Senate Armed Services Committee Holds a Hearing on U.S. Military Commitments Worldwide

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say, before the questioning, that I believe that we carried out this operation for good reason, that the United States of America, the world and the people of Iraq are better off for having been liberated. And I think history will show that when the masquerades continue to be uncovered and the brutalities of the Saddam Hussein regime are more fully revealed, that it was a wise and humane decision on the part of the United States.

MCCAIN:

However, I think it's important for us to remember my hero, President Reagan's old adage, "Facts are stubborn things."

The facts as I see them, Mr. Chairman, are clearly that we underestimated the size of the challenge that we would face after the "military operations," unquote, were completed—the Baathist resistance, the former military people melting into the population, et cetera.

The decay of the infrastructure is truly staggering. You have to see the second largest city in Iraq, which is a total and complete slum, to appreciate the depth and expense involved.

Ambassador Bremer was correct when he said, "I believe, that it will require tens of billions of dollars." That was not anticipated before we went in.

Extending the guard and reservists, which—and according to a Washington Post story this morning, some officials have expressed concern that this could break the Guard and Reserve system—is another fact that we did not take in consideration.

No one believed that we would have to go to the United Nations in the degree that we have today.

And let me point out, Ambassador Grossman, you know, we like to have full facts. There are 29 nations that are
contributing 23,000 troops. There are 28 nations that are contributing 9,000. One nation that's contributing 14,000. That gives a little bit different perspective of the 29-nation coalition.

We've made great progress in the north and in the south, but there remains significant problems. The British made a tough decision in the last few days to increase the size of their commitment, not to call up Guard and Reserve, but to increase the size of their commitment. In the same area that the general was talking about, the Marines have decided to extend their commitment in Najaf, rather than give it to the multinational Polish division, which has neither the charter nor the capability to do the job that our Marines can do.

MCCAIN:

And by the way facts: The Pentagon had planned that there would be some 60,000 troops in Iraq today as a result of the progress that was foreseen.

So, if I may quote the Weekly Standard, "What we are witnessing today is neither prudent multi-lateralism nor the normal, gradual process of turning power over to Iraqis that we all expected to occur over time. On both the international and Iraqi fronts, the administration's actions are being driven by the realization that there are too few American troops in Iraq." I think that that is an accurate statement.

When we have to extend Guard and reservists on active duty, when we have to ask for international forces, when we have to do the things that we are doing, it's clear to me that we need additional troops and we need of certain
specialities—intelligence, civil affairs, special forces, marines—not just more tanks. And that opinion is shared by a large body of opinion, not just my own.

It's been mentioned a couple of times, Secretary Wolfowitz said it, there may be more casualties if we send in additional American troops. And the general just referred to supply convoys that would be open to attack. Is that an accurate depiction of what you said?

WOLFOWITZ:

Depending on what you send them for, I think that's right, Senator.

MCCAIN:

So we're going to send in—we're going to ask for international troops to come in—in all due respect, General—who will also need supply convoys, and we'll tell them they'll take the causalities, Americans won't take the casualties. I don't get the logic there.

WOLFOWITZ:

Senator, the kind of thing—if I may?

MCCAIN:

Go ahead, please.

WOLFOWITZ:

The kind of thing I meant as a vivid example, we had three Americans killed and one very badly wounded when someone threw a bomb or a hand grenade out of the top floor of a hospital they were guarding. We're training Iraqis to guard hospitals. We're not talking about bringing in international troops to do that either. I mean, there are a lot of dangers...

MCCAIN:

What are we asking the international troops to do?

WOLFOWITZ:

Well, the truth is, on the whole, with, I say, the exception of the British in Basra, the international troops are going into areas that are relatively stable.

WOLFOWITZ:

And the delay in Najaf is not a permanent one or it's not an expression of lack of confidence in the troops that are coming in there, which I believe are Spanish in that particular part of the Polish division. But rather that they're brand new troops, and they came in in the middle of a particularly delicate situation, so we extended the overlap period. But General Maddox (ph) can speak to it better than I, but there's a lot of confidence that that Polish division can handle that region precisely because it's not as dangerous as other parts of the country.

MCCAIN:

People I talk to say it's extremely dangerous.

Secretary Grossman, when do you expect this—international troops. When would you expect the first contingent of international troops to arrive in Iraq?

GROSSMAN:

Senator, it depends on how quickly we pass this U.N. Security Council resolution. And our objective...

MCCAIN:

That's true....
(CROSSTALK)

MCCAIN:

... one month, two months, six months, two years, five years?

GROSSMAN:

Well, Secretary Powell is going on Saturday to a meeting of the permanent five foreign ministers. We hope that that will make clear, sort of, what people think about the resolution we have proposed. And I think as Secretary Powell has said over the past few days, we want to get this done sometime before the United Nations General Assembly, which is the 23rd and 24th of September. So if that's done...

