Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Independent Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces

Statement

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REP. VIC SNYDER (D-AR): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Jones, did you have Arkansans on that commission? (Laughter.) I always like to recognize retired Sergeant Major McMichael. We're very proud of him and his Arkansas heritage.

I wanted to pick up a little bit on where Mr. McHugh was. As I read your report about the army's side -- the Iraqi National Army's side of things, I thought it was reasonably positive report. Things are moving the right way -- logistical problems, close air support -- close air support challenges in the future. But that was different than some of the Press headlines that says, "Iraqi army unable to take over within a year." I read your report. I think you used the word "independently." Is that, kind of, the key distinction that -- you don't have an expectation that tomorrow or the next day that they're somehow going to be able to have their supply lines and logistics and close air support, but that they can do a lot of fighting and are already. Is that how you would distinguish between the Press headlines we've been seeing?

GEN. JONES: I think that's correct. I mean, the way we characterize it is they can do more internally to face the troubles that they're facing, but to try the build an army -- first of all, having defeated the army and then having dismembered it, and then trying to reassemble it and have it to be able to be ready to take on the internal threats of the insurgencies and the external threats posed by the neighboring countries is a little bit -- that's a little bit of a stretch in the period of time that they've had. There's no question in my mind that they're on the right glide-slope to get there. And because of the increased capacity, it's going to give us more capability to do more on the external side while they take care of more of the internal problems.

REP. SNYDER: What I want to spend with the remaining time I have is I want to read these comments from the -- what you call your concluding thoughts on page 129 and 130. You know, we have a big debate going on in this country and a big debate going on in this Congress. And you all are very much aware of that and your report is being reviewed in that context. But I want to read what you all say -- which you all, you signed-off on unanimously, and just ask our three former military people here to comment on it.

This is what your report said, concluding thoughts, "While much remains to be done before success can be confidently declared, the strategic consequences of failure, or even perceived failure, for the United States and the Coalition are enormous. We approach a truly strategic moment in this still-young century. Iraq's regional geostrategic position, the balance of power in the Middle East, the economic stability made possible by the flow of energy in many parts of the world, and the ability to defeat and contain terrorism where it is most manifest, are issues that do not lend themselves to easy or quick solutions. How we respond to them, however, could well define our nation in the eyes of the world for years to come." And that's the end of your all's unanimous opinion.

Could with start, Dr. Hamre, and then General Joulwan and then General Jones -- what does that mean to you as we all -- we should have had alumni shirts for the three of you; you all testified so many times here when you were in uniform or in harness.

Dr. Hamre, would you go -- start and then General Joulwan and then General Jones.

MR. HAMRE: Sir, I -- here I will use my own personal vocabulary, so it differs, perhaps, from how my colleagues would say it. But we have strategic interests that are larger than just Iraq. I mean, our continued influence and presence in the region; the ability to get continued access to energy resources; providing a counterweight to Iran -- I mean, we have large strategic interests. Every one of those interests would be seriously diminished if we had to crawl out of Iraq or run out of Iraq. --

REP. SNYDER: General Joulwan.

MR. HAMRE: -- That's what it boils down to. We have to be able to walk out, not crawl out.

GEN. JONES: General Joulwan and I will defer to General Boyd on this issue because he spent a lot of time studying it and I'd like to give him the microphone.

GEN. BOYD: This is the -- this is the crux of the whole issue. This commission did not limit it -- what it knows about Iraq to 20 days or so that we spent there. Some of us have been in and out of Iraq a great deal over the last several years. I have personally had six visits, and many visits to other countries in the region -- the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Syria. I have yet to find anyone who wants us to stay forever but I haven't yet found anyone that wants us to leave any time soon.

They're worried about containing this conflict within the borders of Iraq and if we leave most, if not all, believe that it raises the risk of spill-over of sectarian conflict throughout the entire region. How best do we dampen that risk? -- is the question that all of us wrestled with. It's not in our charter, precisely, but the stakes are so high here that whatever we do, we must have as our objective controlling those risks.

And that means keeping as much support there as long as we believe it is necessary to bolster the Iraqis to do the job themselves.

So you focused, sir, on the key question of all, and that is what are the -- this is not May of '75. We can't come home and have no effect on either our own country or the rest of the world. All of the world is dependent upon stability and a continuation of access to energy in that region -- most important question of all.

REP. SNYDER: Thank you.

REP. SKELTON: Thank the gentleman.

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