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Mr. HATCH. Madam President, as we resume the debate of our Nation's trade policy, I want to take a few minutes to provide an update about where things really are, where we are going, and the possibility of a path forward.
We took a big step yesterday, and I thank all of my colleagues who voted for cloture, once again, for helping us to get closer to the finish.
I am, of course, aware that a number of Senators have concerns about the process and amendments. I understand those concerns. As I said yesterday, I would have preferred a different path for moving this bill. It was always my preference to consider more amendments and have a fuller debate on these important issues. I know that is what the majority leader wanted, as well.
Sadly, there were some who just did not want to cooperate, and instead of moving directly to the bill, we had to negotiate around a filibuster. Then, instead of bringing up and debating amendments, we spent a lot of time addressing concerns and overcoming objections.
I am not going to point fingers or complain about anyone who chooses to exercise their rights under the Senate rules to slow down the debate. We are all well aware that a number of Senators would love to prolong this debate forever to keep the TPA bill from passing. But with a bill this important, we had to find a way forward, which led to a cloture motion and yesterday's vote.
But even now that cloture has been invoked, I am still working to try to reach a reasonable accommodation to address Senators' concerns. Both sides worked late into the night to try to come up with an agreement on time and amendments in order to give Senators an opportunity to make their case. Up to now, no deal has been reached, which from my point of view is unfortunate. And keep in mind that under the rules, we don't have an obligation to do that. We bent over backwards to try to solve this problem, but so far, no deal has been reached.
I am still willing to work with my colleagues to address their concerns, although it is becoming increasingly clear that some concerns are beyond accommodation. But I am always an optimist. As I said yesterday, if any of my colleagues have a reasonable proposal to solve this impasse and allow us to consider more amendments, I am all ears. But as of right now, cloture is invoked and only pending, germane amendments can be considered without an agreement.
Until that time, however, one thing is clear: Absent an agreement on time and votes, the Senate will deal with pending amendments and vote on whether to invoke cloture on TPA this evening. I am, of course, more than willing to wait that long, but I am sure there are many in this Chamber who would prefer to see a solution come together before then.
Let's work together. Let's find a way to hear more amendments and address more issues. I hope people will be willing to work with us on a reasonable path forward, but if not, it appears that the clock, more than anything else, will determine how this debate will unfold.
AMENDMENT NO. 1299
Mr. President, later today the Senate will vote on the Portman-Stabenow currency manipulation amendment.
Up to now, we have all heard more than our fair share of arguments about this amendment. I want to take a few more minutes today to express my opposition to the Portman-Stabenow amendment and to explain to my colleagues why they should vote against it.
I want to reiterate that the Obama administration has made it abundantly clear that if this amendment gets adopted, President Obama will veto the TPA bill. As I have already said a number of times, a vote for the Portman-Stabenow amendment is a vote to kill TPA. That would be, indeed, tragic.
I know that all of my colleagues are aware of the statements made by Secretary Lew and the White House on this matter. I also know that a number of my colleagues who support Portman-Stabenow have said that they don't believe the President would veto the TPA bill over this amendment.
Well, let's say, for the sake of argument, that they are right--but only for the sake of argument. Let's assume that the administration is bluffing. Should we call that bluff? Should we pass the amendment and dare the President to make good on his veto threat? The answer to that question is an emphatic no.
Even if we take veto threats and administration statements of opposition completely out of the equation, one fact still remains: The Portman-Stabenow amendment is bad policy for America, and it is far too risky.
Earlier this week, I laid out four separate negative consequences that would result from the Portman-Stabenow amendment, and I would like to reiterate those concerns here today.
First, the Portman-Stabenow amendment would derail the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Once again, we know that this is the case. I have chatted with Japanese leaders, and they tell me this is the case. That is a very important aspect of what we are trying to do here. We are trying to get Japan, for the first time, to agree to a trade policy that works. I think we have a new leadership there that wants to agree, and we ought to help them.
None of our negotiating partners would sign a trade agreement that included the kinds of rules mandated by the Portman-Stabenow amendment. We have already heard from countries such as Japan that they would walk away from the agreement if the United States were making these types of demands.
Furthermore, the United States would never agree to these types of demands, either. What country would willingly sign a trade agreement that would subject their monetary policies to potential trade sanctions? No country that I am aware of.