MCCAIN:

I would repeat: Do you have any idea as to when we could expect the first international troops to arrive in Iraq?

GROSSMAN:

No, sir.

MCCAIN:

You have no idea?

GROSSMAN:

Well, sir...

MCCAIN:

Thank you.

GROSSMAN:

... I only have no idea because it would depend upon the Security Council resolution. And I can only say to you, sir...

MCCAIN:

So we cannot count on an immediate infusion of international forces into Iraq; is that correct?

GROSSMAN:

I think I can't tell you of the three or four countries that are waiting for a Security Council resolution precisely what day that they will come.

MCCAIN:

Thank you. I'm not asking for precisely what day. I'm asking of a matter—could you tell me, years?

GROSSMAN:

If the Security Council resolution passes, sir, in the next few weeks. I can't imagine that it would be years.

MCCAIN:

That precision is not really satisfying.

General Myers, finally, could I ask you a question?

MYERS:

Can I comment on that question?

MCCAIN:

You can in context of an answer to this question.

You personally traveled to Texas to lobby the president on the need for additional international forces in Iraq. According to
a Post report, you did so after visiting Iraq and hearing directly from General Abizaid that he urgently needed additional military forces from other nations.

MCCAIN:

Isn't your support for the deployment of forces an acknowledgement we need more boots on the ground in Iraq?

MYERS:

No, Senator, it is not. I'll stand by General Maddox's (ph) comments.

MCCAIN:

Let me just point out before we rely on the general too much, I have never heard of a commander in the field who requested more additional help. I don't know of occasion. And so to put a Marine general who's in charge of a specific area of Iraq to discuss these issues which are made by our civilian policymakers, I think, is not helpful to this hearing.

MYERS:

OK. Some facts.

First of all, The Washington Post article was not factual in tone or content. I did not go to Crawford, Texas, to lobby the president for anything. I went as part of the secretary of defense's delegation to talk about a variety of national security issues.

Of the four and a half hours, the four hours, we spent with the president, that might have taken 15 seconds to cover that piece. So the article is not correct.

I do believe we need to internationalize the effort. It's extremely important to do so. Why? And I made it in my opening remarks.

This is an international problem. International terrorism is an international problem. And every time an Iraqi turns around, if they just can't see a U.S. servicemember, it's because they don't want foreigners in their country. And particularly there's some allergy, from time to time, against the U.S. And so we need to internationalize it.

At the same time that we're saying we don't need more troops; what's happening? We've got 55,000 Iraqis under arms. As Secretary Wolfowitz said, the largest part of this coalition right now, besides us, are the Iraqis. And more of those are going to come on every day. And I'm not going to swear to this number, but roughly in summer of '05, we'll have at least 184,000 Iraqis under arms to do this mission -- 184,000.

And so that's part of the answer. And this is something the Iraqis have to take responsibility for themselves. We cannot do it for them. We could put every sailor, soldier, airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman we have in Iraq and it would not make this problem better.

In fact, it could work just to the opposite. The more Americans in Iraq, the less Iraqis might feel prompted to come forward and furnish us that intelligence which is what we need so badly to deal with this threat.

And I don't know—I talk to Abizaid daily, several times a day. He talks to the secretary daily, or more frequently at times.
This is not an issue of Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Wolfowitz or any of the leadership in the Department of Defense saying, "General, you can't have more troops," or any pressure in that way. If they want more troops, they will get more troops. We are a nation at war. We have the capacity. We have the capability.

And I would just finally say, on the reserve component piece, if we're a nation at war, if the stakes are very high, then we're doing exactly as we want to do, as we're designed.

MYERS:

We're using our reserves.

By the way, they performed magnificently, and we have to be—we have to worry about the danger of what harm we might do long-term to our reserve structure, because it's absolutely essential to the way we do our work in this country.

I'm happy you said that.

MCCAIN:

Mr. Chairman, I'm very interested that the reason why we need international troops is because it's an international problem, not because we need more military assistance there.

General Myers, do you intend to ask—to recommend to the president that we increase the size of our military forces in light of having to extend Guard and Reserve personnel?

MYERS:

What we are going to recommend, Senator McCain, is that we look at this mix between the active—I mean, we're only extending the reserve component because that's where the capabilities exist today. And the question we're asking ourselves is—and some of this may be reflected in the '05 budget you'll see in January—the questions we're asking is, do we have the right mix? We have so much of this capability we need today, so many of our military police, so many of our civil affairs. I think every battalion except one is in the—I may have it mixed up, it may be brigades—but is in the reserve component.
We do need perhaps, and that's what's being looked at.

So those are the kind of things we'll take to the president. I think we're a ways off for saying that we need more troops.

WARNER:

Thank you, General.

MCCAIN:

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired.

I do agree with General Myers, the stakes could not be higher. My question is is whether if the stakes are as high as
General Myers maintains, and I'm in total agreement, of whether we are doing everything necessary.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses.