Hire More Heroes Act of 2015

Floor Speech

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Mr. THUNE. Madam President, I rise today to discuss the Iran nuclear deal. We are here today because several months ago Senators Corker and Cardin, the respective chair and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee worked out an agreement to allow us to have this debate voted on here in the Senate, and there were 98 votes in support of allowing a vote on the Iranian nuclear agreement. In fact, it went to the President's desk, and the President then signed it into law. That set in place a process, which is where we end up today.

I certainly hope our colleagues who voted for this allow us to have that debate. It is an important debate. It has serious consequences for America's national security interests, and it certainly is something that shouldn't be minimized in any way. The American people need to have their voices heard in this discussion, which will take place if we are allowed to get on that resolution here in the U.S. Senate.

So I would hope that our colleagues on the other side--there was some discussion I read reporting of statements made by the President or by members of his administration, statements made by some of our colleagues here that perhaps they might block us from even proceeding to this resolution. I think that would be a big mistake. It would be a tragic outcome with respect to something that is this important to America's national security. It certainly is something which the American people deserve and have a right to have their voices heard.

So I am looking forward to this discussion. I hope throughout the course of the next few days we will have a chance to air this out because it is clear that one of the greatest threats to our national security is the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran and a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, President Obama's Iran nuclear deal, which is really a nuclear concessions deal, increases rather than decreases that possibility.

There are numerous reasons to be concerned about a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. That is well documented. It has been talked about a lot. Iran actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, both of which pose an immediate threat to our ally Israel.

Iran incites regional instability, supporting the Houthis in Yemen and the Assad regime in Syria. Iran continues to commit human rights abuses against its own people, and Iran has a history of taking extreme measures to hide its nuclear enrichment program from the international community.

In response to Iran's nuclear activities 9 years ago, in 2006, the U.N. and the United States began to impose sanctions on Iran's nuclear enrichment program. These sanctions were dramatically increased in 2010. The sanctions targeted Iranian businesses and financial institutions as well as members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC, who were responsible for killing hundreds of Americans and froze Iranian assets that would have been used by Iran to support terrorism throughout the region. This had a tremendous impact, effectively bringing Iran to its knees.

Thanks to the pressures the sanctions exerted on Iran's economy, Iran's leadership was under immense pressure to negotiate with the United States and its allies. In 2013 Iran agreed to engage in talks regarding its nuclear program. However, soon after Iran agreed to come to the negotiating table, the Obama administration inexplicably began making concession after concession, with Iran giving up very little in return. The result--a weak deal that is highly unlikely to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power.

We have already heard from many of my colleagues why this agreement is a bad deal. Once this deal goes into effect, right off the bat Iran will have access to roughly $140 billion, which even President Obama and Secretary Kerry acknowledge would be partly used to finance terrorism. The deal will also increase access to conventional weapons, allowing Iran to defend its nuclear infrastructure from military strike. By lifting the ban on ballistic missiles, Iran will be able to purchase a delivery system capable of carrying a nuclear warhead well beyond the confines of the Middle East. The deal will also allow Iran to continue its research and development into advanced centrifuges, permitting Iran to modernize its enrichment infrastructure and reducing the breakout period for a nuclear weapon to a few weeks instead of months.

The outcome of this agreement will be a more prosperous, better armed, more dangerous Iran, exerting its regional influence and continuing to sponsor terror. All of that will be achieved without Iran violating the terms of the agreement.

However, if Iran does decide to cheat, this deal will make that more possible. To begin with, for suspicious sites not currently on the list of Iran's nuclear facilities, Iran gets 24 days' notice before inspections can take place. Even more concerning, however, is the information leaked recently that the secret International Atomic Energy Agency agreement with Iran will allow Iran to provide its own soil samples to inspectors from enrichment sites such as the facility at Parchin. Think about that. The regime which has broken these agreements in the past and cheated in the past--again, well documented--will be able to furnish its own soil inspections.

Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging this when it was raised in committee, Secretary Kerry took on the role of apologist for Iran, defending the deal by saying that private agreements with the IAEA are the norm. However, if the leaked information regarding soil samples is correct, this calls into question the entire credibility of the inspections regime. For this reason and many others, I strongly oppose President Obama's nuclear arms concession agreement with Iran, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to do the same.

By rejecting this agreement, we can negotiate a better deal--one that will actually stop Iran's nuclear program and prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. It is unfortunate that when we have the majority of the American people clearly opposing this deal that the President is not only willing to veto their opposition but to call doing so a victory.

I would like to expand a little bit of detail on some of the national security concerns with this nuclear agreement with Iran.

Since the Iran agreement was first announced in July, the Obama administration has repeatedly stated that we should at least give this deal a try, arguing that if Iran breaks its side of the agreement and pursues a nuclear weapon, we will have the same military options down the road that we have today. However, that is not true. We will not have the same options in the future that we have today. Right now, if a situation arose where Iran entered a breakout period and was pursuing a nuclear weapon, the United States or our allies in the region could conduct a targeted air strike on Iran's enrichment facilities.

For example, if we knew that Iran was using its nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow to enrich weapons-grade uranium, we could utilize our air superiority with bunker-buster bombs. Obviously, we would prefer to avoid a military strike, but if needed, we have that option, and Iran knows this.

However, under this agreement, in 10 years' time, Iran will have faster, far more efficient centrifuges that can operate in significantly smaller facilities that can be placed deeper underground with increased levels of fortification, making a military strike much more complex.

Right now Iran is using IR-1 centrifuges, which are basically 1960s technology; but under this agreement, starting around year 8, Iran can begin testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges. In fact, as stated in page 10 of Annex 1, after the agreement has been in place for 8 1/2 years, Iran can construct up to 30 IR-6 centrifuges and 30 IR-8 centrifuges. Why is this so significant? IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges are far more advanced and estimated to be up to 15 times more efficient than the IR-1 centrifuges that they are using today. By increasing the efficiency of the enrichment process, Iran can significantly reduce the breakout period that is necessary to create a bomb.

On page 17 of Annex 1 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, under the section titled ``Centrifuge Manufacturing,'' the agreement states that at the end of year 8:

Iran will commence manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type.

The administration has repeatedly asserted that even if we destroyed Iran's enrichment facilities with an air strike, we can't turn back time and erase Iran's nuclear enrichment know-how.

While that may be true, we absolutely can and should prevent Iran from increasing its nuclear expertise, but this deal doesn't do that. Instead, it ensures Iran's knowledge will increase by solidifying its ability to develop more advanced centrifuges. Because these IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges are so much more efficient in speeding up the uranium enrichment process, they will make it far easier for Iran to conceal and protect its nuclear program.

Referring once again to the facility at Fordow, when Fordow was first constructed, it was built to contain 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges, which meant that the facility had to be significant in size. IR-8 centrifuges, however, are estimated to be 15 times more efficient than the IR-1 centrifuges used at Fordow, which means that by using IR-8 centrifuges, Iran could replicate the enrichment capability of a facility like Fordow with a building containing not 3,000 centrifuges, but only 200 centrifuges. Such a facility can be the size of a house. By reducing the size of the facilities by this magnitude, Iran could build many Fordows in multiple locations, hiding them more easily and putting them deeper underground. Such facilities could be built within existing mines, making them extremely difficult to find.

As mentioned before, this agreement guarantees Iran will have the manufacturing capacity it needs to build these advanced centrifuges. Even within the parameters of this agreement, Iran could manufacture 200 IR-6 centrifuges and 200 IR-8 centrifuges per year starting around year 8. Since Iran would already have the manufacturing capacity for building IR-8 centrifuges, it would merely need to ramp up the production beyond the terms of the agreement and in a short period of time it could have operating enrichment facilities in multiple locations throughout the country. By the time these violations had been discovered and conformed, the advanced centrifuges would likely be in place, and Iran would have likely enough enriched uranium for a bomb.

But there is much more to it than that. Currently, according to publicly available sources, Iran's air defense capabilities consist of domestically produced, short-range surface-to-air missiles and Russian made, longer range SA-2 and SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, as well as a few Chinese CSA-1s. These systems are vulnerable to electronic countermeasures and pose very little threat to American or even Israeli aircraft.

However, that is not where Iran's air defenses will be in 10 years.

Under this agreement, the ban on conventional weapons sales to Iran will be lifted after 5 years. Russia has already agreed to sell Iran four batteries of S-300 vehicle-launched surface-to-air missiles. Depending upon the sophistication of these S-300 missile systems, they may be able to engage aircraft up to 200 miles away.

As we saw last month with Iran unveiling its new solid-fuel missiles, Iran's domestic military infrastructure will not remain static. Over the next decade, as Iran acquires more and more increasingly advanced weapons systems, its area denial capability will make airstrikes even more difficult. Will a future American President, therefore, have the same military options that we have today, as President Obama and Secretary Kerry claim? The answer is no.

We will still have military options available to us, but the calculus for carrying out a targeted airstrike will be much different down the road. Therefore, it is not realistic for President Obama to claim that future Presidents will have the same military options against Iran we have today. And the more the realistic possibility of a military strike decreases, the more likely Iran will be to violate the terms of the agreement and go after a bomb.

In 10 years' time, under this agreement, our best hope for Iran not attaining a nuclear weapon will be the Iranian Government voluntarily deciding it doesn't want one. That is not something I am willing to bank on.

Madam President, I also want to speak for a moment about Iran's support for terrorism and the idea put forward by President Obama that Iran will spend most of the soon-to-be-acquired economic wealth on its own economy. Even if we assume Iran's military spending remains what it is today as a percentage of Iran's budget, what would that mean going forward?

Well, there are many estimates on how much Iran spends on its military. Some experts put the figure at around $10 billion per year, while others estimate the figure to be closer to $15 billion or even higher. In addition, of the amount spent on Iran's military, about 65 percent is spent on Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps--the IRGC.

In the first year of this agreement, between unfrozen assets and increased revenue from oil sales, Iran is expected to see an initial influx of around $140 billion. Now, using conservative numbers, if Iran's military spending stayed the same in this coming year as a percentage of GDP, it would increase to almost $15 billion, with $9.5 billion going to the IRGC.

One of the main national security concerns we have regarding the IRGC is that Iran uses it to support terrorist organizations. Iran is the main supporter of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, both of which have provoked conflicts with Israel in recent years.

In addition, Iran's support of instability in the region is well known, with the Iranian Government providing funding to the Houthis in Yemen and military assistance to Assad in Syria. Many of our own casualties in Iraq were the result of Iranian-made bombs provided to insurgents by the Iranian Quds Force.

Last summer, the missiles being launched at Israel out of Gaza were primarily imported from Iran. It is no wonder Israel has been so opposed to this deal.

Even the Iron Dome system, which proved so successful during the last Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can be overwhelmed if enough missiles are fired at once. And now Iran, a country bent on Israel's destruction, is going to see a huge increase in military spending.

Even the Quds Force commander, Qassem Suleimani, the man responsible for supplying Iraqi insurgents with bombs that killed U.S. soldiers, will see United Nations and European Union sanctions lifted as a result of this deal.

President Obama keeps arguing that the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran far outweighs the short-term impact of Iran's increased support for terrorism. As we have discussed, I don't think this agreement prevents Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. But even if my colleagues disagree with me on that point, are we really willing to trade the lives of our allies in the short term to try to achieve this goal? That is not a risk I am willing to take.

In urging my colleagues to vote against this deal, I would also like to speak for just a moment about what would happen if Congress is able to stop this deal?

The President keeps saying a ``no'' vote on this deal will lead to war. Well, that is unrealistic and a clear attempt by the President to garner support for the agreement by stoking people's fears.

Iran is very aware of its own military limitations, and it knows what the outcome of such a war would be. For Iran, in the short term, a much more realistic response would be for it to try to keep its side of the agreement in an attempt to gain United Nations and EU sanctions relief. However, despite this attempt, the United States could double down on the U.N. sanctions that were in place prior to the December framework and threaten to use secondary sanctions against foreign businesses who wish to do business with Iran.

Given the size of the U.S. economy compared to Iran, this is a powerful deterrent. Since Iran's economy is already hurting, maintaining sanctions would provide more leverage for the P5+1 to get a better deal.

However, another plausible outcome following congressional rejection of the deal would be for Iran to try to capitalize on congressional disapproval by seeking to divide Russia and China from the West to undermine the multilateral sanctions regime. Iran could try to achieve this by implementing certain commitments from the agreement but not others.

But even if China and Russia wish to do business with Iran, they both still have an incentive to try to achieve the original goal of the negotiations. It is not in China's interest for a nuclear-armed Iran to cause greater instability with global energy prices, and Russia doesn't want an Islamist regime in its backyard, which is prone to regional conflicts, acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities.

These scenarios I am describing have already been echoed by a chorus of experts who have pointed out the flaws in this agreement and offered alternatives. The vote this week is not--is not--a choice between supporting a bad deal or going to war. The vote this week is an opportunity to reject a bad deal in order to achieve a better outcome.

That is what we ought to be doing, and I hope we get the chance to get on this resolution and that we have the chance to get a full debate here in the Senate where the people's voices can be heard. I hope when it is all said and done, Members here in the Senate will come to the same conclusion I and many of my colleagues have, which is that this is a bad deal for our country, it is a bad deal for our allies in the region, and there is a much better outcome that can be achieved if the Senate will reject this bad deal and get us back to negotiations where we can achieve a better outcome.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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