United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006

UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROMOTION ACT OF 2006

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Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, today the House has an opportunity to make an historic choice of great proportions. For 30 years, Mr. Chairman, U.S. policy toward India has been defined and constrained by our insistence on punishing India for its sovereign decision not to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The truth be told, had India conducted its nuclear tests earlier, it would have been treated the way we treat France and Britain and Russia and China and ourselves. In short, it would have been grandfathered in as a member of the nuclear weapons club. But they did not test earlier, and they have been treated differently. And nothing that we have tried over the last three decades has convinced them to give up their nuclear status, and nothing that we would say over the next three decades would convince them, either.

The time has come for the United States to deal with the reality of South Asia as it is and not as a fanciful wish. India lives in a difficult neighborhood, next to Pakistan, which continues to produce nuclear weapons unchecked, and China, whose commitment to a fissile material cutoff is suspect, at best. If India didn't exist in that neighborhood, we would have to invent them.

India has been a responsible nuclear power and deserves to be treated that way. The bill before us does just that.

Critics have expressed concerns regarding the bill's impact on our nonproliferation policy; and, clearly Iran, Pakistan and North Korea are looking for clues as to what it means for them and their nuclear programs.

What do you tell Pakistan and Iran and North Korea? Well, you tell them this: If you want to be treated like India, be like India. Be a responsible international actor with regard to weapons of mass destruction technologies. Don't sell your nuclear technologies to the highest bidder. Don't provide it to terrorists. Be a democracy, a real democracy like India, and work with us on important foreign policy objectives and not against us.

Iran and North Korea signed the NPT and are now running away from their freely entered into obligation and away from IAEA inspections. India did not sign the NPT, and yet is embracing the IAEA and embracing global nonproliferation. India's attitude should be recognized and commended and congratulated.

There are two options before us today: One, don't pass the bill. We do that, and we allow India to pursue its national interests unimpeded, as it has been doing outside of the nonproliferation mainstream.

The other is to make a deal with India and give to the United States and the international community a window in perpetuity into two-thirds of India's nuclear facilities and all of its future nuclear facilities, under safeguards, in compliance, transparent.

I think the choice is clear: If you want the IAEA to inspect India's civilian nuclear facilities, then you are for the bill. If you want India to be obligated to adhere to the missile technologies control regime for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want them to comply for the first time with the nuclear suppliers' groups guidelines for the first time, then you are for the bill. If you want to send a clear message to nuclear rogue states about how to behave, then you are for the bill. And, if you want a broad, deep, and enduring strategic relationship with India, then you are for the bill.

Mr. Chairman, it is time for a 21st century policy towards India, one that supports and encourages India's emergence as a global, responsible power and solidifies U.S.-India bilateral relations for decades to come. The bill before us today is that new policy. I urge our colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 5682.

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