Providing For Consideration of H.R. 5441, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5441, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007

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Mr. SABO. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me time.

Madam Speaker, I commend the Rules Committee for producing a rule that is much improved over last year, with one big exception. I am very disappointed that this rule fails to protect section 536, chemical security provisions, which I added to the bill in the Appropriations Committee.

Nearly 5 years after 9/11, the vast majority of chemical facilities in this country are not properly secured. They are prime targets for a catastrophic terrorist attack. Yet there is precious little being done to protect them. The administration acknowledges this problem, but says it cannot act without new legal authority to make and enforce chemical security regulations.

The Congress for more than four years has failed to act. Competing legislation in the House and the Senate authorizing committees has gone nowhere. What are we waiting for? Section 536 would end the stalemate. These provisions would give DHS the legal authority that Secretary Chertoff says he needs to regulate security at U.S. chemical facilities that pose the greatest risk to Americans.

In 2002, Congress addressed a small part of the chemical security problem. I see Congressman Young on the floor and I congratulate him because the security requirements of chemical facilities on ports under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the Coast Guard are doing a good job of enforcing them.

Under the Bioterrorism Act of 2002, the EPA also oversees security at the Nation's drinking water facilities. The problem is there are thousands of other chemical plants and storage facility without Federal security standards or oversight. An attack on one of them has the potential to kill or injure tens of thousands of people.

DHS has said that 20 percent of the 3,400 chemical facilities it identifies as ``high risk'' adhere to no security guidelines. If section 536 is stricken from this bill, Congress will appear content to leave security at these facilities to the conscience of their operators.

To my friends who would strike 536, I say, what do we have to lose by keeping this language in the bill? If before the end of this Congress the authorizing committees can act and the President signs chemical security legislation into law, then section 536 will be unnecessary. However, I have my doubts that will happen.

If section 536 is struck from this bill, I suspect that another Congress will adjourn without acting on chemical security. And then where will we be? We will go another year without security requirements at the Nation's highest-risk chemical sites. The American people waited too long for Congress to take responsible action to prevent a catastrophic attack on a chemical facility. I urge my colleagues to refrain from making a point of order against the chemical security provisions in this bill.

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