Antitrust Criminal Invesigative Improvements Act of 2005

Floor Speech

ANTITRUST CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2005 -- (Senate - October 25, 2005)

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 250, S. 443.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 443) to improve the investigation of criminal antitrust offenses.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Antitrust Investigative Improvements Act of 2005, a bill I am cosponsoring with Senators DEWINE and LEAHY. This important measure will give the antitrust criminal enforcers at the Department of Justice a vital tool to investigate, detect, and prevent antitrust conspiracies. It will allow the Justice Department, upon a showing of probable cause to a Federal judge, authority to obtain a wiretap order for a limited time period to monitor communications between those suspected of engaging in illegal antitrust conspiracies.

The current Federal criminal code lists over 150 predicate offenses for which the Justice Department may obtain a wiretap during the course of a criminal investigation. These offenses include basic white collar crimes such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. However, under current law, if the Government is investigating a criminal antitrust conspiracy, such as a scheme to fix prices to consumers, the Government cannot obtain a wiretap of the suspected conspirators. This inability to obtain wiretaps unquestionably severely handicaps the detection and prevention of such conspiracies. Only with the consent of a member of the conspiracy who has already agreed to cooperate with the Government may the Government surreptitiously record the meetings of the conspirators.

There is no logical basis to exclude criminal antitrust violations from the list of predicate offenses for a wiretap. A criminal antitrust offense, such as price fixing, is every bit as serious--and causes every bit as much financial loss to its victims--as other white collar crimes, such as mail fraud or wire fraud. A price-fixing conspiracy raises prices to consumers, stealing hard earned dollars from citizens as surely as does a salesman promoting a bogus investment from a ``boiler room'' or, indeed, a thief with a gun. Moreover, by its secret nature as an agreement among competitors, such a conspiracy is likely harder to detect than a fraudulent offering over the phone or through the mail. A properly issued wiretap, therefore, is even more necessary to detect criminal antitrust conspiracies than other white collar offenses.

Detecting, preventing, and punishing criminal antitrust offenses are one of the principal missions of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division. Such offenses are punished severely with corporations facing fines of up to $100 million and individuals subject to jail terms of up to 10 years for each offense. Indeed, last year we passed legislation raising criminal penalties to these new levels. Yet, despite the damage these conspiracies do to the economy and individual consumers, our law enforcement agencies lack the one vital tool essential to uncover these secret conspiracies--the ability to obtain a wiretap to monitor communications between the suspected conspirators upon a showing of probable cause. This legislation will remedy this defect by granting to our law enforcement officials the necessary means to protect consumers and end illegal antitrust conspiracies.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this legislation.

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