Security and Accountability for Every Port Act - Conference Report
SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT--CONFERENCE REPORT -- (Senate - September 29, 2006)
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Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, I support the SAFE Port Act. Simply put--this historic legislation will make us safer.
The result of inaction will be disastrous. The stakes are just too high. In a recent estimate, a 10-to-20 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in a major seaport would kill 50,000 to one million people and would result in direct property damage of $50 to $500 billion, losses due to trade disruption of $100 billion to $200 billion, and indirect costs of $300 billion to $1.2 trillion.
FBI Director Robert Mueller, ominously assessed the terrorist threat at the annual Global Intelligence Briefing by stating he is very concerned ``with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy explosives in its attacks against America.''
Many terrorism experts believe that maritime container shipping may serve as an ideal platform to deliver these weapons to the United States. In fact, we recently saw that containers may also serve as ideal platforms to transport potential terrorists into the United States. This was demonstrated on January 15 and again on April 2 of this year when upwards of 30 Chinese immigrants were found emerging from containers arriving at the Port of Los Angeles. The Subcommittee's concern is that smuggled immigrants could include members of terrorist organizations--and/or--that the container could have contained a weapon of mass destruction.
As the 9/11 Commission put it so succinctly, ``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation.'' Since 90 percent of global trade moves in maritime containers, we can not allow these containers to be utilized to transport weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of such an event would be devastating to our way of life and our economy.
Instead, we must secure our supply chain before we pay the high price of an attack, and seek the appropriate balance between two often competing priorities: security and speed. This balancing act resulted in the creation of two prominent homeland security programs--the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT. CSI effectively pushed our borders out by placing CBP offices in foreign ports to inspect containers before they reach our shores. C-TPAT exemplified a true public-private partnership, in which the private sector took a leading role in securing its supply chain. These programs alone are laudable--but due to the sheer magnitude of the challenge of securing the global supply chain--we must continue to improve upon these promising initiatives.
With that in mind, as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I have directed the Subcommittee's 3-year effort to bolster America's port security and supply chain security. We have identified numerous weaknesses in our programs that secure the global supply chain. A brief overview of these problems illustrates the challenges confronting these efforts:
In CSI, the Subcommittee found that only a de minimus number of such high-risk containers are actually inspected. In fact, the vast majority of high-risk containers are simply not inspected overseas. To make matters worse, the U.S. Government has not established minimum standards for these inspections.
The Subcommittee initially found that an overwhelming proportion of C-TPAT companies enjoy the benefits before DHS conducts a thorough on-site inspection, called a validation. As of July 2006 this proportion has improved considerably to where 49 percent of the participating companies have been subjected to a validation. But this still leaves 51 percent of companies that have not been subjected to any legitimate, on-site review to ensure that their security practices pass muster.
The Subcommittee found that DHS uses a flawed system to identify high-risk shipping containers entering U.S. ports. According to CBP officials, the Automated Targeting System or ATS is largely dependent on ``one of the least reliable or useful types of information for targeting purposes,'' including cargo manifest data and bills of lading. Moreover, the Subcommittee found that this targeting system has never been tested or validated, and may not discern actual, realistic risks.
Currently, only 70 percent of cargo containers entering U.S. ports are screened for nuclear or radiological materials. One part of the problem is that the deployment of radiation detection equipment is woefully behind schedule. As of August 29, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security has deployed only 43 percent of the necessary radiation monitors at priority seaports.
These are just a handful of the significant problems discovered by the Subcommittee. In short, America's supply chain security remains vulnerable. Our enemies could compromise the global supply chain to smuggle a Weapon of Mass Destruction, WMD, or even terrorists, into this country. This legislation tackles these concerns--and many other weaknesses--in a coherent and comprehensive manner.
The SAFE Port Act addresses the problem of inadequate nuclear and radiological screening, by requiring the Secretary of DHS to develop a strategy for deployment of radiatioction capabilities and mandating that, by December 2007, all containers entering the United States through the busiest 22 seaports shall be examined for radiation; requires DHS to develop, implement, and update a strategic plan improve the security of the international cargo supply chain. In particular the plan will identify and address gaps, provide improvements and goals, and establish protocols for the resumption of trade after a critical incident; requires DHS to identify and request reliable and essential information about containers moving through the international supply chain; requires DHS to promulgate a rule to establish minimum standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the U.S.; provides Congressional authorization for the CSI program, empowering cap to identify, examine or search maritime containers before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded in a foreign port as well as establish standards for the use of scanning and radiation detection equipment at CSI ports; and authorizes C-TPAT and establishes certain minimum security and other requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for C-TPAT benefits.
Even if we pass this legislation, our job is not completed. We still need to look to the future and develop even more effective and advanced programs and technology. Effectively scanning containers with both an x-ray and a radiation scan is the only definitive answer to the perplexing and most important question of ``what's in the box?''
However, in fiscal year 2005, only 0.38 percent of containers were screened with a nonintrusive imaging device and only 2.8 percent of containers were screened for radiation prior to entering the United States. DHS' efforts have improved somewhat from last year's paltry numbers, but we have more work to do. To date, DHS still uses a risk-based approach that targets only high-risk containers. While this approach is fundamentally sound, the system used to target high-risk containers has yet to be validated or proven to accurately identify high-risk containers. Moreover, the validity of the intelligence used to enhance this system's targeting ability is increasingly in question. Thus, we need to both enhance our targeting capability and use technology to enhance our ability to increase inspections--without impeding the flow of commerce.
While the United States currently inspects approximately 5 percent of all maritime containers, the partial pilot test in the Port of Hong Kong demonstrates the potential to scan 100 percent of all shipping containers. Each container in the Hong Kong port flows through an integrated system featuring an imaging machine, a radiation scan, and a system to identify the container. Coupling these technologies together allows for the most complete scan of a container currently available. The Hong Kong concept or similar technology holds great promise and could lead to a dramatic improvement in the efficacy of our supply chain security.
I am pleased to say that this legislation develops a pilot program in three foreign seaports, each with unique features and varying levels of trade volume to test integrated scanning systems using non-intrusive inspected radiation detection equipment. It requires full-scale pilot implementation within 1 year after enactment and an evaluation report would be required to be submitted to Congress 120 days after full implementation of the pilot. If the pilot programs prove successful, then full-scale implementation would follow.
The bottom line is this: we are safer now than we were yesterday, but we are not safe enough. The question then becomes: how do we get there? In the words of the hockey legend Wayne Gretzky, ``A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be.'' In other words, we cannot safeguard a post 9/11 America by using pre-9/11 methods. If we think that the terrorists are not plotting their next move, we are mistaken. We must find where the gaps are in our Nation's homeland security and close them before an attack happens. That is the only way to guarantee our security.
I agree with what Secretary Chertoff articulated at our full Committee DHS budget hearing, ``the worst thing would be this: to have a program for reliable cargo that was insufficiently robust so that people could sneak in and use it as a Trojan Horse. That would be the worst of all worlds.'' By reforming and strengthening C-TPAT, CSI, ATS, by expediting the, deployment of sophisticated radiation portal monitors and testing the ability to scan 100 percent of cargo before it enters the United States, the SAFE Port Act closes gaps in our homeland security and makes us safer.
The conference report was agreed to.
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