New Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategy in Southeast Asia

NEW COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I have spoken on the floor several times about the administration's ill-conceived, poorly executed, and self-defeating strategy in Iraq. Today, I intend to talk about how the war in Iraq is having a far-reaching and negative impact on our ability to conduct an effective fight against international terrorism. I saw this firsthand during a recent visit to Thailand and Indonesia, two valuable partners in the fight against terrorism in a strategically critical and often underappreciated region. I visited these two countries to gain a detailed understanding of the radical Jihadist networks that are proliferating throughout the region and of what it will take to effectively confront this threat.

I bring back from the trip both good news and bad news. The good news is that we have a significant opportunity in Thailand, Indonesia, and in Southeast Asia in general, to get our counterterrorism strategy right. It is not too late to stem the relationship between international terrorist networks and local extremist organizations. Nor is it too late to tackle the root causes of extremism in the region.

Unfortunately, there is bad news. Unless we develop a truly comprehensive, global strategy to counter terrorist threats, we will miss the opportunity to gain the upper hand in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia at what couldn't be a more critical time. And changing our misguided policies in Iraq must be a central element of this strategy.

First, international terrorist networks are alive and well in Southeast Asia. During my visit, I examined the current nature of a leading regional terrorist organization, al-Jesmaah al-Islamiyah, or ``JI'', and its affiliates--the threat it continues to pose to countries throughout the region, how it has survived the deaths and arrests of some of its key leaders, and its ties with al-Qaida. Most importantly, I gained a more detailed understanding of the conditions that have provided JI with a recruitment base and operational space.

JI takes advantage of vast areas of ocean, isolated islands, weak or corrupt local and provincial governments, the absence of rule of law, and marginalized Islamic populations to develop its strength. JI has a presence throughout the region. And while arrests of prominent JI leaders in the last few years have helped shed light on the organization, it continues to operate in loosely formed cells, in regionally oriented entities, and in partnership with other terrorist organizations like the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines.

That said, according to a number of sources, including the International Crisis Group, Congressional Research Service, and the State Department, JI and al-Qaida have developed a symbiotic relationship. There is some overlap in membership. They have shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, and often help one another with supply chain systems and transportation. Al-Qaida has also provided JI with considerable financial support

JI and al-Qaida also exploit similar ground as they seek safe haven and new recruits. These groups feed on anti-United States and anti-Western sentiment, fueled in part by discontent and anger about United States policies in Iraq. Unfortunately, the administration's refusal to provide a flexible timeline for withdrawing United States troops from Iraq allows these groups to portray us as occupiers of a Muslim country. Until we show that we are truly committed to redeploying United States troops from Iraq, terrorist organizations will continue to find recruits in otherwise moderate Muslim communities, and we will continue to make it harder to win the full backing of potential partners and allies in the fight against terrorist networks.

It is in this light that I would like to lay out some of my key observations from my recent trip. I will talk about the political and security dynamics in both Thailand and Indonesia, and will argue that a new counterterrorism strategy in the region must incorporate respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the need to hold our friends and allies accountable for making necessary democratic reforms.

I would like to begin with Thailand. Thailand is a critical strategic partner of the United States in, among other things, the fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates. Our close political and military relationship goes back decades and is a vital component of United States national security policies in the region. The 1954 Manila Pact, together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the longstanding United States-Thai security relationship. Thailand's airfields and ports play a particularly important role in United States global military strategy, including having served as the primary hub of the relief effort for the Indian Ocean tsunami.

Thailand has also shown its willingness to stand by the United States in recent military campaigns. Thailand sent 130 soldiers, mostly engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, Thai forces are responsible for the construction of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services, and some Special Forces operations.

Thailand also contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over 450 troops, including medics and engineers, to the southern city of Karbala. The deployment proved unpopular with the Thai public, however, particularly in the volatile southern provinces, and in September 2004, Thai troops were withdrawn from Iraq.