I heard some of my colleagues respond to these claims the same way they responded to the President's veto threat. They don't believe Japan when they say they will walk away from the TPP or they say that any country refusing to accede to these types of standards must be planning to manipulate their currency.
Now, I am all for healthy skepticism around here, but maybe--just maybe--if our government, as well as all of our negotiating partners, all say that Portman-Stabenow is bad policy that they cannot sign onto, there has to be something to those claims.
Guess what. There is something to them, which brings me to the second negative consequence that we would see under the Portman-Stabenow amendment. It would put the Federal Reserve's independence at risk and subject our own monetary policies to trade disputes and possible sanctions.
Once again, we have colleagues in the Senate who have simply decreed here on the floor that U.S. monetary policy is aimed at purely domestic objectives and that it is only other countries that manipulate their currencies to gain trade advantage. But anyone who paid attention to these issues knows that not all of our trading partners share that assessment. Other countries have already accused the United States of currency manipulation, and the Portman-Stabenow amendment would set forth a clear and accessible process for turning those accusations into trade disputes subject to possible sanctions.
We may not agree with those allegations against U.S. monetary policy. I certainly don't. But the problem is that the Portman-Stabenow amendment would take those determinations out of our hands and give them over to international trade tribunals.
So whether we agree or not, we are going to find ourselves in a mess no matter what happens, should that amendment be accepted.
At this point, the proponents of this amendment will likely point out that they have included language to exempt ``the exercise of domestic monetary policy'' from the enforceable rules mandated by the amendment. With all due respect to the authors of the amendment, that is a red herring.
Keep in mind that the U.S. dollar is a global currency, the primary reserve currency in the world today. That being the case, our Nation's monetary policies necessarily have a global impact, making it very difficult to determine what constitutes purely domestic monetary policy and what is meant to be international. Once again, after this amendment, that extremely difficult determination will not be made here in the United States but by international trade tribunals. I don't know about my colleagues, but I have to say that causes me great alarm.
We also need to keep in mind that under currently available economic models and methodologies, it is virtually impossible to definitively measure currency manipulation. There is no clear and obvious threshold at which anyone can, with certainty, declare that a country's currency has been manipulated.
Most like to point to the standards set by the International Monetary Fund. However, even their formulations have been unable to determine currency manipulation with any level of specificity.
For example, IMF models recently showed that in 2013, Japan's currency was anywhere between around 15 percent undervalued and 15 percent overvalued. In other words, existing standards for determining what is and what is not currency manipulation are flimsy and ill-defined. It would be very dangerous to subject U.S. monetary policies to enforceable rules based on these standards. Yet that is precisely what the Portman-Stabenow amendment would do.
Third, under the Portman-Stabenow amendment, the traditional role of the U.S. Treasury in setting U.S. exchange rate policies would be watered down and potentially overruled in international trade tribunals. Thus, adoption of the Portman-Stabenow negotiating objective cedes independence and full authority over not only monetary policy for the Federal Reserve but also the exchange rate policy for the Treasury.
Fourth, the Portman-Stabenow amendment would deal a serious setback to ongoing efforts to fight currency manipulation by encouraging our trading partners to evade regular reporting and transparency of exchange rate policies. If currency standards become enforceable and immediately subject to sanctions under a trade agreement, parties to that agreement would almost certainly start withholding full participation in reporting and monitoring mechanisms that are designed to uncover and combat currency manipulation.
Put simply, we cannot enforce rules against unfair exchange rate practices if we do not have information about them. The Portman-Stabenow amendment would make it far more difficult to obtain that type of information. Their approach would push currency manipulation practices into the shadows as countries would fear being hit with trade sanctions if a trade tribunal--once again using ill-defined standards--deems their policies to be manipulative.
As we can see, concerns about the Portman-Stabenow amendment extend well beyond the veto threats. Indeed, even if no veto threats had been issued--and make no mistake, they have definitely been issued--there are enough problems inherent in the approach taken by this amendment to warrant opposition on its own. Can we take those chances? I don't think so.
Colleagues don't have to take my word for it. Every living former U.S. Treasury Secretary, both Republicans and Democrats--every one--has expressed opposition to the approach taken by the Portman-Stabenow amendment. During the Finance Committee's consideration of the TPA bill, Congress received a letter signed by Tim Geithner, Hank Paulson, John Snow, Paul O'Neill, Larry Summers, Robert Rubin, Nicholas Brady, James Baker, Michael Blumenthal, and George Shultz stating, among other things, that ``it is impossible to get agreement on provisions that subject currency manipulation to trade sanctions in a manner that both the United States and other countries would find acceptable.''
