Medical Care Access Protection Act of 2006--Motion To Proceed

Date: May 8, 2006
Location: Washington, DC
Issues: Judicial Branch


MEDICAL CARE ACCESS PROTECTION ACT OF 2006--MOTION TO PROCEED -- (Senate - May 08, 2006)

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Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I seek recognition to support moving to legislation which would address the serious problems faced today by doctors, hospitals and other medical professionals who provide medical services, including obstetrical and gynecological services, while providing fair treatment to people who are injured in the course of medical treatment.

While most of the attention has been directed to OB/GYN malpractice verdicts, the issues are much broader, involving medical errors, insurance company premiums and insurer investments.

I support caps on noneconomic damages so long as they do not apply to situations such as the paperwork mix-up leading to an erroneous double mastectomy of a woman or the death of a 17-year-old woman on a North Carolina transplant case where there was a faulty blood type match or comparable cases in the OB/GYN services area.

An appropriate standard for cases not covered could be analogous provisions in Pennsylvania law which limit actions against governmental entities or in the limited tort context which exclude from the caps death, serious impairment of bodily function, and permanent disfigurement or dismemberment.

Beyond the issue of caps, I believe there could be savings on the cost of OB/GYN malpractice insurance and other malpractice insurance by eliminating frivolous cases by requiring plaintiffs to file with the court a certification by a doctor in the field that it is an appropriate case to bring to court. This proposal, which is now part of Pennsylvania State procedure, would be expanded federally, thus reducing claims and saving costs. While most malpractice cases are won by defendants, the high cost of litigation drives up OB/GYN malpractice premiums and other premiums. The proposed certification would reduce plaintiff's joinder of peripheral defendants and cut defense costs.

Further savings could be accomplished through patient safety initiatives identified in a report of the Institute of Medicine. On November 29, 1999, the Institute of Medicine, IOM, issued a report entitled: To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. The IOM report estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 hospitalized Americans die each year due to avoidable medical mistakes. However, only a fraction of these deaths and injuries are due to negligence; most errors are caused by system failures. The IOM issued a comprehensive set of recommendations, including the establishment of a nationwide mandatory reporting system; incorporation of patient safety standards in regulatory and accreditation programs; and the development of a non-punitive culture of safety in health care organizations. The report called for a 50 percent reduction in medical errors over 5 years.

The Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education, which I chair, held three hearings to discuss the IOM's findings and explore ways to implement the recommendations outlined in the IOM report. The fiscal year 2001 Labor-HHS appropriations bill contained $50 million for a patient safety initiative and directed the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, AHRQ, to develop guidelines on the collection of uniform error data; establish a competitive demonstration program to test best practices; and research ways to improve provider training. These initiatives were funded at $55 million in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and $84 million in fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006, for a total of $412 million.

There is some evidence that increases in OB/GYN insurance premiums and other premiums have been caused, at least in part, by insurance company losses, the declining stock market of the past several years, and the general rate-setting practices of the industry. As a matter of insurance company calculations, premiums are collected and invested to build up an insurance reserve where there is considerable lag time between the payment of the premium and litigation which results in a verdict or settlement. When the stock market has gone down, for example, that has resulted in insufficient funding to pay claims and the attendant increase in OB/GYN insurance premiums. A similar result occurred in Texas on homeowners insurance where cost and availability of insurance became an issue because companies lost money in the market and could not cover the insured losses on hurricanes.

In structuring legislation to put caps on jury verdicts in malpractice cases, due regard should be given to the history and development of trial by jury under the common law where reliance is placed on average men and women who comprise a jury to reach a just result reflecting the values and views of the community.

Jury trials in modern tort cases descend from the common law jury in trespass, which was drawn from and intended to be representative of the average members of the community in which the alleged trespass occurred. This coincides with the incorporation of negligence standards of liability into trespass actions.

This ``representative'' jury right in civil actions was protected by consensus among the state drafters of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights. The explicit trial by jury safeguards in the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution were adaptations of these common law concepts harmonized with the Sixth Amendment's clause that local juries be used in criminal trials. Thus, from its inception at common law through its inclusion in the Bill of Rights and today, the jury in tort/negligence cases is meant to be representative of the judgment of average members of the community, not of elected representatives.

The right to have a jury decide one's damages has been greatly circumscribed in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. An example is the analysis that the court has applied to limit punitive damage awards.

The Court has shifted its Seventh Amendment focus away from two centuries of precedent in deciding that federal appellate review of punitive damage awards will be decided on a de novo basis and that a jury's determination of punitive damages is not a finding of fact for purposes of the re-examination clause of the Seventh Amendment--``no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.'' Then, in 2003, the Court reasoned that any ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages greater than 9:1 will likely be considered unreasonable and disproportionate, and thus constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of property in non-personal injury cases. Plaintiffs will inevitably face a vastly increased burden to justify a greater ratio, and appellate courts have far greater latitude to disallow or reduce such an award.

These decisions may have already, in effect, placed caps on some jury verdicts in malpractice cases which may involve punitive damages.

The pending bills are a starting point for analysis, discussion, debate and amendment. I am prepared to proceed with the caveat that there is much work to be done before the Senate would be ready, in my opinion, for consideration of final passage.

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