Iran Sanctions Extension Act

Floor Speech

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Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of extending the option of sanctions against Iran by passage of H.R. 6297, the Iran Sanctions Extension Act, which reauthorizes the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 for 10 years.
As a Senior Member of the Homeland Security Committee, and Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, I am very much aware of what is at stake in the work done by President Obama to ensure that Iran does not have the breakout capacity to build a nuclear weapon.

Events over this Congress make it clear that Congress should be even more vigilant in providing for the protection of the United States.

Congress should be mindful of the:

United States' leadership in the effort to forge an enforceable and verifiable nuclear agreement with Iran; and
Deadliness of chemical weapons when they were used during the Syrian conflict against unarmed men, women, and children.

H.R. 6297, allows Congress the option to impose sanctions, but does renew the imposition of sanctions.
As Congress continues to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which resulted in the significant reduction in Iran's capabilities to develop a nuclear weapon, we must continue the peaceful and verifiable efforts to cut off Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon.

President Obama and current and former Secretary of State John Kerry and Hillary Clinton were successful in the pursuit of global sanctions and gained the cooperation of the world, including Russia and China, which was critical in bringing the Iranians to the negotiation table on their nuclear arms program.

We should retain in our arsenal the option to impose sanctions so that if necessary the United States can act quickly to coordinate a global response to any threat posed by Iran's verified breach of the JCPOA.

Declaring sanctions for the sake of declaring sanctions against Iran should never be the objective, nor should we forget that the effectiveness of sanctions are their global nature.

Under President Obama's brilliant leadership the United States had the stature around the globe to impose sanctions, and the diplomatic ties to gain global cooperation to expand participation in Iranian sanctions because we could make the case that Iran's nuclear program posed an international threat to peace and stability.

The United States is the world's foremost authority on radiological weapons grade material detection and source identification.

The Department of Homeland Security is leading the effort through its Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to create a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, which should be aggressively supported with sufficient funding by Congress.

Recognizing the threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive materials, DNDO was created by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-43 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-3.4 and subsequently codified by Title V of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act (Pub. L.
No. 109-347), which amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

A key area that the United States has focused its capabilities and resources is blocking the enrichment of radioactive materials for weapons use; and the detection of radioactive materials that would pose a threat to public safety and health.

There are several material facts that must be understood about weapons grade radioactive material--each nation's process for refining nuclear material for use in a weapon is unique.

Radioactive material has a unique spectrum range and composition that is akin to signatures that cannot be confused with other sources of radioactive material both natural and manmade.

The first essential fact is that having samples and data from Iranian facilities where materials in Iran were produced established the radiological signatures for materials that could have only come from those facilities or from processes that follow the methods used by the Iranian nuclear physicists who developed their program.

The United States has those samples and the data needed to identify material from Iranian efforts to purify radiological materials.

The second essential fact is that radiological material leaves evidence of its presence long after it may have been removed from an area.

The physical evidence of centrifuges; storage facilities or weapons themselves are not the only evidence that may convict Iran of violation of the agreement; it can also be the unique Iranian radiation trail left behind during any attempt to refine or purify radiological material for use in a weapon or the transfer of even small quantities of material that is generated or sourced by the Iranians.

The third essential fact is that if the Iranians need special centrifuges to refine radiological material to a point that it may be used for a weapon.

H.R. 6297 assures that any attempt by the Iranians to cheat by refining more radiological material than is allowed will be detected and Congress would be prepared to impose a sanctions regime.

Another significant signal of Iranian violation would be the unique signature of the sound made by centrifuges that are used to purify radiological material.

The sound of these massive centrifuges will be detectable many miles away from where they are operated--and the United States has the resources in place in cooperation with allies around the world to detect if enrichment activity is occurring.

Operating more centrifuges than is allowed by the agreement would be a actionable sign that Iran is seeking to purify more radioactive material than is allowed by the agreement.

This is important to the timeline in calculating the time to breakout--having enough enriched material to use in a weapon.

The final essential fact is that the United States has satellite surveillance and ground surveillance capability to detect in great detail activity on the ground.

The United States used these resources to identify nuclear arms activity that informed the administration of the severity of the issue and used that evidence to galvanize international support for one of the most successful embargoes in human history.

For these reasons, I will join my colleagues in supporting passage of this bipartisan effort to extend by 10 years the period that sanctions may be applied to Iran.

I urge you to join me in support of this bill and the excellent work of the Obama Administration in making the world much safer from nuclear threats.

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