It is ``impossible.'' That is their word, not mine.
We also received a letter from 14 former chairs of the Council of Economic Advisers, again both Republicans and Democrats, expressing similar views. The letter was signed by Alan Greenspan, Ben Bernanke, Charles Schultze, Martin Feldstein, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Martin Baily, Glenn Hubbard, Austan Goolsbee, Alan Krueger, Christina Romer, Edward Lazear, Harvey Rosen, and Greg Mankiw.
All of these leaders--these experts in economic policy--have cautioned against requiring enforceable currency standards in our trade agreements that are subject to sanctions. They all noted such an approach, which would be required under the Portman-Stabenow amendment, would hinder our own economic policies.
Our current Secretary of Agriculture said much the same thing in a letter this week. In his letter, Secretary Vilsack stated:
Enacting a TPA currency discipline that requires an enforceable negotiating objective would likely derail our efforts to complete the Trans Pacific Partnership and cause us to lose ground on holding countries accountable on currency.
He continued, arguing:
An enforceable currency provision in our trade agreements ..... could give our training partners the power to challenge legitimate U.S. monetary policies needed to ensure strong employment and a healthy, robust economy.
We have also heard from leaders in the business community. In fact, we received letters signed by almost every major business association in this country, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and countless others weighing in either against the Portman-Stabenow amendment, in favor of the Hatch-Wyden alternative or both.
We have heard the same from agricultural organizations, including the American Farm Bureau, the National Pork Producers Council, and many others.
In short, both the business and Ðagricultural communities over-Ðwhelmingly--overwhelmingly--oppose Portman-Stabenow. This isn't about politics, this is about sensible policy.
Now, I am not arguing that we shouldn't do anything about currency manipulation. Senator Wyden and I have submitted an alternative amendment that would take a much more sensible and effective approach to deal with these issues.
The Hatch-Wyden amendment would put a number of tools at our disposal to fight currency manipulation, including enhanced transparency, disclosure, reporting, monitoring, cooperative mechanisms, as well as enforceable rules--the only tool in the Portman-Stabenow amendment. The Portman-Stabenow amendment provides this single tool: enforceable rules, subject--and this is what a lot of people miss--subject to trade sanctions. This single tool is grossly unreliable and poses a serious threat to U.S. interests if we fail to monitor what is going on in international tribunals against the United States.
The Hatch-Wyden amendment would give us maximum transparency and effectiveness with the ability to specifically tailor our efforts at addressing currency manipulation.
The Portman-Stabenow amendment would tie our hands and give us no other option than to subject our trading partners and ourselves to potential sanctions based on unreliable, indefinite standards.
The Hatch-Wyden amendment would preserve the integrity of our current trade negotiations. It would pose no threats to the independence of the Federal Reserve and would not subject our own monetary or exchange rate policies to the whims of an international trade tribunal, and it would increase transparency and accountability of our trading partners' currency practices.
In pretty much every way, the Hatch-Wyden amendment provides a better approach to dealing with currency manipulation than the one offered by the Portman-Stabenow amendment.
So, once again, even if we think the President is blowing smoke when he said he would veto any TPA bill that includes Portman-Stabenow, that is no reason to vote in favor of the amendment--and I don't believe he is blowing smoke. Our alternative approach represents a better solution to a myriad of serious problems.
I urge my colleagues to oppose the Portman-Stabenow currency amendment and support the Hatch-Wyden alternative. I think my colleagues will be happy if they do that because I think I have made a very strong case this morning. There is more to be said, but this ought to cause everybody to think and to pause and to say, Should I really take the chance of voting for this? Is it really possible the President might veto it? Is it really possible it will interfere with our Federal Reserve policy? Is it really possible we could be subject to all kinds of international tribunals--over what? Something we could have avoided with the Hatch-Wyden amendment.
I could go on and on. All I can say is I hope our colleagues will vote for Hatch-Wyden. It is not a matter of wanting to win on something. It is a matter of needing to win on something for the betterment of our country and its foreign policy.
With that, I yield the floor.
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