indefinitely.
And one of the reasons -- there are really three big reasons we found it unsatisfactory. One of them is if you're worried about Russian production capacity you ought to be particularly worried about the Russians storing thousands of intact nuclear pits which they could very rapidly reincorporate into intact weapons. If you're worried about this at all, a huge stack of pits is a big problem, even a huge stack of weapon-grade plutonium is a big problem in terms of breakout potential.
I think concerns with breakout have drastically diminished, even since the time we wrote that study, but nonetheless there is some degree of discomfort associated with having a huge pile of plutonium which is getting bigger all the time, as you dismantle other weapons, and which could be reincorporated into new weapons at any point. It's also undesirable from the standpoint of the signal it sends the world concerning the intentions of the United States and Russia with respect to the irreversibility of their nuclear arms reductions. If we appear to be sitting on an instantaneous breakout potential of immense proportions, some people will wonder whether this is really disarmament or simply waiting until the next round of modernization.
The third reason to be a little leery of simply storing the stuff indefinitely is that we have somewhat less confidence in the security of that material in Russia than we have in the security of the material, the corresponding material in the United States. Again, those circumstances have gotten better since we wrote that report. We hope they'll continue to get better still, but the economic, social and political uncertainty in the future of Russia is considerably greater than that than in the future of the United States, and I would be more comfortable if we had a way to whittle down the pile of material that could be directly incorporated into nuclear weapons with no further ado whatever.
That's why the academy was interested in plutonium disposition, that's why I'm still interested in it, even though I agree that Mr. Sokolski that breeder reactors and recycling plutonium are bad ideas, that's what the U.S. policy has historically opposed. U.S. policy has not opposed taking plutonium that's already separated and mixing it with fission products so that it becomes self-protecting.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Well, we begin.
SEN. BIDEN: Now we're going to end.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Okay. Oh, my gosh.
SEN. BIDEN: I think they know your point, but if you want to briefly respond, please.
MR. SOKOLSKI: Yeah, I think so. Look, I didn't argue, nor am I arguing or recommending that we store this for thousands of years. Second of all, I think I've made clear in the testimony, one of the recommendations of our study was to take the shapes and make them into pucks, even in the interim. I do think you need to get back to this vitrification question. And third, I think we need to understand that the whittling down is going to take a long time and you're moving this stuff around the countryside. You're talking about right now one- fifth, 20 percent of the plutonium, working it for 20 years and having to get new reactors involved beyond the ones that they have. So if you want to go down that route, you have to ask this question: In the United States we said we shouldn't leave plutonium at Los Alamos. It's not safe there. If that's the case, why do we feel it will be much safer to move MOX and weapons grade material to various locations here and in Russia?
SEN. BIDEN: Let me ask. Dr. Gottemoeller pointed out that, as did Habiger declared when he came in July 23rd, made the same general case that the key obstacle that negotiate a verifiable bilateral regime of warhead elimination in recent years was precisely the concern about compromising design information and Habiger went into that. How legitimate is the concern the United States risk compromising sensitive information essential to our national security by allowing Russian observers to monitor future warhead dismantlement? Does it really matter if the Russians gain insight into how we design our warheads?
MS. GOTTEMOELLER: Clearly, Mr. Chairman, if we have even an iota of concern in this regard, we must take that very seriously because weapons design information is the most secret information that this country or the Russian Federation has at its disposal. However, I do believe that there are very important and technically viable ways to conduct verification and monitoring of the elimination of warheads without endangering weapons design information.
I make reference in my testimony to the very extensive joint work that has been done in recent years to develop information barriers. The Russians and U.S. scientists have been working on this together and have even proceeded to some joint demonstration activities. So I think, quite frankly, so that we're on the threshold of developing both the technical tools as well as the procedural capabilities that would allow us with a high degree of confidence to engage in verifiable elimination activities at warhead facilities and be sure that we're not giving up sensitive information.
So, if I may, I'd just like to add one word on the question of surge capability because I was struck that we had only half of the answer on the table. The other half of the answer of course is to continue to work with the Russians on the program that they have already asked us to engage with them on and that is the accelerated shut down of two out of their four warhead production plants. The plants at Arzamas-16, that is the Avangard plant, and the plant at Penza-19. They have already agreed with us in the context of the Nuclear Cities Initiative that we should help them to turn those plants to non-warhead work and I believe that we should continue to support those activities and certainly to support both the Nuclear Cities Initiative and related non-proliferation activities such as the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the ISTC, already referred to elsewhere today.
SEN. BIDEN: With your permission, I am not going to keep you any longer, but I have a couple questions I'd like to submit in writing to each of you, particularly you, Mr. Ambassador, I don't want to hold you any longer. Let me conclude by saying that, you know, some time I'll never forget, years ago, as a young senator I was at a conference with Senator Church and a group of people of your caliber and expertise on nuclear weapons. And I was as a young 30-year-old senator trying very hard to get up to speed and learn as much as I could. I mean he somewhat facetiously -- I mean, he'd known me -- he said, "Joe, don't worry about all the detail." And I looked at him because he was a very detailed guy, and I looked at him and he said, "You're looking at a group of nuclear theologians. You're probably the only person" -- because I have an interest in theology, he said "You're probably the only person here who has read Summa Theologica." I said, "You're looking at the guys who Aquinas was talking about."
The reason I bring up that ridiculous exchange he and I had in a place called Torame(ph) in Italy -- Sicily -- was that some of this is almost surreal. Here we are talking about the difficulty in pursuing the initiatives that Senator Lugar and many of you support and I support, I can't imagine what would have been said in 1973 when I got here if someone is a closed session said you know, the Russians are prepared to allow us to help them destroy two of their facilities that produce nuclear warheads. And by the way, they want us to come into a facility where they have 1,790 -- I believe that was the number, or no, it was more than that -- 1.9 million -- artillery shells that have this God awful capacity and they want us to build a plant to help them destroy that. What do you think we should do?
I mean, people would have been falling all over one another to figure out how the devil we get that done. And today, today, we talk about like well, I'm not sure whether it's very much in our interests or we have the time or the money or the inclination to make this a priority. I just -- maybe I've been here too long. But I find it strange that we're having this discussion about the urgency. But, at any rate, I'd like to insert for the record an article on the Moscow Treaty by Jack Mendelsohn which will be published in next month's issue of Current History. He served in the Department of State in the arms control and disarmament agency. He was a member of Assault 1 and 2 delegations and I'd like to place that in record as well.
Dick, do you have anybody --
SEN. LUGAR: I want to thank the witnesses again for a wonderful exchange which had been educational for us. We appreciate your coming.
SEN. BIDEN: I too, thank you, all four of you and again I warn you I have about two questions for each of you, if you will. I'll try not to trespass too much on your time but that would be appreciated.
Thank you all very, very much. We are adjourned.