While Thailand has been and will continue to be a strong ally, my visit occurred during a politically fragile time for the government. Public demonstrations and significant political pressure on the Prime Minister highlighted the challenges of conducting an effective and responsible counterinsurgency campaign while managing domestic political pressures. The Thai Government has also struggled to account for over 2,000 extrajudicial killings over the last few years, the kidnapping of a prominent human rights lawyer by Thai police and his death in police custody, and overly aggressive and heavy-handed tactics used in the counterinsurgency campaign that in one case resulted in the killing of over 70 detained suspects.

At the same time, though, preparations for national celebrations of the King's 60-year reign underscored the underlying stability of Thailand's constitutional monarchy. It is this stability that has permitted the United States to pursue close counterterrorism and other strategic ties with Thailand that transcend individual politicians and parties. It also provides the foundation of a partnership that can and must be based not only on an understanding of a common threat, but on a shared commitment to finding solutions to the conditions that breed extremism and terrorism.

My visit to Thailand focused primarily on Thailand's counterterrorism role in the region. As I mentioned, longstanding tensions in the mostly Muslim southern provinces of Thailand have recently exploded into violent unrest that has claimed hundreds of lives. The unrest, which has elements of a separatist insurgency, included brutal attacks on civilians. Insurgent tactics have sometimes suggested the influence of international terrorism, but Thai, United States Government, and independent experts believe that neither al-Qaida nor its Southeast Asian affiliates have been behind the violence so far. Thai officials have noted publicly, however, that there has been evidence that many of those involved in the unrest in the south had received militant schooling or training outside of Thailand. It is possible that in the near future international terrorist organizations like JI could exploit the continuing unrest in Thailand's southern provinces.

The United States needs to have a clear understanding of what is happening in Thailand in order to formulate an appropriate policy response. With our Thai partners, we must remain vigilant to the possibility that international terrorist organizations could take advantage of unrest among disaffected Muslim populations in the south.

When I met Prime Minister Thaksin and a number of his key advisors and cabinet members, I stressed the need for the Thai Government to confront the root causes of this unrest before it becomes an international security concern. This means promoting human rights and accountability for abuses that have been committed by Thai security forces and have helped fuel the unrest, as well as increasing opportunities for disaffected or marginalized communities to join regional and international economies. It also means promoting civil society, economic development, transparency and increased political participation of the Muslim community.

I was pleased to learn of the progress being made by the National Reconciliation Council to address grievances stemming from the government's policies in the South. I urged the Prime Minister to take seriously the recommendations that the NRC will be delivering in the coming months, and to emphasize the value of honoring the NRC as a mechanism for strengthening dialogue between the Thai people and the government.

I would like to shift to Indonesia now. After 3 days of meeting with senior Indonesian Government officials including the President, the Foreign and Defense Ministers, the new Chief of the Indonesian military, and the police chief, I have a new sense of optimism about United States-Indonesian relations. But while I am optimistic about progress being made there, limited progress in areas such as military reform and accountability for past crimes against humanity could undermine further democratic reforms and counterterrorism efforts.

Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, and it is a critical player in the global fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates. The terrorist organization al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah and associated groups in the region pose a serious threat to Indonesia and to the interests of the United States, our allies, and our friends. In response to this threat, we need a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and a bilateral relationship with Indonesia aimed at fighting terrorism while supporting that country's efforts at democratization. Fighting terrorism and supporting democratization are not incompatible--in fact, democratic reforms and the growth of civil society in Indonesia have gone hand in hand with expanded counterterrorism efforts, providing a clear indication that Indonesia's political reforms do not come at the cost of the government's ability to fight terrorism.

While the United States-Indonesia relationship has never been more important, Indonesia's effectiveness in countering terrorist networks and other emerging threats hinges on its ability to reform its government, address past crimes and abuses, and improve both the transparency and the effectiveness of the central and provincial governments.

We cannot forget that the Government of Indonesia has had a poor human rights record. The Indonesian military in particular has long been a perpetrator of human rights abuses as well as a serious obstacle to democratization. In recent years, efforts to reform the military, while commendable, have produced mixed results. The greatest improvement has been an increase in civilian control of the military and the withdrawal of the military from active politics.

Ridding the Indonesian military of its private business holdings and providing greater transparency have been harder to achieve. In some areas, the military's treatment of civilian populations has improved, but abuses still occur and there has been virtually no accountability for past human rights violations. There is still a considerable amount of distance to travel for the government and the military to become ``reformed,'' and while progress is being made, more needs to be done.

Serious tensions continue in Papua, the remote easternmost province of Indonesia. Serious unrest due to repressive government policies, poverty, and recent abuses by the Indonesian military and police forces has created an environment of distrust, and I urged the Government of Indonesia to address the abuses that are taking place and immediately open up Papua to journalists and human rights organizations. Doing so would be an important step toward making transparency and justice the new norm for Indonesia.

United States policy toward Indonesia, including the implementation of the administration's decision to resume military assistance, must take these ongoing concerns into account. We must ensure that our assistance promotes reform and human rights, we must remain vigilant to any backsliding, and we must develop clear benchmarks for progress.

Carefully circumscribing any new military assistance is critical to formulating an effective bilateral counterterrorism relationship. There may be areas where the Indonesian military's role is warranted, such as maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. But any resurrection of the military's historical role in domestic security would be counterproductive to the fight against terrorism, not least because it would likely alienate much of the population. We must therefore make clear that such a development would undermine our bilateral relationship.

We must also be alert to the risk that military assistance could overwhelm other elements of a larger counterterrorism strategy. If Indonesia is going to effectively fight terrorism, it must develop a professional, capable, and honest police force and strong judiciary. An imbalanced United States assistance program could harm reform efforts and undermine Indonesia's nascent efforts to coordinate the counterterrorism roles of its various military, police and civilian agencies.

Finally, we must expand assistance programs in the areas of education, economic development and the promotion of civil societies. No counterterrorism strategy can succeed unless the political, social and economic conditions that breed terrorism are confronted head on.

I do believe that we have an opportunity to create and execute a comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategy in Southeast Asia. This strategy needs to take into account the unique nature of each of our partners in the region and their internal political, social, and economic dynamics, while addressing the root causes of extremism and the conditions that fuel or support the growth of terrorist networks.

The United States can take a leadership role in the region and can help friends and allies like Thailand and Indonesia engage as full partners in the fight against terrorist networks. In many cases, the United States should push strongly for ending abusive or heavy-handed government policies, addressing past human rights abuses, and opening political space that allows the freedom to express political discontent or dissatisfaction with government leaders or policies.

Unfortunately, our policies in Iraq are making it increasingly difficult to execute such a strategy effectively. Public opinion in Southeast Asia is critically important if we are to dry up potential havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists. In Thailand, neither anti-American nor anti-Western sentiment has taken root. At the same time, however, Thai officials have stated that the withdrawal of Thai troops from Iraq was motivated in part by the Iraq war's unpopularity in the Muslim community. Indonesians' views on United States policy in Iraq are harsher still, ranging from indifference to deep suspicion. At best, Iraq is seen as ``America's problem;'' at worst, people question our motives for being there. These widely held views make the critically important work of engaging our friends and allies in the fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates that much more difficult.

There are also opportunity costs to our narrow focus on Iraq. The war in Iraq has drained precious resources away from what must be a global counterterrorism strategy, one that addresses the dangers of weak states and regions. The war also undercuts critical elements of this strategy. Widespread global skepticism about our policies in Iraq makes it all the more difficult for us to promote human rights and the rule of law while seeking partners against extremism and violence.

The President's misguided, Iraq-centric foreign policy is both symptom and cause of an alarming failure to conduct a comprehensive, global war on the terrorist networks that threaten us. Southeast Asia is but one of the regions that requires more focused attention. We cannot afford to continue treating threats in this and other parts of the world as secondary to an Iraq-focused national security strategy. The time has long since come for the President to set a flexible timeline for withdrawal from Iraq, and to develop a comprehensive, global strategy to fight terrorist networks and the conditions that breed them.

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